DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit in 24 June A LJG 15-1 this connection on excerpt from a magazine, Number 127, and an excerpt from an article, with the speech which the dean of the Berlin diplomatic corps made in the name of the whole diplomatic corps to Mr. von Neurath on his birthday on 2 February 1938.
Both documents are contained in my document book Number 4, Number 127, and in Document Book Number 1, Hunter 18. and the personal points in the charge against Mr. von Neurath. Now I come to the second aspect of the charge, his activity as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: from political life; is that true?
A Yes. I was in Berlin very seldom. For the most part I was in the mountains. have any knowledge of Hitler's plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia?
A You mean the winter?
THE PRESIDENT: September 1539?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : That was my mistake. I meant in the winter.
THE PRESIDENT: of 1938, you mean?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I n the late winter of 19381939--February or march 1939.
THE WITNESS: The differences between us and Czechoslovakia on the treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechs had been solved by the separation of the Sudetenland. The way to friendly cooperation seemed open to me. One of the focal points of danger for the peace of Europe had been cleared up. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
the P resident of Cz echoslovakia in the night of 14-15 March 24 June A LJG 15-2 1959 in Berlin.
This talk has already been discussed here. I do not believe I need to go into it in much detail, but you know of it. I should like to ask you, Did you know of these events as described, particularly as given in PS-2798?
A No, I did not know of then. I learned of then only much later. I only learned here of the notes of Hewel, but after I learned of these events, I disapproved strongly, and would I not have token office as Reich Protector if I had known of these things at the time. I was completely surprised by the events in March 1939. I did not receive foreign political information. I was dependent upon the radio and the newspapers. The possibility of attach on Czechoslovakia in 1938 I considered to have been eliminated after the Munich agreement.
As for Hacha's visit to Berlin, I learned, like every other German, by radio and newspapers the next morning. The official statement of the taking over of protection of Czechoslovakia seemed not improbable after S lovakia had become independent, and after I learned that the Czech Foreign Minister, in the course of the winter 1953-1939 in Berlin, had said that the previous policy would be completely changed and that the union would be sought with Germany. would react to this development, which was in contravention of the agreement which had been reached in Munich. My first question to Hitler when I went to Vienna at his request was whether England and France had been informed beforehand and had given their approval. When he said No, that that was quite unnecessary and that the Czech' government had asked us to take over the protection, I immediately realized how dangerous the situation was and said so to Hitler. cussion of the Czech government. Hitler's request that I take the post of Reich Protector was a complete surprise to me, and I had misgivings against taking the office, which I expressed 24 June A LJG 15-3 to Hitler.
I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would antagonize the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement, even if Hacha had asked fro protection voluntarily, and it was clear to no that any intensification of the situation through the bad attitude of the Czechs would bring about on immediate danger of war. The permission of England and France had to be exacted.
I explained this to Hitler, too. Hitler's answer was that that was precisely the reason why he was asking no to take over the post--to show that he was not carrying on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was known abroad as a moderate man, and he would give no the most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten German element.
I still hesitated. I said that I did not know conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator. Hitler said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time and that he would give me two experienced men who know the conditions.
The police and the SS were not under my orders. This, in effect, made it impossible for no to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his organ. This I did not know at the time, but I must point out that great responsibility for further developments lies with the other powers, especially the signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making paper protests, I had expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then, perhaps, the tension might have been increased for the moment, but the German people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler would have avoided taking further aggressive steps.
Q. The charge is made that you took this office so that my misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment briefly on this point?
A. What is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt to reconcile the Czechs with the new conditions. Because of the years of nationality struggles, and through measures of suppression, I was to keep the hate-filled German population from excesses.
Q. What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to your office?
A/ He assured me that my activity in balancing national confidence, by winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy, would be supported at all times. In particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by political radicals, particularly from the SS and police and Sudeten Germans. I had pointed, out this danger particularly.
Q. Were you convinced at that time that, in making these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious and honest?
A. Yes, I definitely had that impression.
Q. Then you believed that the assurances he gave you would be kept?
A. Yes
Q. At that time did you not have any plan or intention for forcible Germanization of Czechoslovakia?
A. No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have considered that nonsense; I would not have believed that anyone could have such an idea.
