Q Did you know anything before 1938 about the fact that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or to attack Czechoslovakia at all?
was Neurath pursued both with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with regard to the other European countries until November 1937?
A Until von Neurath's resignation, departure in February 1938, I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by von Neurath and Inever heard anything to thecontrary. regardind the question of rearmament, that is to say, the return of Germany's armed supremacy in the year of 1935?
A I know that Mr. von Neurath based his thoughts on the fact that by the statement given by the Western lowers on the 11th of December 1939, Germany had equal rights affirmed to her and that therefore when all disarmament efforts had failed, he considered that Germany did definitely have the right to rearm. reflections and attitude of Herr von Neurath, with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland. problem and because he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland was inter-connected with the Locarno Pact but I know that in the French-Russian agreement of assistance, he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact and that the ratification of this Fact, that is, the coming into force of it-he derived the right of Germany to rearm in the Rhineland also.
Q What was the politican situation altogether in those days? Could one assume on the strength of it that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be arrived at in any case? the Western Powers-though they did not agree to the remilitarization of the Rhineland--did nevertheless very quickly find themselves satisfied with the fait accompli. In those days I spent fourteen days in London, two weeks, on behalf of the Reich Government, whichwas the second half of March, 1936, and I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with a number of Englishmen and the view I found in the widest circles was that now Germany had been granted equal rights and one couldn't deprive them of the right to remilitariz the Rhineland.
In certain circles I even found the view that one set believed that the remilitarization of the Rhineland, whichwas due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly.
Q And now one last question. What do you know about von Neurath's resignation from the positionof Reich Foreign Minister in February, 1938? was completely surprised by Neurath's sudden departure from the position of Foreign Minister. I did know that there were many thing he did not agree with and that repeatedly here he had applied to be allowed toresign and I also knew that he was ill; he suffered from a rheumatic heart. I also know that he had celebrated his sixty-fifth birthday which gave him the right to retire, but I was nevertheless surprised about the actual fact particularly as I didn't know the details at that moment. I had confidence in the people's policy of the Foreign Minister and I regretted his departure very much indeed. I remember that amongst the officials in Washington, his departure was also very much regretted, because Secretary of State Sumner Welles called me a few days after this new development and asked me about von Neurath's resignation and he told me that in the American Government the departure of this man from his office, who had pursued a level headed policy, was being regretted.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other member of the defendant's counsel wish to ask him any questions? BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for von Papen):
Q One single question, Mr. Witness. You said that on the occasion when von Neurath commenced his activities as Foreign Minister, you had expected that he would continue Stresemann's and Bruening's policy and bring in his policy? Did he actually continue it after he became Foreign Minister-as far as you know, that is?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with regard to the last witness, the prosecution do not desire to take up time by asking any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Voelkers. as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: pure truth and will withheld and add nothing.
(The witness repeated theoath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. Witness, on two occasions you were the personal referendary attached to von Neurath; this was at the beginning of his position as Foreign Minister and later when he was Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct?
A Yes; since 1920, I was a member of the Foreign Office and I spent all my timeabroad. I spent four years in Geneva as permanent representative for German and General Counsel attached to the League of Nations and again in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became personal referendary of the newly appointed Foreign Minister Herr von Neurath. I remained in that positi for one year and then upon my own request I was sent to Madrid as an Embassy Counsel and then I became Ambassador to Havana and in 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office for use as personal referendary with the title of a "Cabinet Chief" to Herr von Neurath who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Prague. did it take place on the strength of any personal relations or merely for professional reasons?
A Only for professional reasons; until I was attached to von Neurath in Berlin, I didn't know him. Neurath's appointment as Foreign Minister? generally most satisfied to see that an old professional diplomat was appointed, considering the difficult political situation and that he became am expert minister because in that way we say a guarantee for our required political course; this was all the more so as one knew that von Neurath had the special confidence of the Reich President von Hindenburg and also because he, on the strength of his entire personality and his level-headedness and quietness, enjoyed the recognition and warship of all the official; of the Foreign Office. When Hitler came to power afterwards, I had the impression that he was sceptical towards him and retiring. He did not belong to the circle of the closer associates of Hitler and never during that time when evening conferences which Hitler was holding in the Reich Chancellery in those days.
Gradually, however, the pressure against the Foreign Office increased more and more. The foreign organization was created and Ribbentrop's office was starting a competitive enterprise in which all sorts of dull people went into it and at once went on a journey abroad and they were furnishing all sorts of special reports which went directly to the Fuehrer without which the Foreign office had any control; and to add to this, that later on, the head of the foreign organization was sent to the Foreign Office as a commissioner and that Prince Waldeck was in fact sent into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the pressure became such that finally one couldn't fight against it any more but the fact that the Foreign Office held itself as long as rather like an "island" and that it still resisted the pressure and escaped the pressure of the Party, that,I think, is certainly the merit of the former Foreign Minister and his Secretary of State von Buelow. Later, when the new Jewish laws were introduced, too, in the Foreign Office, I know, that von Neurath protected as far as possible his officials, and I, myself, during the last two years of the war when I was in Stockholm, found two former colleagues of mine there with whom I had a close friendship and that is Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to run the mail department and who had to leave earlier and who has often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to von Neurath for not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything else when he went abroad but also that von Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions and had it sent to him in Swedish kronen.
Q. What was your position and your activities in Prague in the Protectorate government?
A. My position in Prague with the government of the protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had seven years earlier when I had been personal referendary attached to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, with the only difference that in the Foreign Office there was a special Records and Minutes Department and a Chief of Minutes and Records, whereas in Prague, as my chief occupation, I was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs. I had under me the socalled offices of the Reich Protector, which you must not mistake for the large authority with which, as such, I had nothing to do. When, in 1939, I went to Prague in the summer, the authority was already working for several months. My predecessor had been Legation Councillor von Kessel, who came from the Foreign Office. Apart from myself, the office of the Reich Protector contained two more officials from the Foreign Office, who were attached to me, and then there was Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech woman, and who was employed by the Reich Protector because through him, particularly, she was hoping to establish special connections with the Czechs. The Office was responsible, apart from general and usual affairs, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of the personal applications, for which, as time went by, we had to create a special department, because later on, when these many negotiations took place, so many applications were received, particularly addressed to the Reich Protector personally -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, surely this is very remote from anything we have got to consider and all the previous evidence this witness has given has been cumulative evidence which hasn't been cross-examined upon before, and new what he is saying is all very remote to anything we have got to consider.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In fact, he had already come to an end, Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the questions which I am about to put on the strength of his own knowledge.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What can you tell us, on the strength of your observations and experiences, regarding von Neurath's position with reference to the Czechs?
A. I can only give you general impressions. As I have already told you, I had no contact with the actual activities of the office. I was only personally attached to von Neurath for his private affairs and all ceremonial ratters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he started in his position as Reich Protector he did so with the intention of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as was possible in order to equalize the difficulties and bring about an understanding which would form the healthy basis for a living together of the two nations. He often told me that he was appointed Reich Protector, a man to protect the Czechs, and we know that the last German ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr, had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian government, in turn, had been prepared to carry out an Anschluss with Germany. He simply was an opponent of the military solution, and von Neurath told me when I came to Prague that -- I thin in September '38 -- he very strongly spoke against the military solution, and that, together with Goering, he had visited Hitler in Munich in order to try and deter him from that. In the practical work of my office I experienced again and again, that von Neurath had a very kind attitude towards Czech applicants; he had much sympathy and understanding. He examined each individual case, and that was known very well amongst the Czechs. Since we in his office had the possibility of examining each individual request and application which came from Czech individuals, and handing it on directly to the highest chief, the Czech applicants had recognized this way as being most suitable, because the probability of a positive reply to their private applications and requests through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if they had systematically applied to the authorities concerned in the Government.
Particularly, this practice brought us -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, this witness is simply making speeches you knot. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is imply going on -BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. Witness, what do you know about the personal and official relationship between von Protector and the President of State, Hacha?
A. According to my observations, the personal and official relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha, was excellent. Furthermore, I believe that this was not merely outwardly so, but I had the impression that von Neurath really was most drawn towards the President of State, because he considered him a very decent and clear-cut character, which under the existing circumstances -
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your Counsel has heard enough of your answer, surely you can stop.
