But many young people volunteered to work in Germany for labor conditions and wages were bettor in the Reich at that time than in the protectorate. Reich protectorate office, how did that come about? remained as long as I did. Despite all the things that took place and despite all the difficulties, the reason for my remaining as long as I did was that I was convinced and I am convinced of this today, I was convinced of the fact that I had to stay as long as I could reconcile with my conscience the fact that by remaining I could prevent that this country, which was entrusted to Germany, would be prevented from being turned over to the dominance and rule of the SS. Everything which took place after my departure in '41, the many things that happened to the country, I prevented all of this through my presence there and oven if my activities were limited and my sphere of influence was limited I believe the fact that I remained I thus served not only my own people and my own country out the Czech people as well and even today, under the same circumstances, I would not act any differently. that I should leave such a tremendously difficult and tremendously important office only in the case of last report. The crow of a ship does not go below dock and twiddle its thumbs while the ship is in danger. one hundred per cent, that everyone will have to understand and appreciate, anyone who at one time or another had been forced to be active politically and not only in theory. I believe because of my remaining and through my perseverance in office I prevented much suffering and much misery, misery and suffering which descended on the Czech people after I left. This opinion of mine was shared by many circles of the Czech population as 25 June M LJG 6-2a I could gather from the many, many letters which were addressed to me from the Czech people.
Q And how did it come about that you laid down your office? from Hitler asking me to come to headquarters immediately. There he told me that I was being too mild and lenient with the Czechs and that this state of affairs could not continue. He told me that he had decided to introduce rather sharp measures against the Czech resistance movement and for this purpose the notorious Obergruppenfuehrer H eydrich would be sent to Prague. I tried very energetically to dissuade him from this. However, I was not successful. Thereupon I asked for my resignation, since I told him I could never be responsible for any activity of Heydrich's in Prague. Hitler refused my resignation, he turned it down. However, he did grant me one thing, that I could go on leave. I flow to Prague and on the following day I continued on my journey to my home. At the same hour that I left Prague Heydrich arrived. my immediate resignation. In spite of the fact that I did not receive any answer I again put in another request and explained at the same time that under no circumstances would I return to Prague; that I lad dissolved my office and I refused to act in the future and from now on as Reich Protector. Only in October 1943 was I relieved of my office.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to conclude my examination in chief with a brief quotation from the Czech indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: Your going on leave, was that made public?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I was just going to quote that, Mr. President.
In the text of the Czech Indictment it says:
"And including the second half of September, the underground Czech revolt committees, with the help of BBC, have executed a 25 June M LJG 6-3a successful boycott against the German press.
The German authorities seized the opportunity to aim a tremendous blow at the German population. On the 27th of September, 1941, radio station Prague gave out the following report:
'Reich minister Baron von Neurath, Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia has found it necessary to ask the fuehrer for a long leave in order to restore his impaired health.'" Then in conclusion it says:
"Under these circumstances the Fuehrer agreed with the request of the Reich Protector and charged Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich with the leadership of the office of Reich P rotector of Bohemia and Moravia during the time of the illness of Mr. von Neurath."
Mr. President, in this way I should like to conclude my examination in chief of the defendant.
THE PRESIDENT : From September 1941 until October 1943, did you live on your own estates, or what?
THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I have concluded my examination in chief.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants' Counsel with to ask any questions? BY DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant vonPapen): of Rations, Von Papen followed Hitler to Munich to persuade him to remain in the League of Nations?
A Yes, that is known to me. In fact, I was the cause of his doing so. 1934 talk against unfriendly acts in the cabinet, in respect to German policy towards Austria, as for instance, the introduction of the 1,000 mark frontier bar? Did he object to it? pursued that line. that Papen's attitude in the Austrianproblem was one of the causes for Hitler's giving him the mission in Vienna after the murder of Dollfuss? the letter of 26th April 1934 to Papen in which he announced the fact that Papen would to sent to Austria?
A Yes, but the way it happened was as follows: When Hitler told me about his intention to send Papen to Vienna, I reminded him that to make it possible for Him to exert any influence, he should first of all, after the events of 30 June, clear up the relationship between himself--Hitler--and Papen, and clear it up publicly. That, I think, was the cause of the letter which has been read out in this Court.
there were demonstrations. Were you and von Papen surprised by those demonstrations, and were they in the sense in which you felt? their tremendous size. They certainly did not please me, because they case a shadow on my discussions with Schuschnigg.
Q Then, the last question: Before Schleicher's government was formed there was on 2 December 1932 a meeting of the cabinet. The day before Papen had been given orders by Hindenburg to send the Parliament on leave and to form a new government. Is it correct that Papen referred this matter to the Cabinet and that Schleicher, as Minister for the Armed Forces, made a statement to the effect that this would lead to civil war and that the armed forces were too weak to prevent such a civil war?
A Yes, I remember very accurately how these things happened. We were all somewhat surprised about Schleicher's statement.
However, it was so well founded, or so well reasoned about, that one had to assume itas being correct.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendant's counsel wish to ask questions?
(No response)
The prosecution? BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q At the time about which Dr. Kubuschok has just been asking you, in the second half of 1932, did you know that President von Hindenburg, the defendant von Papen, and General von Schleicher were discussing and considering very hard what would be the best method of dealing with the Nazi Party?
A No. As I have already testified, I had no connection in that respect. I knew absolutely nothing about all these negotiations. negotiations. But didn't you know that the problem as to how to deal with the Nazi Party was exercising the minds of the President, the defendant, von Papen, and General von Schleicher; it was very urgent in their minds?
Q Again, don't think, defendant, that I am suggesting that you were in the negotiations. You may take it--well, I will make all the suggestions perfectly clear. President von Hindenburg, to the defendant von Papen, and to General von Schleicher was that thereshould be a government with Hitler as Chancellor, but well brigaded by conservative elements, in harness with conservative elements; thatwas the plan that was ultimately resolved on? You knew that much, I suppose, didn't you?
A Yes, but the plan was not quite like that. At that time, the time you are talking about, there was only mention of the fact that the necessity existed to bring the Nazi Party into the Government.
A But eventually, when the Nazi Party came in, on 30 January 1933, the plan was that it would be well harnessed to conservative lements.
That was the idea in President von Hindenburg's mind, was it not? understand you rightly, isn't that so? understand you rightly, isn't that so?
A Yes. It has been explained that it was the special wish of the President, von Hindenburg, that I should remain in the government.
Q In order to keep Hitler's government peace-loving and respectable. Is that a fair way of putting it? from exercising their methods toe much within the government. diplomatist. When you became a Minister, did you not think that you had some responsibility for keeping the government respectable and peace-loving as a Minister of the Reich? through?
Q I don't want to go into the workings of your mind too much, but I just want to get this clear. You realized, as a foreign minister, and as a well-known figure to all the Chancelleries of Europe, that your presence in the government would be taken throughout Europe as a sign of your approval and your responsibility for what the government did, did you not?
A I doubt that very much. Perhaps one might have hoped so.
Q Well now, let's consider it. Is it your case that up to November of 1937 you were perfectly satisfied with the peace-loving intentions and respectability of the government?
A I was convinced of the peaceful intentions of the government. I have already stated that.
Q What about raspectability? By "respectability" I mean the general standard of decency that is required by any government, under which its people are going to be reasonably happy and contented.
Were you satisfied with that?
as the policy in the interior was concerned.
Q Well, I would just like to look at that for a moment. Did you know about the "Brown Terror" in March of 1933, some six weeks after the government was formed? made by the American Consul, Mr. Geist, document 1759-PS, United States Exhibit 420?
Q Just let me remind you. It is a long affidavit, and there are only one or two parts I want to put to you.
Mr. Geist gives detailed particulars of the bad treatment, the beating, the assaulting, the insulting, and so on, of Jews as early as March 1933. Did you know about that?
A I know of events; I don't know the affidavit, I haven't seen it. I do knowof the events, however, from complaints made by foreign diplomatic representatives. I repeatedly accosted Hitler with regard to these events, asking him to stop them. I do not know any further details. you did receive, did you not, a synopsis or an account of what was appearing in the foreign press? not know.
Q Just let me take an example. You had been Ambassador at the Court of St. James from 1930 to 1932, if my recollection is correct, had you not? net -- that the London Times and the Manchester Guardian were newspapers that had a great deal of influence in England, didn't you? were full of the most terrible stories of the ill treatment of Jews, Social Democrats, and Communists in Germany?
A That is possible. I cannot remember the date, but these were just the cases which I brought up before Hitler, drawing his attention to how countries abroad were receiving these things. were making allegations. As early as the 12th of April, 1933, the Manchester Guardian was saying:
"The inquirer by digging only an inch below the surface, which to the casual observer may seem tranquil enough, will, in city after city, village after village, discover such an abundance of barbarism committed by the Brown Shirts that modern analogies fail."
It described them as "instruments of a terror that although wanton is systematic -- wanton in the sense that unlike a revolutionary terror it is imposed by no outward necessity, and systematic in the sense that it is an organic part of the Hitler regime." ing in responsible British papers?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, that is D-911, which is a collection of extracts, and, with Mr. Wurms' affidavit, will be GB-512. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: was systematic in the sense of being an organic part of the Hitler regime? was quoting: "An eminent German conservative, who is in close touch with the Nationalist members of the German Government, and certainly more sympathetic to the right than to the left, has given the number of victims as being as many as 20,000 in April"? Did you know that, that the figure was being put that high? Hamburger Fremdenblatt, which, in turn, was invoking official sources and stating that there were 18,000 Communists in prison in the Reich and that the 10,000 prisoners in Prussia included many social intellectuals and others. as a newspaper if it misquoted official sources under your government in April 1933, misrepresented the position? It would not, would it?
A That I don't know, but I do know that a lot of stupid things were committed by meansof figures.
a responsible Hamburg paper, as an official figure, and requoted by the London Times, which is the principal paper in England. Wasn't that sufficiently serious for you to bring it up is the Cabinet? the London papers--they don't always tell the truth.
Q No. That is a perfectly reasonable comment. Newspapers, like egeryone else, are misinformed. But when you had a widespread account of terrible conditions giving large numbers, did you not,as one of the respectable elements in this government, think that it was worthy of bringing it up in cabinet and finding out whether it was true or not?
A How do you know that I did not do that?
Q That is what I am asking. Did you bring it up, and what was the result when you did? see Hitler -- not the cabinet, but Hitler, all the time.
Q That is not what I asked you. You see, defendant, what I asked you was why you did not bring it up in the cabinet. Here was a cabinet established with conservative elements to keep it respectable. Why did you not bring it up in the cabinet and try and get the support of Herr von Papen, Herr Hugenberg, and all the other conservative gentlemen in the cabinet, of whom we have heard? Why did you not bring it up? me to tell Hitler directly. the Tribunal that you did not think it was worth while to bring a matter up in the Reich cabinet? Within two months of Hitler's earning into power, it had become so "Fuehrer-principled" that you could not bring it up in the cabinet? judge it, and that considered direct presentations made to Hitler more effective.
Q I see. Well, now, I do not suppose you were interested, but did you know about the putting into concentration camps of any of the gentlemen that I mentioned to the defendant von Papen -- Herr von Ossietzski, Herr Muehsam, or Dr. Hermann Duncker, or any of the other left-wing writers and lawyers and politicians? Did you know that they had gone to a concentration camp from which they never returned?
A No; no, I did not know that.
Q You do not know at all?
in June, you knew very well how, at any rate, foreign opinion had crystallized against Germany because of the treatment of the Jews and the opposition parties, did you not, when you wont to the world economic conference in June?
A Yes. That was mentioned by me in a report that was read in court.
Q Now you say that your reaction was to go to Hitler and pretest. I just want you to look at what the existing documents show that you did. Now, let us take April, first of all. Would you look at Document D-794?
(A document was handed to the witness.)
SIR DAVID MAXWELLFYFE: My Lord, it is Document Book 12-A, Page 8, It willbe GB 513. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: 1933:
"The Italian Ambassador telephoned me last night and informed me that Mussolini had declared himself prepared to deny, through the Italian delegations abroad, all news about the persecution of the Jews in Germany that had been distorted by propaganda, if we should consider this course useful. I thanked Herr Cerrati, also on your behalf, and told him that we should be glad to accept his offer.
"I regard this friendly gesture of Mussolini's as important enough to bring it to your notice."
What did you think had been distorted by propaganda?
A Perhaps you will be good enough he read. It says that the news had been distorted by propaganda.
Q That is what I was so interested in, defendant. What did you think had been distorted, and how much knowledge had you, so that you could decide whether the news had been distorted or not? families, and put into concentration camps, and that their property had been destroyed and was beginning to be sold at under value.
You knew that all these things were happening, did you not?
A No, certainly not, at that time. That they were beaten, yes, that had heard. But then in these days, no Jews were murdered.-gave the most circumstantial examples of typical murders of Jews? You must have seen that; you must have seen that the foreign press was saying it Why did you think that it was distorted? What inquiry did you make to discover whether it was distorted?
A Who -- who -- who told me? Who had informed me about murders being committed?
Q I on putting it to you that it was in the foreign press. I have given you the two examples from the press of my country, and obviously from what Signer Mussolini was saying, it was in the press of other countries. You must have known what they were saying. What inquiries did you make to find out whether it was true or not?
A I used the channel which I had. I went to the police authorities concerned.
Q Did you ask Himmler, or did you ask the defendant Goering?
Q Did you ask the defendant Goering? Did you ask the defendant Goering?
Q Why not? Why not? He was the head, inventing the Gestapo and the concentration camps at that time. He would have been a very good man to ask, would he not? supreme head of police authorities.
Q Did you ask the defendant Frick ?
Q May I suggest to you that I do not want to take up time ? Why did you not take the trouble to ask Goering or Frick or anyone who could have given you, as I suggest, proper information ?
Would you look at Document 3893 PS ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE : The Tribunal will find it at Page 128 of Document Book 12-A. My Lord, that will become GB 514. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE : September, 1933, on the Jewish question :
" The Minister had no doubt that the stupid talk abroad about purely internal German affairs, as for example the Jewish question, will quickly be silenced if one realizes that the necessary cleaning up of public life must temporarily entail individual cases of personal hardship, but that nevertheless is served to establish all the more firmly the authority of justice and law in Germany." and against the left-wing sympathizers up to that time, that it was a necessary cleaning up of public life", which would, of course, temporarily involve "individual cases" of harship, and that was necessary "more firmly" to establish "the authority of justice and law in Germany" ? Was that your view ? to the question of what my attitude was toward the Jews, that in view of the incidents which occurred after the last war and the control that the Jews in Germany had over public life, I wished to see these symptoms either removed or limited. I considered that right, and that is what I am referring to here. said on the 17th of September, 1933 -- that you thought the treatment of the Jews in 1933 a "necessary cleaning up of public" in Germany ? Are we to take it that your view then is your view now, and you do not deviate from it at all?
Is that right ?
A No; that is still my view today, only that is should have been carried out by different methods.
Q All right. Well, we will not go into discussions of it. opposition ?
Q Well, then, let us take it by stages. Am I to understand that you believe in the prescribing, the making illegal of the Communist party ? facing civil war.
Q Very well. You agreed with that. Did you agree with the breaking down and making illegal of the trade unions ? unions ?
A This was a sphere which could not affect me in any way. I was foreign minister, and not minister of the interior.
Q I see. Well, again, I am not going to argue with you . You thought it was perfectly right as foreign minister to remain and give your support and authority to a government which was doing something of which you disapproved, such as breaking down the trade unions. Is that how we are to take it ?
A Yes. But I will say something to you. Have you ever heard that every cabinet minister left the cabinet if he did not like one individual story or one fact ? it did something of which he morally disapproved, and I understood from you that you morally disapproved of the breaking down of the trade union movement. If I am wrong, correct me. If you did not disapprove, say so.
A I did not think that it was immoral. It was a political measure, but not an immoral deed.
Q Then let us take No. 3, take the Social Democratic party, that was a party which had taken a great share in the government of Germany and of Prussia for the years since the war. Did you think it right, morally right, to make that party illegal and unable to take any further share in the carrying on of the country?
Q Let us get it clear. Did you think it right or not?
Q What did you do to protest against that; what did you do to protest against the dissolution of the Social Democratic Party? the Social Democratic Party? of the opposition parties? You never raised that in the cabinet; that is right, isn't it?
A I can't remember whether this question was brought up before the cabinet.
Q I see. All right. Let us just pass to another aspect and still on 1933. You see, I just want you to have in mind what was happening in 1933. Did you know that after you had announced that Germany was leaving the Disarmament and the League of Nations, that orders for military preparations to deal with the possibility of war, had been begun?
A No. In 1933, no, I knew nothing about it. of October 1933. Now, defendant, you were Foreign Minister. Are you telling the Tribunal that neither had Hitler nor Marshal von Blomberg---I think he was Reichswehr Minister--that none of them told you, as a result of this action, "we shall have to have the preparations ready in case sanctions, including military sanctions, are imposed on Germany." Did none of them tell you that that was to be the result of your move in foreign policy?
Q I see. You will agree with me that it is rather odd not to inform the Foreign Minister of the possible consequences of his policy in the military preparations you are taking to deal with it; it is rather odd, isn't it in any system of government, of totalitarian, democratic, or anythin g you like, it is rather odd not to tell the Foreign Minister what you are doing in the way of military preparations, to deal with his policy, isn't it? ing of the the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, that opinion was mine. I had to decide, I had to decide whether this might have possible consequences. The military had their own opinion, presumably, but I do not know. There were certain discussions amongst the general staff. That, I assume, at any rate. with it qickly. May I take it, that up to the end of 1933, despite these matters which I have put to you, that you were perfectly satisfied with the respectability and peace-loving intentions of the government; is that right?
Q Well, now, just let us turn to 1934. You remember your conversation with Mr. Dodd, the American ambassador, which you mentioned in your document book No. 1, at page 54. It was on the 28th of May 1934, and Mr. Dodd had told you apparently what he had said to Hitler about the way Americans are trying to control profiteering by great financial interests. He said that you said that you were glad that he had informed Hitler and then Mr. Dodd added "that the Chancellor had not agreed with me." Then he says; "Von Neurath was silent for a moment after my "remarks.
It was plain that he was entirely of my way of thinking.
He begged no to say to Washington that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose, but he did not commit himself on Hitler." What did you mean by that "...that the outbreak was entirely contrary to the German Government purpose..."
A. By that, I wanted to say that the members of the cabinet, the majority of then were against these methods. Apart from that, I can add that I had asked Mr. Dodd to give backing to my suggestions I was making to Hitler, to go and see Hitler personally. I took him to Hitler,
Q. But did you know, in May 1934, that the German Government was going in for systematic and virulent anti-Semitism, didn't you know that?
A. Anti-Semitic propaganda, I could hear practically daily from Dr. Goebbels' speeches.
Q. Yes; well, let us pass to something a little more concrete. Had you any reason for disliking General von S chleicher or General von Bredar?
A. No.
Q. What was the effect on your mind of these two gentlemen and Frau von Schleicher being killed in the blood purge of the 30th of June 1934?
A. I hardly need to answer that. It is a matter, of course, that I was repulsed by, it is quite clear, but then I old you the other day that unfortunately in the case of such a revolt, innocent people always have to suffer.
Q. But just let us got it clear. You told the Tribunal the other day that you thought--and had some reason for thinking--that there was a movement in the SS, that is, a movement led by Roehm and Ernst, and I suppose people that you would consider undesirable of that sort; what reason:had you to suppose that General von Schleicher and General von Bredar had been in a conspiracy, if any?
A. I had no reason at all, and I don't believe 30 today.
I don't believe today that they were plotting.
Q. Did you hear about the unfortunate way in which Herr von Papen kept on losing secretaries at the same time? You remember, you know.
A. Yes, that was the --
Q. Do you know that Herr von Boese and Jung were killed, von Chirski was arrested, and two other gentlemen also arrested? Did you hear about that?
A. Yes, I did, through Herr von Papen.
Q. And did you regard the blood purge of the 30th of June as just another element in the necessary cleaning up of public life?
A. To the extent that it was carried out with all the outrages and murders of innocent people, most certainly not.
Q. Why did you go on in a government that was using murder as an instrument of political action?
A. I have already told you twice that in the case of such revolution, such mishaps cannot be avoided.
Q. I see. Well, now, let us take just another of your 1934 experiences. You knew about the terroristic acts that were going on in Austria and in May and June of 1934, did you not; and by "terroristic acts"---don't let us have any doubt about it---what I mean is the causing of explosions in Austrian public utilities and railways and things like that. I mean dynamite. I don't mean anything vague. You knew that such acts were going on in Austria in May and June 1934, did you not?
A. Yes, I heard about it, and against that I have always fought, because I knew that it was done by Nazis and let me say, mostly by Austrian Nazis.
Q. What position did Herr Koepke have in your Ministry on the 31st of May 1934?
A. Herr Koepke, he was the ministerial Director.