Q. Do you still believe that Hitler's assurances and express intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they were only made illusory through further developments?
A. Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to a document in my document book 5, under number 142, which is an excerpt from Henderson's "Falure of a Mission". I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of that. BY DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN:
Q. From that time at the conclusion of the Ferman-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 on the independence of Slovakia, a charge is made against you. Did you have anything to do with drawing up this treaty or with declaring Slovakia autonomous ?
A. No. I learned of the autonomy declaration of Slovakia, and of all these events, only after they had been made public.
Q. What were the principles of your program for your administration in Prague?
A. It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only gradually, by sparing the national feeling as far an possible, and without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would have taken several generations. I attempted a gradual coordination, and weakening of previous hostile policies.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to document 143, in my document book 5. This is a reporduction of an article which Mr. von Neurath wrote about the end of his administration in Prague, in the European Review, at the end of March 1939. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this. It shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what tendencies Mr. von Neurath took up his office at that time. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What were the conditions which you found when you took over your office in April? That is, conditions in Prague?
A. The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of their former allies in the fall of 1938. To a large extent they seemed ready to be loyal and to cooperate. However, the influence of anti-Czech and Sudeten German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS, was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed as my State Secretary at Himmler's instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with him from the very beginning, because he represented a completely contrary policy toward the Czechs.
The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of the Administration was an experienced administration official under Secretary of State von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin Ministries.
supervisory officers, each for several Czech districts. They were appointed by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Q. To whom was the police subordinate?
A. The police was completely independent of my office. It was directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police; that is to say, Himmler Himmler appointed my own Secretary of State Frank as Higher SS and Police Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank was the Commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office, without my approval, without my even having been informed previously From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which I had to struggle in Prague.
Q. The discussion of the position of the police is in a Czechoslovakian report under the number USSR-60, which was submitted by the prosecution. This presents things in a somewhat different light. Do you support the description which you have just given?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. You were informed of police measures only afterwards, but not beforehand? You were not asked for your approval beforehand?
A. That is true, and I was informed afterwards only sporadically. I frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private persons of incidents which I had not been informed about by the police even afterwards: I had to inquire of Frank.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer to the decree of the 1st of September, 1939, which I submit as number 149 in my document book 5, and I should like to point out the following.
This order is divided into two completely separate sections: Part I is the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector; and Part II, completely separate, is the establishment of the German Security Police under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police. This outer form of the order, the separation of the two branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that the police and the policepower were only under Himmler or under the Berlin authorities. This alone expresses the fact that the Reich Protector could exert no influence on them.
This is the great tragedy of Mr. von Neurath' s activities as Reich Protector. Matters are charged against him for which he cannot take the responsibility, and did not take the responsibility. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: which mentions the administrative measures according to which the Reichs Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the Ger,an Police, in agreement with the Reichs Protector, can take the necessary administrative measures for the maintenance of security and public order in tie Protectorate, and i t states that they may take these measures, even outside of the limits determined upon.
What does this mean?
A I do not know what this order means by "administrative measures." It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably referring to the issuing of general prescriptions. At least, as long as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsfueherer SS made any use of this power. Arrests were all made, without informing me previously, on the basis of paragraph 11 of the order. The police in the protectorate were not in any way subordinate to me. executive powers in the protectorate and that would include the police?
A No; I have already mentioned that. of the police, or at least influence on the police , from Hitler? A I repeatedly applied to Hitler in connection with the recurring excesses of the police/ He told me repeatedly that he would investigste these circumstances, but nothing was changed. From his influence on the police throughout the Reich, Himmler considered the police his own domain; he was too powerful.
Q The Czechoslovakian report on which the indictment is based states the possibility for subordination of the Gestapo to the Reich Protectorate Office; that is, up to September, 1941.
On the basis of the statements which you have just made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent ?
