This pact, therefore, carried the signature of Ribbentrop rather than my own, even though I was still Foreign Minister at that time, and, as a matter of course, I would have had to sign treaties.
Mr. von Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler's foreign political alliance, above all to bring about parity or German equality, exceeded peaceful means and that the conduct of war and the use of violence was to be part of the means to be considered? to the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht on the 5th of November, 1937, a speech which has been mentioned here frequently, and a speech at which I was present. The notes regarding the contents on this speech, as we have seen from the Hoszbach minutes which were made five days later -- and from a speech which lasted two or three hours -- the notes were made from memory and set down in that way. no concrete contents, and various possibilities were envisaged. However, it was quite obvious to me that the whole tendency and all the plans were of an aggressive nature. This speech of Hitler's upset me very, very much, because the whole policy which I had pursued -- the police of using only peaceful means -- and the entire channel of our foreign policy had had the props knocked out from under it. It was a matter of course that I could not assume responsibility for a policy of that nature.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, which I have already mentioned, which is number 3 in document book number 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph under figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems so significant to me that I should like to ask the High Tribunal to grant me permission to quote this entire paragraph. I quotes "When Mr. von Neurath had to recognize for the first time, from Hitler's statements on 5 November 1937, that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward the neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered several heart attacks.
"He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his visit on Now Year's day in 1938, and we found him to be suffering very much physically and spiritually. He was, above all, very shaken by the fact that Hitler in the meantime had refused to receive him, and he could not see any possibility under these circumstances of drawing the latter from his plans, plans which he condemned to the utmost. 'It Is horrible to play the part or Cassandra', he often said. He categorically declared that he could not participate in this policy under any circumstances, and that he would draw the immediate consequences from this. He did not falter from this decision either when Hitler declared to him, on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday, that he could not do without him as Foreign Minister. He discussed this with us the same evening during a telephone call of congratulations on the occasion of his birthday." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: you gained from this speech?
Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and together with him and the chief of the German staff, Bock, I discussed what perhaps we could do in order to change over Hitler. We agreed that, first of all, Colonel General von Fritsch, who in the days following was scheduled to report to Hitler during the next few days, was to explain the military reasons to him, which were in contradiction to this policy. Then I wanted to explain the political reasons to him. not receive, or did not wish to receive me. Unfortunately I could not see Hitler. Then on the 14th or 15th of January, I could not speak with him until nighttime. On that occasion I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part of it.
Many of his plans could be carried out in a peaceful way; however, it would take a little longer that way. Then he told me that he did not have time any longer. I called his attention to the risk of a war and to the serious admonitions which the generals had given to him. I reminded him ofhis speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in which he himself had declared every new war to be utter nonsense, and so forth.
Despite all of my arguments, he maintained his position. I told him not be one of the people who would be co-guilty in this policy. Then Hitler refused to accept my request for a resignation. However, I remain ed steadfast, and on the 4th of February he gave me my resignation.
Q Did you have the impression, Mr. von Neurath, that Hitler reluctantly decided to grant your resignation, or that with your request for a resignation you went ahead of his own wishes a little?
A I believe the latter applies. For some time I believed Hitler must have had the wish -
THE PRESIDENT: That is not evidence. You cannot say what you think another man thought. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: were made president of thenewly instituted and secret cabinet council What did that appointment mean?
of a secret cabinet council took place only for the purpose of having changes in foreign policy and changes on the military side covered up. Further witnesses' testimony has established and confirmed that fact that the secret cabinet council was never called together. of working, for since my resignation on the 4th of February I was cut off from receiving any foreign political messages. as Reich minister. But actually, were you a member of the Reich cabinet or not?
