There can be no dispute over the statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to a point which must be considered of decisive importance for solving the question of when the rearmament, i.e. the status of the entire industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for defense. account especially for the defendant Keitel, as a soldier, that until he took over the office of Chief of OKW on 4 February 1953, he had not hold a decisive position.
Now, that part did the defendant Keitel play at that date?
a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel,
b) in the field of administrative and - as charged by the prosecution - military-political rearmament which was dealt with under the heading of "Reichsverteidigungsrat" (Reich Defense Council). historical development of the organization data and I beg the Tribunal to take official notice of those matters, and I shall continue on page 47. ploitation and organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary war materials. requires expenditure of money and even more of time. (Establishment of industrial equipment stocks).
When Germany procalimed its equal rights as regards its need for national defense - that is, the supreme importance of its defense - it did not have the means to help its material rearmament as they had been taken away on recognition and execution of the disarmament plan.
It has been confirmed here during tye trial on different hads, that first 10, then 7-8 years were reckoned on, and foreseen in order to give material equipment in the hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially munitions, to the peace time Wehrmacht which had been disclosed to the world with the proclamation of freedom in national defense in 1935. This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the USA with its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war, required 4 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in this war. It results from this that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the limits of defensive armament, is only to be achieved gradually, in the case of nations, whic - like Germany in 1934, had no armaments.
1st stage: Creation of the prerequisites with regard to industries and raw materials (capacities) for the production of war supplies.
accordance with the efficiency inmanpower of a nation. Those and no military aircraft at its disposal, it can well be believed that any soldier of judgment had to assume that under the given circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of aggression. capacity of chief of staff of theWehrmacht bureau, must be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel is of course responsible for General Thomas, chief of the defense economy staff. The technical details and the extent of his activity can be seen from document PS 2353, which is correct in essence despite the fact that Thomas, in declaration prefixed to this historical document, now wants it to look as if he had altered his original notes and given them a more favourable turn to please Hitler, this in case of the arrest he apprehended. This does not correspond to the facts. What Thomas wrote, proves according to defendant Keitel's opinion, that a "war armament" with Mobilization of the industrial capacity and its conversion toward war economy began only at the beginning of October 1939. It further proves, that the statements of the defendants which were examined here, as far as they were connected with this rearmament, and especially Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in complete agreement on the following point: that it cannot be admitted that in this period wars of aggression were desired, and according to the momentary state of armament they must have appeared impossible. period. The evidence has demonstrated that until spring 1938 only 27 peace time divisions were poorly equipped and that 10 to 12 reserve divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other supplies nor armaments at its disposal.
If, despite this fact, and without general mobilization, it succeeded by the fall of 1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression against Czechoslovakia, when at that time it had the poorest protection on its western front, one can see what was the maximum war potential in those days. Under such circumstances and in knowledge of the armament situation and war potentials of neighboring country which were mutually united by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old school could ever think of occasioning a war. The fact, that already one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially improved, must primarily be traced back to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl has declared on the witness stand, that when in 1935 he came to the Wehrmacht bureau, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except what was foreseen in the case of internal unrest. The occupation of the de-militarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by Hitler.
The "Initial Assembly and Combat Directives of June 1937" is a general instruction for eventual and possible military conflicts. EC 194. This is an order issued by the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the observation of submarines movements during the occupation of the Rhine, Keitel signed and forwarded this order. established by the Treaty ofVersailles. It is indisputable that in view of the size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an attack from the outside world, such as may be considered for any country and nation an elementary right. This state of insufficiency, which had been provided by the military clauses, of the Treaty of Versailles, was discussed before 1933, already with a view to improving it without using the actual soldiers for it.
