A. I cannot quite picture just under what view the direc-
tives, just how this proclamation can be used as the basis of an accusation. At this time, the period of the most political tension, it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in order to commit acts of sabotage, acts of sabotage which would damage public services. In my opinion, in no Stat, at a period of time like this, would conditions have been tolerated without severe punishment resulting. Through this warning, in the way of a proclamation, we wanted to try to prevent all incentive for committing of acts of sabotage and as far as I recall, this warning actually worked out this way and was effective this way, and in fact, there were no acts of sabotage that actually took place and the threat of special punishment, of course, is not contained in this warning at all but, on the other hand, this proclamation refers to measures, punishing measures, which already existed.
Q. Shortly after the publication of this proclamation, the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?
A. I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was convinced in the main that England would keep her promise to Poland, and I believe that therewith the war against England and France would be started. The United States, with its tremendous production potential and capacity, would s tand behind these powers; and lastly, all the statements made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war, left no doubt on my part that the United States would come in with the other powers, and the rather lighthearted beginning of this war, because of my ethical convictions and ideology, I repudiated and was against it.
Q. For what reasons did you remain in your office instead of laying down your office?
A. I said to myself, I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the Czechs would try--if not to throw off German rule, but as far as the regulations of the German Wehrmacht as they were in the Prtectorates--that the Czechs would try to disturbe this activity of the Wehrmacht by sabotage and similar acts and that, on the other hand, through this, on the side of Germany, on the part of Germany, the severest measures would be taken against the population and in this way, the police would be motivated--above all, the Gestapo--to take a hand and proceed with the utmost severity.
Through my remaining in office, I tried to prevent both of these reasons so that a more strict treatment, as far as the Czech population was concerned, should be avoided on the basis of the policy of concilation and coordination which I followed and practiced. To lay down my office at a moment like that, that would have been desertion but, on the other hand, I believed that a war which concerned itself with the existence of the German people--but my part as a German, a German which I was with great and burning love--that I could not refuse to put my services at the disposal of my country for, after all, we were not concerned with Hitler and the Nazi regime was not a state, but the existence of a people for the state.
Q. Therefore, with you remaining in office, you did not thereby give your approval to this war, which was brought about by Hitler?
A. Never, for it was an accomplished fact, to which I contributed absolutely nothing, and my attitude and my judgement about the insane war, I told Hitler as well. I told him very unequivocally; but I would have considered myself a traitor to the German and Czech people if I had used the task which was very very serious, and which I had undertaken to the welfare of both people, if I had left this task in the lurch in the critical moment, and, as long as it was important for me to help even in a restricted measure, I believe I could justify my remaining. I do not believe that any decent person would have acted differently if he had been in my shoes, for, above all, up and beyond personal wishes, you will find your duty and obligation to your own people.
Q. On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests and there were arrests in the number of more than a thousand, especially representatives of the intelligentsia were arrested in so far as they were considered politically unreliable.
Were you advised or informed of these arrests in advance, as it should have been done according to the proclamation of the 1st of September 1939?
A. No, not even afterwards, was I told. I learned of these arrests through President Hacha.
Q. What did you have done then?
A. First of all, I had Frank come to me and objected to him. He said that he wasn't advised and hadn't been informed either, and he said that this was quite a general police preventive measure.
Q. From Berlin?
A. Yes, which had been instigated by Himmler direct.
Q. Did you now try to have the people who had been arrested, and who had been taken into the Reich, to have them liberated?
A. Yes. Constantly I tried with Frank, with Himmler and Heydrich to have these people released.
Q. And what was the result, did you have any success in your efforts to have these people released?
A. Hundreds of these people who had been arrested, whose names I tried to get under great difficulty from the Czechs and it was a rather tedious job, for the German police refused, to give me these names. Hundreds of these people were in the course of time released.
Q. On the 20th of October 1939, in Prague, public demonstrations occurred for the first time and it was on the occasion of the Czech Independence Day. On this occasion, some of the people who were demonstrating, and some policemen were either hurt or killed, for the police took rather strong measures against the people demonstrating. Regarding these police measures before, during and after this demonstration, did you have prior knowledge of these police measures and did you endorse them?
A. At that time I was not in Prague, and only on the 29th of October, did Frank tell me over the telephone about the unrest which was taking place and the more intimate details I did not learn until I returned on the 30th or 31st.
I accused Frank that, through his personal interference, on the street and through the use of the SS, that he had intensified the tumult instead of restoring order by means of the Czech police.
Q. Frank sent a report dealing with these matters of unrest to Berlin. Then he was interrogated through the Czech delegation on the 5th of May 1945, and froma report which he mentioned to his interrogators, an excerpt from the minutes of this interrogation will be found in my document book No.5 under No.152. This document hasbeen submitted by me and I should like to quote just a few sentences from this report: "This was the first occurrence where the population demonstrated publicly, and that these slogans that were mentioned in the proceeding paragraphs were heard in the open. This matter was therefore taken seriously and I personally reported to Berlin about all incidents. I should like to say that I was an eye-witness to this demonstration, and that I had the opinion that this matter was a dangerous one. The report which I sent to Berlin in this report, in this report I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations, and that, therefore, special importance and weight was to be attached to them since they took place in the open street. I asked for the directive which I received immediately from the Fuehrer's Headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to the Sicherheitspolizei, "to the secturity Police and I received knowledge of their contents. The entire actions was carried through by the police directive". Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank's, and the measures which are mentioned therein; did you have any knowledge of this report before it was sent off and afterwards?
A No. This report was unknown to me up until my time here in Nurnberg; but Frank always reported to Berlin direct. Apart from that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration which was carried on by young people should be considered especially important or significant or that special police measures were called for in this case. killed on the 28th of October there were more demonstrations in Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others were arrested and the universities were closed. What do you know about this incident? his wounds, and the police, in order to prevent new demonstrations, had prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to take place on the 15th of November. Despite this, masses of people collected, and when the police attempted to disperse the crowds, renewed demonstrations and shootings resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly enraged and called me. Frank, and General Fredericki for a conference to be held in Berlin. Before this conference, Hitler had asked the former Czech ambassador, Chvalkovsky, to be present also. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him and quiet him down, but despite that he accused the Czech ambassador repeatedly and gave him instructions to tell the Czech government that in case anything like this were to be repeated he would take the most severe measures against the people who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the entire Czech government responsible. The language used by Hitler was quite uncontrolled and the treatment which he accorded this man was quite embarrasssing to us who were listening. After the Czech ambassador had left, we stayed with Hitler for a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin. I told him one to two days. Then we remained for dinner, on which occasion we did not speak about these incidents any more. Hitler asked State Secretary Frank to come back later. The shooting of the leaders of the demonstration, the taking of students to concentration camps. those were matters that Hitler did not touch upon with even one word; neither did he mention the closing of the universities. Toward evening I asked about the pilot of my airplane in order to give him instructions. I was told at the airport that together with Frank, he had flown back to Prague in my airplane. The following day I returned to Prague by train.
When I arrived in Prague, I learned that Hitler had decreed the closing of all Czech universities for three years, the arrest of perhaps twelve hundred students and their being taken to a concentration camp, as well as the shooting of the leaders of the demonstration. All of these things had been decreed by Hitler; but at the same time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was put before mein which these directions were published, measures which had been publicised in the Press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and I accused him of these unheard of things which had taken place without my approval and my knowlede. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler's. I hadn't even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed toit quite illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing any of this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank repeatedly misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of these decrees of Hitler -- and Hitler, of course, had the opportunity to reach me by telphone in Berlin during my sojourn there -- naturally, I would have objected to these decrees and at that time would have asked for my resignation. Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler personally and I tried to have them released by going to Himmler. Gradually most of them were released, I believe more than eight hundred in all, and the last of their number were released in the summer of 1941. Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I complained bitterly to Hitler about his demeanor towards me. He evaded an answer, so far as I recall. However, he, promised me that the students would be released very soon and he promised that the Czech universities would be reopened after one year. Both promises were not kept by him. Councillor von Hollenben, dated 18 May 1946, who at that time participated in the Protectorate government. Please refer to figure 21.