A No. Apart from the fact that according to my knowledge the Reich cabinet did not function at all any longer, for there were no longer any sessions of the Reich cabinet, the title "Reich minister" was just atitle of form, which was in no way connected with any activity, and with which no department was connected. In contrast to the members of the Reich government, I did not receive any laws which I had to sign. of von Ribbentrop, you represented him as foreign minister; and they gather this from an entry in the diary of Colonel General Jodl,which said that Neurath in the meantime is taking over the foreign office. Will you please comment on this? associations with my former colleagues, and I had retired completely. However, I still remained in Berlin. On the 11th of March, 1938, late in the afternoon, suddenly Hitler rang me up in my flat and asked me to come and see him.
In the anteroom I met, besides Mr. von Papen, von Brachitsch and a number of other high officials and officers in close companionship with Hitler. Geering was in the room with Hitler when I arrived. Hitler told me that the Anschluss with Austria was a fact, and that German troops in the night of the 11th and 12th would cross the border. When I objected and asked whether that had to be, Hitler told me the reason why he did not wish to wait any longer. He asked me what was to be done by the Foreign Office as a matter of routine, since the foreign minister was absent in London at the time.
I told him that as a matter of form we would receive pretests which, of course, would have to be answered. And apart from that, on our part, a report was to be given to the various powers, and this report was a purely formal treatment of the situation. I also told him immediately to recall the foreign minister from London.
Goering, however, contradicted me on this. Finally Hitler asked me to tell the State Secretary or the Foreign Office what he just told me, so that the Foreign Office would be au courant and would know what was going on. which Hitler had given; and complete with the events as they had taken place, I told these things to the State Secretary, who was the official representative of Ribbentrop. Foreign Minister was absent. Then on the 12th of March, I personally told them about a letter which had been addressed to me and had come from the British ambassador protesting on the part of Britain against the occupation of Austria. I told him that the foreign office would submit a note of reply. fact and told him about the contents of the note over the telephone. Goering as a deputy of Hitler asked me to sign the reply in his stead, since the letter of the British ambassador had been addressed to me. This is something which Goering has stated as a witness here in this courtroom; hence the phrase in this letter which says "in the name of the Reich Government. " and to advise him of the state of affairs. From the telephone conversation which has already been mentioned here, between Goering and Ribbentrop, it can be seen that Goering did this. I found out the explanation of why the British note was sent to me here through the testimony of Goering. I have learned that he himself on the evening of the 11th had told the British ambassador that he, Goering, was representing Hitler during his absence, and that he was his deputy, and that Hitler had asked me to assist him on matters of foreign political advice.
which, in a very remarkable way, was made on the 10th of March, when I did not make any appearance, perhaps may be traced back to the fact that someone saw me on the 11th of March in the Reich chancellory. In any event, I took part in no other activities as the deputy of Ribbentrop.
Foreign Office, did you use that paper?
A The fact that I used stationery with the heading "President of the Secret Cabinet Council", stationery which was found in an adjoining room, shows that this rather fictitious institution actually existed and shows as well that I did not represent the Foreign Office or the Foreign Minister, otherwise I would have used their stationery. answered by you in a note which you have just described. The prosecution is accusing you of the fact that the reasons given by you in this letter and the picture of events in Austria and the event which preceded the marching into Austria are not correct; since, I assume, that the High Tribunal is cognizant of the passages with which the accused is charged, I do not feel that I need to quote these passages for Mr. Ribbentrop and you know these passages as well and I should like to have your opinion. incorrect is quite true and justified but the reason fir it was just this, that I had no other reports or information except the report given me by Hitler and these pieces of information were the basis of the contents of the note -- this information I had transmitted to the Foreign Office which, for their part, was completely ignorant of incidents and in that way the draft originated; and I should like to add that a planning of the incidents which led to a marching into Austria, which applies to my period of the Foreign Office, that there was never any talk of those plans. Hitler never had any foreign political plans at all; rather, he made decisions very suddenly and in as brief a period of time at possible, transformed decisions into action so that oven his closest collaborator, and co-workers had knowledge of these decisions but a few days in advance and thi expression "Anschluss" of Austria, which is used generally and commonly and which is used here, is on the whole not identical with the things that took place, which was the incorporation of Austria and this incorporation of Austria, that is the thing we are concerned with; but this incorporation of Austria into Germany, that was something which Hitler told us about in the very last moment and that is a decision which Hitler made at the very last moment, that is, when we were marching into Linz; and as a further piece of proof that the plan for a violent marching in had not been made in advance, that may be seen from the circumstances and free the fact that Hitler just a few days before that, had sent his Foreign Minister to London to straighten out some diplomatic matters there.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to an excerpt from the book which we have mentioned, a book by Sir Neville Henderson, "Failure of a Mission", and this excerpt is number four in my document book, under the number 129; and may I ask that the High Tribunal kindly take judicial notice of this document. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: after the marching in, you told the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Berlin regarding the ramifications of the measures as they would apply to a relationship with Czechoslovakia. According to a report which the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastny, has given concerning this discussion, you allegedly declared that the German government did not wish to take any stops against Czechoslovakia and had no intention of that sort but rather was above all concerned with and intended to, in the future, observe the arbitration treaty which w as concluded in the twenties. Will you please comment on this report, which is found under number 141 in my book, volume 5, and asyou know about this matter, define your attitude.
