THE PRESIDENT: This is really evidence in rebuttal, is it?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, in rebuttal of the points raised in the cross examination. It is very difficult to decide whether one should make a final objection until one knows what use DR. Drakzbuehler is going to make of it. I suggest that we do not object at this stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, these applications and the Tribunal's orders granting the witnesses are always subject to that provision.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please. Then the Prosecution makes no further objection. Neurath, a request for minutes from the interrogatory of the --
THE PRESIDENT: They have both been withdrawn, have they not?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh, they have? I was not certain.
My Lord, then Dr. Thoma makes application on behalf of the defendant Rosenberg for three matters: the exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant; the entry of Dr. Strauber, 27 May 1944; and third, a note of the Ministerialrat, Dr. Beil. they leave it to the Tribunal with that suggestion -- that the case is already well covered. I don't know if Dr. Thoma wishes to say anything further.
DR. THOMA (Counsel for defendant Rosenberg): Gentlemen of the Tribunal, I should merely like to say briefly that apparently there has been an error in the matter of Dr. Beil, because here we are concerned with an interrogatory I have submitted an interrogatory to him which has not yet been received back. There is nothing else that I know about this affair, but I have made an application which has not been mentioned.yet. I applied for some of Rosenberg' writing to be included in thedocument book -- the questions which were discussed during the meeting of the conferences in the Gau Schools and which refer to questions of the living together of the nations of Europe, and religious tolerance, and his work for a finer humanity, and I should like to have these articles admitted, please. Apart from that, I have no further applications to make, and I leave the decision, of course, to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: If I understand what you said right, Dr. Thoma, you weren't referring to any of the applications which are before us. The applications which are before us are an exchange of letters between Dr. Ley and the defendant in the autumn of 1944; another is an entry which Dr. Strauber made; and the third is a note of Dr. Boil.
DR. THOMA: Yes, that is right. I have to confess that these applications are completely strange to me. In my opinion, Rosenberg must have made applications on his own initiative, because I can't find any trace of them. Or perhaps an error was made in the memorandum to the Tribunal. I don't know the application.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, the copies of the applications are before us, and they appear to be signed both by the defendant Rosenberg and by yourself.
DR. THOMA: In that case, this must have happened months ago. I can't remember; this is the 3rd of June.
THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, you don't want them?
DR. THOMA: Application number 3 is settled. May I beg the Tribunal to make a decision favorable to the defendant, please?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the next applications are a number of documents on behalf of the defendant von Papen, and the prosecution have no objection to those.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, a good many of them -- certainly numbers 3, 15, and 13, I think -- have either been admitted or rejected.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: That is so, My Lord. I had a note opposite number 13. I really think they have been dealt with, My Lord, they are in the books, and I don't think any further discussion is required.
THE PRESIDENT: Are they all in the books?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I think so, My Lord. Dr. Kubuschok says he agrees with me.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If Your Lordship Pleases, the next is an application on behalf of the defendant Bormann, a request for a decree of Hitler's,and a decree issued by Bormann in 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't quite understand the meaning of the last one. Can you tell me what it means?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I took it myself that it was to the SD, instead of "of" the SD, pertaining to members of the head office of the National Socialist Party to the SD.
DR. BERGOLD (Counsel for defendant Bormann): My Lord, we are here concerned with a decree from Bormann in which he prohibits members of the Party Chancellery from becoming members of the SD. It is an internal decree of Bormann's, therefore, applying to the Chancellory.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, the remaining applications are on behalf of the defendant Goering, the admission of an affidavit by Baron von Gersdorff, and a book by Joseph Chepski. My Lord, my Soviet colleague has dealt with that by submission in writing, dated the 20th of June. I did not propose to say anything further about that, My Lord. Colonel Pokrovsky is here if Your Lordship would like to hear him further.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already made an order with reference to this.
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: Your Lordship has.
THE PRESIDENT: We made the order on the 9th of June, apparently, that, for the defendant Goering, three witnesses could be produced either personally -- Perhaps we had better hear from Dr. Stahmer about this.
DR. STAHMER (Counsel for defendant Goering): Mr. President, we understood that the decision of the Tribunal was this: Having applied for five witnesses, the Tribunal then went on to say that I could produce three out of the five.
