Every official business relation, oral or in writing, which went beyond an exchange of ideas with ether military agencies or authorities was subject to the exclusive decision of the supreme commander himself. The OKW was merely the executive staff of the supreme commander.
4) Therefore, when documents issued by the Supreme Commanderor by the OKW show signatures or initials of the defendant Keitel, or those of a division chief or a section chief, in the OKW,'one cannot derive therefrom the conclusion that an own, independent authority issuing orders existed. In each instance it was a case of taking notice of, forwarding or transmitting the orders of the Supreme Commander himself. Because of the heavy claims on Hitler's time in his positions as Chief of State, Reich Chancellor, Party Leader and Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, it was impossible to obtain always his personal signature, unless it concerned matters of particular importance or fundamental significance. It has to be noted that in all cases Hitler's personal decision or approval had to be obtained. that because of the signing of documents or because of existence of initials the defendant Keitel is co-responsible for the factual contents of the documents, this cannot be accepted. It would be going by theletter of the law to derive the responsibility of the defendant Keitel as chief of the military chancellory from his forwarding or signing of orders, instructions and such, a responsibility which, in my opinion, can be laid only upon that person who issues or brings about the order by virtue of his authority. only in case it would be proved that he wilfully and casually participated in deciding theseorders, instructions, etc.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, would that be a convenient time to break off?
(recess was taken)
M. DUBOST: Gentlemen,the Defense have presented a request to the French Prosecution concerning the communication of some documents. This request is divided into two parts. of the publication of a document in the course of my own exposition. I am able to communicate to the defense counsel the answer which the French Government has made to its request, as the French Government has found in the documents left by the German authorities the answer which was made to the protest filed at the time of the massacre of French prisoners. It is, by the way, a purely dilatory answer. The German authorities answered that the Armistice Commission was not competent; that the request must be made by the Scapini embassy. that, on that side, this incident is closed.
A part of the defense counsel's request concerns a statement made by my colleague, Mr. Edgar Faure, who at the beginning of his exposition announced to the Tribunal that he had examined approximately 2,500 documents, of which he had retained obly two hundred. I can, of course, not answer on behalf of Mr. Edgar Faure. I know only that the French delegation has only eight hundred documents, as a total of all its documents, and has submitted them all to the Tribunal and to the Defense. I therefore think that it is merely an oratorical figure and that my colleague wished to allude to letters of transmission which were of no importance.
In any case, I said earlier to the defense counsel, Dr. Nelte, that I had all the documents of our delegation open to him and that he would be able to see that we had no more documents that those which we had published. On the other hand, the request which we forwarded to Paris in order that complimentary documents which might have been forgotten should be sent, all those requests to Paris have remained without result. We therefore conclude that we have here all the documents which we could make us of in this trial.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am grateful to the French delegation for the elucidations given now and with reference to which I had made complaints this morning. If I had had that explanation a few days earlier than what happened this morning would not have occurred. I regret it very much indeed.
decisive for the defendant Keitel I would like furthermore to point out the following: of military operations, are operational orders issued to the Commanders-inChief of the three Wehrmacht branches by the Supreme Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were composed, Hitler discussed with the competent OKW officers, also with the defendant Keitel, the military technical aspect of the order. The instructions, without considering the opinions manifested by the individual officers, were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander's wishes. the three Wehrmacht branches to whom they were forwarded through the OKW. Thereupon, the three Wehrmachtbranches for their part ordered, on the basis of the general instructions, the details for the carrying out of what the instructions stipulated. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the statement of the Charter according to which the carrying out of orders is not accepted as a legal ground for exclusion because the transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the Wehrmacht branches but the forwarding of the expression of the wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmach. The order directed to the OKW, if one wants to express it that way, referred in all cases to the elaboration upon some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely external act of transmitting the ready-made decision without having the authority of expressing an opinion on this decision. defendant's rank,of Field Marshal, did not recognize correctly this position of the defendant Keitel. This rank was in no proportion to the real authority of the defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a general Field Marshal is always a military chief. However, as we have seen, the defendant Keitel had no authority to issue orders, whatsoever. Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the defendant Keitel, as Chef du Bureau. This definition is materially correct. A Chef du Bureau has to take care that the bureau which he directs operates properly; that the affairs are correct ly and promptly settled by the competent officials.