A It is quite correct that on the 12th of March, to Mastny I made the statement that he alleges I made in a conversation with him; only the course of the conversation was a little bit different from the way he described it.
On the 12th of March, I was called by phone by von Weizsaecker who at that time was Iminsterial Director. He called me at my home, telling me that the Czechoslovakian Ambassador Mastny was with him and wanted to know whether he could see me sometime during the course of the day. I asked Mr. Mastny to come to my home during the afternoon. Mr. Mastny asked me if I believed Hitler, now, that is, immediately in connection with the Austrian Anschluss, would undertake something against Czechoslovakia as well. I replied that he could be at case, that Hitler had just told me on the previous evening in reply to my questionand to my reference to the point that the Anschluss of Austria would create unrest in Czechoslovakia, that in reply to this, Hitler had told me that he did not think of undertaking anything against Czechoslovakia. Then Mastny further asked whether according to that, Germany would observe the agreement which was concluded in the year 1920, on whether Germany still considered herself bound by this agreement. On the basis of the answer given to me by Hitler, I, with a clear conscience, affirmed and told him that Germany did consider herself bound by this agreement. Hitler added in this connection that he believed that the connections with Czechoslovakia from now on would improve considerably, that the settlement of the Austrian matter, the Austrian Affair, had after all been a domestic one. Hitler and on his instructions; that, however, is not true. I purely and simply referred to my discussion with Hitler which was fresh in my mind and the further emphasis in this report that I spoke as the president of the Secret Cabinet Council, that must be an expression of speech used by Mr. Mastny in order to give more weight to his report. between the statements thatyou made and the plans as they developed on the fifth of November, and the prosecution accuses you, that despite the realization of the plans which existed, you acted in bad faith up to a certain point in that you gave a statement to Mastny, a statement which was calming.
A From this discussion, you could see but generally that Hitler was concerned with plans of war.
In no way was there any conversation or talk about an aggressive plan against the Czechoslovakian State but we talked only of the eventuality that in case a war should break cut, Czechoslovakia and Austria would have to be occupied so that cur right flank would be protected and kept free. The form of the attack or that an attack of Czechoslovakia was to take palace, and actual thinking there would be any conflict in the East, that was a mute and very disputed question which was not touched and for a fact, the Sudetenland which was a border region and strategically in fact a key position of the Czech defense, was settled in a peaceful manner by agreement with the Powers and was relinquished in a peaceful way but concrete war plans against Czechoslovakia, as Colonel General Jodl has testified to, were made towards the end of May 1933 and handed over to the General Staff for their handling. About the existence of these plans, I learned for the first time here and apart from that, when Hitler told me thathe would do nothing against the Czechoslovakian State, I had to rely on the fact that this was his real opinion; that the ideas that Hitler had at that time were changed by the time the 5th of November came around, and that he had given up his ideas as set forth on the 12th of March.
