"Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However, it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.
"The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore, Perhaps, for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan, on the other hand, there was the probability of losing the Phillippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament he would have nothing to offset such a loss.
"In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore, it might be possible, that his attitued toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to feel the pro-British --" -- I guess that is "fool" -- "in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.
"In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. ('Nothing succeeds like success,' the RAM remarked). He followed, here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: 'You open fire, then the nation will be united.' The Japanese need to be shaken UP to awaken. After all, as an Oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not." English translation:
"Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject, when had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.
"The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer -- who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time -- could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at her disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British Fleet in Singapore. Thus, the British Fleet would be forced to disappear from Singaport immediately.
"Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British "The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods "Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger, expert capture Singapore.
As a cautious Foreign Minister, he doubled this estimate for six months.
If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more "If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherland East Indies, oil fields would be set afire.
They could be brought into operation again "The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherland East Indier simultaneously with the capture of Singapore."
pushed the Japanese another step alone the road to aggressive war. The Archives, are contained in our Document No. 1882-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit No. USA 153.
I shall read a few brief extracts from these notes, "In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, from the League of Nations."
"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would "In conclusion the Reich Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trips:
"1) Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this.
Even England would have to concede it, "2) There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany.
"3) Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war.
Such an entry into really leading role in East Asia."
same tack I have previously noted. Germany has already won the war for all practical purposes.
Japan's entry will hasten the inevitable end. But I also invite the Tribunal's attention to Ribbentrop's assurances, conflict.
The references to the weakness of the United States scattered against the British Commonwealth.
This is our Document No. 1538-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit U.S.A.154.
This document is a top secret report, Intelligence Division of the OKW.
I wish merely to call attention, at it is stated:
"The preparations for attack on Singapore and Manila stand".
I shall return to this Document again, later. I point out here, Next, exhortations to Japanese aggression against the U.S.S.R.I invite the Tribunal's attention at this point, to the language of th Indictment on Page 10 of the English edition.
I quote, beginning with the eighth line from the top of the page: "The Nazi conspirators conceived that Japanese aggression would weaken and handicap those nations with whom they were at war and those with whom they contemplated war. Accordingly, the Nazi conspirators exhorted Japan to seek a 'new order of things.'" particular reference to the British Commonwealth of Nations. We now turn to their efforts to induce the Japanese to commit a "stab in the back" on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Here again, the Defendant Ribbentrop appears as a central figure.
For some months prior to the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, regarding collaboration with Japan, the Nazi conspirators, as I have shown, had been preparing "Fall Barbarossa", the plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R. Basic Order No. 24 decreed, however, that the Japanese "must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation." on 29 March, 1941, almost three weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, Ribbentrop nevertheless hinted at things to come. The report of this conference, contained in 1877-PS, has already been introduced as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 152 and read into the record. I wish to invite the Tribunal's attention again to the first two paragraphs of the English translation of 1877-PS, where Ribbentrop assured Matsuoka that the largest part of the German Army was on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, fully prepared to open the attack at any time. Ribbentrop then added that, although he believed that the U.S.S.R. would try to avoid developments leading to war, nevertheless a conflict with the Soviet Union, even if not probable, would have to be considered possible. in April of 1941, can only be conjectured. Once the Nazis had unleashed their aggression against the U.S.S.R. in June of 1941, the tenor of Ribbentrop's remarks left no room for doubt. On 10 July, 1941, Ribbentrop dispatched a code telegram to Ott, the German Ambassador in Tokyo.
The telegram is our Document 2896-PS, which I now introduce as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 155. I quote from numbered Paragraph 4 of that telegram, which is the first paragraph of the English translation:
"Please take this opportunity to thank the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow for conveying the cable report. It would be convenient if we could keep on receiving news from Russia this way. In summing up, I would like to say: I have now, as in the past, full confidence in the Japanese Policy, and in the Japanese Foreign Minister, first of all because the present Japanese Government would really act inexcusably toward the future of its nation if it would, not take this unique opportunity to solve the Russian problem, as well as to secure for all time its expansion to the South and settle the Chinese matter. Since Russia, as reported by the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, is in effect close to collapse, a report which coincides with our own observations as far as we are able to judge at the present war situation, it is simply impossible that Japan does not solve the matter of Vladivostok and the Siberian area, as soon as her military preparations are completed." the English translation, the sentence beginning "However"-
"However, I ask you to employ all available means in further insisting upon Japan's entry into the war against Russia at the soonest possible date, as I have mentioned already in my note to Matsuoka. The sooner this entry is effected, the better it is. The natural objective still remains that we and Japan join hands on the Trans-Siberian railroad, before winter starts. After the collapse of Russia, however, the position of the Three Power Pact States in the world will be so gigantic that the question of England's collapse or the total destruction of the English islands, respectively, will only be a matter of tine. An America totally isolated from the rest of the world would then be faced with our taking possession of the remaining positions of the British Empire which are important for the Three Power Pact countries. I have the unshakable conviction that a carrying through of the new order as desired by us will be a matter of course, and there would be no insurmountable difficulties if the countries of the Three Power Pact stand close together and encounter every action of the Americans with the same weapons.
