a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official figure, and requoted by the London Times, which is the principal paper in England. Wasn't that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up is the Cabinet? the London papers--they don't always tell the truth.
Q No. That is a perfectly reasonable comment. Newspapers, like egeryone else, are misinformed. But when you had a widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did you not,as one of the respectable elements in this government, think that it was worthy of bringing it up in cabinet and finding out whether it was true or not?
A How do you know that I did not do that?
Q That is what I am asking. Did you bring it up, and what was the result when you did? see Hitler -- not the cabinet, but Hitler, all the time.
Q That is not what I asked you. You see, defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the cabinet. Here was a cabinet established with conservative elements to keep it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the cabinet and try and get the support of Herr von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other conservative gentlemen in the cabinet, of whom we have heard? Why did you not bring it up? me to tell Hitler directly. the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth while to bring a matter up in the Reich cabinet? Within two months of Hitler's earning into power, it had become so "Fuehrer-principled" that you could not bring it up in the cabinet? judge it, and that considered direct presentations made to Hitler more effective.
Q I see. Well, now, I do not suppose you were interested, but did you know about the putting into concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the defendant von Papen -- Herr von Ossietzski, Herr Muehsam, or Dr. Hermann Duncker, or any of the other left-wing writers and lawyers and politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp from which they never returned?
A No; no, I did not know that.
Q You do not know at all?
in June, you knew very well how, at any rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany because of the treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not, when you wont to the world economic conference in June?
A Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was read in court.
Q Now you say that your reaction was to go to Hitler and pretest. I just want you to look at what the existing documents show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you look at Document D-794?
(A document was handed to the witness.)
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: My Lord, it is Document Book 12-A, Page 8, It willbe GB 513. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: 1933:
"The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerrati, also on your behalf, and told him that we should be glad to accept his offer.
"I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini's as important enough to bring it to your notice."
What did you think had been distorted by propaganda?
A Perhaps you will be good enough he read. It says that the news had been distorted by propaganda.
Q That is what I was so interested in, defendant. What did you think had been distorted, and how much knowledge had you, so that you could decide whether the news had been distorted or not? families, and put into concentration camps, and that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold at under value.
You knew that all these things were happening, did you not?
A No, certainly not, at that time. That they were beaten, yes, that had heard. But then in these days, no Jews were murdered.-gave the most circumstantial examples of typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen that the foreign press was saying it Why did you think that it was distorted? What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was distorted?
A Who -- who -- who told me? Who had informed me about murders being committed?
Q I on putting it to you that it was in the foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my country, and obviously from what Signer Mussolini was saying, it was in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or not?
A I used the channel which I had. I went to the police authorities concerned.
Q Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask the defendant Goering?
Q Did you ask the defendant Goering? Did you ask the defendant Goering?
Q Why not? Why not? He was the head, inventing the Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would have been a very good man to ask, would he not? supreme head of police authorities.
Q Did you ask the defendant Frick ?
Q May I suggest to you that I do not want to take up time ? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Goering or Frick or anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper information ?
Would you look at Document 3893 PS ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE : The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12-A. My Lord, that will become GB 514. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE : September, 1933, on the Jewish question :
" The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish question, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail individual cases of personal hardship, but that nevertheless is served to establish all the more firmly the authority of justice and law in Germany." and against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a necessary cleaning up of public life", which would, of course, temporarily involve "individual cases" of harship, and that was necessary "more firmly" to establish "the authority of justice and law in Germany" ? Was that your view ? to the question of what my attitude was toward the Jews, that in view of the incidents which occurred after the last war and the control that the Jews in Germany had over public life, I wished to see these symptoms either removed or limited. I considered that right, and that is what I am referring to here. said on the 17th of September, 1933 -- that you thought the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a "necessary cleaning up of public" in Germany ? Are we to take it that your view then is your view now, and you do not deviate from it at all?
Is that right ?
A No; that is still my view today, only that is should have been carried out by different methods.
