Then there was a plenipotentiary for the Four-
26 June LJG 16-1b Year P lan and there was the Armed Forces plenipotentiary who had a large staff. Furthermore, those were P arty sources which had not been centrally organized. P rague and the north came under Gauleiter Henlein in the Sudeten Gau; the whole of Moravia came under Gauleiter Dr. Jury, and the west came again under athird Gau. All these Gauleiters tried, in turn, on their part -
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, this is all detail, isn't it, and quite unnecessary detail? BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Do you know anything about von Neurath's attitude towards numerous plans of Germanizing the Czechs?
A No, about that I know nothing. I only remember that on one occasion, right at the beginning, von Neurath told me -or rather, the war had actually started, and he told me that the whole structure of the P rotectorate was regarded by him as an intermediary solution and that finally peace would decide the fate of Czechoslovakia. of 1939 there were demonstrations on the occasion of the Independence Day of Czechoslovakia, on the 28th day of October, 1939.
A Well, I cannot remember the details. There were demonstrations on the Czech national holiday in October. As far as I can remember, they took place on the Wenze Platz. students died, who was buried on the 15th of November? You probably know that there were renewed troubles, particularly amongst the students at P rague. What do you Know about this and what do you know about the actions introduced immediately afterwards? tion that we were to keep back the demonstrations; as I was told much later they weren't particularly effective. In spite of this, Frank had reported to Berlin a bout it. At any rate, the Reich P rotector and Frank and General Frederici were called into 26 June LJG 16-2b Berlin for a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellory.
I accompanied the Reich Protector at the time. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Ambassador in Berlin, was also invited. I was present when Hitler, in a very excited manner and in a most insulting way, reproached the Ambassador because of the events, for which he was holding the Czech government responsible. Whether the closing of universities was discussed on that occasion, I cannot remember, nor can I remember having heard that he threatened the shooting or arrest of students. The manner in which Hitler treated the Ambassador was nest awkward to us. The Ambassador then left the room without having said a single word and, as far as I can remember, the subject was then no longer mentioned. We had lunch and when saying goodbye, Hitler said to Frank that he wished to talk to him some more.
I remember that on the way home, as I was walking with von Neurath, he was angry about it.
On the following day, I traveled back together with Neurath after Frank had already left for Prague. I remember that when I came into the office in Prague. I saw a red placard which said that because of the uprising, the shooting of the leaders and the arrest of students and the closing of universities had been ordered, and that placard had Neurath's signature. Since I didn't know what might have happened in Prague in the meantime, I was utterly surprised, because I had heard nothing about these measures in Berlin, and I suspected some intrigue on Frank's part. and I went to report the matter to Neurath. I had the impression that Neurath was most unpleasantly surprised, just as I was, and that he had known nothing at all about this previously.
Soon afterwards, Frank passed through my room going into Neurath's room, and he had that red placard under his arm. I don't know whether Neurath had sent for him or whether he came on his own initiative. least work for the release of those students who had been arrested ?
A Yes. He immediately used his influence, but he didn't even succeed in getting hold of the list of names of those who had been arrested. Only after we kept at it, did we receive from the Czech Government an incomplete list of names. In spite of this, von Neurath immediately worked for their release, and he did, in fact, have excellent results in that connection as time went by. those students who, because of this uprising end the closing of the universities which was connected with it, were now more or less unemployed ? matter. of universities to Hitler ? I knew well, had asked me on one occasion, something which reported to von Neurath and von Neurath again made efforts at the time. But as far as I know, as long as we were in Prague, the universities were not reopened.
Q Do you remember a Czech Fascist organization Vlajka ?
A Yes, I do, but I know very little about it. I only know that we in the office had a number of addresses sent to us by members of the movement, and I also know that we had been informed by Czech sources that these people were partly criminal and generally not much use. Von Neurath adopted the view quite generally that this was an internal affair of the Czechs and that after all, these were people who wanted to work together with us. But he, on his part, refused any collaboration, and such letters were never answered by us or our office. he was Reich Protector Do you have any knowledge of whether von Neurath, in his capacity as president of the Secret Cabinet Council, was ever active ?
A No. As long as I was in Prague, von Neurath was never active.
On the contrary, on one occasion he told me that Hitler, when he appointed him, had told him that he shouldn't kid himself that he would over call the Cabinet Council. Council. The principle decrees with reference to the protectorate came from Berline and were signed by the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich, but Neurath never countersigned or cosigned. later, honorary Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS. During the time that von Neurath was is Prague, did he over wear the uniform of that rank? ple, but he used to wear civilian clothes a great deal. It may be that on one occasion he were the black uniform of the SS, on the occasion of a parade of the SS, but I don't know for certain now. Otherwise, he never were it. concerning Neurath's departure from Prague in September 1941? September, he was accompanied by his military adjutant. I met him at the airfield, and in the car he told me that Hitler had been furious because of the acts of sabotage which occurred in his protectorate, and that he wanted to send Heydrich to make an example of the matter.
He, Neurath, had stated that he didn't want to have anything to do with that, and had asked that he desist. Hitler then had decided that he should first of all go on leave, and so he did. He departed the following day.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions.
Mr. President, may I make one request as she and of my case. I have not yet been able to submit all documents because the translations haven't yet all reached me. May I further myself the right to submit the few remaining documents perhaps at the end of the case of my colleague Dr. Fritz?
THE PRESIDENT: You needn't wait for the translation. You can offer the documents in evidence now, put in a list with the numbers.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, we haven't got them with me, I'm afraid. Perhaps, if I may, I could do so tomorrow or the day after.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
Do any of two defendants' counsel want to ask any question Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My lord, the Prosecution do not wish to cross examine or the same basis. are in our Document Book 12-B, the collection of the anti-Jewish decrees in the Protectorate. They are all from the Verordnungsblatt for the Protectorate, and the Prosecution asks the Tribunal to take judicial notice of them as being an official publication. The collection is merely for convenience and access of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
THE PRESIDENT: Then that closes your case for the present, Dr. Luedinghausen.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the defendant Fritsch DR. FRITZ ( Counsel for defendant Fritsche) : Mr. President, I intend to present the case of the defendant Fritsche as follows : the witness von Schirmeister.
In the course of these two examinations I intend to present to the Tribunal a few affidavits and to refer to these and to the rest of the contents of my two document books and to quote individual passages. I hope that the Tribunal will approve of this procedure.
I consider it, further, necessary to point out the following : as witnesses for me : first Mr. von Schirmeister, second Dr. Kriegk and as documents the text of all radio speeches of the defendant Fritsche from the year 1932 to '45: second, the archives of "Deutscher Schnelldienst of the Propaganda Ministry, From all this evidence, in spite of the efforts of the General Secretary, unfortunately only the witness von Schirmeister can be brought here. Therefore, I had to reformulate my case and ask for the indulgence of the Court go into somewhat greater detail than originally intended. to the witness stand.
HANS FRITSCHE, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows : BY THE PRESIDENT :
Q will you state your full name please ?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me : truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT : You may sit down. BY DR. FRITZ :
Q Mr. Fritsche, will you please describe briefly your career up to the year 1933 ?
A I may refer to my affidavit 3469-PS, points one, two and three. In addition I can limit myself -
DR. FRITZ : Mr. President, at the beginning of the examination may I remark that my document books, of which I have two, have not yet been translated.
This affidavit, which the defendant has just mentioned is contained in the Prosecution document book. I do not know whether the Tribunal now has this document book.
THE PRESIDENT : Well, you can go on.
A (continuing) I was born on 21 April, 1900. My father was an official. I attended the Humanistiches Gymnasium. Then I was a soldier in the First World War; returned to school and studied at various universities philosophy, history and national economics. of my people. We called this need "Versailles." Enough has been said here as to the Versailles Treaty. I need add nothing to what has already been said. change in the Versailles Treaty ?
Q Did you seek this change through war ? common sense, which were at that time all on the German side. A certain restoration of the power of the German Reich I would have welcomed because saw a danger of war in the weakness of the Reich but the means of war to change Versailles did not seem possible to me, not expedient and not desirable. I remained the same later under the Hitler government. millions of other Germans were especially impressive. The first was the assurance -- I myself was a simple soldier and therefore I know what war means. The second was the statement--in all the bloodiest wars of the last thousand years not even the victors won as much as they sacrificed during the wars. These two assurances sounded to German ears like holy and obligating oaths. What Hitler's policy did against these two assurances was a betrayal of the German public.
Q When, how and why did you come to the NSDAP ?
AAfter my entry into the Propaganda Ministry I joined the Party. I refer again to my affidavit 3469-PS, to points nine to thirteen.
I joined the NSDAP not through the party program, nor through Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" nor did I join through the personality of Hitler, the suggestive power which has frequently been mentioned, but which I did not feel.
I rejected the rough, radicalism of the methods of the party. This radicalism contradicted the practice of my whole life and my personal style. Because of this robust practice I entered into a conflict with the Party in 1932. people. This party overcame the split in the German people and brought it unity. Mr. Bruening's attempt to bring help to the state on a democratic basis had failed because of foreign political circumstances not because of any resistance within the German people. After the cabinets had not led to a new foundation amongst the people, the appointment of Hitler, as Reich Chancellor, meant a return to democratic principles.