I ask you to report in the near future as often as possible and in detail on the political situation there."
We have Ott's reply to this telegram, dated 13 July, 1941. This is our document number 2897-PS, which I offer in evidence as Exhibit No. USA 156. After reading the heading, I shall skip to the last paragraph on page 3 of the German text, which is the paragraph appearing in the English translation.
"Telegram; Secret Cipher System." Sent 14 July from Tokyo; arrived lit July, 1941. "As fast as possible."
"I am trying with all means to work toward Japan's entry into the war against Russia as soon as possible. Especially using arguments of personal message of Foreign minister and telegram cited above, to convince Matsuoka personally, as well as the Foreign Office, military elements, nationalists and friendly business men. I believe that, according to military preparations, Japanese participation will soon take place. The greatest obstacles against which one has to fight thereby is the disunity among activist groups which, without unified command, follows various aims and only slowly adjusts itself to the changed situation." induce the Japanese to aggression against the USSR. I shall present three documents covering July of 1942 and March and April of 1943. The first is our document 2911-PS, which contains notes of a discussion.
between Ribbentrop and Oshima, Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, on 9 July 1942. were sweeping forward in the USSR, and the fall of Savastopol had just been announced. the relevant extracts appearing in the English translation thereof:
"He, the Foreign Minister, asked to see the Ambassador at this time when the situation was as described, because now a question of fateful importance had arisen concerning the joint conduct of the war. If Japan felt itself sufficiently strong militarily, the moment for Japan to attack Russia was probably now. He thought it possible that if Japan attacked Russia at this time it would lead to her -- Russia's --final moral collapse; at least, it would hasten the collapse of her present system. In any case, never again would Japan have such an opportunity as existed at the present to eliminate once and for all the Russian colossus in Eastern Asia.
"He had discussed this question with the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer was of the same opinion, but he wanted to emphasize one point right away: Japan should attack Russia only if she felt sufficiently strong for such an undertaking. Under no circumstances should Japanese operations against Russia be allowed to bog down at the half-way mark, and we do not want to urge Japan into an action that is not mutually profitable."
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now, for ten minutes.
(Whereupon at 1540 hours a recess was taken).
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I now offer in evidence our Document Number 2954-PS as Exhibit USA 158. This is a record of a conference between Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima on 6 March 1939. in the broad expanses of the USSR had changed somewhat. completely defeated the German forces at Stalingrad and inflicted very severe losses. Further north and west their winter offensive had removed large areas from the hands of the invader.
Combined United States and British forces had already landed in North Africa.
You will note as I read that the tone of Ribbentrop's argument at this time reflects the changed military situation. The familiar refrain of "So sorry, please," likewise appears to have crept in. the end of organized Japanese resistance on the Island of Guadalcanal. between Ribbentrop and Oshima on 6 March 1943, which appears in the English translation in the document book.
"Ambassador Oshima declared that he received a telegram from Tokyo, and he is to report by order of his Government to the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs the following: The suggestion of the German Government to attack Russia was the subject of a common conference between the Japanese Government and the Imperial headquarters, during which the question was discussed in detail and investigated exactly. The result is the following: The Japanese Government absolutely recognizes the danger, which threatens from Russia, and completely understands the desire of its German ally, that Japan on her part will also enter the war against Russia. However, it is not possible for the Japanese Government, considering the present war situation, to enter into the war. It is rather of the conviction that it would be in the common interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On the other hand, the Japanese Government would never disregard the Russian question.
"The Japanese Government has the intention to become aggressive again in the future on other fronts.