Q All right. Well, we will not go into discussions of it. opposition ?
Q Well, then, let us take it by stages. Am I to understand that you believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist party ? facing civil war.
Q Very well. You agreed with that. Did you agree with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions ? unions ?
A This was a sphere which could not affect me in any way. I was foreign minister, and not minister of the interior.
Q I see. Well, again, I am not going to argue with you . You thought it was perfectly right as foreign minister to remain and give your support and authority to a government which was doing something of which you disapproved, such as breaking down the trade unions. Is that how we are to take it ?
A Yes. But I will say something to you. Have you ever heard that every cabinet minister left the cabinet if he did not like one individual story or one fact ? it did something of which he morally disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct me. If you did not disapprove, say so.
A I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political measure, but not an immoral deed.
Q Then let us take No. 3, take the Social Democratic party, that was a party which had taken a great share in the government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable to take any further share in the carrying on of the country?
Q Let us get it clear. Did you think it right or not?
Q What did you do to protest against that; what did you do to protest against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party? the Social Democratic Party? of the opposition parties? You never raised that in the cabinet; that is right, isn't it?
A I can't remember whether this question was brought up before the cabinet.
Q I see. All right. Let us just pass to another aspect and still on 1933. You see, I just want you to have in mind what was happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that Germany was leaving the Disarmament and the League of Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the possibility of war, had been begun?
A No. In 1933, no, I knew nothing about it. of October 1933. Now, defendant, you were Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that neither had Hitler nor Marshal von Blomberg---I think he was Reichswehr Minister--that none of them told you, as a result of this action, "we shall have to have the preparations ready in case sanctions, including military sanctions, are imposed on Germany." Did none of them tell you that that was to be the result of your move in foreign policy?
Q I see. You will agree with me that it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of the possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn't it in any system of government, of totalitarian, democratic, or anythin g you like, it is rather odd not to tell the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the way of military preparations, to deal with his policy, isn't it? ing of the the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, that opinion was mine. I had to decide, I had to decide whether this might have possible consequences. The military had their own opinion, presumably, but I do not know. There were certain discussions amongst the general staff. That, I assume, at any rate. with it qickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933, despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly satisfied with the respectability and peace-loving intentions of the government; is that right?
Q Well, now, just let us turn to 1934. You remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American ambassador, which you mentioned in your document book No. 1, at page 54. It was on the 28th of May 1934, and Mr. Dodd had told you apparently what he had said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to control profiteering by great financial interests. He said that you said that you were glad that he had informed Hitler and then Mr. Dodd added "that the Chancellor had not agreed with me." Then he says; "Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my "remarks.
It was plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking.
He begged no to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on Hitler." What did you mean by that "...that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose..."
A. By that, I wanted to say that the members of the cabinet, the majority of then were against these methods. Apart from that, I can add that I had asked Mr. Dodd to give backing to my suggestions I was making to Hitler, to go and see Hitler personally. I took him to Hitler,
Q. But did you know, in May 1934, that the German Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-Semitism, didn't you know that?
A. Anti-Semitic propaganda, I could hear practically daily from Dr. Goebbels' speeches.
Q. Yes; well, let us pass to something a little more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General von S chleicher or General von Bredar?
A. No.
Q. What was the effect on your mind of these two gentlemen and Frau von Schleicher being killed in the blood purge of the 30th of June 1934?
A. I hardly need to answer that. It is a matter, of course, that I was repulsed by, it is quite clear, but then I old you the other day that unfortunately in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to suffer.
Q. But just let us got it clear. You told the Tribunal the other day that you thought--and had some reason for thinking--that there was a movement in the SS, that is, a movement led by Roehm and Ernst, and I suppose people that you would consider undesirable of that sort; what reason:had you to suppose that General von Schleicher and General von Bredar had been in a conspiracy, if any?
A. I had no reason at all, and I don't believe 30 today.
I don't believe today that they were plotting.
Q. Did you hear about the unfortunate way in which Herr von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time? You remember, you know.