Much has been said here about these matters. I ask for permission to give one circumstance which I know has not yet been mentioned here which does have a certain significance. the true sense of the word for the NSDAP did not have party organizations in the sense of the Marxist party, for example. It had not developed a right theory; all the theoretical matters of the party were debatable. The oretical writings of Godtfried Faber had been prohibited. The theoratician Rosenberg was disputed in the party to the end. The lack of theory in the party was so great that even the printing of the bare party program was forbidden for the German papers. A few years after, in 1939, the German papers were even forbidden to quote arbitrarily any part of Hitler's "Mein Kampf". limited party but I thought I was joining a movement, a movement which united in itself such contrasts as perhaps those of Ley and Funk, Rosenberg and the Reich Bishop; a movement which was Catholic in its chose of methods; which at one time prohibited the labor of women and at one time advocated the labor of women. Therefore, I believed I was joining a movement because within the NSDAP one group saw in the swastika flag nothing but a new combination, a new form of the black, white and red colors while another group saw in this flag the red flag with a swastika. It was so that there were groups of former German nationalists in the NSDAP or of former communists in the NSDAP.
Thus, I hoped that in this most wide flung movement I would find a new form of spiritual discussion which would not be carried out with murderous bitterness, which had previously ruled in Germany but which had a certain discipline and nationalist and social thought.
For this reason, in constant compromises, I put my own 26 June A LJG 19-1 wishes, my own misgivings, my own political attitudes aside, and in many conversations I advised my friends to do so, also, if they complained that they and their interests were badly treated.
I came to the conviction that millions of Germans had joined the Party only for this reason and in this expectation. They thought they were serving a good cause. thing to this cause, everything except their honor. Meanwhile, I had to realize that the leader of this cause accepted the sacrifice of those idealists, that he used it and that, through senseless, inhuman murder--unique in history--sullied their honor, a murder which not only no necessity of war could have justified, but also one for which one could not even find any reason in any necessity of war. customary oath of unconditional loyalty to Hitler in 1933. For whatever reason you did this, the fact that you took this oath is true, is it not?
A Yes. I twice swore an oath to the Weimar Constitution in 1933 and 1938.
I may add something. It was always and it still is my conviction that no oath relieves a human being of his general duty to humanity. No one is made an irresponsible tool by an oath. My oath would never have made no carry out an order if I had realized that it was criminal. Never in my life did 1 obey anyone blindly. For that reason, I do not refer for any of my actions to my duty under this oath.
Q Did you keep the oath which you took?
A Yes. I have not been suspected of any actions which I could have considered criminal or a violation of written or unwritten laws. Moreover, I did not keep the oath which I took to Hitler, but to the German people.
Q How long did you keep the oath?
A I kept it to the end. Then, it is true, against the 26 June A LJG 19-2 order which I was given, I remained in Berlin.
When Editor and his entourage fled into death or fled toward the West, I was the only high, official to my knowledge to remain in Berlin. I collecte the employees of the high Reich agencies who had been left to their fate. I collected them in the ruins of my office. Hitler had left an order to fight on. The Berlin battle commandant could not be found. Thus, as a civilian, I felt obliged to offer the Russian Marshal Zhukov capitulation. When I was sending off the ommissary to go across the battleline, the last adjutant of Hitler appeared--General Burgsdorff--and he wanted to shoot me by way of fulfilling Hitler's order. Nevertheless, the capitulation came about, even though it was signed by the battle commandant, who had been found in the meantime. Thus, I believe I kept my oath, the oath which I had taken to the German people in the person of Hitler.
Q Did you hold an office in the P arty?
Q Were you a political loader? organizations that are accused here?
Q Did you ever take part in a P arty rally?
Q At any of those celebrations of the 8 November in Munich? work from 1935 to 1945. to the rest of the affidavits. Again I may limit myself to a very brief presentation to supplement what is said in the affidavits. what I had been previously, Chief Editor of the Wireless Service.
That was the name of the German radio news service. I remained 26 June A LJG 19-3 that for five more years.
of the Reich Radio Company, was incorporated into the Propaganda Ministry in its press section. Since I was a specialist in journalistic news service, I soon was entrusted with the news agencies--first, the smaller ones, such as Transozean or Europa-P ress or Eildienst. Later I was entrusted with the big German news service. for I was only an employee of the Ministry are not an official. I had no right to determine the Contents of the news. I had only the organizational supervision, but I believe that my advice was valuable at the time. nature. In December 1938, I become head of the section, German Press. I became Ministerialdirigent. As an official, I still thought myself the fournalist I had been for decades previously. I continued to direct the German Press Section until the spring of 1942. superior, Reich P ress Chief Dr. Dietrich. For that reason, I became a soldier and went to the Eastern Front.