An examination was made and it was found that in cases of mobilization a series of tasks could betaken over by the civil ministries. Hereby, it was a question of tasks of a purely defensive nature, which cannot in any way be considered aggressive. They were tasks of national defense, and principally, the following. like the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As is quite clear, these are matters for defense only. the committee of advisers. (Referentenausschuss) It consisted of advisers coming from the different civil ministries, who after being recognized by the ministry of the interior (Severing up to the end of 1935) met for conferences at the Reich ministry. The Reichswehr minister charged the then colonel Keitel to direct these meetings. At the latter the advisers received and discussed the desires of the Reich ministry as regards the aforementioned tasks, which the individual ministers could take over in case of a mobilization.
During Minister Severing's time this cooperation worked without friction in order to satisfy as for as possible the wishes of the Reichswehr minister, and it went on in the same way after 30 January, 1933. The scope of the tasks and the composition remained the same. When on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established through a resolution of Hitler's new Reich government, the committee was maintained; it changed only its designation: the committee of advisers became the Reich Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and was not charged with any new competency. It only grew in size as it went on developing, especially after the introduction of general military service. Now as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body, which had to give advice in questions of national defense concerning the civilian sector, which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by the civil ministries. For this count of the indictment it must be made quite clear that, after 4 April 1933, Keitel's position did not change either, and especially that he did not become a member of the Reich Defense Council.
statements of the prosecution, may be considered as factually non-existent according to the result of the evidence produced - later on I will come back to the time after 1938. In any case, the prosecution could not prove that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this period. The protocols submitted dealt without exception with the session of the Reich Defense Committee and themembers of this committee reported to their competent ministries, which inturn, had the opportunity to give, in the framework of the cabinet, the necessary concrete form to the suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee. For this reason there were never any sessions of the formal legally existing Reich Defense Council, so that witnesses could rightly say that the Reich Defense Counsil existed only on paper. ministry, and later, from October 1935, as brigadier general (Chief in the Wehrmacht bureau of the Reich war minister), Keitel was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. the war ministry, and thus had no function connected with this count of the indictment. During this time also he did not participate in sessions of the Reich Defense Council, the protocols of which have been presented by the prosecution as having a specially probative value. committee of advisors, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being transferred to duty with the troops. The first session after his transfer to the Reich War Ministry was heldon 6 December 1935; it is put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. And, therefore, in the examination of Keitel's responsibility, although one has to exclude the above protocols as well as the work done in general by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years of sessions 3 to 10, I will nevertheless make them the subject of my statements, as it is from these protocols that one can see what the Reich Defense Committee was doing. of an institution , which exists in this or some other form in every country, and which serves the purpose of national defense doomed legitimate by every country has now been presented as an important argument in the evidence given of plans and preparations in view of aggression.
1934, and 1935, reveal the character of the work as that of preparations for the event of war. But it is likewise evidence, that it is a question of preparations which were intended to bring about a more perfect degree of readiness in national defense in case of mobilization.
If the "Political situation" is mentioned twice, these allusions point to the fear in neighbouring states of military sanctions. Reference is made to the case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy. impotency, which made it impossible to secure the open frontiers of the Reich. fear deriving from the situation at the time that the publishing of measures, though of a defensive nature, would produce preventive measures on the part of the victorious powers. attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany.
This question is important for Keitel's attitude, for he affirmed that the conclusion drawn from the prescribed secrecy was erroneous and that the secrecy was a proof of a bad conscience, and the bad conscience a proof of knowledge of illegality. advisory body in matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was concerned by a mobilization. At no time did it ever Indulge in discussions concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material or concerning plans of aggression. that the Committee of Reich Defense was contemplating plans for aggression.
I do not wish to read the next new sentences. Here we deal with the liberation of the Rhine River, a question which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River.
This came up in Goering's testimony.