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What was the relationship between von Neurath and the Secretary of State attached to him, Frank?
A. That was a very bad one. As soon as I started my job, von Neurath told me that he had had considerable difficulties with him because of his one-sided, anti-Czech attitude, as a Sudeten German, an attitude which, as a Reich German, he could not easily understand. He had also hoped, However, that Frank who was not a civil servant and was an outsider, would gradually adapt himself to his, Neurath's, policies, and adapt himself also to the view of civil servants who were working there, but unfortunately this was not possible. I do not know when -
Q Mr. Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the actual offi-
cial powers were which von Neurath had and which Frank had, compared to each other?
A Von Neurath was the superior of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was running the administration and the set-up of the interior offices, which was a very large institution. Secretary of State von Burgsdorff, who I think has been examined before this High Tribunal, came underhim. In his capacity as Secretary of State, Frank was also the Higher Police and SS leader.
Q Did von Neurath, as far as this branch of Frank's activities were concerned, have decisive influence upon him; that is to say, could he influence his activity as Higher SS Police leader? ing. I do not know whether, during the initial period, the matter was ruled upon by law. In practice, however, the police, and with that the Secretary of State, with his measures, were completely independent from Mr. von Neurath. This was also due to circumstances in the Reich, where Himmler, too, had the entire police and SS under him, having taken the executive powers away from the Ministry of the Interior. As near as I can remember, in the autumn of 1939 a law appeared which contained a statement according to which the police were independent, and it went on to say that von Neurath was later to be informed of all measures introduced. administration and the German Security Police and the Protectorate, under date of 1st of September 1939?
A Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to administration and the second part to the police.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under No. 149.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have presented it. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
the instructions, of the police actions which Frank carried out independ-
ently? who used to report to the Reich Protector several times everyweek. I do not believe that he informed him of the pending actions. We never heard of anything like that. Whether he reported such actions afterwards is something which I can not say. Usually it happened like this: the Reich Protector would show him numerous applications which came from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested or sent them to him, and then Boehm would take them along when he reported to the Protectorate. This, generally speaking, was the so-called later information of the Reich Protector. measures, no matter in which way, did he work towards the cancellation of arrests or for any limitation and weakening of such police measures? Protector had a special department for the purpose of receiving such applications. This department, which of course came directly under the Reich Protector, did everything possible in order to quiet the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local departments, the local police chiefs and the Secretary of State Frank, usually refused. Again and again the Reich Protector would then go directly to Himmler and very often to the Fuehrer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and that von Neurath has repeatedly objected to the Fuehrer about this.
Q Mr. Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us anything about now far von Neurath, as Reich protector, apart frompolice measures but in his political and economic measures, may have given instructions freely and independently or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving those? besides that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich Commissioner for Economy who, so for as I can remember and as I heard at the time, had already begun to work when the office of the Reich Protector hadn't yet been established.
Then there was a plenipotentiary for the Four-
26 June LJG 16-1b Year P lan and there was the Armed Forces plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Furthermore, those were P arty sources which had not been centrally organized. P rague and the north came under Gauleiter Henlein in the Sudeten Gau; the whole of Moravia came under Gauleiter Dr. Jury, and the west came again under athird Gau. All these Gauleiters tried, in turn, on their part -
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, isn't it, and quite unnecessary detail? BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Do you know anything about von Neurath's attitude towards numerous plans of Germanizing the Czechs?
A No, about that I know nothing. I only remember that on one occasion, right at the beginning, von Neurath told me -or rather, the war had actually started, and he told me that the whole structure of the P rotectorate was regarded by him as an intermediary solution and that finally peace would decide the fate of Czechoslovakia. of 1939 there were demonstrations on the occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on the 28th day of October, 1939.
A Well, I cannot remember the details. There were demonstrations on the Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can remember, they took place on the Wenze Platz. students died, who was buried on the 15th of November? You probably know that there were renewed troubles, particularly amongst the students at P rague. What do you Know about this and what do you know about the actions introduced immediately afterwards? tion that we were to keep back the demonstrations; as I was told much later they weren't particularly effective. In spite of this, Frank had reported to Berlin a bout it. At any rate, the Reich P rotector and Frank and General Frederici were called into 26 June LJG 16-2b Berlin for a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellory.
