trips to their capitals, in reality had only the one purpose of strengthening the existing economic relationships, and thus promoting mutual trade and exchange of goods, and in addition, to gain information about the political conditions, which are always difficult to understand,
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In my Document Book No.2, under No. 30, page 87, I have a short excerpt from another affidavit of Mr. Messersmith, on the 29th of August 1945. The Prosecution has already submitted it as USA-750, PS-2386, in another connection. I should like to quote one passage from this excerpt. It is on page 87 of my Document Book 2, and reads:
"During the years 1933-1934, the German Foreign Office was maintained by the Nazi Government for the most part with the old line conservative officials in charge. This situation continued generally throughout the period during which Baron von Neurath was Foreign Minister. However, after vonRibbentrop became Chief of the Foreign Office, the situation with regard to the policy officials was gradually changed. During vonNeurath's incumbency, the German Foreign Office had not been coordinated, and little blame for acts of German foreign policy could be attributed to von Neurath and his assistants during this period, though his continuation in office indicated his agreement with National Socialist aims, for which activities von Neurath might easily adduce in his defense reasons of patriotic motive." Southeast, I have the three communiques on von Neurath's visit to Belgrade, Sofia, and Budapest in June 1937, under Nos. 122, 123, and 124 in my Document Book 4. I ask the Court to take judicial noticeof them. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, from your speech of the 29th of August 1937, which you made at the demonstration of foreign Germans in Stuttgart, the charge is made that in this speech you made statements of aggressive intentions. The following statement was ostensibly made by you in this speech:
"The unity of national will created by National Socialism has made possible a foreign policy by which the terms of the Versailles Dictate are exploded, military freedom is regained, and sovereignty is restored throughout the state.
We are again masters in our own house, and we have created the means to remain so in the future. By our foreign political actions we have taken nothing from anyone. From the words and deeds of Hitler we can see that he has no aggressive desires."
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to point out that these sentences can be understood only in context. I should like to ask the permission of the Court to read the text briefly. This excerpt from the speech is submitted by me in Document Book 4, No. 126. I quote:
"We have become masters in our own house. We have created the means to remain so."
THE PRESIDENT: You have just read that. You have read it once.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. I should like to read the sentence which was omitted.
THE PRESIDENT: You may read anything which is relevant and which was omitted, of course.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The quotation that I am submitting reads:
"But this attitude of the new German Reich is in reality the strongest bulwark for safeguarding peace and will always prove itself as such in a world in turmoil, just because we have recognized the danger of certain destructive tendencies as they continually assert themselves in Europe, We are act looking for differences between other people, but are trying to find connecting links. We are not thinking of political isolation. We want political cooperation between governments, a cooperation which, if it is to be successful, cannot be based on theoretical ideas of collectivity, but on living reality, and which must devote itself to the concrete tasks of the present. With satisfaction we can state that in pursuing such a realistic peace policy, we are working hand in hand with our friend Italy. This justifies the hope that we may also reach a friendly understanding with other nations regarding important questions of foreign policy."
THE PRESIDENT: I think this is a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, just before the recess I had confronted you with a quotation from a speech dated 29 August, 1937 and I had asked you at that time whether you wished to make a statement concerning this at the time. which the Prosecution is trying to show. It is almost impossible to show my peaceful character and intentions in a more convincing way than I did in this speech. policy that you conducted, and that it could be summarized and they accuse you of the following sentences in a speech before the academy for German Law when you said, and I quote:
"From the realization of the fundamental facts the Reich Cabinet always tried to be in favor of those things so that each concrete international problem be handled with those methods which are appropriate and not to assimilate it unnecessarily with other problems and thus complicate matters in that way and as long as the problem exists only between two powers the way for an immediate understanding between these two powers is to be chosen. We are in a position to determine and to see that this method has proved itself to be a good one, not only in the German interests but also in the General interests."
Will you please comment on that accusation which is leveled against you?
A This quotation is, first of all, tern completely from its context. The entire speech contained the number of reasons out of which I considered the conclusion of bilateral agreements were possible in preference to so-called collective agreements and from this tendency and in this way this part which was quoted is to be understood. Therefore, I should ask that you please quote the passage in its entire context.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this speech Mr. von Neurath, referring to the League of Nations and international law, which he delivered on 30 October, 1937 before the Academy for German Law -- that will be found under number 128 of my document book volume 4--I would, with the permission of the Tribunal, like too quote this passage in its entirety, a passage from which we shall see that the accusation made by the Prosecution and the passage selected by the Prosecution does not have the sense which is credited to it by the Prosecution. It says here:
"I am convinced that the same or similar concerns will also arise in other case, where a schematic structure, as is an absolute mutual system of assitance will be intended for a more or loss larger group of states. Such projects, even in the most favorable cases, namely, when intended to be an equal guarantee by all participants, will only remain as a piece of paper --".
THE PRESIDENT. Is it not sufficient to refer to the document? The defendant has just said that the speech contained the reasons why he considered bilateral possible rather than general agreements. He said that, The document appears to confirm that. Could you not refer be the document without reading the words?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I did so because it was torn from its context and I believed that I would be permitted to quote the context as well. However, if the High Tribunal wish to read the matter itself I shall dispense with quoting it
THE PRESI DENT: It does not seem to me to add to it. It is just the words which the defendant has quoted the substance of.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I omitted one sentence as I thought it was superfluouse. But from the context it may be seen, and may be seen from the entire speech, what the defendant intended to convey. If the High Tribunal prefers to read the entire speech as I have submitted it, then, of course, I shall be satisfied. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, under number L-150, U.S. 65, the Prosecution have submitted a note of the then American ambassador in Paris, Bullitt, regarding a discussion he had with you in May of 1936 and the Prosecution concludes on page 8 of the English trial brief that as foreign minister you participated in the planning of aggressive war against Austria and Czechoslovakia. your position regarding this accusation which is leveled against you. and the signatory powers of the Treaty of Versailles. This applied especially to France and Czechoslovakia. Therefore it was to be taken for granted in conducting a reasonable German foreign policy that this unrest had to be given a chance to die down so as to convince the world that Germany was not pursuing aggressive plans in that direction but was only a restoration of her full sovereignty in our own region.