I shall continue on page 5, paragraph 3:
The true nature of the Committee's activities is set out quite simply and clearly in the "Bookof Mobilization for the Civilian Administration." It refers to the result of discussions between all the members of the Reich defense Committee and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Wehrmacht as well as to that of armaments. of your decision. You may see from them whether the prosecution is right in its supposition of a total planning of aggressive war, or whether the defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing: "What has been discussed and planned here is what every country is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty, namely the safeguarding of the security of their country." as for the German Wehrmacht: For Keitel which could not yet form an opinion of the newly-created office of the "Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht" with the high sounding name; for the Wehrmacht which lost on that day its relative independence. Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Wehrmacht - the nation in arms - by removing both the Commander in Chief Of the Wehrmacht and the constitutionally responsible Reich Minister of War. This truly portentuous decision became fatal for Keitel and the German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not realized by the participants. That they may be blamed for not realizing it, it is easy to say now in retrospect. At the time, everybody who was not an inveterate sceptic or pessimist had to base his judgement on the development of things in general and on the strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other could be clearly seen on 4 February 1938. days and who met him for the first time as man to man in the preliminary discussions, the decision was none of his own. Hitler assigned him to the newly created office of Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and Keitel accepted it.
Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions connected with such a seemingly brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground for the Chief of the Wehrmacht office in the Reich Ministry of war to decline the offer, since von Blomberg himself had proposed him. The way Hitler considered this office could not be discerned by Keitel. from the statements made by Dr. Lammers and from the affidavit deposed by Blomberg, on page 59, I shall quote the penultimate p aragraph:
"In the future, I shall, not have any Minister of War; neither will I have in the future a Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht to stand between me, thehighest commander, and the other high commanders of the Wehrmacht."
On page 60, from Blomberg's affidavit in answer to question 24, I quote the second half:
"He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a 'Chef du Bureau' who would direct and carry out current affairs under him and thus under Hitler's responsibility. I named Keitel, who, under me, had carried out this office very well."
In answer to question 27:
"I proposed Keitel as 'Chef du Bureau' believing that I had put him on the right job."
In answer to question 29, "Was it not Hitler's intention to create a tool for himself in the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his decisions and command?":
"This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler's original intention at that time was most certainly to have at his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ and in no way an adviser who claimed same responsibility." known to the Tribunal, so I do not have to read, it to you. It results therefrom, for the position of the defendant Keitel and the questions of his competence and responsibility as well as from the hearing of witnesses, that:
1) Hitler did not want either a responsible minister of war or any other person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire Wehrmacht.
He united in his on person both of these institutions by declaring that in regard to the commanding authority he would from now on exercise it directly and personally as well as the functions of the Reich Minister of War, which were to be administered by Keitel under his instructions.
2) Hitler also created a military staff as advisory council in military technical matters. He designated it as the High Command of the Wehrmacht. It was nothing more than the military chancellory of the Fuehrer and Highest Commander. Such chancellelleries were already existing as Reich Chancellery, Chancellory of the President, and Party Chancellery. The defendant Keitel was assigned to the post of Chief of the military chancellory with the title of Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, nemaed for short, Chief OKW.
3) Hence, it follws that the OKW was not intended to be an intermediary agency between the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht and the three Wehrmacht sections. The contrary assumption of the prosecution, which is connected with a graphic representation, is founded upon an erroneous judgment. An intermediary level between the supreme commander and the three high commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces as existed before 4 February 1938, with rights of its own, no longer existed now. The OKW, in which the defendant Keitel was the Chief of Staff, was no independent military agency or authority, but exclusively Hitler's military-technical staff and his war ministry office. The OKW had no independent authority whatsoever, neither the power to issue ordersnor the military authority. Therefore, the OKW could not issue its own orders. All instructions, decrees, normal directions or orders issued by the OKW were rather the expression of the desires of the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht. The commander-in-chief of the three Wehrmacht branches were always aware of the fact that no intermediary level existed between them and the supreme commander. They never considered or recognized the OKW as such. This is confirmed by the affidavits of the codefendants Grand Admiral Doenitz and Raeder as well as by the testimony of Reich Marshal Goering and Dr. Lammers. It is an entirely erroneous conception that the OKW or in this case the defendant Keitel as chief of the OKW, would have had the authority to issue instructions or orders on his own.