But he does not participate in the final decisions considered by his superior, here the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, as being correct. While this principle holds already true in general, it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any advice concerning military decisions. This has been proven through the hearing of evidence, particularly through the testimony of General Jodl. activities of the OKW as "Coordination in the state and in the Wehrmacht." The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and thankless work of the defendant Keitel. Wehrmacht branches. It consisted, furthermore, of the settlement of arising divergencies and of a struggle against Hitler's negative attitude towards any ordely settlement, i.e. through the competent channels. the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true especially for the replacement of personnel but also for the supply of everything that is required for special warfare. of opinion was the OKW. the defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred as a necessary result of the overlapping of factual interests and personal differences of opinion which Keitel tried to settle by means of coordination or mediation, i.e. in nearly all cases by means of mutual compromising. No particular personal experience is needed in order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the ingratitude of both parites. offices which were provided with special official authorities or which had Hitler's favor and special confidence for personal, mostly party-political reasons.
reciate the heavy burden of work involved in Keitel's position. of the Armed Forces and the political sector is the more difficult as the functions of the High Command of the Armed Forces, of the Reich Minister of War and of the Chief of State were embodied in the person of Hitler, since February 4th, 1938. the political leadership and the leadership of the Armed Forces due to the identity of the person. chief of Hitler's military staff was so closely connected with its superior, Hitler, that he must be responsible for the political complexity, if not as the perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter. This assumption is erroneous. Fuehrerstate.
not absolutely good or bad, but that everything depends on the 8 July A LJG 18-1 ways and on the methods of realization and the means of carrying out the principle.
Keitel has a military backgraound and favors the Fuehrer principle for the field he knows. According to this principle the responsibility lies positively with the one who has the authority to command. While the Fuehrer principle in fact hardly underwent any change in the civilian province, where it was also applied but where it amounted to no more than superficialities, this principle necessarily made itself felt much more strongly and obviously in the military sphere, particularly in the relationship between the Commander-in-chiefs and their Chiefs of the General Staff. ally responsible Commanders, now they became the operational assistants to the Commanders. In the formulation of orders they were collaborators, advisers in the field of strategic operations, for which those officers had bee especially trained. of the General Staff; he was the Chief of the military Office (Militaerkanzlei) under Hitler, soldier and administrator of war ministerial duties; therefore, minister, claims the Prosecution. out to be formalistic when the real functions give another picture. This is particularly important in the case of Keitel. It should be determined what he actually was and how he acted in reality. leads to an erroneous understanding of Keitel's functions. To begin with, Hitler dissolved the Reich ministry of War because he no longer wished to have a Minister of War; in spite of the fact that on the 4th of February 1938 a considerable number of functions, handled up to then by the Reich Ministry of War, had been assigned to the individual Wehrmacht branches, the OKW retained a number of functions and their administration. pertaining to the war leadership, Keitel was not at liberty to attend to these on the basis of his complete authority according 8 July A LJG 18-2 to his own judgment, hut he had to present the demands of the Wehrmacht and coordinate the Wehrmacht's affairs with the duties of the other ministries.
duties in the person of Hitler was in practice unfeasible. Thus, an extensive amount of preparatory and executive work rested with Hitler's military staff, whose Chief of Staff was Keitel. Hence, also, the responsibility. But not with reference to important questions, especially those of a fundamental nature. It was, of course, a matter of judgment to what extent the defendant Keitel considered matters essential and fundamental and submitted them. But the evidence showed that when in doubt, Keitel was inclined to present matters rather than to make his own decision, after he lad examined them conscientiously. that Keitel had no way of knowing whether Hitler got the news that seemed important to him through his adjutants, through Himmler and Bormann, or in some other way. To avoid afterwards the unavoidable discussions with Hitler who, being distrustful of everyone, always took it for granted that people would intentionally conceal things from him, Keitel was anxious not to leave himself open to reproaches for having omitted something. A characteristic example is the case of the mass escape of 80 RAF officers from camp Sagan. in his capacity as custodian of the functions of the ministry of war which still remained in the OKW, held no position as a minister. Here, too, he was the chief du bureau, the head of the military office, a position which is also held by the chief of a ministerial office, or even a state secretary. I wish to refer in this connection to Dr. Lammer's statement, already referred to by me, and to the affidavits of Grand Admirals Raeder and Doenitz which I Have already mentioned here repeatedly.
