All of them, however, appear to blend into one grand motif of Nazi policy. The pattern into which these varied reasons impelling the decision to attack may be said to fall, is the traditional Nazi ambition for expansion to the East at the expense of the USSR. This Nazi version of an earlier imperial, imperative "Drang Nach Osten" or the drive to the East had been a cardinal principle of the Nazi Party almost since its birth and rested on the twin bases of political strategy and economic aggrandizement. Politically such action meant elimination of the powerful country to the East, which might constitute a threat to German ambitions, and acquisitions of Lebensraum, while on the economic side magnificent opportunities for the plunder of vast quantities of food, raw materials, and other supplies, going far beyond any legitimate exploitation under the Geneva Convention principles for military purposes. Undoubtedly the demands of the German War economy for food and raw material served to revive the attractiveness of the economic side of this theory while the difficulties Germany was experiencing in defeating England reaffirmed for the Nazi conspirators the temporarily forgotten Nazi political imperative of eliminating, as a political factor, their one formidable opponent on the continent. Kampf, where he stated: I quote from page 641 of the Houghton Mifflin, English edition, as follows:
"There are two reasons which induce me to submit to a special examination the relation of Germany to Russia:
"1. Here perhaps we are dealing with the most decisive concern of all German foreign affairs; and "2. This question is also the touchstone for the political capacity of the young National Socialist movements to think clearly and to act correctly."
Again at page 654 of the same edition:
"And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-war period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the east.
At long last we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre-war period and shift to the soil policy of the future.
"If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states." in the stated purposes of the organization which the defendant Rosenberg set up to administer the occupied Eastern Territories. I have already discussed this material and need repeat it now. In a speech, however, which he delivered, two days before the attack, to the people most interested in the problem of the East, Rosenberg restated in his usual somewhat mystic fashion the political basis for the campaign and its interrelationship with the economic goal. I should like to read a short extract from that speech, which is Document number 1058-PS and which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit USA No. 147. The part I read is from page 9 of the German text:
"The job of feeding the German people stands, this year, without a doubt, at the top of the list of Germany's claims on the East; and here the southern territories and the northern caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. We see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our part to feed also the Russian people with the products of that surplus territory. We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings. A very extensive evacuation will be necessary, without any doubt, and it is sure that the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians. A later decision will have to determine to which extent industries can still be maintained there (Wagon Factories, etc.). The consideration and execution of this policy in the Russian area proper is for the German Reich and its future a tremendous and by no neans negative task, as might appear, if one takes only the harsh necessity of the evacuation into consideration. The conversion of Russian dynamics towards the East is a task which requires the strongest characters. Perhaps, this decision will also be approved by a coming Russia later, not in 30 but maybe in a 100 years." Britain had served to further strengthen them in their belief of the political necessity of eliminating the Soviet Union as a European factor before Germany could completely achieve her role as the master of Europe.
in our discussion of the organization set-up under Goering and General Thomas to carry out the economic exploitation of the territory they occupied. The purely materialistic basis far the attack was unmistakable and if any doubt existed that at least one of the main purposes of the invasion was to steal the food and raw material needed for the Nazi war machine regardless of the horrible consequences such robbery would entail, that doubt is dispelled by a memorandum which bears our No. 2718-PS and which I introduced earlier during my opening statement as Exhibit USA No. 32, showing clear and conscious recognition that these Nazi plans would no doubt result in starving to death millions of people by robbing them of their food. randum in which he stated that General Keitel had confirmed to him Hitler's present conception of the German Economic policy concerning raw material. This policy expressed the almost unbelievable heartless theory that less manpower would be used in the conquest of sources of raw materials than would be necessary to produce synthetics in lieu of such raw materials. This is our Document No. 1456PS, and I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA 148. I should like to read the first two paragraphs.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we better do that after the adjournment.
(Whereupon, at 1255 hours the hearing of the Tribunal recessed to reconvene at 1400 hours.)
Tribunal, in the matter of: The United States of
THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the defendant Kaltenbrunner is now in Court.
Will you stand up, please. (Whereupon the defendant Kaltenbrunner stands up in the Defendants' box). In accordance with Article Twenty-four of the Charter, you must now plead either guilty or not guilty.
THE DEFENDANT KALTENBRUNNER: I am not believe that I have made myself guilty. I don't believe that I have made myself guilty.
THE PRESIDENT: That is all of you. Mr. Alderman.
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please this Tribunal. I had just put into evidence document 1456-PS as exhibit USA-148. I now read from this document on page one:
"The following is the new conception of the Fuehrer, which confirmed later on by Field Marshal Keitel:
Paragraph 1.
autarkical endeavors. It is impossible, to try and or other measures.
For instance, it is impossible, to entirely depend on it.
All these autarkical endeavors impossible to provide it.
One has to choose another way.
What one does not have, but needs, one must conquer. The running of the synthetic factories in question.
The aim "interest to us for the war economy, by conquering "At the time the 4-year-plan was established, I issued the be too great.
Nevertheless, my solution was always to economic alliances."
aggression. We have seen the Nazi conspirators as they planned, prepared, and finally initiated their wanton attack upon the Soviet Union. Others will carry on the tale and describe the horrible manner in which they waged this war of aggression, and the countless crimes they committed in its wake. When I consider the solemn pledge of non-aggression; the base and sinister motives involved; the months of secret planning and preparation; and the unbelievable suffering intentionally and deliberately wrought -- when I consider all of this I feel fully justified in saying that never before - and God help us never again - in the history of relations between Sovereign nations has a blacker chapter been written than the one which tells of the Nazi conspirators' unprovoked invasion of the territory of the Soviet Union. For those responsible, and they are here before you, the defendants in this case - it might be just to let the punishment fit the crime. aggressive war case, German collaboration with Italy and Japan, and aggressive war against the United States. The relevant portions of the indictment are set forth in subsection 7 under Section IV (F) of Count 1, appearing at pages nine and ten of the printed English text of the indictment. The materials relating to this unholy alliance of the three fascist powers, and to the aggressive war against the United States have been fathered together in a document book, marked with the letter "Q", which I now submit to the Tribunal.
collaboration, I should like to invite the attention of the Tribunal to the significance of this phase. In the course of the joint presentation by the British and American prosecution in the past several days, we have seen the swastika carried forward by force of arms from a tightly controlled and remilitarized Germany to the four corners of Europe. The elements of a conspiracy I am now about to discuss project the Nazi plan upon a universal screen, involving the "Older World" of Asia, and the "New World" of the United States of America. As a result, the wars of aggression that were planned in Berlin, and launched across the frontiers of Poland ended some six years later, almost to the day, in surrender ceremonies upon a United States battleship riding at anchor in the Bay of Tokyo.
The first formal alliance between Hitler's Germany and the Japanese Government was the Anti-Comintern Pact signed in Berlin on 25 November 1936. This agreement, on its face, was directed against the activities of the Communist International. It was subsequently adhered to by Italy on 6 November 1937. state documents, in accordance with Article twenty-one of the Charter. The German text of these treaties 00 the original German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, and the subsequent Protocol of Adherence by Italy -are to be found in volumes four and five of the Dokumente der deutschen Politik, respectively. The English translation of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of 25 November 1936 is contained in our Document No. 2508-PS; the English translation of the Protocol of Adherence by Italy of 6 November 1937, is contained in our Document No. 2506-PS. Both of these documents are included in the Document Books which have just been handed up to the Tribunal.
shall submit regarding the defendant Ribbentrop's active participation in collaboration with the Japanese, that Ribbentrop signed the Anti-Comintern Pact for Germany, at Berlin, even though at that time, November 1936, Ribbentrop was not the German Foreign Minister, but simply Hitler's Special Ambassador Plenipotentiary. was signed, and one year after the initiation of war in Europe, the German, Italian and Japanese Governments signed another pact at Berlin a ten year military-economic alliance. Again I note that the defendant Ribbentrop signed for Germany, this time in his capacity as Foreign Minister. The official German text of this pact, as well as the Japanese and Italian texts, together with an English translation, is contained in our Document No. 2643-PS, which has been certified by the signature and seal of the United States Secretary of State. I now offer document No. 2643-PS as Exhibit No. USA-149. and collaboration with each other in the establishment of a "new order" in Europe and East Asia. I should like to read into the record parts of this far-reaching agreement.
"The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan consider it as a the world be given its own proper place.
They have therefore prosperity and welfare of the peoples there.
Furthermore, "the world as are inclined to give to their endeavors a direction peace as the ultimate goal may thus be realized.
Accordingly, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan have agreed as follows:
Article 1: Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany Article 2: Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership Article 3: Germany, Italy and Japan agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid basis.
They further undertake to assist conflict."
"The present Pact shall come into force immediately upon signature and force."
the world that the fascist leaders of Germany, Japan and Italy had cemented a full military alliance to achieve world domination, and to establish the "new order" presaged by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, and the Nazi overflow into Austria early in 1938. Secretary of State of the United States at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact. This statement appears in the official U. S. Publication, "Peace and War, U. S. Foreign Policy, 1931-1941" which has already been offered as Exhibit No. U.S.A.-122. Mr. Hull's statement is No. 184 therein. It is also our Document No. 2944-PS, and both the English text and a German translation thereof are included in the document books. I now quote statement by the Secretary of State, September 27, 1940:
"The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the which has existed for several years.
Announcement of the called attention.
That such an agreement has been in process of termining -- in the determining of this country's policies."
I shall not --- that is the end of the quotation. I shall not attempt here to trace the relationships and negotiations leading up to the Tripartite Pact of 27 November 1940. I shall note, however, one example of the type of German-Japanese relationship existing before the formalization of the Tripartite Pact. This is the record of conversation of 31 January 1939 between Himmler and General Oshima, Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, which was referred to by the U.S. Chief of Counsel in his opening address. This document, which is signed by Himmler in crayon, is our Document No. 2195-PS. I offer it in evidence as Exhibit No. USA-150.
I now quote the file memorandum:
"Today I visited General Oshima. The conversation ranged over the following subjects:
"1) The Fuehrer speech, which pleased him very much, especially "2) We discussed conclusion of a treaty to consolidate the triangle Germany/Italy/Japan into an even firmer mold.
He also told me that, together with German counter-espionage (abwehr), he was Russia and emanating from the Caucasus and the Ukraine.
However, "3) Furthermore, he had succeeded up to now to send 10 Russians with bombs across the Caucasian frontier.
These Russians had the mission to kill Stalin.
A number of additional Russians, whom he had also sent across, had been shot at the frontier."
the Nazi conspirators, once their military and economic alliance with Japan had been formalized, exhorted the Japanese to aggression against those nations with whom they were at war, and those with whom they contemplated war.
In this the Nazi conspirators pursued a course strikingly parallel to that followed in their relationship with the other members of the European Axis. On 10 June 1940, in fulfillment of her alliance with Germany, Italy had carried out her "Stab in the back" by declaring war against France and Great Britain. The nazi conspirators set about to induce similar action by Japan on the other side of the world. tion was aimed, at various times, were the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States of America. I shall deal with each of these nations in the order named. available to us -- the Nazi conspirators undertook to exploit their alliance with Japan by exhortations to commit aggression against the British Commonwealth. Again the figure of the defendant Ribbentrop appears. On that date, 23 February 1941, he held a conference with General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin, at which he urged that the Japanese open hostilities against the British in the Far East as soon as possible. against the Soviet Union as Exhibit No. USA-129. A part of it has already been read into the record and I now intend to read another portion. I shall again come back to this document when dealing with the German-Japanese collaboration as regards the United States. on 2 March, sent copies of an extract of the record of this conference to his various ambassadors and ministers for their strict confidential and purely personal information, with the further note that -- and I quote: "These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation with the general political situation facing Germany in early spring 1941." 1834-PS, to the end of the first paragraph on that page, and then skip to the last three sentences of the second paragraph:
"Extract from the Report of the Conference of the Reichs Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941.
"After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been fully vindicated. He" -- that is, Ribbentrop --"regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now."
Then, skipping:
"Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?" for Japanese intervention against the British. First outlining the intended air and U-Boat warfare against England, he said -- and I now quote the last two sentences in paragraph 4 on page 2 of the English translation:
"Thereby England's situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions." of the English translation, I quote Defendant Ribbentrop again:
"The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides, our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English -American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English, (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. On order of the Fuehrer the anti-aircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunitions plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and anti-aircraft guns.
"Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to see for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the cooperation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England's key position in the Far East. Japan on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war.
There were three reasons for quick action:
"1) Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.). The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.
"2) A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.
"3) In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy."
I should like to note at this point the subtlety of Ribbentrop's argument. First he told the Japanese Ambassador that Germany had already practically won the war by herself. Nevertheless, he suggested that the war could be successfully terminated more quickly with Japan's aid and that the moment was propitious for Japan's entry. Then, referring to the spoils of conquest, he indicated that Japan would be best advised to pick up by herself during the war the positions she wanted, implying that she would have to earn her share of the booty, which is reminiscent of that statement I read to you earlier from the Fuehrer, that those who wished to be in on the meal must take a part in the cooking.