"The RAM brought up the question after the explanation by the Ambassador, how the continued waging of the war is envisaged in Tokyo. At present, Germany wages the war against the common enemies, England and America, mostly alone, while Japan mostly behaves more defensively. However, it would be more correct that all powers allied in the Three Power Pact would, combine their forces to defeat England and America, but also Russia together. It is not good when one part must fight alone. One cannot overstrain the German national strength. He has worried silently, that certain forces work in Tokyo, who are of the opinion and who propagate it, that Germany would come through the fight victoriously, and that therefore Japan should consolidate itself further at first, before it makes further and utmost efforts."
quotation:
"Then the RAM again brought up the question of the attack on Russia by Japan, and he declared that after all, the fight on the Burma front as well as in the South is actually more of a maritime problem, and on all fronts except those in China there are mostly very few ground forces committed. Therefore, the attack on Russia is primarily an Army affair, and he asked himself if the necessary forces would not be ready for that."
Ribbentrop kept on trying. He held another conference with Oshima about three weeks later on 13 April 1943. The top secret notes of this conference are contained in our Document 2929-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 159.
I shall quote only one sentence:
"The Reichminister for Foreign Affairs then stressed again that without any doubt this year presented the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt strong enough and had sufficient anti-tank weapons at her disposal to attack Russia, which certainly would never again be as weak as she is at the moment." in large measure responsible for the appearance of millions of Americans in uniform all over the world. against the United States, as noted by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening statement, present a two-fold aspect; one of preparations by the Nazis themselves for attack from across the Atlantic, and the other of fomenting of war in the Pacific. the Japanese to war against the British Commonwealth and the U.S.S.R., I have referred to some documents and quoted some sentences relating to the United States. I shall take those documents up again in their relevant passages to show their particular application. I have also, in the treatment of Ribbentrop's urging the Japanese to war against the U.S.S.R., gone beyond the dates of 7 December and 11 December 1941, when the Japanese and German Governments respectively initiated and declared aggressive war against the United States. acceptance of the direction in which their actions were leading as well as the universal aspects of their conspiracy and of their alliance with the Japanese. Their intentions against the United States must be viewed in the focus of both their overall plan and their immediate commitments elsewhere. That their overall plan involved ultimate aggressive war against the United States was intimated by the Defendant Goering in a speech on 8 July 1938, when these conspirators had already forcibly annexed Austria and were carrying their plan against Czechoslovakia.
industry, and the copy that we have was transmitted as the inclosure to a secret memorandum from Goering's adjutant to General Udet who was then in charge of experimental research for the Luftwaffe. It is contained in our Document Number R-140, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 160.
I invite the Tribunal's attention to the statement in the covering memorandum that the inclosure is a copy of the shorthand minutes of the conference. I shall not go through the long speech, in which Goering called for increased aircraft production and pleaded the necessity for full mobilization of German industrial capacity. I wish to quote just two sentences, which appear on page 33 of the German text and page 11 of the English translation. Quoting from the second full paragraph on page 11 of the English translation, starting with the third sentence from the end of the paragraph:
"I still am missing entirely the bomber which flies with 5 tons of explosives as far as New York and back. I should be extremely happy to have such a bomber so that I would at last be able to stop somewhat the mouth of the arrogant people over there."
THE PRESIDENT: Which page is this on?
MR. ALDERMAN: Page all of the English translation. Goering's fervent hope, of course, was not capable of realization at that time, either technically or in the face of the Nazi conspirators' schedule of aggression that has been outlined here in the past several days. aggressive war in Europe, up to the launching of the campaign against the U.S.S.R., it is only reasonable to believe that these conspirators were not disposed to involve the United States at war at that time in war. Nevertheless, even in the fall of 1940 the prosecution of war against the United States of America at a later date was on the military agenda. This is clearly shown in a document which we have found in the files of the OKL, the German Air Force files.
It is document 376-PS, which I now offer as Exhibit Number USA 161.
This document is a memorandum marked "Chefsache", the German designation for top secret, from a Major von Falkenstein to an unspecified general, presumably a Luftwaffe General. that time the Luftwaffe liaison officer with the Operations Staff of the OKW, which was the staff headed by the Defendant Jodl. His memorandum, which he characterizes as a "brief resume on the military questions current here", is dated the 29th of October 1940. It covers several questions. I shall quote to you Numbered Paragraph 5, which appears at the bottom of the first page of the English translation and carries over to the reverse side of the one-sheet document.