THE a RESIDENT: Shall we break off?
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 24 June 1946.)
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN :
Q Mr. von Neurath, there was a talk on the 28th of May 1938, at which Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering, the commanders in Chief of the Wehmacht, were present and at which it is asserted, in the affidavit of Mr. Wiedemann, that you were also present. was mentioned by Wiedemann. Keitel, Ribbentrop, Goering and Raeder knew nothing of this talk. Perhaps it is a mistake or a confusion with the talk mentioned by Schmundt of the 28th of April, 1938, but I was not present at this talk either. I was not in Berlin at all. In the Sudeten crisis in the fall of 1938, did you take an active part and advocate a peaceful policy ?
A Yes, After my dismissal in February, 1938, I lived on my estate. On about the 26th of September I received a telephone call from one of my former ministerial colleagues that Hitler had instructed the Wehrmacht to be ready to march by the 28th of September. Apparently he wanted to solve the Sudeten question by force. I was to come to Berlin immediately and attempt to dissuade Hitler from his intention. In the night I went to Berlin. After my arrival I inquired at the Foreign Office about the situation and reported to Hitler. I was turned away. But on the 28th I went to the Reich Chancellery. I met Hitler's entourage ready to march. I inquired after Hitler and the answer was given that he would receive no one. Nevertheless, I went to the door and entered Hitler's room. When he saw me he asked, in a harsh voice, "What do you want ?" I answered that I wanted to point out the consequences of this intended step. I explained to him that he would bring on a European war, probably a world war, while negotiations were still in progress on the Sudeten problem, by marching into Czechoslovakia, that Czechoslovakia would doubtless resist and it would not be an easy struggle; that France and England and Poland would go to war, and that it would be a crime on his part to shed so much blood unless all possibilities of peaceful settlement had been exhausted. I knew that Mr. Chamberlain was willing to come to Germany once more and that he would also be willing to have the Czechs turn over the Sudeten land if that could prevent war.
THE PRESIDENT : How did you know that Mr. Chamberlain would be willing to come ?
THE WITNESS : By the fact that I had met the English Ambassador on the Street.
THE PRESIDENT : Go on.
THE WITNESS : Hitler was not interested in this conference. During our talk Goering had appeared and he supported me in my efforts to persuade Hitler to a conference. Finally Hitler agreed, If I could bring Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to Berlin by the next day. As that was impossible for Mussolini, I suggested Munich as the place for negotiations. I established contact with the English and French ambassadors, who were both on their way to see Hitler. Hitler himself telephoned directly to Mussolini, By six o'clock the promise and answers had been received.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of my document No. 20 in Document Book No. 1, Page 72-b, an excerpt from the book of Ambassador Henderson, "Failure of a Mission". BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : took place ?
A Yes. In view of Hitler's attitude, I was concerned about the course of the conference. Therefore, I told him that I considered it expedient if I could go to Munich too, since I know the foreign representatives personally and for that reason could serve as mediator. When he agreed, Goering invited me to go in his special train. In the course of the long session I repeatedly talked to the three persons and to Hitler and tried to mediate differences which arose.
Mr. Chamberlain, at the end of this talk, asked me to arrange a talk with the Fuehrer alone, without Ribbentrop, on the next day, since he would like to make a suggestion. The Fuehrer did not want this at first, but finally I persuaded him. At this talk, an agreement was reached between England and Germany, which France later joined. Chamberlain, who was living at the same hotel as I, showed me this agreement with great joy after the talk, and I also was glad to see it. I hoped that English-German relationships which had suffered in the Godesberg and Berchtesgaden meetings might be brough back to normalcy and the way would be opened for further conferences.
As in the summer of '37, Chamberlain invited me to visit England. I immediately told him that I did not believe that Hitler who had forbidden me to go to England in the summer of '37, would now give his approval, especially since I was no longer Foreign Minister. In January 1938 the English ambassador repeated the invitation, but I had to tell him that I had no opportunity to obtain Hitler's approval.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document 21 in my document book. It is a letter of the French Ambassador Francois Poncet, of the 18th of October 1938, a few weeks after the Munich conference. I should like to quote only two sentences from it.