A No. I have to deny it. I have explained what the circumstances were, that I had no influence whatever.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in this connection from Document 153 in my document book 5, which consist of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the Czechoslovakian delegation on the 30th of May, 1945. These minutes from Frank's testimony say :
"Neither the Reich Protectorate nor I myself am responsible for the police. The highest responsibilities lie with Heinrich Himmler as chief of the German police. The Gestapo received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Office". BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : to prevent the worst measures either by the police or the Gestapo, or to minimize their effect afterwards ? Will you please describe how you acted and how Frank attempted to act in these matters ? constantly visiting me. My office was for the most part busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified, I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report. I worked on them in favor of releasing the arrested persons. There was a struggle between Frank and the police which was often successful. were released at my instigation. In addition, many sentences were lightened in regard to personal transportation, property, food, and so forth. families of the ministers and members of the foreign office who had gone abroad were not arrested ?
A Yes, that is right. Frank has ordered the arrest of the members of the families of these two ministers Necas and Feierabend. When I learned about it, I had it stopped.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break off now, because this section is finished.
( A recess was taken. ) BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : which you have been held responsible to a greater or lesser degree by the prosecution. In the summer of 1939, were there many arrests of the members of the families by Czechoslovakian police ?
A No; the activity of the police in the summer of 1939 was very small, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict increasingly these police measures more and more.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : The Czechoslovakian prosecution, under USSR 60 in Supplement 1, is submitting a proclamation which you gave out in August, 1938, as Reich Protectorate; that is, just prior to the outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve a warning to the people of the Protectorate, to intimidate them, and to keep them from sabotage. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : should like to have you comment on it.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : This appendix is attached to the document USSR 60 Exhibit 1. I have just had the proclamation given to the defendant. It reads as follows : -- With the permission of the High Tribunal, I should like to read the most important pert :
"Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate, and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted most harshly and will be punished most severely. By "Sabotage" as described in the line under Paragraph 1, all disturbances are meant : disturbances of the public and economic life, specifically the damaging of necessary installations such as railroads, telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, water works, electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the hoarding of consumer goods, and the spreading of rumors by word or in writing.
"The population must follow and observe all the directives of the organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have been published or such as will be published in the future.
Refusal to obey or acting against these measures or against any organ of the Reich will be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly.
"Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the entire Czechoslovakian population. I expect that under all conditions the Czchoslovakian population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Fuehrer has guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN :
Q Will you please comment on this ?
A. I cannot quite picture just under what view the direc-
tives, just how this proclamation can be used as the basis of an accusation. At this time, the period of the most political tension, it was to be feared that radical elements would exploit the situation in order to commit acts of sabotage, acts of sabotage which would damage public services. In my opinion, in no Stat, at a period of time like this, would conditions have been tolerated without severe punishment resulting. Through this warning, in the way of a proclamation, we wanted to try to prevent all incentive for committing of acts of sabotage and as far as I recall, this warning actually worked out this way and was effective this way, and in fact, there were no acts of sabotage that actually took place and the threat of special punishment, of course, is not contained in this warning at all but, on the other hand, this proclamation refers to measures, punishing measures, which already existed.
Q. Shortly after the publication of this proclamation, the war broke out. What was your attitude toward this war?
A. I considered this war the greatest piece of stupidity, for on the basis of my knowledge of British psychology and politics, I was convinced in the main that England would keep her promise to Poland, and I believe that therewith the war against England and France would be started. The United States, with its tremendous production potential and capacity, would s tand behind these powers; and lastly, all the statements made by President Roosevelt before the beginning of the war, left no doubt on my part that the United States would come in with the other powers, and the rather lighthearted beginning of this war, because of my ethical convictions and ideology, I repudiated and was against it.
Q. For what reasons did you remain in your office instead of laying down your office?
A. I said to myself, I told myself that during the war, on the one hand, the Czechs would try--if not to throw off German rule, but as far as the regulations of the German Wehrmacht as they were in the Prtectorates--that the Czechs would try to disturbe this activity of the Wehrmacht by sabotage and similar acts and that, on the other hand, through this, on the side of Germany, on the part of Germany, the severest measures would be taken against the population and in this way, the police would be motivated--above all, the Gestapo--to take a hand and proceed with the utmost severity.