Every official business relation, oral or in writing, which went beyond an exchange of ideas with ether military agencies or authorities was subject to the exclusive decision of the supreme commander himself. The OKW was merely the executive staff of the supreme commander.
4) Therefore, when documents issued by the Supreme Commanderor by the OKW show signatures or initials of the defendant Keitel, or those of a division chief or a section chief, in the OKW,'one cannot derive therefrom the conclusion that an own, independent authority issuing orders existed. In each instance it was a case of taking notice of, forwarding or transmitting the orders of the Supreme Commander himself. Because of the heavy claims on Hitler's time in his positions as Chief of State, Reich Chancellor, Party Leader and Supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, it was impossible to obtain always his personal signature, unless it concerned matters of particular importance or fundamental significance. It has to be noted that in all cases Hitler's personal decision or approval had to be obtained. that because of the signing of documents or because of existence of initials the defendant Keitel is co-responsible for the factual contents of the documents, this cannot be accepted. It would be going by theletter of the law to derive the responsibility of the defendant Keitel as chief of the military chancellory from his forwarding or signing of orders, instructions and such, a responsibility which, in my opinion, can be laid only upon that person who issues or brings about the order by virtue of his authority. only in case it would be proved that he wilfully and casually participated in deciding theseorders, instructions, etc.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, would that be a convenient time to break off?
(recess was taken)
M. DUBOST: Gentlemen,the Defense have presented a request to the French Prosecution concerning the communication of some documents. This request is divided into two parts. of the publication of a document in the course of my own exposition. I am able to communicate to the defense counsel the answer which the French Government has made to its request, as the French Government has found in the documents left by the German authorities the answer which was made to the protest filed at the time of the massacre of French prisoners. It is, by the way, a purely dilatory answer. The German authorities answered that the Armistice Commission was not competent; that the request must be made by the Scapini embassy. that, on that side, this incident is closed.
A part of the defense counsel's request concerns a statement made by my colleague, Mr. Edgar Faure, who at the beginning of his exposition announced to the Tribunal that he had examined approximately 2,500 documents, of which he had retained obly two hundred. I can, of course, not answer on behalf of Mr. Edgar Faure. I know only that the French delegation has only eight hundred documents, as a total of all its documents, and has submitted them all to the Tribunal and to the Defense. I therefore think that it is merely an oratorical figure and that my colleague wished to allude to letters of transmission which were of no importance.
In any case, I said earlier to the defense counsel, Dr. Nelte, that I had all the documents of our delegation open to him and that he would be able to see that we had no more documents that those which we had published. On the other hand, the request which we forwarded to Paris in order that complimentary documents which might have been forgotten should be sent, all those requests to Paris have remained without result. We therefore conclude that we have here all the documents which we could make us of in this trial.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am grateful to the French delegation for the elucidations given now and with reference to which I had made complaints this morning. If I had had that explanation a few days earlier than what happened this morning would not have occurred. I regret it very much indeed.
decisive for the defendant Keitel I would like furthermore to point out the following: of military operations, are operational orders issued to the Commanders-inChief of the three Wehrmacht branches by the Supreme Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were composed, Hitler discussed with the competent OKW officers, also with the defendant Keitel, the military technical aspect of the order. The instructions, without considering the opinions manifested by the individual officers, were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander's wishes. the three Wehrmacht branches to whom they were forwarded through the OKW. Thereupon, the three Wehrmachtbranches for their part ordered, on the basis of the general instructions, the details for the carrying out of what the instructions stipulated. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the statement of the Charter according to which the carrying out of orders is not accepted as a legal ground for exclusion because the transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the Wehrmacht branches but the forwarding of the expression of the wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmach. The order directed to the OKW, if one wants to express it that way, referred in all cases to the elaboration upon some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely external act of transmitting the ready-made decision without having the authority of expressing an opinion on this decision. defendant's rank,of Field Marshal, did not recognize correctly this position of the defendant Keitel. This rank was in no proportion to the real authority of the defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a general Field Marshal is always a military chief. However, as we have seen, the defendant Keitel had no authority to issue orders, whatsoever. Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the defendant Keitel, as Chef du Bureau. This definition is materially correct. A Chef du Bureau has to take care that the bureau which he directs operates properly; that the affairs are correct ly and promptly settled by the competent officials.