I accompanied the Reich Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Ambassador in Berlin, was also invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited manner and in a most insulting way, reproached the Ambassador because of the events, for which he was holding the Czech government responsible. Whether the closing of universities was discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can I remember having heard that he threatened the shooting or arrest of students. The manner in which Hitler treated the Ambassador was nest awkward to us. The Ambassador then left the room without having said a single word and, as far as I can remember, the subject was then no longer mentioned. We had lunch and when saying goodbye, Hitler said to Frank that he wished to talk to him some more.
I remember that on the way home, as I was walking with von Neurath, he was angry about it.
On the following day, I traveled back together with Neurath after Frank had already left for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in Prague. I saw a red placard which said that because of the uprising, the shooting of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing of universities had been ordered, and that placard had Neurath's signature. Since I didn't know what might have happened in Prague in the meantime, I was utterly surprised, because I had heard nothing about these measures in Berlin, and I suspected some intrigue on Frank's part. and I went to report the matter to Neurath. I had the impression that Neurath was most unpleasantly surprised, just as I was, and that he had known nothing at all about this previously.
Soon afterwards, Frank passed through my room going into Neurath's room, and he had that red placard under his arm. I don't know whether Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own initiative. least work for the release of those students who had been arrested ?
A Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he didn't even succeed in getting hold of the list of names of those who had been arrested. Only after we kept at it, did we receive from the Czech Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, von Neurath immediately worked for their release, and he did, in fact, have excellent results in that connection as time went by. those students who, because of this uprising end the closing of the universities which was connected with it, were now more or less unemployed ? matter. of universities to Hitler ? I knew well, had asked me on one occasion, something which reported to von Neurath and von Neurath again made efforts at the time. But as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague, the universities were not reopened.
Q Do you remember a Czech Fascist organization Vlajka ?
A Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that we in the office had a number of addresses sent to us by members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not much use. Von Neurath adopted the view quite generally that this was an internal affair of the Czechs and that after all, these were people who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused any collaboration, and such letters were never answered by us or our office. he was Reich Protector Do you have any knowledge of whether von Neurath, in his capacity as president of the Secret Cabinet Council, was ever active ?
A No. As long as I was in Prague, von Neurath was never active.
On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when he appointed him, had told him that he shouldn't kid himself that he would over call the Cabinet Council. Council. The principle decrees with reference to the protectorate came from Berline and were signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, but Neurath never countersigned or cosigned. later, honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS. During the time that von Neurath was is Prague, did he over wear the uniform of that rank? ple, but he used to wear civilian clothes a great deal. It may be that on one occasion he were the black uniform of the SS, on the occasion of a parade of the SS, but I don't know for certain now. Otherwise, he never were it. concerning Neurath's departure from Prague in September 1941? September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I met him at the airfield, and in the car he told me that Hitler had been furious because of the acts of sabotage which occurred in his protectorate, and that he wanted to send Heydrich to make an example of the matter.
He, Neurath, had stated that he didn't want to have anything to do with that, and had asked that he desist. Hitler then had decided that he should first of all go on leave, and so he did. He departed the following day.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
Mr. President, may I make one request as she and of my case. I have not yet been able to submit all documents because the translations haven't yet all reached me. May I further myself the right to submit the few remaining documents perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague Dr. Fritz?
THE PRESIDENT: You needn't wait for the translation. You can offer the documents in evidence now, put in a list with the numbers.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, we haven't got them with me, I'm afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
Do any of two defendants' counsel want to ask any question Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My lord, the Prosecution do not wish to cross examine or the same basis. are in our Document Book 12-B, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the Protectorate. They are all from the Verordnungsblatt for the Protectorate, and the Prosecution asks the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them as being an official publication. The collection is merely for convenience and access of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT: Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Luedinghausen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the defendant Fritsch DR. FRITZ ( Counsel for defendant Fritsche) : Mr. President, I intend to present the case of the defendant Fritsche as follows : the witness von Schirmeister.