Through my remaining in office, I tried to prevent both of these reasons so that a more strict treatment, as far as the Czech population was concerned, should be avoided on the basis of the policy of concilation and coordination which I followed and practiced. To lay down my office at a moment like that, that would have been desertion but, on the other hand, I believed that a war which concerned itself with the existence of the German people--but my part as a German, a German which I was with great and burning love--that I could not refuse to put my services at the disposal of my country for, after all, we were not concerned with Hitler and the Nazi regime was not a state, but the existence of a people for the state.
Q. Therefore, with you remaining in office, you did not thereby give your approval to this war, which was brought about by Hitler?
A. Never, for it was an accomplished fact, to which I contributed absolutely nothing, and my attitude and my judgement about the insane war, I told Hitler as well. I told him very unequivocally; but I would have considered myself a traitor to the German and Czech people if I had used the task which was very very serious, and which I had undertaken to the welfare of both people, if I had left this task in the lurch in the critical moment, and, as long as it was important for me to help even in a restricted measure, I believe I could justify my remaining. I do not believe that any decent person would have acted differently if he had been in my shoes, for, above all, up and beyond personal wishes, you will find your duty and obligation to your own people.
Q. On the day of the outbreak of the war, in the Protectorate as well as everywhere in the Reich, so-called preventive measures were taken in the form of numerous arrests and there were arrests in the number of more than a thousand, especially representatives of the intelligentsia were arrested in so far as they were considered politically unreliable.
Were you advised or informed of these arrests in advance, as it should have been done according to the proclamation of the 1st of September 1939?
A. No, not even afterwards, was I told. I learned of these arrests through President Hacha.
Q. What did you have done then?
A. First of all, I had Frank come to me and objected to him. He said that he wasn't advised and hadn't been informed either, and he said that this was quite a general police preventive measure.
Q. From Berlin?
A. Yes, which had been instigated by Himmler direct.
Q. Did you now try to have the people who had been arrested, and who had been taken into the Reich, to have them liberated?
A. Yes. Constantly I tried with Frank, with Himmler and Heydrich to have these people released.
Q. And what was the result, did you have any success in your efforts to have these people released?
A. Hundreds of these people who had been arrested, whose names I tried to get under great difficulty from the Czechs and it was a rather tedious job, for the German police refused, to give me these names. Hundreds of these people were in the course of time released.
Q. On the 20th of October 1939, in Prague, public demonstrations occurred for the first time and it was on the occasion of the Czech Independence Day. On this occasion, some of the people who were demonstrating, and some policemen were either hurt or killed, for the police took rather strong measures against the people demonstrating. Regarding these police measures before, during and after this demonstration, did you have prior knowledge of these police measures and did you endorse them?
A. At that time I was not in Prague, and only on the 29th of October, did Frank tell me over the telephone about the unrest which was taking place and the more intimate details I did not learn until I returned on the 30th or 31st.
I accused Frank that, through his personal interference, on the street and through the use of the SS, that he had intensified the tumult instead of restoring order by means of the Czech police.
Q. Frank sent a report dealing with these matters of unrest to Berlin. Then he was interrogated through the Czech delegation on the 5th of May 1945, and froma report which he mentioned to his interrogators, an excerpt from the minutes of this interrogation will be found in my document book No.5 under No.152. This document hasbeen submitted by me and I should like to quote just a few sentences from this report: "This was the first occurrence where the population demonstrated publicly, and that these slogans that were mentioned in the proceeding paragraphs were heard in the open. This matter was therefore taken seriously and I personally reported to Berlin about all incidents. I should like to say that I was an eye-witness to this demonstration, and that I had the opinion that this matter was a dangerous one. The report which I sent to Berlin in this report, in this report I stated specifically that these were the first demonstrations, and that, therefore, special importance and weight was to be attached to them since they took place in the open street. I asked for the directive which I received immediately from the Fuehrer's Headquarters. These directives were sent from Berlin direct to the Sicherheitspolizei, "to the secturity Police and I received knowledge of their contents. The entire actions was carried through by the police directive". Did you have knowledge of this report of Frank's, and the measures which are mentioned therein; did you have any knowledge of this report before it was sent off and afterwards?