The text of the Fuehrer decree of February 4, 1938 shows 8 July A LJG 18-3 that Hitler wished to make this clear.
(1915-PS) If Hitler had not had the desire to exclude every third person from a responsible and perhaps to him uncomfortable function at the highest military sector, he night have given Keitel at least the authority to take part in Cabinet meetings. In the Fuehrer decree (2098 PS) , in which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy as well as Keitel had been given the rank of a ReichsMinister, it was explicitly stated that both Commanders-in-Chief shall be entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. The fact that this was decreed simultaneously is a convincing argumentum e contrario. It proves that Hitler did not wish that him Chief of Staff of the OKW should perhaps have had opportunity to present his own opinions and possible doubts before the Cabinet. Minister had the purpose of enabling him to carry on direct negotiation with the departmental ministers. Had Keitel not have had the rank of a Reich minister, he would have been limited to conferences with state secretaries and such, thus very handicapped in carrying out the Fuehrer's orders and tasks. Keitel as Reich minister, even as Reich minister without portfolio. He was no minister, and was no member of the Reich government. State Secretary Stuckart in a document submitted to the Prosecution has listed all members of the Reichsregierung. Keitel is not among them; he is mentioned in this document only as the holder of one of the highest offices. to membership in the Reichscabinet, but considered other branches as part of the Reichsregierung, too. It would soon, therefore, as if the Prosecution looked upon the legal structure based on German law as irrelevant. Pursuant to Appendix B to the general Bill of Indictment, the Reichsregierung is, according to the Indictment composed of Members of the regular Cabinet after the 30 January 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor of the German 8 July A LJG 18-4 Republic.
The expression "regular Cabinet" used here means: Reich Minister, i.e., Head of Departments of the Central Government; Reich Minister without portfolio, Minister of State with the function of Reich Ministers and ether officials entitled to participate in the Cabinet meetings.
I assume that my colleague, Dr. Kubuschok, will come to this during his case before the organization.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that you are taking a very long time over this question of whether Keitel was
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, that the Prosecution took a great deal of time to make clear what position Field Marshal Keitel occupied in their opinion. He has been described, not only as Field Marshall here and as the Chief of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they have -- 1 must confess that I have forgotten. It seems to me and the Tribunal generally that you are taking up far too long on this topic and you have got many other topics which are of very great importance to the defendant, and you have already been speaking for several hours, and you occupied a large number of pages in order to try and define what Keitel's position was. I thought you might be able to cut it down.
DR. NELTE: I shall try. I; that is to say, that he was not a minister. I now pass on to the following paragraph. the Fuehrer Decree of 4 February 1938, there never was a Secret Cabinet Council; that such council was never set up; that it never hold a session; and that no persons involved ever received a commission. Thus, it is proved that the defendant was never a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. Council for the Defense of the Reich. Witness Dr. Lammers has confirmed that becoming a member of the Ministerial Council for 8 July A LJG 18-5 the Defense of the Reich did not change Keitel's official position and especially did not wake him a minister.
In his affidavit of 25 November 1945, co-defendant Dr. Frick says that Keitel worked in the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich as liaison man.
In order to clarify the defendant Keitel's responsibility and competence, it is necessary to analyze the concept of OKW. I ask, Mr. President, that this statement not be considered a theoretical and, therefore, superfluous discussion. mental assertion-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Nelte, may I ask what you have been doing if you haven't been analyzing the concept of the OKW?
DR. NELTE: Up until now I have explained Keitel's position as the Chief of the OKW. In statements on page 74 and the following pages I was going to explain to you that the prosecution, and others as well, have talked about the OKW: and "OKW" is a word which has three different types of significance.
Mr. President, if you will be good enough to permit me to submit this in its written form, and if you would consider it as having been presented in Court, then I am willing to leave out the pages up to 77 and submit them to you. explanation regarding the interpretation of the word "OKW", and, in particular, it is important to show that this is not identical with Keitel. and what share he had in the happenings as a whole after investigating his legal competencies, I now wish to examine what actual influence he had upon the development and carrying out of the measurers the effects of which constitute the subject of this trial. From everyday experience we know that it does not matter so much what a person should be in a particular position, but what he has made of that position by virtue of his personality. ality of no other defendant has been judged in such varying and contradictory ways as that of the defendant Keitel.