Dr. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: This interrogatory may be found under No.158 in my Document Book No. 5. The answer of Mr. von Hollenben reads as follows. "The Student riots of October and November, 1939, have been a turning point in the history of the Protectorate. I can not give you a chronological repetition of the events by memory. However, I can state the following: The manifestations which took place on the 28th of October, 1939, on the occasion of the 20th an anniversary of the constitution of the Czechoslovak state in Prague and Bruenn, mainly by the academic youth, could be foreseen.
Therefore, Mr. von Neurath, on the 28th of October, 1939, issued the order quietly to ignore them as far as possible and only to interfere when they assumed the character of a serious danger to public quiet and safety. Because of the disobedience of this order, the whole of this misery has arisen. Immediately after the conference with Hitler, Frank returned to Prague. Regarding the measures taken against the students, the office of the Reich Protectorate, who himself was still in Berlin had only received knowledge on the following morning, partly through the applications which the members of the families of the arrested students made in the office of Mr. von Neurath.
"In my opinion, Mr. von Neurath did not learn of these sanctions against students until after they had taken place. I personally, however, did not report on this matter to him, and I cannot tell you just who did report to von Neurath on this matter.
"The proclamation in question, addressed to the Czech people, was given out without the knowledge of Mr. von Neurath, and this is my determined conviction, that it was issued under false pretenses by the use of his name. I remember distinctly that because of this matter he would have heated arguments and conflicts with Frank. At that time he remained in office for he believed that by remaining he could prevent much more disaster. He considered the closing of the universities an irresponsible step of intervention into the life of the Czech people. He tried, with all the means at his disposal to have the Czech university teachers and students who had been taken into german concentration camps linerated subsequently, and until such liberation, to have them segregated." affadavit which I just received a few days ago from the female secretary of Mr. von Neurath at that time, Miss Irene Friedrich. This is dated the 6th of June 1946. I should like to submit this affidavit fromwhich we can see quite clear that at the time the proclamation was issued and published, Mr. von Neurath has not returned from Berlin, and therefore that it was quite impossible for Mr. von Neurath to have had knowledge of this proclamation.
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): What is the number of the affidavit?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No. 159, Mr. President. the 26th of March 1946. This deals with the discussion which he had with President Hacha regarding the arrests of students. It is a document in which we can see that Mr. von Neurath tried and kept on trying to have these students released.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number for that? You said Document Book 5.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-6 and is mot found in my document book. I just referred to that, Your Honor. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Aside from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally, did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of your office?
A. No, but single instances of arrest did take place. I tried to investigate and perhaps rescind these measures at the suggestion of the Czech Government and private people.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few sentences from the document of theCzech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on page 59 of the English text. I quote:
"Representatives of the Turn Society Suckold, which had one million members immediately after a movement for the liberation of the country, put thier services at the disposal of the resistance movement at home and abroad. The idea of Suckold was to give the members abroad strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest times. This was true at home to even a larger extent.
"The Gestapo knew of this danger full well, and therefore proceeded with the utmost severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but since they realized the firm resolve of this group, they becan to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of arrests on the 1st of November 1939. Then, extensive arrests of single individuals and of organizations followed." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Will you please comment on this.
A. Suckold was the most dangerous organization hostile to the State found in the Protectorate. The magnitude and the extent of their activity can be seen from this document of the Czech Prosecution which has just been mentioned It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could not be tolerated especially in war, and the report itself characterizes the first police measures as still moderate.
movement have been treated any differently. In cases of this kind, high treason or cases of sabotage, I could not quite agree with the people who had committed these acts, and the Czech Government quite agreed with my stand.
Q. The Czech report further mentions shootings under martial law. During your period of office, did these actually take place?
A. No, as far as shootings under martial law in my period of office are concerned, apart from the case of the nine students which we have already dealt with, I know of no others.
Q. Did Frank, aside from his activity as Higher Police and SS Fuehrer, when he became State Secretary try to use his influence in the administrative work of the Protectorate, and did you in that way work closely with him?
A. Frank represented German interests in a radical and unequivocal way, and had an old Sudeten-German hate of the Czechs. I tried to avoid these tendencies and weaken them, but he was a part of the general policy and the administration.
Q. What was your personal relationship to Frank?
A. From the beginning, it was very, very poor, just because of the fact that he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized and observed that on very many occasions he did not tell me the truth.
Q. What was your personal and official relationship to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?
A. In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was quite convinced of the fact that my intentions were quite sincere, my intentions dealing with the fair treatment of the Czech population, and that I did everything within my power to realize my intentions and make them into fact. Czech Government directed towards the interests of the people, and I approved of them. say it was a very good one. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha's difficult task as far as I could, and to make things easy for him for I realized that he, too, through his assumption of the post of president and through his remaining in office, was making a great personal sacrifice.
He and the members of the government were always invited to all festivities which did not have a perfectly German character, and were decorated in accordance with their work.
Q What was the manner of work of your office, your authority in Prague? Were you quite independent in your work or were you and your authority bound to directives from Berlin?
A My answer in this respect is a rather tedious and boring one. The fundamentals of policy and the administration of the department, these matters were set down in Berlin applying to the protectorate as well. That means that the policy was laid/down by Hitler himself or by the department ministers. My field was the supervision of the carrying out of instructions and the application of these principles as they applied to the protectorate, always considering the special circumstances that obtained, resulting from the ethical, cultural and economic structure of the country. It can be taken for granted that above all in a war that the protectorate which was situated in the center of the Reich could not be treated as an independent unit but rather that the protectorate had to be incorporated into the general pattern. up by the central office in Berlin. The officials of my branches, therefore, from the beginning, had a certain subjectivety to their home authorities, even though they were subordinate to me and the various managers of the branches received their directives direct from Berlin, directives that applied to various problems and these directivesoriginated with the department or ministry in Berlin. Then these directives were submitted to the Under State Secretary von Burgsdorff, who was the head of the administration, or if they were very fundamental matters they were submitted directly to me, reported to me directly. The carrying out of these measures in the protectorate was in that way discussed and after discussion or conferences with the Czech ministers there was a vote taken. Thereupon and as a result of this, the decrees which were signed by me or by my deputy came about in that way. existed in the Reich or relations dealing with the economy which were newly issued in the Reich, apart from that a series of directives applying to the protectorate were issued directly by the competent Berlin ministries. The Reich Minister of the Interior had been set up as the central agency for the issuing of these decrees and directives.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to the following, to be found in document book 5; documents number 145, a decree emanating from the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, dealing with the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, dated the 22nd of March, 1939; number 146, extracts from basic regulations applying to the protectorate dealing with commercial dealings with the protectorate dated 28 March, 1939 and number 147, a directive as to the carrying through of justice in the protectorate, dated 14 April, 1939 -- 146, a directive dealing with law and justice in the protectorate under date of 7 June, 1939 and I again should like to refer to the document which has already been submitted, number 147, a regulation dealing with the development of and administration of German Security Police. did not originate in the Reich protectorate but rather from the competent Reich ministries and in part also emanated from Reichsmarshal Goering as the chairman of the Reich Defense Council and Goering signed these directives and as to the legal basis applying to the protectorate, the decree emanated from the Fuehrer and Reichchancellor dealt with the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, dated 16 March, 1939, signed by Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you ask the defendant to clear up what his concern was with these decrees of the Reichsfuehrer and of the defendant Goering.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No, Mr. President, I wanted to show that he had nothing to do with these matters but, however, that he was charged with the carrying through of these measures in itself and by itself after these matters were decreed. He had the obligation and the duty to see to it that these measures which were given out by agencies in the Reich and that was the thing I wanted to prove, that all these directives did not originate with him himself but rather with others.