A No. This report was unknown to me up until my time here in Nurnberg; but Frank always reported to Berlin direct. Apart from that, I was never of the opinion that this demonstration which was carried on by young people should be considered especially important or significant or that special police measures were called for in this case. killed on the 28th of October there were more demonstrations in Prague, in the course of which numerous students were shot, others were arrested and the universities were closed. What do you know about this incident? his wounds, and the police, in order to prevent new demonstrations, had prohibited the participation of students at the funeral, which was to take place on the 15th of November. Despite this, masses of people collected, and when the police attempted to disperse the crowds, renewed demonstrations and shootings resulted. When this was reported to Hitler by Frank, Hitler was greatly enraged and called me. Frank, and General Fredericki for a conference to be held in Berlin. Before this conference, Hitler had asked the former Czech ambassador, Chvalkovsky, to be present also. Hitler was in a rage. I tried to calm him and quiet him down, but despite that he accused the Czech ambassador repeatedly and gave him instructions to tell the Czech government that in case anything like this were to be repeated he would take the most severe measures against the people who were disturbing the peace and, furthermore, that he would hold the entire Czech government responsible. The language used by Hitler was quite uncontrolled and the treatment which he accorded this man was quite embarrasssing to us who were listening. After the Czech ambassador had left, we stayed with Hitler for a few minutes longer. He asked me how long I would remain in Berlin. I told him one to two days. Then we remained for dinner, on which occasion we did not speak about these incidents any more. Hitler asked State Secretary Frank to come back later. The shooting of the leaders of the demonstration, the taking of students to concentration camps. those were matters that Hitler did not touch upon with even one word; neither did he mention the closing of the universities. Toward evening I asked about the pilot of my airplane in order to give him instructions. I was told at the airport that together with Frank, he had flown back to Prague in my airplane. The following day I returned to Prague by train.
When I arrived in Prague, I learned that Hitler had decreed the closing of all Czech universities for three years, the arrest of perhaps twelve hundred students and their being taken to a concentration camp, as well as the shooting of the leaders of the demonstration. All of these things had been decreed by Hitler; but at the same time a proclamation, which was signed with my name, was put before mein which these directions were published, measures which had been publicised in the Press and had been posted publicly. I had Frank summoned immediately and I accused him of these unheard of things which had taken place without my approval and my knowlede. He referred to a specific decree of Hitler's. I hadn't even seen this proclamation. My name had been affixed toit quite illegally by Frank. Even as my deputy, he was not justified in doing any of this; but later, through an official in my office, I learned that Frank repeatedly misused my name in this way. If I had had any advance knowledge of these decrees of Hitler -- and Hitler, of course, had the opportunity to reach me by telphone in Berlin during my sojourn there -- naturally, I would have objected to these decrees and at that time would have asked for my resignation. Immediately I tried to have these students released. I tried with Hitler personally and I tried to have them released by going to Himmler. Gradually most of them were released, I believe more than eight hundred in all, and the last of their number were released in the summer of 1941. Shortly after this incident, when I was again present in Berlin, I complained bitterly to Hitler about his demeanor towards me. He evaded an answer, so far as I recall. However, he, promised me that the students would be released very soon and he promised that the Czech universities would be reopened after one year. Both promises were not kept by him. Councillor von Hollenben, dated 18 May 1946, who at that time participated in the Protectorate government. Please refer to figure 21.
Dr. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: This interrogatory may be found under No.158 in my Document Book No. 5. The answer of Mr. von Hollenben reads as follows. "The Student riots of October and November, 1939, have been a turning point in the history of the Protectorate. I can not give you a chronological repetition of the events by memory. However, I can state the following: The manifestations which took place on the 28th of October, 1939, on the occasion of the 20th an anniversary of the constitution of the Czechoslovak state in Prague and Bruenn, mainly by the academic youth, could be foreseen.
Therefore, Mr. von Neurath, on the 28th of October, 1939, issued the order quietly to ignore them as far as possible and only to interfere when they assumed the character of a serious danger to public quiet and safety. Because of the disobedience of this order, the whole of this misery has arisen. Immediately after the conference with Hitler, Frank returned to Prague. Regarding the measures taken against the students, the office of the Reich Protectorate, who himself was still in Berlin had only received knowledge on the following morning, partly through the applications which the members of the families of the arrested students made in the office of Mr. von Neurath.