In the fall of 1942 I was called back by Dr. Goebbels. Dr. Goebbels approved my previous criticism, of which he know, and he offered to make me head of the Radio Section of his ministry. I answered that I could return to the Propaganda ministry only if I had the certainty that a political end of the war would be sought and that total military victory world not be sought, which from the first day of the war I had considered impossible. I told Dr. Goebbels at that time that a fight to self- destruction, as the gods fought at Vesuvius, I was not willing to participate in as a propagandist. Dr. Goebbels answered that Hitler and he, also, were seeking a political end to the war by reaching some sort, of understanding.
He promised me 26 June A LJG 19-4 that he would inform me in time if he noticed that the Fuehrer was changing his intentions.
Dr. Goebbels repeated this promise. Each time that he reported it, he always gave me substantiated indications about the political efforts in progress at the moment. Today I have the feeling that he broke his promise.
became Ministerial Director.
Q Those were your official positions; they were less known among the public. Better known were your radio speeches. What about them? German station, and on the Deutschland Sender. At the beginning of the war I spoke daily on all the stations, I believe for three or four months. Then I spoke three times a week, then twice a week, and finally once a week again. At first these radio speeches were just reviews of newspaper articles, that is, a collection of quotations from domestic and foreign newspapers. After the beginning of the war, however, these speeches, of course, became polemic on the basis of quotations mostly from foreign papers and foreign radio stations.
Q Did your speeches have an official character? The prosecution says that they were, of course, under the control of the Propaganda Ministry.
A That is not true in that form. The speeches were not official. At the beginning they were decidedly private work. Of course, I could not prevent in the course of time, that the private speeches of a man holding a position in the Propaganda Ministry were no longer considered as private, but semiofficial.
Q You say private work, which was later considered semi-official. To clear up this question, I. would like to ask this. Could one criticize these speeches, or was one arrested for so doing?
A One was not only allowed to criticize, but one did so. I had extensive correspondence with my critics, although only with these who signed their names. There were also anonymous critics, of course, but I may add that the anonymous critics only had general complaints. certain protection for my speeches, apparently on the assumption that they were semi-official. The suggestion was made that they would appear in any possible trials. I refused this, explaining -- as I publicly explained repeatedly -- that people have to be allowed to criticize something. If it is forbidden to criticize the State and the Government, there must be an allowance, at least, to criticize the press, the radio, and me.
Q How did you work out these speeches? Were they written out and censored beforehand?
A I always refused to let then be censored beforehand. The material was gathered very carefully. It was kept in the so-called Archib-Schnelldienst which has been applied for and approved by the Tribunal but which could not be found. and reports from foreign broadcasts. The investigation of doubtful matters was done by my own agents. A rough draft of the speech was then dictated. That was a different procedure than in the case of an article; every sentence was not polished. In a written work, every Word counts, but when it is spoken, the total impression is more important.
Q You worked in the Propaganda Ministry; Dr. Goebbels was the Minister. His name has been mentioned here frequently in various positions, as Reich Minister for Propaganda, Reich Propaganda Director of the NSDAP, Reich Deputy for the Total War Effort, and Gauleiter of Berlin. In which of these capacities did you deal with Dr. Goebbels?
Q Were you his representative?
A No. In the last two and a half years I was his deputy for radio, and was the head of one of twelve sections of his Ministry. Dr. Goebbels' representatives were his state secretaries. The last one was Dr. Naumann, who was his successor for one day.
Q Was Dr. Goebbels your only and direct superior?
A No. Between him and me there were many offices at the beginning, and there were still a few later. This is the first time, here in the dock, that I am without official superiors.
Q. Which of the defendants did you know, or with whom did you have official or personal relations?
A. I had official conversations two or three times, shortly after 1933, with Funk, who was State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry at that time. Those conversations concerned economic and organizational matters. I discussed with him the financial plans for the reorganization of this new system. matter. I spoke to Seyss-Inquart in The Hague, and to Papen in Istanbul. I know all the others only at a distance and met them personally only here during the trial.
Q. How about Hitler?
A. I never had a conversation with him. In the course of twelve years, however, I saw him several times at the Reichstag, of course, at big occasions, and at receptions. Once I was at his headquarters and was invited to dinner with a large number of other people. Otherwise, I received instructions from Hitler only through Dr. Dietrich or his representative, or through Dr. Goebbels or his various representatives.