"The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:
"(a) No other operational commitment "(b) Portuguese neutrality "(c) Support of France and Spain.
"a brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF." -- or the German Air Force.
The Nazi's military interest in the United States is further indicated by Paragraph 7, which I read:
"General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10 to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits." early gains in the aggression against the USSR, the Fuehrer signed an order for further preliminary preparations for the attack on the United States. This Top Secret order, found in the files of the German Navy, is our Document No. c-74, which I now offer as Exhibit USA 162. I read from the first paragraph of that text, just preceding the paragraph numbered (1):
"By virtue of the intentions announced in Directive No. 32, for the further conduct of the War, I lay down the following principles to govern the strength of personnel and of material supplies "(1) In General:
"The military domination of Europe after the defeat of Russia will enable the strength of the Army to be considerably reduced in the near future. As far as the reduced strength of the Army will allow, the Armoured units will be greatly increased.
"Naval armament must be restricted to those measures which have a direct connection with the conduct of the war against England and, should the case arise, against America.
"The main effort in armament will be shifted to the Air Force, which must be greatly increased in strength." at least preliminary plans of their own against the United States. The Nazis plan with regard to the United States was, however, a complex one, involving in addition collaboration with the Japanese. In the course of their repeated representations to the Japanese to undertake an assault against British possessions in the Pacific Far East, they again considered war against the United States. Japan. This is our Document C-75, which I have put in as USA-151. I have read it in its entirety into the record. The Tribunal will recall that in that basic order, which was issued on 5 March 1941, the Nazi policy was state in subparagraph (3)(a) as "forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war." framework of that policy, the possibility of the United States' entry into the Far Eastern conflict which the Nazis were then instigating. This could result from an attack by Japan on possessions of the United States practically simultaneously with the assault on the British Empire, as actually happened. Other possibilities of the involvement of the United States were also discussed. This, basic order number 24 stated -- and I am referring to subparagraph (3)(c), on the top of page two of the document, C-75:
"The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany." subparagraph (3)(d):
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)." involvement, as well as a clear intent to attack. The vital threat to United States interests if Japan were to capture Singapore was also envisioned by the defendant Raeder in his meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler and the defendants Keitel and Jodl. These minutes are contained in our Document C-152, which has already been put in as Exhibit No. GB 122. I wish now to repeat the four sentences of Item 11 of the minutes of that conference, contained on page 1 of the English translation. I am quoting the defendant Raeder:
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (the whole English fleet contained, unpreparedness of the United States of America for war against Japan, inferiority, of the United States vis-a-vis the Japanese.) Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England. Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, the Phillipines, Borneo, and Dutch East Indies). Japan, wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the USA. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible." involvement as a result of the course of aggression that he was urging on the Japanese. I refer again to his meeting of 23 February, 1941 with the Japanese ambassador, Oshima, the Exhibit No. USA 129.
subparagraph (2), near the bottom of Page 3 of the English translation, of a declaration of war.
Two paragraphs later, Ribbentrop practically dropped the pretense that the United States would not be involved.
I translation:
"The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that the final victory of the countries of the Throe Power Pact.
The Foreign morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's en try into the war.
If, however, contrary to all expectations, the end.
He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job.
Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that unfortunate victory of this fleet in Japanese waters."
"The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly on the basis of new affronts by the U.S.A. to break off diplomatic relations.
Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this;
arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lessen should open the opinion.
Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong.
The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda.
The question, however, was in no way acute at the time."
ment of the United States. Notes of this conference are contained in our document 1877-PS, which I have already intorduced as Exhibit "USA-152", an I have read it into the record.
The relevant statements appear in the of the English translation.
I shall not take the Tribunal's time to read and could lead to United States' involvement in the contemplated Far Eastern conflict.
This document is our 1881-PS, report of the conference on 4 April 1941.
I've already offered, in my opening statement to the Tribunal two weeks ago, document 1881-PS as Exhibit Number "USA-33", and
THE PRESIDENT: I think we might treat it as being in evidence.
MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to emphasize, however, that the passages probable involvement of the United States in the Far Eastern conflict that the Nazis were urging, but also a knowledge on their part that the Japanese Army and Navy were actually preparing war plans against the United States.