"In my opinion, Mr. von Neurath did not learn of these sanctions against students until after they had taken place. I personally, however, did not report on this matter to him, and I cannot tell you just who did report to von Neurath on this matter.
"The proclamation in question, addressed to the Czech people, was given out without the knowledge of Mr. von Neurath, and this is my determined conviction, that it was issued under false pretenses by the use of his name. I remember distinctly that because of this matter he would have heated arguments and conflicts with Frank. At that time he remained in office for he believed that by remaining he could prevent much more disaster. He considered the closing of the universities an irresponsible step of intervention into the life of the Czech people. He tried, with all the means at his disposal to have the Czech university teachers and students who had been taken into german concentration camps linerated subsequently, and until such liberation, to have them segregated." affadavit which I just received a few days ago from the female secretary of Mr. von Neurath at that time, Miss Irene Friedrich. This is dated the 6th of June 1946. I should like to submit this affidavit fromwhich we can see quite clear that at the time the proclamation was issued and published, Mr. von Neurath has not returned from Berlin, and therefore that it was quite impossible for Mr. von Neurath to have had knowledge of this proclamation.
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): What is the number of the affidavit?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No. 159, Mr. President. the 26th of March 1946. This deals with the discussion which he had with President Hacha regarding the arrests of students. It is a document in which we can see that Mr. von Neurath tried and kept on trying to have these students released.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give us the number for that? You said Document Book 5.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No, that is attached to the Czech report, USSR-6 and is mot found in my document book. I just referred to that, Your Honor. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Aside from these two actions which were decreed by Hitler personally, did other arrests take place on a rather large scale during the time of your office?
A. No, but single instances of arrest did take place. I tried to investigate and perhaps rescind these measures at the suggestion of the Czech Government and private people.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Now I should like to read a few sentences from the document of theCzech Prosecution, USSR-60, to be found on page 59 of the English text. I quote:
"Representatives of the Turn Society Suckold, which had one million members immediately after a movement for the liberation of the country, put thier services at the disposal of the resistance movement at home and abroad. The idea of Suckold was to give the members abroad strength and enthusiasm even in the hardest times. This was true at home to even a larger extent.
"The Gestapo knew of this danger full well, and therefore proceeded with the utmost severity. In the beginning, their measures were moderate, but since they realized the firm resolve of this group, they becan to use force. The first arrests took place on the day of the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a further large number of arrests on the 1st of November 1939. Then, extensive arrests of single individuals and of organizations followed." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Will you please comment on this.
A. Suckold was the most dangerous organization hostile to the State found in the Protectorate. The magnitude and the extent of their activity can be seen from this document of the Czech Prosecution which has just been mentioned It was taken for granted that machinations of this kind could not be tolerated especially in war, and the report itself characterizes the first police measures as still moderate.
movement have been treated any differently. In cases of this kind, high treason or cases of sabotage, I could not quite agree with the people who had committed these acts, and the Czech Government quite agreed with my stand.
Q. The Czech report further mentions shootings under martial law. During your period of office, did these actually take place?
A. No, as far as shootings under martial law in my period of office are concerned, apart from the case of the nine students which we have already dealt with, I know of no others.
Q. Did Frank, aside from his activity as Higher Police and SS Fuehrer, when he became State Secretary try to use his influence in the administrative work of the Protectorate, and did you in that way work closely with him?
A. Frank represented German interests in a radical and unequivocal way, and had an old Sudeten-German hate of the Czechs. I tried to avoid these tendencies and weaken them, but he was a part of the general policy and the administration.
Q. What was your personal relationship to Frank?
A. From the beginning, it was very, very poor, just because of the fact that he was so radical, and beyond that, I quite soon realized and observed that on very many occasions he did not tell me the truth.
Q. What was your personal and official relationship to President Hacha and to the Czech Government?
A. In general, good. The Czech Government at that time was quite convinced of the fact that my intentions were quite sincere, my intentions dealing with the fair treatment of the Czech population, and that I did everything within my power to realize my intentions and make them into fact. Czech Government directed towards the interests of the people, and I approved of them. say it was a very good one. I always tried to facilitate Mr. Hacha's difficult task as far as I could, and to make things easy for him for I realized that he, too, through his assumption of the post of president and through his remaining in office, was making a great personal sacrifice.