THE PRESIDENT: That is right.
DR. STAHMER: Then, with reference to the affidavits, nothing was said in that particular decision. Therefore I had assumed that I would not be prevented from asking for permission to submit an affidavit in so far as the Tribunal considers that necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, after the Tribunal had made that order about limiting the number of witnesses to three, didn't you receive a communication, to which you have replied, I think, suggesting that possibly you might be able to dispense with actual oral witnesses and do that whole part of the case by affidavits?
DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, yes. I received it, and I have already negotiated about the matter with the Russian prosecution. We didn't quite reach an agreement, however, and therefore I made a supplementary application to the Tribunal a few weeks ago.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but wasn't the agreement which you striving to arrive at an agreement that only three affidavits should be produced on either side? Or was it more than three?
DR. STAHMER: No. The question which remains, and which we haven't agreed upon, is whether I can read a few of the affidavits here.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
Dr. Stahmer, I think the position is, then, that unless you are able to arrive at an agreement with the Soviet prosecution, we shall have to abide by our previous order.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will grant me the indulgence of mentioning three exhibits. They all refer to the diary of Admiral Assmann, My Lord, which was introduced during the cases of the defendants Doenitz and Raeder. There are three exhibits concerned.
The first is document D-879. We thought that would be more complete if a connecting page was put into make the continuity of the Exhibit. For that purpose, My Lord, the prosecution asks that Exhibit GB-482 he withdrawn and that there be substituted the two pages which were originally in it, with a connecting page. That is merely adding a connecting page, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Is there any objection to that on the pa of the defense?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I don't think so, My Lord, I haven't heard of any.
THE PRESIDENT: What do the documents relate to, did you say?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: The diary of Admiral Assmann, who was on the staff of the defendant Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is only a question of putting the exhibit in proper form. the same diary, on the 23rd of February, 1940. I promised Your Lordship that I should put in an exhibit when I dealt with the diary in cross-examination and, My Lord, the exhibit has been prepared and I want to put it in under the number GB-475. That is, D-881 will become GB-475. D-892. That exhibit has now been prepared and will become GB-476. Copies are available for the defendants and will be given to them after the approval of the Court is given.
THE PRESIDENT: And copies, of course, will be supplied to the Court as well?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Of course, My Lord. They are just awaiting the formal approval of the Court, and they will be submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Sir David, that is all right.
THE PRESIDENT: Then, Sir David, we will consider the other matter.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If yourLordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Yes, Dr. Thoma.
DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I just wanted to use this opportunity to submit to the Tribunal the affidavit of Robert Scholz. It has been returned, translated into English, French, and I should now like to submit it under Exhibit No. 41 to the Tribunal. I have already shown it to Mr. Dodd, and he has not objected.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. KRAUS (Counsel for the defendant Schacht): Mr. President, I wanted to ascertain whether and at what point we could submit affidavits and documents after this situation. The reason is that during recent days I have received two affidavits and a document, the relevance of which has not yet been finally decided upon.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal would like to know when the counsel for the prosecution and counsel for defense think would be the best time to deal with these matters which are outstanding, and with any evidence which either the defense or the prosecution may wish to bring in rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: Yes, My Lord. I have not had the chance of discussing it with any of the counsel for the defense, but I should have thought at the end of the evidence. One might reasonably hope that the evidence will finish this week. It might be possible to deal with it on Saturday morning or on Monday, and suit the counsel for the defense, and, of course, as the Tribunal decides.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Tribunal, I think, will expect the defense counsel and the prosecution to be ready, directly the end of the evidence comes, to deal with all these additional questions which are outstanding and also with any applications that they may have with reference to rebuttal.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship please, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: I wanted that to be clearly understood, that it will be expected that it is to be done immediately the evidence closes. That, I think, answers Dr. Kraus's point about the affidavits and documents. That would be the most appropriate time.
Sir David, have you got any ideas as to how long that would take?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I think a very short time. I should have thought that two days or thereabouts would see it through. I have discussed it with Mr. Dodd, and that was the view we took.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. In about two days at the outside?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: At the outside, My Lord. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship please. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. Witness, since when have you known Mr. von Neurath?
