"Extract from the Report of the Conference of the Reichs Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.
"After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He" -- that is, Ribbentrop --"regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now."
Then, skipping:
"Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?" for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-Boat warfare against England, he said -- and I now quote the last two sentences in paragraph 4 on page 2 of the English translation:
"Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions." of the English translation, I quote Defendant Ribbentrop again:
"The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides, our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English -American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English, (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
"Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to see for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war.
There were three reasons for quick action:
"1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
"2) A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
"3) In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy."
I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop's argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan's aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan's entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent of that statement I read to you earlier from the Fuehrer, that those who wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.
Continuing Ribbentrop's argument, to show the real nature of the GermanJapanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS.
"The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
"Ambassador Oshima definitely a greed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis.
The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the EastAsian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought." instigation to war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall return to him again in this connection. military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document No. C-75, as Exhibit No. USA-151. Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and entitled "Basic Order No.24 regarding Collaboration with Japan." It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima that I have just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Wavy, and Air Force, as well as to the Foreign Office. We have turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have introduced, is Copy No. 2 of the order distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy No.4, designed for the Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab, the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. The head of this Operations Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy No.4 was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. It is our Document No.
384-PS, referred to by the U.S. Chief of Counsel in his opening address.
I shall not burden the Tribunal by introducing two identical copies of the same order.
Basic Order No.24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan. I shall therefore read it in its entirety, some two pages of English translation.
"The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:
"1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East."
"Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.
"The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The 'Barbarossa' operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this."
Then there is a marginal note, "Slightly exaggerated."
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration" -
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put in?
MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of the order.
THE PRESIDENT: By whom?
MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order, which was the Naval War Staff.
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters.
Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
"In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.
"3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
"This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
"a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this, Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
"b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
"d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -- extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)."A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
"4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
"The working out of the details is the responsibility of the 'Main Commission' with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.
"5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operations." will see that it went to the heads of all of the armed forces. Armed Forces High Command, Joint Operations Staff, Intelligence Division and to the Chief of Foreign Affairs simultaneously for Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read than the Nazi's cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941. The inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases. I shall pass war, for the moment, the references to the United States in Basic Order No 2* and take that point up later.
I now wish to refer to our Document No. C-152, which has already been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit No. G.B.-122. This document is the top secret record of a meeting on 18 March, 1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, a meeting attended by Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with paragraph 11 in this phase, where Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy is speaking.
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Phillipines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible." conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence in paragraph 11 of our Document C-152.
"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England." Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract. induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of March, 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A Report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives, is contained in our Document No. 1877-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 152. English. I shall now read from the top of page one of the English translation.
"The RAM (That is Ribbentrop) resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the disucssions with the Russians too far.
He did not know how the situa-
tion would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the south on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however, believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it ants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
"He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable would have to be considered possible." the English translation.
"Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarine based on the Phillippines, and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Homo Fleets, he had again discussed thesituation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year, would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.
"Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
"The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore, Perhaps, for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the Phillippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
"In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore, it might be possible, that his attitued toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to feel the pro-British --" -- I guess that is "fool" -- "in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
"In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the RAM remarked). He followed, here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then the nation will be united.' The Japanese need to be shaken UP to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not." English translation:
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject, when had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
"The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer -- who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time -- could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to disappear from Singaport immediately.
"Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British "The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods "Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger, expert capture Singapore.
As a cautious Foreign Minister, he doubled this estimate for six months.
If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more "If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, oil fields would be set afire.
They could be brought into operation again "The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indier simultaneously with the capture of Singapore."
pushed the Japanese another step alone the road to aggressive war. The Archives, are contained in our Document No. 1882-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit No. USA 153.
I shall read a few brief extracts from these notes, "In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, from the League of Nations."
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would "In conclusion the Reich Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trips:
"1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this.
Even England would have to concede it, "2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany.
"3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war.
Such an entry into really leading role in East Asia."
same tack I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes.
Japan's entry will hasten the inevitable end. But I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances, conflict.
The references to the weakness of the United States scattered against the British Commonwealth.
This is our Document No. 1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit U.S.A.154.
This document is a top secret report, Intelligence Division of the OKW.
I wish merely to call attention, at it is stated:
"The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand".
I shall return to this Document again, later. I point out here, Next, exhortations to Japanese aggression against the U.S.S.R.I invite the Tribunal's attention at this point, to the language of th Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition.
I quote, beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page: "The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a 'new order of things.'" particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a "stab in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again, the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, regarding collaboration with Japan, the Nazi conspirators, as I have shown, had been preparing "Fall Barbarossa", the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation." on 29 March, 1941, almost three weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal's attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. in April of 1941, can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July, 1941, Ribbentrop dispatched a code telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo.
The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first paragraph of the English translation:
"Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would, not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area, as soon as her military preparations are completed." the English translation, the sentence beginning "However"-
"However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of tine. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons.
I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there."
We have Ott's reply to this telegram, dated 13 July, 1941. This is our document number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit No. USA 156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English translation.
"Telegram; Secret Cipher System." Sent 14 July from Tokyo; arrived lit July, 1941. "As fast as possible."
"I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation." induce the Japanese to aggression against the USSR. I shall present three documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first is our document 2911-PS, which contains notes of a discussion.
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. were sweeping forward in the USSR, and the fall of Savastopol had just been announced. the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof:
"He, the Foreign Minister, asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war. If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at this time it would lead to her -- Russia's --final moral collapse; at least, it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at the present to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia.
"He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for ten minutes.
(Whereupon at 1540 hours a recess was taken).
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA 158. This is a record of a conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1939. in the broad expanses of the USSR had changed somewhat. completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large areas from the hands of the invader.
Combined United States and British forces had already landed in North Africa.
You will note as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argument at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar refrain of "So sorry, please," likewise appears to have crept in. the end of organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal. between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appears in the English translation in the document book.
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger, which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.
"The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
"The RAM brought up the question after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would, combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently, that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts."