Q. Quite a responsible position, was it not?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember Herr Koepke reporting to you on the 31st of May 1934, on a visit of Baron von Waechter?
A. No, I cannot remember that.
A. Well, just think; you know. Baron von Waechter was one of the leaders of the Putsch against Dolfuss six weeks later on the 25th of July. Don't you remember Herr Koepke making a report to you and you passing it on to Hitler?
A. No, I cannot remember that.
Q Let 's refresh your memory if you don't remember it. Will you look at Document D-868? It willbecome GB 155. Just look at it. I will read it over, but just look at the signatories carefully and if you will be good enough to look at the top, I think you will find,on the original, there are your own initials, and on the left hand side there is a note: "The Reich Chancellor has been informed 6/6." That is on the 6th of June. That is initialed "L" by Lammers, Dr. Lammers. Then there is a note below that: "From the Reich Chancellor on 6th June", also initialed by Lammers I think. And on the other side you will see there is a note which is certainly initialed "Lammers." "Habicht is coming today . . . L 6/6." And this memorandum comes back from the Reich Chancellor to the Foreign Office on the same day. Now just let's see what reports you were getting from Austria and passing on to Hitler. We will omit, unless you want it particularly, a description of Baron von Waechter's fresh, youthful appearance in Paragraph 1; but it goes on to say: "His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite. Herr von Waechter drew up for me too a picture of the situation in Austria which was in some of its colours, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Irrespective of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr von Waechter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus, the great terrorist action as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up, was by no means committed by Marxists, but by the Austrian SA, and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or in its preparation. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater. Then he says that the main seat of unrest is Carinthia and where conditions were worst.
And then he says: "Herr von Waechter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, and namely, by means of centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in Austria itself and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today." Now just let's pause there for a moment. Herr Habicht was appointed about that time Press Attache at the German Embassy in Vienna. The appointment of Herr Habicht as Press attache would be done either by you or with your approval, would it not? It was under your department?
AAt the moment, I don't even know the details, but Habicht was the Austrian Attache in Munich and if and when he went to Vienna as Press Attache I don't know. the end of May, 1934, and what I am asking you is, was it not either at your order or with your approval that he was given a post which gave him diplomatic immunity in the middle of his plottings?
A If Mr. Habicht was really there, then he neither went with my knowledge or approval, and presumably, it was arranged by the Ministry of Propaganda, who used to send these Press people about.
Q Well, you will agree with me, definitely, that this isn't a very pleasant document; it doesn't describe a very pleasant state of affairs. Let me remind you, this came from your ministerial director to you and went on to the Fuehrer and came back from Dr. Lammers with a note:
"Habicht is coming today."
Q To the Fuehrer?
A Mr. Prosecutor, I want to point out to you that here only the Austrian National Socialists are being mentioned, and I had nothing to do with those. Office document goes to the Reich Chancellor; it comes back on the 6th of June with a note from Dr. Lammers saying: "Habicht is coming today." You must have known all about Habicht on the 6th of June. It is mentioned in this report.
A Not at all. This note from Lammers means that Habicht was going to see the Reich Chancellor and this report from my ministerial director was passed on to the Reich Chancellor by me to show what the conditions were in Austria. That was the reason. and when I asked him who were the leading Reich German personalities who influenced the Putsch in Austria in July, 1934, he thought for a long time and the only leading Reich German personality that he could remember as influencing the Putsch was this very Herr Habicht? that you know very well, on the 6th of June, 1934, that Herr Habicht, this leading Reich personality, according to the Defendant von Papen, was organizing revolution in Austria, didn't you?
A Whatever makes you think a thing like that? Mr. Habicht never came to see me. He went to see the Reich Chancellor.
Q You saw this report. This is a report of your ministerial director. I have just read what von Waechter thought.
A Yes, but it doesn't say a word about Mr. Habicht.
Q Yes, I just read that to you. May I remind you: "The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself, He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters."
In other words, what Waechter isputting to the Foreign Office were the views of Habicht no loss than himself.
A Yes, and it goes on to talk about all these terrorist acts. These terrorist acts and these things which are being described in this document were brought to the Reich Chancellor's notice by me.
Q Well, just look what the report says at the foot of the page: "But when nothing followed in the meantime, and on the other hand the counter measures of the Austrian administration grow more and more brutal and incisive from day to day, the radical elements moved afresh and came forward with the statement that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical reasons, but was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of opposition and had in view, as the true political aim, merely the weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which was as unobtrusive as possible. They were now working on this principle." Listen to the next bit, his suggestion to you, the nearest warning of trouble which any Foreign Minister ever heard of: "In the course of the discussions, this idea, which goes on secretly smouldering, was met with again and again. A change must soon be made and a uniform leadership . . . . otherwise Herr von Waechter concluded his impressive description, - any day a disaster might occur which would have the worst consequences from the point of view of foreign policy, not for Austria alone,but above all for Germany." Then, dramatically, in the middle of the conversation, Herr vonWaechter receives a telephone message that he had better not go back to Vienna or he will be arrested on his arrival; and within six weeks he had started the Putsch and Chancellor Dollfuss had been shot.
Do you remember now? Did you not appreciate, at the beginning of June, 1934, that there was the greatest danger of an uprising and trouble in Austria?
A Yes, but definitely. That is the very reason for which I sent the report to the Chancellor. I couldn't intervene in Austria. Papen was unable to specify, who, in your opinion, were the other prominent Reich German personalities who were behind the Dollfuss Putsch in Austria? You say you were not. In your opinion, who were these personalities that Herr von Papen mentioned as being behind this Dollfuss Putsch?
A I know none. I only knew Habicht always as a personality agains t whom I objected before Hitler because of his actions. Apart from that. I know no Reich Germans. He was an Austrian National Socialist who has been mentioned dozens of times during the trial and whom I didn't know either.
Q I am not mentioning them. I an mentioning the Defendant von Papen's prominent Reich German personalities and I can trying very hard to find out who they were. Are you taking the sane line, that the only one you can remember is the Press Attache, Habicht? Is that all you can help the Tribunal in this matter?
A I have already said that it will have to be, no, that I don't know one.
Q Is it your opinion that your Minister, Dr. Ried, know nothing about this, despite what Mr. Messersmith said on that point? Do you think Dr. Ried knew nothing about the Putsch?
A How far Ried was informed, that is something I can't tell you, but you do know how, when he acted objectionably later on, I recalled him right away. Apart from that, I always prohibited the ambassador from intervening in such matters.
Q You haven't any doubt in your own mind that Dr. Ried 25 June A LJG 11-1b know all about the impending Putsch, have you?
A Oh, yes, I have considerable doubt that he knew. I don't believe so, because according to his character, he wasn't like that. the Austrian Nationalists had made this Putsch and had murdered Dollfuss?
A That wasn't a secret.
Q No, I know it. A lot of those things were not secrets. What I am interested in was your knowledge -- when you found out -
Q But didn't that give you any qualms about remaining in a government which had extended its policy of murder from at home to abroad, through the Party elements in Austria? every German murderer who has been active abroad, then I would have had a lot of work to do, wouldn't I? how in a moment -- you know that the Austrian NSDAP was in close touch with and acting under the orders of Hitler all the time when Hitler was head of your government; you know that perfectly well, didn't you?
A He was the chief of the NSDAP. That they were collaborating was natural, wasn't it?
Q Yes. Now there is just one other point -
A Yes. I want to tell you one thing: I continuously worked against that with Hitler, together with Herr von Papen, namely, that this Mr. Habicht should be active in the way be was.
Q We will take that up in a moment. I just want to get one point of fact. Does this accord with your recollection: I have been through all the reports of the Defendant von Papen and apart from three personal reports, two dealing with Herr von Chirski and one dealing with abuse of Hitler, which is of no 25 June M LJG 11-2b political significance, we have twenty-eight reports.
Nineteen of these reports are marked as being copies to the Foreign Office. Is that in accord with your recollection, that three out of four of Herr von Papen's reports would come to you to be seen by you?
Q You are quite right, Herr von Neurath. You wouldn't know how many went to you, but you say you saw a considerable number of Herr von Papen's reports. I think there were nineteen; I am sure you can take it that they are marked, nineteen are marked: "P assed the Foreign Office." were put before me. I didn't receive every individual report from every ambassador or Charge d'Affaires abroad. Otherwise, I would have drowned in paper. these from Herr von Papen, who was supposed to be in a rather special position dealing with a very difficult problem? Did you receive a considerable number of reports from Herr von Papen to Hitler as passed to you? certainly not all. I can't tell you more than that today.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, perhaps this would be a convenient time to break off.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time.
( A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1405 hours, 25 June 1946.) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: before I put some questions to you. an air force and on the 16th of March I think you, among others, signed the law introducing compulsory military service. You explained all that to us; I don't want to go over it again, but I just want to ask you about the Secret Reich Defense Law of the 21st of May 1935. Would you look at General Thomas' comment on it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is at page 52 of document Book 12. It is about page 71 of the German document book.
THE PRESIDENT: No. 12-A or B?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No. 12, my Lord. That is the original one; page 52. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE:
Q "The General Reich Centralization of the Supreme Reich authorities, ordered in case of war, has influenced the development and the activity of the war economy organization to such an extent that it is necessary to discuss the matter in detail. The foundations had already been laid for the central organization of the supreme Reich authorities in the event of a war prior to 1933, in many discussions and decrees, but it was radically altered when the National Socialists came into power, and especially by the decease of President von Hindenburg. The latest orders were decreed in the Reich Defense Law of May 21, 1935, supposed to be published only in case of war, but already declared valid for carrying out war preparations. As this law fixed the duties of the armed forces and the other Reich authorities in case of war, it was also the fun damental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization."
Schacht had been made Plenipotentiary for War Economy. the fundamental ruling for the development and activity of the war economy organization? bilization. it had already been declared valid for carrying out war preparations Didn't you understand that it was a big stop forward for war preparations?
A Not at all. It wasn't a large step forward at all. It was only the establishing of the necessary measures in case of a war. In every country you have to be prepared, and you have to guarantee a working together and cooperation of the various offices in such an event.
Q That is your view. Now, at this time, up to May 1935, is it correct that the German Foreign Office was still staffed by diplomats or Foreign Office Officials of the older school and had not yet been invaded by the products of the Bureau Ribbentrop? the happenings in Austria or the rearmament, the declaration of the air force and the conscription? from the report which you submitted to me. The reestablishment of the Wehrmacht was a decision which was made in the Cabinet, and of course I knew about that.
Q Yes, but -- I'm sorry, probably I didn't out the proper emphasis on the word. When I said "warning", I meant a real warning from your officials that these happenings were making Germany regarded abroad as being bloodthirsty and war-mongering.
Did you get any warnings from your officials?
A Certainly not, for that wasn't the case, and if any assertions or claims like that were being made abroad, they certainly weren't true. of the interpreter Paul Schmidt.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is page 68 of Document Book 12-A, and it is page 65 or 66 of the German version, paragraph 4.
Q (Continuing): Now, just let me read you paragraphs 4 and 5, as to what Herr Paul Schmidt says:
"4. The attempted putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfus on 25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the Foreign Office because these events discredited Germany in the eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the putsch had been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi methods both in foreign and in domestic policy. This concern over the repercussions of the attempted putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence in leading to the FranceSoviet Consultative Pact of 5 December 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning by the Nazis."
Defendant, let's take that. In these three points, is it correct as Herr Schmidt says, that the attempted putsch and the murder of Dollfuss seriously disturbed the career personnel in the Foreign Office?
but I was personally disquieted, as well.
Q And taking the last sentence:
"This concern (that is the disturbance by the Putsch) over the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by a recognition of the fact that these episodes (blood purges and the Putsch) were of influence in loading to the France-Soviet consultative pact of December 5, 1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning." recognising that the blood purge and the Putsch had alarmed France and the Soviet Union as to the position of Germany and led to the consultative pact? Schmidt.
Q No, with respect to you, defendant, it is not. What interpreter Schmidt is saying is that that was the opinion of your experienced staff in the Foreign Office and that is what I am putting to you. Is he not right in saying that your experienced staff were concerned that these events had had their effect on the consultative pact? heeded as a warning by the Nazis?
"The announcement in March of the establishment of a German Air Force and of the introduction of conscription was followed on 2 May, 1935, by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the Foreign office regarded this as a further very serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy but the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the Western Powers, declaring that they were not going t o be intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these expressions of concern to Hitler."
Now, just let us take that. Do you agree that the career personnel of the Foreign Office regarded the France-Soviet pact as "a further serious warning as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy"?
A I do not know in the name of whose personnel Mr. Schmidt is making statements, in whose name he is making these statements. But I, at any event, did not say anything to the effect that my career personnel expressed opinions to this effect.
Q Well, here is Herr Schmidt saying:
"The career officials, at least, expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath." That is you. though he was an interpreter for a great deal of the time, are you saying that Herr Schmidt is not stating what is accurate when he says that your personnel, officials, expressed their concern to you?
A Quite exclusively and completely. How could Mr. Schmidt know, who was only an insignificant official at that time, what my career personnel and officials told me and on the other hand, how could Schmidt judge this? And beyond that I should like to add that Schmidt said here, before this Court, that this affidavit or whatever this may be, was submitted to him after he had just recovered from a serious illness and that he personally did not have exact knowledge of the contents. that I put these paragraphs to Herr Schmidt and he agreed with them when he was giving evidence before this Tribunal. We will read paragraph six because I want to ask you about the end.
"The re-entry of the German military forces into the Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in February. A German communique of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed that the French-Soviet pact of mutual assistance was incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France. Considered against the background statements in Main Kampf offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhoneland was decided upon.
I personally knew about it and discussed it approximately two or three weeks before it occurred.
Considerable fear had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning the risk of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government circles consulted by Hitler who felt confident that the Rhinland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from England and France. Neurath's position throughout this period was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath that in the general run of old school diplomats, whom he (Hitler) tended to hold In disrespect". about and discussed the march into the Rhineland some two or three weeks before it occurred, how much before it occureed had you discussed it?
A. Mr. Schmidt must have been clairvoyant and a soothsayer for two or three weeks in advance I even did not know anything about it. I heard this decision only one week in advance and if it says here that in the Foreign Office it was generally common knowledge that I was the only one in the government circles consulted by Hitler who was confident that the Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from Britain and France, I, of course, was right.
Q. But is it true that you were the only person in government circles be thought that it could be occupied without interference by Britain and France? Is that true?
A. I am not in a position to say that, whether I was the only one, but at any rate, I had that conviction, based on my knowledge of international conditions.
Q. So that at any rate, whatever the militations of Herr Paul Schmidt, he know what your position was quite accurately. Was he not right about it in the last sentence, that your position throughout the period was one which would make Hitler look to you rather than to the rest, the other officials of pre-Nazi diplomacy and foreign affairs, because you were the person who was encouraging him?
Is that not the position?
A. I did not encourage him in any way, but I described the situation as I saw it, and the fact that I was right, that is a matter of proof.
Q. Well now, I just want you to deal with one other point, which is really 1936, but we will deal with it as I have been dealing with Austria. to the description of the Austrian treaty, the treaty between the Reich and Austria of the 11th of July as being a subterfuge or a facade. That Is right, is it not, you objected very strongly to that view? Gauleiters of the Austrian N.S.D.A.P. to carry on the struggle at the same time as the treaty was signed?
A. No, I do not know anything about that.
Q. just let me remind you. I do not want to put anything that seems unfair.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, it is document book 12, page 97.
This is the report of Dr. Rainer, whom the Tribunal has had the advantage of seeing, and if you will look at the end of one paragraph it says:
"The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons (that is defendant SeyssInquart and Colonel Glaise-Horstenau). Papen mentioned GlaiseHorstenau to the Fuehrer as being the trusted person".
Now, the next paragraph:
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the pa rty--" THE PRESIDENT: Sir David -SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you say 97 of document book 12?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I did, My Lord, yes. Yes, My Lord, it is the third paragraph, and begins -- "it that time--" THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see it, SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: If your Lordship pleases:
"At that time, the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the party in Austria, in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do". THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was another "At that time" that we were looking at. Could you five us some other indication?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, it is in the middle.
THE PRESIDENT : It is on 98 in ours.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : I am so sorry, My Lord. The paging must be different, I beg Your Lordship's pardon. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE :
"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National-Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor --"
"--became his successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Dr. Radnor and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzburg, where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936, all illegal Gauleiters met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At the same conference the Gauleiters received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler." supervised the conclusion of this treaty, that he intended to give the illegal Gauleiters instructions as to how to carry on the fight ? Didn't he tell you that ? same Mr. Rainer who appeared here as a witness-- who stated that Hitler has summoned him and told him and other Gauleiters that in the future they were to observe the agreement of 1936, and that is the fact that I remember, and this matter that you just quoted is not mentioned in the document that you put before me.
Q It is not mentioned. What is mentioned is the political instructions for carrying out the fight and the organizational instructions from Globocnik. At any rate, you knew nothing about that ? made sincerely if you do not know the instructions that are given to the illegal Party in Austria by Hitler, is it not ?
A Yes, Yes, of course.
Q Well, now, just let's deal with one or two oil or points. I would just like you look at what Mr. Messersmith says at the end of 1935. You remember this statement-- I will give you the reference in a moment--that :
"Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are diplomats of the old school. They are in fact, servile instruments of the regime, and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sew discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime."
Now, can you tell us up to the date on which Mr. Messersmith wrote that-on 10 October 1935-- of a single instruction of Hitler's that you had not carried out ?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, I am sorry; I mislaid the reference. It is Document Book 12, page 106. That is the reference to it. BY SIR DAVID MARWELL-FYFE :
Q You see, Mr. Messersmith is there saying that you and the defendant von Papen and von Mackensen are servile instruments of the regime. Now, I am just asking you whether you could tell us up to the date that Mr. Messersmith wrote, on 10 October 1935, any instructions of Hitler's that you had refused to carry out. the number of times I objected to Hitler and contradicted Hitler, and I talked about Messersmith's affidavit and its significance.
Q Defendant, I will put it this way : Up to 10 October 1935, what did you tell the Tribunal was themost serious thing that Hitler has ordered you to do and you had refused to carry out ? What was the most serious--the one that mattered most ?
AAt this moment, that is a question that I can not answer. How do you expect me to remember what the most serious question was that I opposed and fought ? I fought many, many things. not trouble you with it anymore.
A Please give me examples. It is rather hard to make a statement and a claim without giving me the possibility of refuting any claims.
American diplomat put. I would like to ask you about Mr. Bullitt's report, with which I gather you agree.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, that is L-150, and it is at page 72 of the document book 12.
THE PRESIDENT : Yes, it is 74.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : Yes, it is 74. I am sorry My Lord. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE :
Q Now, it is the second paragraph there. After saying that he had a talk with you, he says :
"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until"the Rhineland had been digested". He explained that by that he meant that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent rather than encourage an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. "As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France can not enter German territory at will, all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."
Q You agree you said that ?
A Yes, yes. Certainly, yesterday or the day before I testified in detail about what that was to mean.
Q I would like to see if you agree with the meaning I suggest. That is that as soon as you had got your fortifications in sufficiently good order on your Western Frontier, you would proceed to try and secure an anschluss with Austria and to get back the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. Isn't that what it means ? I want to say by the statement and I express myself to the effect that these countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and France, would change their policy as regards Germany, especially if they saw they could not march through Germany at will.
Q You appreciate, defendant, what I an putting to you ? I think I made it quite clear-- that at the time that you were facing the Western Powers with the remilitarization of Germany and the Rhineland--that is in 1935 and 1936--you were then giving assurances to Austria, which Hitler did in May 1935, and you made this treaty in 1936.
As soon as you had digested your first steps, you then turned against Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. I an suggesting, you see, that you were talking the exact truth and prophysizing with a Cassandra-like accuracy. That is what I am suggesting--that you knew very well that these intentions were there.
A Not at all. Not at all. Not at all. That is an assumption on your part, and it has no "backing at all. There is no proof for it at all. point before we proceed to 1937. support the Nazi attitude toward the Christian churches, of oppressing the churches. I have understood you correctly, have I not ? repression of the Church. Would you just look at document 3758-PS.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : My Lord, that will become GB 516. My Lord, Your Lordship will find it in document book 12-A, page 81. BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE : diary of the Reich Ministry of Justice :
"The Reich Foreign Minister sent over, with a personal note for confidential information, a letter from Cardinal State Secretary Pacelli--" That is the Present Pope. "-- to the German Ambassador in the Vatican, in which he (Pacelli) presses for an act of pardon for Chief Curate Seelmayer. He, the Reich Foreign Minister, remarks to this that after the heavy attacks on the German Administration of Justice by the Holy See in the note of 21 January, there is no reason in his opinion to show any deference to the Vatican. He recommends it, however, since, because of foreign policy reasons, it is valuable not to let cool off the good personal relations with Pacelli."