A Since 1913. I met him when I joined the Foreign Office, and he was counsel to the Foreign Office at that time. I then met him again in Constantinople, and there I had contact with him. Then I did not meet him again until 1930. with 1930? London, and I, in the Foreign Office, was head of the department of England and America. that is, yourself -- and von Neurath, who was ambassador to London just then?
Q Do you know anything about Neurath's appointment to the position of Reich Foreign Minister? Service were upset by Bruening's sudden departure, who stood for sound policy at the time. We only agreed with the change because it was von Neurath who took Bruening's place; and because we knew that Neurath was a man whom we considered as an experienced diplomat. Furthermore, we knew that he was representing Bruening's policy in London,and we therefore expected that as Foreign Minister he would continue Bruening's policy. station in Berlin when he arrived in Germany; and the conversation I had with him gave me the impression that he did not like leaving London at all, and that he was not very pleased with having to take over the Foreign Ministry.
He did tell me, however, "I shall comply with the wishes of the old gentleman." That, of course, was Reich President von Hindenburg. under von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry? and America until 1936. Afterwards, in April, 1936, I took over and reestablished the political department, and then Secretary of State von Buelow died in June, and in August, 1936, I was given the post of Secretary of State of the Foreign Office. I remained in that provisional position until March, 1937, and then I became ambassador to Washington. the Foreign Office? the Foreign Office he retained the old officials.
Q Did he, for instance, retain the Secretary of State von Buelow? until his death. Ambassador von Hassel to Rome and Ambassador Kessler to Paris, all of whom were old diplomatic officials. the aims of Neurath's foreign policy were? states, and by this means to reestablish Germany's equal status which we had lost in 1918, gradually. This was the same policy as had been Stresemann's and Bruening's policy.
The difficulties connected with Germany's position were known to von Neurath, and he talked to me about it repeatedly. He was by no means pleased. He saw things realistically. His tendency was to exercise moderation.
Q What do you know about Neurath's entry into Hitler's government, which was being formed on the 30th of January, 1933?
Buelow when I returned from leave at the beginning of February, 1933, to Berlin.
Afterwards, Neurath did not in any way participate in the formation of the new cabinet -- that is, Hitler's cabinet -- and apart from that, he was sick about that time. He heard of the plan of making Hitler Reich Chancellor and forming a new government. He wanted to discuss it with Reich President von Hindenburg, to make certain reservations and to secure them for himself. But he came too late, and could not, therefore, prevent anything. In spite of this, he still retained the Foreign Ministry in the new cabinet because he did not want to disappoint the Reich President, and wanted to fulfil his wish.
Q Do you know anything about Neurath's attitude towards the National Socialist policy in the interior?
A I know that Mr. von Neurath, soon after the 30th of January, 1933, had certain worries regarding the interior policy, because he was feeling particularly that this would be a burden to foreign policy. When, in June 1933, I visited him in London, where, during that period he was visiting the world economic conference and was head of the German delegation, he explained his worries to me. He said, however, that these things wouldprobably die down and that very probably developments would be similar to those in Fascist Italy, where there had been a wild beginning, but where things had settled down afterwards. He was hoping that that plan would be applicable to Germany.
Q I shall now come to the year of 1936. One of the principal questions which dominated that year was the Austrian problem. Can you tell us what Neurath's attitude was toward the repeated intervention of German forces in the Reich in affairs in Austria?
A Yes. Mr. von Neurath considered such German intervention with Austria as an inter ference not merely non-permissible, but damaging. He told me so repeatedly. He was aiming at economic improvement of the relations with Austria, in order to improve political relations in the process. He wished to leave Austria untouched. and Austria, the economic strengthening of affairs and by this means the re establishment of the relations between the two countries.
Hitler had intended to annex Austria, with the necessary arrangements, of course?
Q Did you know anything before 1938 about the fact that Hitler had intended to solve the Sudeten problem by force or to attack Czechoslovakia at all?
was Neurath pursued both with regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia and also with regard to the other European countries until November 1937?
A Until von Neurath's resignation, departure in February 1938, I always presumed that Hitler agreed with the peaceful policy pursued by von Neurath and Inever heard anything to thecontrary. regardind the question of rearmament, that is to say, the return of Germany's armed supremacy in the year of 1935?
A I know that Mr. von Neurath based his thoughts on the fact that by the statement given by the Western lowers on the 11th of December 1939, Germany had equal rights affirmed to her and that therefore when all disarmament efforts had failed, he considered that Germany did definitely have the right to rearm. reflections and attitude of Herr von Neurath, with reference to the remilitarization of the demilitarized Rhineland. problem and because he knew that the problem of the remilitarization of the Rhineland was inter-connected with the Locarno Pact but I know that in the French-Russian agreement of assistance, he saw a breach of the Locarno Pact and that the ratification of this Fact, that is, the coming into force of it-he derived the right of Germany to rearm in the Rhineland also.
Q What was the politican situation altogether in those days? Could one assume on the strength of it that sooner or later a peaceful solution of this Rhineland problem would be arrived at in any case? the Western Powers-though they did not agree to the remilitarization of the Rhineland--did nevertheless very quickly find themselves satisfied with the fait accompli. In those days I spent fourteen days in London, two weeks, on behalf of the Reich Government, whichwas the second half of March, 1936, and I had the opportunity to discuss this matter with a number of Englishmen and the view I found in the widest circles was that now Germany had been granted equal rights and one couldn't deprive them of the right to remilitariz the Rhineland.
In certain circles I even found the view that one set believed that the remilitarization of the Rhineland, whichwas due sooner or later in any case, was carried out so quickly and comparatively painlessly.
Q And now one last question. What do you know about von Neurath's resignation from the positionof Reich Foreign Minister in February, 1938? was completely surprised by Neurath's sudden departure from the position of Foreign Minister. I did know that there were many thing he did not agree with and that repeatedly here he had applied to be allowed toresign and I also knew that he was ill; he suffered from a rheumatic heart. I also know that he had celebrated his sixty-fifth birthday which gave him the right to retire, but I was nevertheless surprised about the actual fact particularly as I didn't know the details at that moment. I had confidence in the people's policy of the Foreign Minister and I regretted his departure very much indeed. I remember that amongst the officials in Washington, his departure was also very much regretted, because Secretary of State Sumner Welles called me a few days after this new development and asked me about von Neurath's resignation and he told me that in the American Government the departure of this man from his office, who had pursued a level headed policy, was being regretted.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have no further questions to this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other member of the defendant's counsel wish to ask him any questions? BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for von Papen):
Q One single question, Mr. Witness. You said that on the occasion when von Neurath commenced his activities as Foreign Minister, you had expected that he would continue Stresemann's and Bruening's policy and bring in his policy? Did he actually continue it after he became Foreign Minister-as far as you know, that is?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: My Lord, on the same basis I intimated with regard to the last witness, the prosecution do not desire to take up time by asking any questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness may retire.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I then have your permission to call my third and last witness, Dr. Voelkers. as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: pure truth and will withheld and add nothing.
(The witness repeated theoath).
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. Witness, on two occasions you were the personal referendary attached to von Neurath; this was at the beginning of his position as Foreign Minister and later when he was Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia; is that correct?
A Yes; since 1920, I was a member of the Foreign Office and I spent all my timeabroad. I spent four years in Geneva as permanent representative for German and General Counsel attached to the League of Nations and again in 1932 I was called to the Foreign Office and became personal referendary of the newly appointed Foreign Minister Herr von Neurath. I remained in that positi for one year and then upon my own request I was sent to Madrid as an Embassy Counsel and then I became Ambassador to Havana and in 1939 I was called back to the Foreign Office for use as personal referendary with the title of a "Cabinet Chief" to Herr von Neurath who in the meantime had been appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Prague. did it take place on the strength of any personal relations or merely for professional reasons?
A Only for professional reasons; until I was attached to von Neurath in Berlin, I didn't know him. Neurath's appointment as Foreign Minister? generally most satisfied to see that an old professional diplomat was appointed, considering the difficult political situation and that he became am expert minister because in that way we say a guarantee for our required political course; this was all the more so as one knew that von Neurath had the special confidence of the Reich President von Hindenburg and also because he, on the strength of his entire personality and his level-headedness and quietness, enjoyed the recognition and warship of all the official; of the Foreign Office. When Hitler came to power afterwards, I had the impression that he was sceptical towards him and retiring. He did not belong to the circle of the closer associates of Hitler and never during that time when evening conferences which Hitler was holding in the Reich Chancellery in those days.