Continuing Ribbentrop's argument, to show the real nature of the GermanJapanese alliance, I shall now read the top two paragraphs on page 5 of the English translation of 1834-PS.
"The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded. On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indo-China). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.
"Ambassador Oshima definitely a greed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be found on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis.
The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the EastAsian sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as heretofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought." instigation to war by the Defendant Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. I shall return to him again in this connection. military representatives in the encouragement and provocation of wars of aggression. I therefore offer in evidence our Document No. C-75, as Exhibit No. USA-151. Keitel as Chief of the OKW, and entitled "Basic Order No.24 regarding Collaboration with Japan." It is dated 5 March 1941, about a week and a half after Ribbentrop's conference with Oshima that I have just discussed. It was distributed in 14 copies to the highest commands of the Army, Wavy, and Air Force, as well as to the Foreign Office. We have turned up two copies of this order, identical except for handwritten notations presumably made by the recipients. C-75, the document I have introduced, is Copy No. 2 of the order distributed to the Naval War Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, the OKM. We also have Copy No.4, designed for the Wehrmacht Fuehrungstab, the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. The head of this Operations Staff was the Defendant Jodl. Copy No.4 was found in the OKW files at Flensburg. It is our Document No.
384-PS, referred to by the U.S. Chief of Counsel in his opening address.
I shall not burden the Tribunal by introducing two identical copies of the same order.
Basic Order No.24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan. I shall therefore read it in its entirety, some two pages of English translation.
"The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:
"1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East."
"Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.
"The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The 'Barbarossa' operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this."
Then there is a marginal note, "Slightly exaggerated."
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration" -
THE PRESIDENT (interposing): Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put in?
MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of the order.
THE PRESIDENT: By whom?
MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order, which was the Naval War Staff.
"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters.
Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
"In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions to himself.
"3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
"This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
"a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this, Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
"b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
"c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
"d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.
"In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power -- extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia)."A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
"4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
"The working out of the details is the responsibility of the 'Main Commission' with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.
"5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operations." will see that it went to the heads of all of the armed forces. Armed Forces High Command, Joint Operations Staff, Intelligence Division and to the Chief of Foreign Affairs simultaneously for Foreign Office.
It appears from what I have just read than the Nazi's cardinal operational principle in their collaboration with Japan was, as early as March 1941. The inducement of Japan to aggression against Singapore and other British Far Eastern bases. I shall pass war, for the moment, the references to the United States in Basic Order No 2* and take that point up later.
I now wish to refer to our Document No. C-152, which has already been introduced by the British prosecution as Exhibit No. G.B.-122. This document is the top secret record of a meeting on 18 March, 1941, about two weeks after the issuance of Basic Order No. 24, a meeting attended by Hitler, the Defendant Raeder, the Defendant Keitel and the Defendant Jodl. We are concerned only with paragraph 11 in this phase, where Raeder, then Commander in Chief of the Navy is speaking.
"Japan must take steps to seize Singapore as soon as possible, since the opportunity will never again be as favorable (whole English Fleet contained; unpreparedness of U.S.A. for war against Japan; inferiority of U.S. Fleet vis-a-vis the Japanese). Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers she will only carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England.
Germany must, therefore, concentrate all her efforts on spurring Japan to act immediately. If Japan has Singapore, all other East Asiatic questions regarding the U.S.A. and England are thereby solved (Guam, Phillipines, Borneo, Dutch East Indies).
"Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible." conferences had already been held with the Japanese to discuss the activation of Japanese military support against the British and to urge their immediate attack on Singapore. I quote again the second sentence in paragraph 11 of our Document C-152.
"Japan is indeed making preparations for this action, but according to all declarations made by Japanese officers, she will carry it out if Germany proceeds to land in England." Japanese to eliminate this condition precedent to their performance under the contract. induce the Japanese to aggression against the British Commonwealth. On the 29th of March, 1941, he met with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, who was then in Berlin. A Report of their conversations, found in the German Foreign Office Archives, is contained in our Document No. 1877-PS, which I now offer in evidence as Exhibit No. U.S.A. 152. English. I shall now read from the top of page one of the English translation.
"The RAM (That is Ribbentrop) resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter's impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the disucssions with the Russians too far.
He did not know how the situa-
tion would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the south on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German Army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however, believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany, however, enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had, of course, even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it ants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.
"He could not know, of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable would have to be considered possible." the English translation.
"Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears expressed by the Japanese of possible attacks by submarine based on the Phillippines, and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Homo Fleets, he had again discussed thesituation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year, would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.