Keitel's material responsibility is proportionate to his actual position in the tug-of-war with and around Hitler, his effective indluence upon that group and with it on those circumstances as a whole which could prove the cause of the effects of Hitler's Headquarters in the military field. charges made by the prosecution against Keitel on the strength of the cross-examination of Dr. Gisevius, in other words, after presentation of evidence has been completed.
In view of the comprehensive scope of Justice Jackson's questions and the answers given thereto by Dr. Gisevius, the testimony of Dr. Gisevius has become of tremendous importance in the case of the defendant Keitel.
Had Dr. Gisevius' statements about Keitel been true--i.e. statements made by him in most instances in terms of conclusive findings, derived from information--the defendant Keitel would not have told the truth during the presentation of evidence. The importance of that fact becomes evident when it is considered that a negative opinion on truthfulness would of necessity destroy Keitel's defense, which in its essence draws on the subjective aspect of facts as a whole. In view of this fact and the importance of the testimony of Dr. Gisevius also for other defendants, it becomes my duty not to leave anything undone to explain the contrast between Keitel's answers and the testimony of the witness Gisevius. because the rendering of their purported utterances cannot be directly refuted. Testifying on the strength of information belongs to another group of statements which almost defy refutation. he bases his testimony primarily on information obtained from witnesses who are dead. It seems to me that Justice Jackson uses Dr. Gisevius as star witness in his global attack on the defendant Keitel After completion of presentation of evidence against Keitel he did not bring forward One individual circumstance but an indictment on all counts.
one hand and as far as possible, with proving the objective incorrectness of facts based upon information obtained from certain individuals, and, further, with establishing proof of the unreliability of the information. I call to mind the words which the defendant Keitel said under oath upon completion of his direct examination by me while in the witness box:
"One may hold it against me that I was wrong and made mistakes, that my attitude toward the Fuehrer Adolf Hitler was wrong and weak, but it should not be said of me that I was a coward, that I was untruthful, and that I was disloyal". dant Keitel, during interrogation by the Prosecution, as follows:
1) Keitel built an inpenetrable ring round Hitler so that the latter could be told nothing.
2) Keitel failed to pass on to Hitler reports he had received from Canaris whenever such reports covered atrocities, crimes and the like, or he gave orders to modify them.
3) Keitel had a tremendous influence on the OKW and the army.
4) Keitel threatened his subordinates, when they made political statements that he would not protect them; he even said that he would turn them over to the Gestapo. Dr. GESEVIUS says in one part of his statement that KEITEL had no influence over HITLER. He exonerates HITLER by explaining that KEITEL had formed a ring round HITLER, in order that the latter should be told nothing. called KEITEL a powerful staff officer who had exerted great influence over HITLER; the French prosecution described KEITEL as a willing tool of HITLER; the German generals called him a "yesman" who could not carry anything through; and now KEITEL grows, according to the statement of Dr. GISEVIUS, into a real handyman and buffer of HITLER, who hid from the latter anything bad, who submitted to him only what he, KEITEL, saw fit, and permitted no one to approach HITLER.
only be maintained by somebody who did not know the conditions prevailing around HITLER. Before the war KEITEL worked in Berlin in the Bendler Strasse, while HITLER was in the Wilhelmstrasse. KEITEL came perhaps once a week to report, or on special order. At that time, on account of space conditions, it was in fact impossible for KEITEL to exert any influence over access to the Fuehrer.
was at the Berghof near Berchtesgaden for weeks at a tire whilst KEITEL remained in Berlin.
c) At the beginning of operations, KEITEL was with JODL and the Supreme General Staff at the Fuehrer's headquarters. Here also they were separated. KEITEL did not sit in HITLER'S anteroom, but rather in other buildings or barracks. He came at the proper time with General JODL to the conference on the situation, in which, besides HITLER, some 15 or 20 officers of all three branches of the Wehrmacht took part. Apart from the conferences on the situation there was a physical contact. When HITLER wanted KEITEL for anything he sent for him. HITLER and his adjutants, the chief of the Party Chancellery, the chief of the Presidential chancellery, and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery. not possibly prevent anybody going to HITLER.