"But of us, it is not I who have contracted the greater debt of gratitude. I have always found with you, even at the most delicate moments, the most courteous, the most indulgent and the most confident reception. You made a difficult task easy for me. I shall never forget what I owe you."
Mr. President, at this point I should like to submit a letter of the French Ambassador Poncet which was received only a few days ago, which I mentioned at the beginning of my case. I asked that the French Ambassador be called as a witness, and in answer a letter of the ambassador of the 7th of June was sent to the French Prosecution, a copy of which I received through the General Secretary's office at the end of last week -- I believe Thursday or Friday.
prescribed form of an affidavit but is a private letter, I would ask that you honor it as if it were in the form of an affidavit. The original of this letter is in the possession of the French Prosecution and the French Prosecution has promised me that the original will be submitted to the court on the request of the court. I submit the certified copy.
THE PRESIDENT: The original document should be presented to the court now, or as soon as it conveniently can be.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The day before yesterday I talked to a member of the French Prosecution and he said they did not have it at the moment. I don't know where they have it. Therefore, I ask that it be submitted; otherwise I would already have submitted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but it must be submitted as soon as possible.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to offer it in evidence, do you DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes; 162.THE PRESIDENT:
There is no objection, I take it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No objection, my Lord.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: This letter reads -- if I may quote one brief passage -
THE PRESIDENT: You gave it a number, did you?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No. 162.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "He" -- that is Mr. von Neurath-"made efforts to facilitate the task of foreign diplomats in the German capital. They, like myself, were grateful to him. I do not doubt that he often turned Hitler's mind to the dangers he was exposing Germany to by the excesses of his regime, and that he made him listen to the voice of prudence and moderation."
Now I come to another subject. I should like to present the following: BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: during your period in office as Reich Foreign minister, a representative of the Foreign Office took part in sessions of the Reich Defense Counsel, and by the Reich Defense Law of 1936, you, as President of the Secret Cabinet, were a member of this Reich Defense Counsel. the Secret Cabinet, did I have anything to do with matters of the Reich Defense Counsel. I never took part in any session or talk. It has been stated here that all Ministers from the tine of Koch in 1933 had so-called Reich Defense experts who were to deal with certain questions resulting from possible motilization in case of a defensive war.
As Dr. Schacht has already testified, the Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 wasnothing but legalization of a committee which had existed before 1933. Reich Defense, did you see signs of preparation for a war of aggression?
A In no way. The designation indicates that it was preparations for the defense of the Reich against attack, and not preparationsfor attack. Moreover, I know that in France as well as in England such arrangements had existed for a long time.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document 78 which is on page 213 of my Document Book 3. It is an excerpt from a statement of the French Bar Minister Petain of the 6th of June 1934, before the Army Commission of the French Chamber, which mentions the necessity of a defense counsel or committee.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal doesn't think that any evidence that other countries had other organizations is really relevant to this case.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: honors than some of the Nazi leaders themselves, and concludes that you were especially close to Hitler. Will you please comment on this
A That is a rather remarkable assumption. It was clear that as the oldest minister who had served the state for over 40 years, Hitler could not avoid giving me honors and honorary titles, but they were limited to what is customary for the incumbents of high state positions. charge is made against you. You held the Order of the German Eagle, the War Merit Cross First Class.
A Yes. The Order of the German Eagle was founded in 1937 and was to be warded only to foreigners.
It would have had no great value abroad but would have been considered more a type of special order, such as the colonial order if no German had held it. For that reason in my capacity as Foreign Minister, immediately when the order was founded, Hitler gave me the Grand Cross of the order.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, is it not sufficient for the defendant to have said that it was usual to give these titles? It is not necessary for us to investigate the particular merits of the particular order, is it? It seems to me to be very remote.