A. Yes, that was the --
Q. Do you know that Herr von Boese and Jung were killed, von Chirski was arrested, and two other gentlemen also arrested? Did you hear about that?
A. Yes, I did, through Herr von Papen.
Q. And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public life?
A. To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.
Q. Why did you go on in a government that was using murder as an instrument of political action?
A. I have already told you twice that in the case of such revolution, such mishaps cannot be avoided.
Q. I see. Well, now, let us take just another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were going on in Austria and in May and June of 1934, did you not; and by "terroristic acts"---don't let us have any doubt about it---what I mean is the causing of explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like that. I mean dynamite. I don't mean anything vague. You knew that such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?
A. Yes, I heard about it, and against that I have always fought, because I knew that it was done by Nazis and let me say, mostly by Austrian Nazis.
Q. What position did Herr Koepke have in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?
A. Herr Koepke, he was the ministerial Director.
Q. Quite a responsible position, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember Herr Koepke reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Waechter?
A. No, I cannot remember that.
A. Well, just think; you know. Baron von Waechter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dolfuss six weeks later on the 25th of July. Don't you remember Herr Koepke making a report to you and you passing it on to Hitler?
A. No, I cannot remember that.
Q Let 's refresh your memory if you don't remember it. Will you look at Document D-868? It willbecome GB 155. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories carefully and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think you will find,on the original, there are your own initials, and on the left hand side there is a note: "The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6." That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed "L" by Lammers, Dr. Lammers. Then there is a note below that: "From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June", also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will see there is a note which is certainly initialed "Lammers." "Habicht is coming today . . . L 6/6." And this memorandum comes back from the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let's see what reports you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Waechter's fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say: "His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr von Waechter drew up for me too a picture of the situation in Austria which was in some of its colours, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Irrespective of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr von Waechter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus, the great terrorist action as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means committed by Marxists, but by the Austrian SA, and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or in its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater. Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia and where conditions were worst.
And then he says: "Herr von Waechter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, and namely, by means of centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in Austria itself and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today." Now just let's pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed about that time Press Attache at the German Embassy in Vienna. The appointment of Herr Habicht as Press attache would be done either by you or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?
AAt the moment, I don't even know the details, but Habicht was the Austrian Attache in Munich and if and when he went to Vienna as Press Attache I don't know. the end of May, 1934, and what I am asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his plottings?
A If Mr. Habicht was really there, then he neither went with my knowledge or approval, and presumably, it was arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda, who used to send these Press people about.
Q Well, you will agree with me, definitely, that this isn't a very pleasant document; it doesn't describe a very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came from your ministerial director to you and went on to the Fuehrer and came back from Dr. Lammers with a note:
"Habicht is coming today."
Q To the Fuehrer?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being mentioned, and I had nothing to do with those. Office document goes to the Reich Chancellor; it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying: "Habicht is coming today." You must have known all about Habicht on the 6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.
A Not at all. This note from Lammers means that Habicht was going to see the Reich Chancellor and this report from my ministerial director was passed on to the Reich Chancellor by me to show what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason. and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July, 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr Habicht? that you know very well, on the 6th of June, 1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality, according to the Defendant von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn't you?
A Whatever makes you think a thing like that? Mr. Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.
Q You saw this report. This is a report of your ministerial director. I have just read what von Waechter thought.
A Yes, but it doesn't say a word about Mr. Habicht.
Q Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you: "The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself, He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters."
In other words, what Waechter isputting to the Foreign Office were the views of Habicht no loss than himself.
A Yes, and it goes on to talk about all these terrorist acts. These terrorist acts and these things which are being described in this document were brought to the Reich Chancellor's notice by me.