HITLER'S sources of information were the responsible heads of each department; it was occasionally not clear whence HITLER detained, his information.
GISEVIUS did not knew these conditions from his own experience; he himself was never near KEITEL, who never saw or spoke to him, and whose name he did not know. If he gave his opinion here, he could only base it on information given him by CANARIS, THOMAS, and OSTER.
General JODL has been heard regarding this question. He certainly is the best witness in this matter, since he, as well as KEITEL, lived in the immediate vicinity of HITLER and therefore could form his own judgment. He stated, concerning this matter:
"Unfortunately, it was impossible to keep things from HITLER. Many channels of information led to HITLER direct."
that what KEITEL had testified was quite correct, and that which witness GISEVIUS stated was, in general, merely a figure of speech. that the allegations of the witness GISEVIUS that KEITEL was able to keep the high commanders of the branches of the Wehrmacht away from HITLER is false.
If, however, this wasnot the case, it follows that the way from the branches of the Wehrmacht to the Fuehrer was open at any tine.
from JODL, the Chief of the Supreme General Staff, and also in particular, CANARIS, had immediate access to HITLER. a ring round HITLER is proved false. KEITEL by CANARIS about atrocities in connection with deportations, extermination of Jews, concentration camps, the persecution of the church, and the killing of insane persons, which KEITEL withheld from HITLER. Defense Economy Office, the purpose of which was to inform HITLER about the war potential of the enemy and bring him to reason. Concerning admiral CANARIS'S reports, it must be said that as chief of espionage and counterintelligence he naturally delivered regular reports which concerned the conduct of the war, including the conduct of economic warfare. neither to the jurisdiction of theCounter-Intelligence Office nor of the Army High Command (OKW). It has been proved that HITLER took strict care that every worker confined himself to his own special field, and it was particularly forbidden to military offices to concern themselves with political affairs. and especially a bout the extermination of the Jaws, and the concentration camps. This is in absolute contradiction to the assertion of the witness GISEVIUS that CANARIS submitted reports to the defendant KEITEL on the above-mentioned subjects. One can affirm that reports of any kind whatsoever were delivered to Keitel without having to fear being contradicted, especially when one does not have to fear that those reports will be found.
For if they are not delivered, neither can they be found, because they do not exist. Now Gisevius has declared that he gathered documents from the beginning which contained incriminating material. Is it not remarkable, under these circumstances, that up to now, none of those reports have been produced. If they were on hand at the Army High Command (OKW) they were to that extent an object of the accusation and the evidence. Can it be sufficient under these circumstances if a witness declares he knows from third parties that such reports were submitted to Keitel? to foreign countries on personal, secret errands for Hitler, had access to Hitler at all times. He would thus have had an opportunity to go to Hitler immediately if he had had serious misgivings of conscience, as Gisevius has declared he did. Why did he not do so? has luckily for Keitel, at one point of his deposition made a positive declaration that permits of objective verification:
"...........I believe that I have still two examples to mention, which to me are particularly characteristic: first, the attempt was made by all possible means to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against the invasion of Holland and Belgium, that is, to inform Hitler that the information submitted by Keitel about alleged violations of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was false. The Counter Intelligence Office (Abwehr) was to prepare reports incriminating the Dutch and Belgians. Admiral Canaris at that time refused to sign these reports. I request that this be verified. He told Keitel repeatedly that this report which was ostensibly made by the Army High Command (OKW) was false. This is an instance where Mr. Keitel did not transmit to Hitler what he was supposed to have transmitted.........." Document PS 790 which refers to the case of the White Book about violations of neutrality by Holland and Belgium. Jodl testified, word for word:
"..........I understand the question and would like very briefly to state the fact, as it really was, so long as disgust does not choke me.