DR. VON LUEDING HAUSEN: Mr. President, I mentioned it only because the Prosecution brought it out especially. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: in that well-known cabinet, you received the Golden Party insignia from Hitler and thus became a member of the Nazi Party. What about that?
AAs to the way in which this was awarded, Mr.Schacht as well as Raeder have testified here. I was not a member of any party. Between 1933 and 1937 I had several times been requested to join the party but had refused. My attitude toward the Party was generally know n. For that reason I was repeatedly attacked. As to the reason this insignia was awarded in 1937 to various members of the cabinet and to the generals who were not allowed to become members of the Party, I believe that has been described in enough detail and that I need not go into it again. the SS.
A Yes, that was a complete surprise to me. In September 1937 Mussolini had announced his visit to Germany. In the last days before this visit I was not in Berlin. When I returned in the morning I found my tailor at the entrance of my house with the uniform of an SS Gruppenfuehrer. I asked him what that meant. He told me the Reichschancellor had instructed him to make me a uniform immediately. I went to see Hitler and asked him why he had done this. He said he wanted all the men who were to be present at the reception of Mussolini to be in uniform. I told him that was not very agreeable to me and I had to explain in no case would I be subordinate to Himmler and did not want to have anything to do with the SS. Hitler assured me solemnly that this would not asked of me, that I would have no obligation to the SS and this actually did not happen.
fuehrer was apparently done in the course of general promotions without any special emphasis.
Q Did you wear this uniform at all?
A Only twice as far as I can recall; at the reception of Mussolini and then when in 1938 I went to Ankara to the funeral of Kemal pasha. In Prague, at official occasions, I always wore the diplomatic uniform without any insignia. congratulations and other expressions of the honoring of your person and your activities from various sources. You were congratulated, amongst others, by Hitler and you received a check for 250,000 marks.
Will you please tell us what was the significance of this gift?
A. The Prosecution recently mentioned this gift
A. The Prosecution recently mentioned this gift. They forget to say that I refused it.
The events were as follows. On the day of my 70th birthday, in the morning, a deputy of Hitler called on me and brought me a congratulatory letter from Hitler and an oil painting by a young German painter, showing an Italian landscapte. The letter enclosed a check for 250,000 marks. I was painfully embarrassed. I immediately told the envoy I considered the gift an insult. I am not a lackey whom one dismisses with a tip and told him he should take the check back with him. He said he was not authorized to do so. check for the Reich treasury. He said that he believed the check was on a special account of Hitler's and he could not accept it. At his advice I turned the check over to the Reich Credit Association for a special account end informed the competent finance office in writing. I never touched one penny of this sum. refuse because it was within the limits of a normal birthday gift and sending it back would have been considered an insult.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to submit two letters of the Reich Credit association in this connection which I received on Saturday, upon my inquiry, from the Reich Credit Association. They contain confirmation that this sum of 250,000 marks in its full extent, plus the interest which has accumulated, is still today in a special account of the Reich Credit Association. This is proof that Mr. von Neurath did not, in fact, touch a penny of this sum.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number of it?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 160 and 161.
Mr. President, in my haste I have only been able to have the English translation made. The French and Russian translation will be prepared in the next few days.
I received it myself only Saturday afternoon. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. The further charge is made against you that in the conservative circles of Germany you were considered as a sort of member of the fifth column to induce them to agree to the National Socialist regime and the fact of your remaining in the N.S.D.A.P. was considered as an example.
A. This statement is nonsense because it was known throughout Germany and abroad that I was no National Socialist and that I opposed National Socialist excesses against the church and the Jews and that I opposed a policy which endangered peace. This was clearly shown when I was dismissed in February 1938. The general consternation was not expressed in the German press because there was no press available. assumed that I was with all my heart behind the Nazis, as the Indictment says. Other countries knew this just as well and saw in me an obstacle to Nazi policy. That I was not a blind follower of Nazi theories the foreign diplomats in Berlin knew best as they could observe my constant struggle against the Party.