THE WITNESS: I should like to add that I was chiefly concerned with the fact that these matters were published in the protectorate and then that my organs and agencies supervised the carrying through of these measures. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: measures?
A The extent of autonomy was not clearly limited. Basically the protectorate was autonomous and it was administered by Czech authorities and Czech officials. But in the course of time essential restrictions were placed on this state of autonomy. They were set down in the decree which you have just read. The introduction of these restrictions could be traced back to the Reich Government and resulted, in part, from general tendencies toward centralization in Berlin and to a large extent was brought about through the general political development and was necessary because of the war and of the so-called total carrying on of the war. These restrictions were necessary, I constantly and always objected to these restrictions if in my opinion they could not be brought into accord with needs and requirements of the people.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to refer to article 3 of the decree, given out by the Fuehrer and Reichschancellor, dealing with the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, number 144 of my document book number 5. This reads:
"The protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia is autonomous and administer itself. The rights of sovereignty which accrue to it on the basis of its state of autonomy are carried out on the basis of military and economic affairs. The rights of sovereignty are upheld to their own organs and to their own authorities and officials." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q How about the Wehrmacht officers in the protectorate? Were you concerned with them, connected with them? who kept me advised about the basic military questions *---* who was to advise me as to these military matters. USSR 60, sets down in detail and of which you are accused. in the protectorate? Could you treat with death sentences?
A The justice of the German courts was under my jurisdiction. The Czech courts were not under my jurisdiction. These courts were under the jurisdiction of the Justice Minister in Berlin. Decisions about pardons concerning the German courts, those were matters which concerned me and requests for pardons which were submitted to me, these, in special cases, of course, might apply to Czechs.
However, these matters did not concern themselves with political misdemeanors; political proceedings against Czechs were, as far as I recall, handled by the peoples' courts (Volksgericht) in Berlin. Insofar as we were concerned with high treason and as far as I know, in the proceedings against Czechs the same basic principles were applied as against Germans.
Q Did you have the right to pardon when the People's Court gave decisions against Czechs? have the right to pardon. courts in the Protectorate? there were special courts which were active. In my opinion, this might apply only to courts for proceedings against certain misdemeanors and courts which were established in the beginning of the war in the Reich. However, these courts were not under my jurisdiction. Instead, they were subordinated to the Reich Minister of Justice. He appointed the judges, gave them their directions and directives, and the judges reported back to him direct. I had no opportunity of using influence in any way. like to quote one sentence from the Czech report, USSR 60. This may be found on page 106 of the German text and page 92 of the English text. It deals with regulations that were to be applied and used by these special courts. I quote:
"A large number of these regulations and decrees deal with principles that all civilized countries consider irrevocable." but I should like to say in this case that in the latest developments, this principle has been decreased among civilized peoples. The teeth have been taken out of it. with the Germanization of the areas in the Protectorate inhabited by Czechs. You said previously that you, when you assumed office, did not know about such plans. Who later revealed the pattern of these plans to you? cles, but in the great part they were to be traced back to the organizations of Himmler and beyond that to the suggestions on the part of the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube.
leged Germanization, I should like to quote a report by General Fredericki to the OKW , dated 15 October 194. I should like to confront you with that. This is the document which has been submitted by the Prosecution under PS-862, US Exhibit No. 313, and it is concerned with the statements about the principles of the policy pursued in the Protectorate which State Secretary Frank made in a discussion with your office. Aside from that, Frank said that the Reich Protector defined his attitudes toward various plans. He mentioned three possibilities of solution of the possible Germanization of the Czech areas. You probably know this piece of writing and I do not believe that it is necessary for me to read it. What do you know about this memorandum? Did you write it? Tell us what you have to say about it. mentioned on the part of various Party offices for the resettlement of the Czechs. I considered this plan quite insane and incapable of execution, and I held this view from the beginning. Frank, who agreed with me in this one point, therefore drew up at my suggestion and direction this memorandum which you have just mentioned, a memorandum in which the radical measures of the SS and of the Party were turned down and in which the so-called gradual assimilation was considered as the only possible solution of this problem. and I wanted to hamper the plans of the SS. Since this plan of resettlement had been reported by Himmler to the Fuehrer and this had already been done, I had to have a rather stringent directive from him in order to do away with it. suggestion. Therefore, the proposal of the policy of assimilation, for with this suggestion the matter really had been postponed, had been shelved. In order to eliminate the counter measures of the SS and of Himmler, I reported to the Fuehrer personally, and I asked that he issue a stringent directive, which he did. Therefore this matter had been buried, and it was not taken up again.
Germanization would have to be carried out for a number of years by the office of the Reich Protector means that the SS could no longer interfere in this matter. The Reich Protector alone was to be the competent authority, and the Reich Protector did nothing, and to this same effect, the same sentence applies and shows that I was not favorably inclined to radicalism -- a statement made by General Fredericki that for the Wehrmacht no special consequences would result since they had always toed the line. were working contrary to the intended Germanization and that these elements would have to be handled roughly and have to be eliminated, those, of course, were the words that he used and the type of language that he used in matters of that kind, but nothing was done to further assimilate the people.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I am now asking your permission to quote the affidavit that we have mentioned which was made by Baronness Ritter, Number 3 in my document book. I ask permission to quote a few sentences from this affidavit. They are found on page 18 of the document book. It says there:
"To the plans for the Germanization and in regard to the gradual assimilation of the Czechs, Neurath stated as follows in a letter:
"'Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people who are about to be resett led--'" THE PRESIDENT:
Page 18?
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: Page 18, yes. It is the second paragraph from the end.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have it.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: "'Quite aside from the sensible point of view, the people who are to be resettled arouse pity in one's soul. However, I believe I have discovered a way now to prevent disaster. Time won is everything won, and frequently postponing is giving up.'" Mr. President, if it is permissible for me to make a suggestion, I would suggest that we stop now, since the pattern of Germanization is now completed.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think you are going to be? You have already been a day and a half.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, the accusations are not quite concrete. They are rather intangible, and these accusations as they are mentioned have to be picked up by me point by point. I have approximately 20 more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: How long do you think it will take?
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: I assume perhaps an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will expect you to conclude in an hour.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: I hope so, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 25 June 1946.)
Official Transcript of the International Military 25 June M LJG 1-1
DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): Mr. President, I should like to advise the High Tribunal that the manuscript of my pledoyer (final argument) will be ready tomorrow, that is, the first half; the second half will be ready by Saturday. That will be ready in typewritten form. I am sorry to say that I can furnish only eight copies, six of which are earmarked for the interpreters to facilitate their difficult task. I am very sorry that I am not able to furnish more than eight copies, since I personally have no multigraph machine. the statement made by the Chief Prosecutor for the United States on Friday, if I do not request the help of the prosecution and their facilities. it would be valuable, in order to facilitate my presentation, to have a translation of my speech put before them, in which case I would request that the High Tribunal make the necessary arrangements. I am quite ready to place my manuscript at the disposal of the High Tribunal, under the conditions published by you, Mr. President, as far as I personally am concerned. I am advised that the same would apply to the majority of the defense counsel. in order to reduce the time spent on the presentation of our final argument, it seems important to me to have this point clarified and decided on by the High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, if you would hand in the manuscript to which you have referred, the Tribunal will make arrangements to have it translated into the various languages. I think that will meet the position so far as you are concerned.
DR. NELTE: Yes.