Gradually, however, the pressure against the Foreign Office increased more and more. The foreign organization was created and Ribbentrop's office was starting a competitive enterprise in which all sorts of dull people went into it and at once went on a journey abroad and they were furnishing all sorts of special reports which went directly to the Fuehrer without which the Foreign office had any control; and to add to this, that later on, the head of the foreign organization was sent to the Foreign Office as a commissioner and that Prince Waldeck was in fact sent into the personnel department of the Foreign Office. At that stage the pressure became such that finally one couldn't fight against it any more but the fact that the Foreign Office held itself as long as rather like an "island" and that it still resisted the pressure and escaped the pressure of the Party, that,I think, is certainly the merit of the former Foreign Minister and his Secretary of State von Buelow. Later, when the new Jewish laws were introduced, too, in the Foreign Office, I know, that von Neurath protected as far as possible his officials, and I, myself, during the last two years of the war when I was in Stockholm, found two former colleagues of mine there with whom I had a close friendship and that is Ministerial Director Richard Meier who used to run the mail department and who had to leave earlier and who has often told me in Stockholm how grateful he was to von Neurath for not only having enabled him to take with him his family and his furniture and everything else when he went abroad but also that von Neurath, until the collapse, continued to pay him his monthly pensions and had it sent to him in Swedish kronen.
Q. What was your position and your activities in Prague in the Protectorate government?
A. My position in Prague with the government of the protectorate was approximately the same as the one I had seven years earlier when I had been personal referendary attached to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, with the only difference that in the Foreign Office there was a special Records and Minutes Department and a Chief of Minutes and Records, whereas in Prague, as my chief occupation, I was also in charge of all protocols and ceremonial affairs. I had under me the socalled offices of the Reich Protector, which you must not mistake for the large authority with which, as such, I had nothing to do. When, in 1939, I went to Prague in the summer, the authority was already working for several months. My predecessor had been Legation Councillor von Kessel, who came from the Foreign Office. Apart from myself, the office of the Reich Protector contained two more officials from the Foreign Office, who were attached to me, and then there was Count Waldburg, whose mother was a Czech woman, and who was employed by the Reich Protector because through him, particularly, she was hoping to establish special connections with the Czechs. The Office was responsible, apart from general and usual affairs, for dealing with the private correspondence and the handling of the personal applications, for which, as time went by, we had to create a special department, because later on, when these many negotiations took place, so many applications were received, particularly addressed to the Reich Protector personally -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, surely this is very remote from anything we have got to consider and all the previous evidence this witness has given has been cumulative evidence which hasn't been cross-examined upon before, and new what he is saying is all very remote to anything we have got to consider.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In fact, he had already come to an end, Mr. President. I merely wanted to show that he is in a position to answer the questions which I am about to put on the strength of his own knowledge.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What can you tell us, on the strength of your observations and experiences, regarding von Neurath's position with reference to the Czechs?
A. I can only give you general impressions. As I have already told you, I had no contact with the actual activities of the office. I was only personally attached to von Neurath for his private affairs and all ceremonial ratters. But I do know, and he told me, that when he started in his position as Reich Protector he did so with the intention of treating the Czech population as justly and decently as was possible in order to equalize the difficulties and bring about an understanding which would form the healthy basis for a living together of the two nations. He often told me that he was appointed Reich Protector, a man to protect the Czechs, and we know that the last German ambassador in Prague, Dr. Eisenlohr, had often reported that the last Czechoslovakian government, in turn, had been prepared to carry out an Anschluss with Germany. He simply was an opponent of the military solution, and von Neurath told me when I came to Prague that -- I thin in September '38 -- he very strongly spoke against the military solution, and that, together with Goering, he had visited Hitler in Munich in order to try and deter him from that. In the practical work of my office I experienced again and again, that von Neurath had a very kind attitude towards Czech applicants; he had much sympathy and understanding. He examined each individual case, and that was known very well amongst the Czechs. Since we in his office had the possibility of examining each individual request and application which came from Czech individuals, and handing it on directly to the highest chief, the Czech applicants had recognized this way as being most suitable, because the probability of a positive reply to their private applications and requests through the highest local chief promised to be much more favorable than if they had systematically applied to the authorities concerned in the Government.