But he does not participate in the final decisions considered by his superior, here the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, as being correct. While this principle holds already true in general, it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any advice concerning military decisions. This has been proven through the hearing of evidence, particularly through the testimony of General Jodl. activities of the OKW as "Coordination in the state and in the Wehrmacht." The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and thankless work of the defendant Keitel. Wehrmacht branches. It consisted, furthermore, of the settlement of arising divergencies and of a struggle against Hitler's negative attitude towards any ordely settlement, i.e. through the competent channels. the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true especially for the replacement of personnel but also for the supply of everything that is required for special warfare. of opinion was the OKW. the defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred as a necessary result of the overlapping of factual interests and personal differences of opinion which Keitel tried to settle by means of coordination or mediation, i.e. in nearly all cases by means of mutual compromising. No particular personal experience is needed in order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the ingratitude of both parites. offices which were provided with special official authorities or which had Hitler's favor and special confidence for personal, mostly party-political reasons.
reciate the heavy burden of work involved in Keitel's position. of the Armed Forces and the political sector is the more difficult as the functions of the High Command of the Armed Forces, of the Reich Minister of War and of the Chief of State were embodied in the person of Hitler, since February 4th, 1938. the political leadership and the leadership of the Armed Forces due to the identity of the person. chief of Hitler's military staff was so closely connected with its superior, Hitler, that he must be responsible for the political complexity, if not as the perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter. This assumption is erroneous. Fuehrerstate.
not absolutely good or bad, but that everything depends on the 8 July A LJG 18-1 ways and on the methods of realization and the means of carrying out the principle.
Keitel has a military backgraound and favors the Fuehrer principle for the field he knows. According to this principle the responsibility lies positively with the one who has the authority to command. While the Fuehrer principle in fact hardly underwent any change in the civilian province, where it was also applied but where it amounted to no more than superficialities, this principle necessarily made itself felt much more strongly and obviously in the military sphere, particularly in the relationship between the Commander-in-chiefs and their Chiefs of the General Staff. ally responsible Commanders, now they became the operational assistants to the Commanders. In the formulation of orders they were collaborators, advisers in the field of strategic operations, for which those officers had bee especially trained. of the General Staff; he was the Chief of the military Office (Militaerkanzlei) under Hitler, soldier and administrator of war ministerial duties; therefore, minister, claims the Prosecution. out to be formalistic when the real functions give another picture. This is particularly important in the case of Keitel. It should be determined what he actually was and how he acted in reality. leads to an erroneous understanding of Keitel's functions. To begin with, Hitler dissolved the Reich ministry of War because he no longer wished to have a Minister of War; in spite of the fact that on the 4th of February 1938 a considerable number of functions, handled up to then by the Reich Ministry of War, had been assigned to the individual Wehrmacht branches, the OKW retained a number of functions and their administration. pertaining to the war leadership, Keitel was not at liberty to attend to these on the basis of his complete authority according 8 July A LJG 18-2 to his own judgment, hut he had to present the demands of the Wehrmacht and coordinate the Wehrmacht's affairs with the duties of the other ministries.
duties in the person of Hitler was in practice unfeasible. Thus, an extensive amount of preparatory and executive work rested with Hitler's military staff, whose Chief of Staff was Keitel. Hence, also, the responsibility. But not with reference to important questions, especially those of a fundamental nature. It was, of course, a matter of judgment to what extent the defendant Keitel considered matters essential and fundamental and submitted them. But the evidence showed that when in doubt, Keitel was inclined to present matters rather than to make his own decision, after he lad examined them conscientiously. that Keitel had no way of knowing whether Hitler got the news that seemed important to him through his adjutants, through Himmler and Bormann, or in some other way. To avoid afterwards the unavoidable discussions with Hitler who, being distrustful of everyone, always took it for granted that people would intentionally conceal things from him, Keitel was anxious not to leave himself open to reproaches for having omitted something. A characteristic example is the case of the mass escape of 80 RAF officers from camp Sagan. in his capacity as custodian of the functions of the ministry of war which still remained in the OKW, held no position as a minister. Here, too, he was the chief du bureau, the head of the military office, a position which is also held by the chief of a ministerial office, or even a state secretary. I wish to refer in this connection to Dr. Lammer's statement, already referred to by me, and to the affidavits of Grand Admirals Raeder and Doenitz which I Have already mentioned here repeatedly.
The text of the Fuehrer decree of February 4, 1938 shows 8 July A LJG 18-3 that Hitler wished to make this clear.
(1915-PS) If Hitler had not had the desire to exclude every third person from a responsible and perhaps to him uncomfortable function at the highest military sector, he night have given Keitel at least the authority to take part in Cabinet meetings. In the Fuehrer decree (2098 PS) , in which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy as well as Keitel had been given the rank of a ReichsMinister, it was explicitly stated that both Commanders-in-Chief shall be entitled to take part in Cabinet meetings. The fact that this was decreed simultaneously is a convincing argumentum e contrario. It proves that Hitler did not wish that him Chief of Staff of the OKW should perhaps have had opportunity to present his own opinions and possible doubts before the Cabinet. Minister had the purpose of enabling him to carry on direct negotiation with the departmental ministers. Had Keitel not have had the rank of a Reich minister, he would have been limited to conferences with state secretaries and such, thus very handicapped in carrying out the Fuehrer's orders and tasks. Keitel as Reich minister, even as Reich minister without portfolio. He was no minister, and was no member of the Reich government. State Secretary Stuckart in a document submitted to the Prosecution has listed all members of the Reichsregierung. Keitel is not among them; he is mentioned in this document only as the holder of one of the highest offices. to membership in the Reichscabinet, but considered other branches as part of the Reichsregierung, too. It would soon, therefore, as if the Prosecution looked upon the legal structure based on German law as irrelevant. Pursuant to Appendix B to the general Bill of Indictment, the Reichsregierung is, according to the Indictment composed of Members of the regular Cabinet after the 30 January 1933, the day Hitler became Chancellor of the German 8 July A LJG 18-4 Republic.
The expression "regular Cabinet" used here means: Reich Minister, i.e., Head of Departments of the Central Government; Reich Minister without portfolio, Minister of State with the function of Reich Ministers and ether officials entitled to participate in the Cabinet meetings.
I assume that my colleague, Dr. Kubuschok, will come to this during his case before the organization.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, the Tribunal feels that you are taking a very long time over this question of whether Keitel was
DR. NELTE: I believe, Mr. President, that the Prosecution took a great deal of time to make clear what position Field Marshal Keitel occupied in their opinion. He has been described, not only as Field Marshall here and as the Chief of the OKW.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if they have -- 1 must confess that I have forgotten. It seems to me and the Tribunal generally that you are taking up far too long on this topic and you have got many other topics which are of very great importance to the defendant, and you have already been speaking for several hours, and you occupied a large number of pages in order to try and define what Keitel's position was. I thought you might be able to cut it down.
DR. NELTE: I shall try. I; that is to say, that he was not a minister. I now pass on to the following paragraph. the Fuehrer Decree of 4 February 1938, there never was a Secret Cabinet Council; that such council was never set up; that it never hold a session; and that no persons involved ever received a commission. Thus, it is proved that the defendant was never a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. Council for the Defense of the Reich. Witness Dr. Lammers has confirmed that becoming a member of the Ministerial Council for 8 July A LJG 18-5 the Defense of the Reich did not change Keitel's official position and especially did not wake him a minister.