I was present when Canaris case to the Field Marshal in the Reich Chancellery with these report notes and laid before him the project of the Foreign Office's White Book. Field marshal Keitel then locked through this book, above all listening to the chief remarks which Canaris made at the request of the Foreign Office, namely, that the reports were perhaps stillsusceptible of some improvement, that he should confirm the fact that a military operation against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that asit is expressed, here, a final really striking violation of neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said a word, Field Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table and said; I refuse to do this, how does it happen that I should take any responsibility for a political decision. In this White Book appear word for word, true and correct, the very same reports that you, yourself, Canaris, brought to me." To this Canaris said: "I am entirely of the same idea. It is, in my opinion too, entirely superfluous to have this document signed on the part of the Wehrmacht and the reports that we have here, are in their totality completely sufficient to prove the violations of neutrality which have taken place in Holland and Belgium." And he advised Field Marshal Keitel not to sign it at all. That is the way it happened. The Field Marshal then took the book with him and I do not know what happened subsequently.........." Keitel did not sign the White Book. Therefore in the only verifiable case a clear proof is obtained of the inexactitude of Gisevius' testimony. dous influence on the Army High Command (OKW) and the Army. These words, without are presentation of concrete facts are only a phrase in the mouth of a man who had no contact whatsoever with Keitel. They are refuted by the statements of Goering, Doenitz and Raeder. Jodl has qualified this statement as merely a figure of speech. Insofar the witness speaks of his tremendous influence on the OKW, it must appear questionable what the witness really means. that the influence which resulted from his position which I have already discussed How he stood with his subordinates will be taken up later.
culpable influence on what happened. This influence, however, could only take effect on Hitler or the Branches of the German Armed Forces. That Keitel had no decisive influence on Hitler has even been confirmed by Gisevius and his being without decisive influence a the Branches of the Armed Forces, has been established by the results of the testimony.
Against the defendant Keitel was "that instead of placing himself in front of his subordinate officers to protect them, he threatened to hand then ever to the Gestapo". in the Army High Command was dismissed in the years up to 1944; furthermore, until 20 July1944, the day of the attempt on Hitler's life and the transfer of the judicial power in the home-army to Himmler, no officer of the Army High Command was turned ever to the Police. Grand Admiral Doenitz has confirmed that the Brandies of the Armed Forces and the Army High Command were very scrupulous in maintaining the privileges of the Armed Forces as opposed to the police. the defendant Keitel. I think this remark has a special importance, not only because Keitel lived, a companionable and friendly terns with his official subordinate, General Jodl, during their long years of cooperation. As natural as that may appear, the less natural it is, if one reflects that Jodl in spite of his officially subordinate position, in reality became more and more Hitler's only strategic advisor. What this means, considering the preponderance of the operational tasks in the war, has been convincingly demonstrated here by General Jodl. of his subaltern Jodl in this domain, this proves in Keitel a trait of character which refutes the information derived from obscure sources by the witness Gisevius. his subordinate Chief of Office, Canaris, also is incompatible with the contrary assertion of witness Gisevius. Keitel but testified to by Jodl without Keitel's consent, that the latter supported and helped Canaris' family after his arrest.
I only refer to this to refute the perhaps most serious personal reproach, according to which Keitel did net behave decently towards his subordinates and abused his superior position - which was especially powerful in military life - even to the point of threatening violence.
According to Gisevius' evidence, Admiral Canaris not only played a double role in the service, but also with respect to the defendant Keitel, while exploiting the friendship shown to him, he expressed a similar attitude, whereas in the midst of his own group he openly spoke in a spiteful way about Keitel. the witnesses v. Buttlar and Brandenfels (session of 8 May 1946, page 11119 of the German transcript), from which it is clear that Keitel always treated the officers of the German Armed Forces Operational Staff kindly. Ziervogel on the one hand and Himmler on the ether, in which Keitel, to whom the incident was reported, immediately and energetically intervened in writing to protect his subordinates against Himmler. The affidavit of the Chief of Office in Canaris' office, Admiral Buerkner, to which I refer also testifies in the same way to Keitel's kindly a ttitude towards his subordinates. occasion to speak energetically to his office and department chiefs. generally concern themselves with politics, and that when the situation deteriorated, they made political information the subject of their argumentation. And in explanation I state that Keitel has, in fact, defined his attitude with words which were based on his assumption that the soldier in war would have to testify to his faith and obedience, and that if Keitel ever heard anything, he would reprimand these officers.
Keitel did this with "words". That docs not mean that this was mere camouflage which did not correspond to his inner attitude; but it does mean, that the form, perhaps often rough and harsh, in which the defendant Keitel spoke to his officers did not - even in a single case - lead to an officer being punished or discipline.