Q Well, just look what the report says at the foot of the page: "But when nothing followed in the meantime, and on the other hand the counter measures of the Austrian administration grow more and more brutal and incisive from day to day, the radical elements moved afresh and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons, but was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as the true political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which was as unobtrusive as possible. They were now working on this principle." Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of: "In the course of the discussions, this idea, which goes on secretly smouldering, was met with again and again. A change must soon be made and a uniform leadership . . . . otherwise Herr von Waechter concluded his impressive description, - any day a disaster might occur which would have the worst consequences from the point of view of foreign policy, not for Austria alone,but above all for Germany." Then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr vonWaechter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within six weeks he had started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot.
Do you remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June, 1934, that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and trouble in Austria?
A Yes, but definitely. That is the very reason for which I sent the report to the Chancellor. I couldn't intervene in Austria. Papen was unable to specify, who, in your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. In your opinion, who were these personalities that Herr von Papen mentioned as being behind this Dollfuss Putsch?
A I know none. I only knew Habicht always as a personality agains t whom I objected before Hitler because of his actions. Apart from that. I know no Reich Germans. He was an Austrian National Socialist who has been mentioned dozens of times during the trial and whom I didn't know either.
Q I am not mentioning them. I an mentioning the Defendant von Papen's prominent Reich German personalities and I can trying very hard to find out who they were. Are you taking the sane line, that the only one you can remember is the Press Attache, Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?
A I have already said that it will have to be, no, that I don't know one.
Q Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr. Ried, know nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith said on that point? Do you think Dr. Ried knew nothing about the Putsch?
A How far Ried was informed, that is something I can't tell you, but you do know how, when he acted objectionably later on, I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always prohibited the ambassador from intervening in such matters.
Q You haven't any doubt in your own mind that Dr. Ried 25 June A LJG 11-1b know all about the impending Putsch, have you?
A Oh, yes, I have considerable doubt that he knew. I don't believe so, because according to his character, he wasn't like that. the Austrian Nationalists had made this Putsch and had murdered Dollfuss?
A That wasn't a secret.
Q No, I know it. A lot of those things were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge -- when you found out -
Q But didn't that give you any qualms about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria? every German murderer who has been active abroad, then I would have had a lot of work to do, wouldn't I? how in a moment -- you know that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch with and acting under the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler was head of your government; you know that perfectly well, didn't you?
A He was the chief of the NSDAP. That they were collaborating was natural, wasn't it?
Q Yes. Now there is just one other point -
A Yes. I want to tell you one thing: I continuously worked against that with Hitler, together with Herr von Papen, namely, that this Mr. Habicht should be active in the way be was.
Q We will take that up in a moment. I just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have been through all the reports of the Defendant von Papen and apart from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr von Chirski and one dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no 25 June M LJG 11-2b political significance, we have twenty-eight reports.
Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three out of four of Herr von Papen's reports would come to you to be seen by you?
Q You are quite right, Herr von Neurath. You wouldn't know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable number of Herr von Papen's reports. I think there were nineteen; I am sure you can take it that they are marked, nineteen are marked: "P assed the Foreign Office." were put before me. I didn't receive every individual report from every ambassador or Charge d'Affaires abroad. Otherwise, I would have drowned in paper. these from Herr von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive a considerable number of reports from Herr von Papen to Hitler as passed to you? certainly not all. I can't tell you more than that today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
( A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1405 hours, 25 June 1946.) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: before I put some questions to you. an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don't want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas' comment on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is at page 52 of document Book 12. It is about page 71 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: No. 12-A or B?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No. 12, my Lord. That is the original one; page 52. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q "The General Reich Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss the matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933, in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the decease of President von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the armed forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fun damental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization."
Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy. the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization? bilization. it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations Didn't you understand that it was a big stop forward for war preparations?
A Not at all. It wasn't a large step forward at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to be prepared, and you have to guarantee a working together and cooperation of the various offices in such an event.
Q That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office Officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop? the happenings in Austria or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force and the conscription? from the report which you submitted to me. The reestablishment of the Wehrmacht was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that.
Q Yes, but -- I'm sorry, probably I didn't out the proper emphasis on the word. When I said "warning", I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and war-mongering.
Did you get any warnings from your officials?