Particularly, this practice brought us -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, this witness is simply making speeches you knot. You are not asking him any questions at all. He is imply going on -BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. Witness, what do you know about the personal and official relationship between von Protector and the President of State, Hacha?
A. According to my observations, the personal and official relationship between the Reich Protector and the President of State Hacha, was excellent. Furthermore, I believe that this was not merely outwardly so, but I had the impression that von Neurath really was most drawn towards the President of State, because he considered him a very decent and clear-cut character, which under the existing circumstances -
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, when you see your Counsel has heard enough of your answer, surely you can stop.
THE WITNESS: Very well. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What was the relationship between von Neurath and the Secretary of State attached to him, Frank?
A. That was a very bad one. As soon as I started my job, von Neurath told me that he had had considerable difficulties with him because of his one-sided, anti-Czech attitude, as a Sudeten German, an attitude which, as a Reich German, he could not easily understand. He had also hoped, However, that Frank who was not a civil servant and was an outsider, would gradually adapt himself to his, Neurath's, policies, and adapt himself also to the view of civil servants who were working there, but unfortunately this was not possible. I do not know when -
Q Mr. Witness, can you describe to us briefly what the actual offi-
cial powers were which von Neurath had and which Frank had, compared to each other?
A Von Neurath was the superior of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was running the administration and the set-up of the interior offices, which was a very large institution. Secretary of State von Burgsdorff, who I think has been examined before this High Tribunal, came underhim. In his capacity as Secretary of State, Frank was also the Higher Police and SS leader.
Q Did von Neurath, as far as this branch of Frank's activities were concerned, have decisive influence upon him; that is to say, could he influence his activity as Higher SS Police leader? ing. I do not know whether, during the initial period, the matter was ruled upon by law. In practice, however, the police, and with that the Secretary of State, with his measures, were completely independent from Mr. von Neurath. This was also due to circumstances in the Reich, where Himmler, too, had the entire police and SS under him, having taken the executive powers away from the Ministry of the Interior. As near as I can remember, in the autumn of 1939 a law appeared which contained a statement according to which the police were independent, and it went on to say that von Neurath was later to be informed of all measures introduced. administration and the German Security Police and the Protectorate, under date of 1st of September 1939?
A Yes, I think that is the one. The first part referred to administration and the second part to the police.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I remind you that the wording of this decree is contained in my document book under No. 149.
THE PRESIDENT: It has been submitted as evidence?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I merely wanted to remind you that I have presented it. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
the instructions, of the police actions which Frank carried out independ-
ently? who used to report to the Reich Protector several times everyweek. I do not believe that he informed him of the pending actions. We never heard of anything like that. Whether he reported such actions afterwards is something which I can not say. Usually it happened like this: the Reich Protector would show him numerous applications which came from the next of kin of Czechs who had been arrested or sent them to him, and then Boehm would take them along when he reported to the Protectorate. This, generally speaking, was the so-called later information of the Reich Protector. measures, no matter in which way, did he work towards the cancellation of arrests or for any limitation and weakening of such police measures? Protector had a special department for the purpose of receiving such applications. This department, which of course came directly under the Reich Protector, did everything possible in order to quiet the next of kin and to bring about the releases of the detained persons. The work was particularly difficult because these local departments, the local police chiefs and the Secretary of State Frank, usually refused. Again and again the Reich Protector would then go directly to Himmler and very often to the Fuehrer himself. I know and remember that there was a very excited correspondence with Himmler and that von Neurath has repeatedly objected to the Fuehrer about this.
Q Mr. Witness, can you judge, or can you tell us anything about now far von Neurath, as Reich protector, apart frompolice measures but in his political and economic measures, may have given instructions freely and independently or how far he was depending on Berlin when giving those? besides that of the Reich Protector. For instance, there was a Reich Commissioner for Economy who, so for as I can remember and as I heard at the time, had already begun to work when the office of the Reich Protector hadn't yet been established.