In the course of these two examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to refer to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books and to quote individual passages. I hope that the Tribunal will approve of this procedure.
I consider it, further, necessary to point out the following : as witnesses for me : first Mr. von Schirmeister, second Dr. Kriegk and as documents the text of all radio speeches of the defendant Fritsche from the year 1932 to '45: second, the archives of "Deutscher Schnelldienst of the Propaganda Ministry, From all this evidence, in spite of the efforts of the General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness von Schirmeister can be brought here. Therefore, I had to reformulate my case and ask for the indulgence of the Court go into somewhat greater detail than originally intended. to the witness stand.
HANS FRITSCHE, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows : BY THE PRESIDENT :
Q will you state your full name please ?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me : truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT : You may sit down. BY DR. FRITZ :
Q Mr. Fritsche, will you please describe briefly your career up to the year 1933 ?
A I may refer to my affidavit 3469-PS, points one, two and three. In addition I can limit myself -
DR. FRITZ : Mr. President, at the beginning of the examination may I remark that my document books, of which I have two, have not yet been translated.
This affidavit, which the defendant has just mentioned is contained in the Prosecution document book. I do not know whether the Tribunal now has this document book.
THE PRESIDENT : Well, you can go on.
A (continuing) I was born on 21 April, 1900. My father was an official. I attended the Humanistiches Gymnasium. Then I was a soldier in the First World War; returned to school and studied at various universities philosophy, history and national economics. of my people. We called this need "Versailles." Enough has been said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what has already been said. change in the Versailles Treaty ?
Q Did you seek this change through war ? common sense, which were at that time all on the German side. A certain restoration of the power of the German Reich I would have welcomed because saw a danger of war in the weakness of the Reich but the means of war to change Versailles did not seem possible to me, not expedient and not desirable. I remained the same later under the Hitler government. millions of other Germans were especially impressive. The first was the assurance -- I myself was a simple soldier and therefore I know what war means. The second was the statement--in all the bloodiest wars of the last thousand years not even the victors won as much as they sacrificed during the wars. These two assurances sounded to German ears like holy and obligating oaths. What Hitler's policy did against these two assurances was a betrayal of the German public.
Q When, how and why did you come to the NSDAP ?
AAfter my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the Party. I refer again to my affidavit 3469-PS, to points nine to thirteen.
I joined the NSDAP not through the party program, nor through Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" nor did I join through the personality of Hitler, the suggestive power which has frequently been mentioned, but which I did not feel.
I rejected the rough, radicalism of the methods of the party. This radicalism contradicted the practice of my whole life and my personal style. Because of this robust practice I entered into a conflict with the Party in 1932. people. This party overcame the split in the German people and brought it unity. Mr. Bruening's attempt to bring help to the state on a democratic basis had failed because of foreign political circumstances not because of any resistance within the German people. After the cabinets had not led to a new foundation amongst the people, the appointment of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return to democratic principles.
Much has been said here about these matters. I ask for permission to give one circumstance which I know has not yet been mentioned here which does have a certain significance. the true sense of the word for the NSDAP did not have party organizations in the sense of the Marxist party, for example. It had not developed a right theory; all the theoretical matters of the party were debatable. The oretical writings of Godtfried Faber had been prohibited. The theoratician Rosenberg was disputed in the party to the end. The lack of theory in the party was so great that even the printing of the bare party program was forbidden for the German papers. A few years after, in 1939, the German papers were even forbidden to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler's "Mein Kampf". limited party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which united in itself such contrasts as perhaps those of Ley and Funk, Rosenberg and the Reich Bishop; a movement which was Catholic in its chose of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and at one time advocated the labor of women. Therefore, I believed I was joining a movement because within the NSDAP one group saw in the swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form of the black, white and red colors while another group saw in this flag the red flag with a swastika. It was so that there were groups of former German nationalists in the NSDAP or of former communists in the NSDAP.
Thus, I hoped that in this most wide flung movement I would find a new form of spiritual discussion which would not be carried out with murderous bitterness, which had previously ruled in Germany but which had a certain discipline and nationalist and social thought.