Q. What were your relations with Dr. Goebbels? Were you friendly with him? Did you see him often?
A. One cannot say that we were friends. The relationship was rather reserved, official, and also somewhat distant. I saw him personally less frequently than other follow workers of Dr. Goebbels of my rank. However, I believe he treated me with more respect than any other of his co-workers. To that extent I held a special position in a sense. I esteemed Dr. Goebbels' intelligence and his ability at least sometimes to change his own opinion when he heard a better argument. I saw him about twice a year during the first five years. Then I became head of the section I saw him perhaps once a month. After the outbreak of war I saw him daily in the course of a conference of 30 to 50 fellow workers; and in addition, about once a week I had a conference on special subjects with him.
Q. Now we come to the subject of propaganda. Can you sketch the propaganda system in the Third Reich?
A. I shall attempt to do so. There were three sorts of propaganda. The first was the unorganized agitation of the radical fanatics in the Party. It was shown in all fields, in the field of religion, racial policy, art, general policy, and the conduct of the war. The head of this unorganized agitation, increasingly, was Bormann. of the NSDAP. The head of this was Dr. Goebbels. It attempted to bring the agitation of the radicals into some form capable of discussion. Ministry.
Q. The prosecution maintained at the beginning that you were head of the Radio Section of the Propaganda Division of the NSDAP. How about that?
A. The prosecution has withdrawn that assertion. They said that they had no proof. It would have been more correct to say that this statement can be proved to be false. I refer to my affidavit 3469-PS, point 37. There I state that in contrast to all of my predecessors, as for as I know, as head of the Radio Division of the Ministry I was not at the same time head of the Radio Section of the Party. Today I expand this statement by saying that I held no office whatever in the Party.
Q You have been accused of having helped Dr. Goebbels to plunge the world into the blood-bath of aggressive war. Is that true? Did. Dr Goebbels ever speak with you about aggressive plans?
A No; I never heard of any intention to wage aggressive war, either from Dr. Goebbels or from anyone else. several times at which it was said that various aggressive plans were discusse for example,before the attack on Czechoslovakia, before the attack on Poland, and on Norway, and on Russia. Did you participate in these conferences? Did you hear of them?
A I did not participate in a single one of these conferences. I heard of them for the first time here in the courtroom. possibility of war ever mentioned?
A No; but the danger of war was mentioned as early as 1933, the danger of war determined by the one-sided disarmament of one state in the midst of other states which were highly armed. This disproportion between armament and non-armament had to appear as an inducement for attack. were one of the main reasons first for the demand for disarmament of the other powers and afterwards for the German demand for equality of armament. That scorned completely logical to me, but never was the danger of war mentioned without at the same time a reference to the German will for peace. That seemed to me honest. imminent, I saw Dr. Goebbels more often than ever before. I gave Dr. Goebbels a number of little memoranda, a contribution from my field of work in the news system, as it were. They were an analysis of the public opinionof Western countries, and they repeatedly indicated that England was determined to wage war in case of a conflict about Poland.
I recall that Dr. Goebbels was deeply impressed when I gave him one of these memoranda once. He expressed his concern, and decided immediately to fly to Hitler, He said to me, verbatim: "Believe me, we did not work successfully for six years in order to risk everything in a war now."
which have been mentioned here in the courtroom in part.
I was convinced of the honesty of the will for peace in Hitler's policy. Hitler secretly thought differently or acted differently. I cannot form a judgment, because the documents of the other side have not yet been published. But if it should be as the documents submitted here say, I must state that I was deceived about the aims of German policy.
DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, at the beginning of my case, I said that it was not possible to bring the radio speeches of the defendant Fritsche here. I tried to obtain them from a German radio station, and succeeded in getting a small part from the years 1939 and 1940. I have selected some of those speeches which I should like to submit as Fritsche Exhibit No. 1. quote only one sentence from the radio speech of Fritsche of the 15th of November, 1939:
"The only reason for war, which our people on the whole have never desired, the only reason for war which can be justified morally is the fight for the existence of the people." of the war, he re-asserted during the war as well. As proof of this, I should like to quote another passage from the same document, from a radio speech of Fritsche of the 23rd of July, 1940:
"We Germans in the course of all our history, and especially twenty years ago, experienced enough blood and tears and human suffering to lock it honestly in the eye now.
"We know what war meant, and therefore we did not want war. And because the Fuehrer knows it so well, and experienced it, that is why on the 6th of October and the 19th of July he offered peace." BY DR. FRITZ:
Q Did youin any way, Mr. Fritsche, have anything to do with war preparation from the intellectual or organizational standpoint?