The erection of fortifications was to serve only the purpose of decreasing the temptation of our neighbors who were armed to the teeth from marching into German territory, which was lying there unprotected. Despite negotiations and all efforts, it had not been possible to make them observe the disarmament clause in the Treaty of Versaille. instead of disarming continued to arm and through the conclusion of agreements with Soviet Russia increased the military superiority.
In my discussion with Mr. Bullitt I wanted to mention all these facts and I hoped through making military attacks more difficult France and Czechoslovakia would change their policy, which was hostile to Germany. I tried to create a better understanding with both these countries with special reference to the maintenance of peace. These, my hopes and my views, can be seen especially in the last part of the report -- a report which Mr. Bullitt agreed to and endorsed. report, at that time England was trying to bring about a rapprochement between Germany and Italy in order to prevent further conversations because of the tension which had arisen because of Abyssinia. That resistance against the Anschluss between Germany and Austria was to be recognized. This resistance was shared completely by Mussolini at that time. The realization of this intention on the part of England, which was rather transparent, was one of the motives for the conclusion of the German-Austrian treaty of 11/7/36. The statement which I had hoped for on the part of the British, in November 1937 on the occasion of the visit of Lord Halifax to Berlin, came about. Lord Halifax at that time told me and I took care to remember this statement verbatim and I quote in English:
"People in England would never understand why they should go to war only because two German countries wish to unite." English ambassador at Vienna, and the wording of which I knew, promised complete support and asked for resistance toward the Anschluss.
From the Bullitt notes, we can also see that I said that Hitler's greatest wish was an actual and true understanding with France.
Apart from that, and as he stated, right from the beginning, I also told Mr. Bullitt that the German government would do everything in order to prevent an uprising on the part of the National S ocialists in Austria.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: These notes set down by Mr. Bullitt are included as Number 15 in my document book, page 60. That has been submitted by no, and I should like the High Tribunal to refer to page 60, especially tha last paragraph, and to take special notice of it, so tha t I can save time by not quoting it. This is document book Number 1, Neurath document 15, page 60, last paragraph. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: the policy that was to be pursued by Germany with reference to Czechoslovakia? characterized by a strong suspicion toward us. This distrust resulted partly from the geographic location of the country, between Germany and Austria, and in part from the diversities of nationality which were found within the country. These national oppositions were very resentful, and the country's being drawn into a military and friendship agreement with the Russians and the French did not contribute to the creation of a closer relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia. stiuation and worked to that end. I also tried to extend our economic connections. In this connection, I did not consider as possibilities military occupation or violent means in this case, any more than I did in other cases. question? The Germans were present in the Sudetenland and In the peace negotiations in the year 1919 when these German were given 24 June A LJG 8-2 over to the Chech state, autonomy was promised to them, on the model of the Swiss Confederation.
Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons corroborated this statement in 1940. The Sudeten German delegation at that time, as well as Austria, had demanded anschluss with the Reich. ment. Instead of autonomy, there was a deliberate policy of Czech-ification. The Germans were refused the use of their own German language in the courts, as well as before administrative authorities, and so forth, and they were prohibited from using their own language under threat of punishment.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, can not the defendant go on to the time with which we have to dela, namely, 1958, and tell us what his policy was then, without telling us all these facts beforehand about 1919?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well. I just wanted to bring out certain foundations to show that his later policy was correct. However, if the High Tribunal believes that this is well known, I shall shall satisfy myself with the testimony which has already been given. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, what was your official and personal relationship to Hitler during your time as Foreign Minister? tion with Hitler of any kind. I did not belong to his close circle either. concerning foreign political matters, and on the whole, he was quite approachable as far as the arguments by no were concerned. However, In the course of time, these relationships changed to such an extent that other organizations, especially the Party, concerned themselves with foreign policy, and these organizations approached and had access to Hitler with their plans and their ideas. This applied especially to the so-called Bureau Ribben trop.
Ribbentrop turned more and more into a personal adviser 24 June A LJG 8-3 of Hitler when it came to foreign political matters, and he gained more and more influence.
Frequently it was difficult to dissuade Hitler from proposals which had been submitted to him through these channels. in certain aspects. The Foreign Office, not only in Berlin, but also through its representatives abroad, later not difficulty after difficulty. These difficulties were caused by the methods of work and the sources of information of this bureau of Ribbentrop. I personally was always opposed to any influence which the P arty and the Party organs tried to exert on foreign policy. Specifically, I was opposed to his officials being drawn into foreign political matters. I tried to oppose these things, especially if they were not out of my control, and for that reason I tried to resign several times. In each case, I succeeded in having Hitler for a certain period of time dispense with the influence which Ribbentrop had exerted on him in this direction.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to submit and have the High Tribunal take official notice of an extract from an article in the American newspaper " Time", dated 10 April 1933, number 9 of my document book Number 1, page 44. I should also like to refer-
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that more newspaper reports or comments are in the nature of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In addition, I should like to submit, or rather, I have submitted in my document book Number 1, under Number 17, an extract from the well known look of the former British Ambassador at Berlin, Henderson, " Failure of a Mission ", and to take official notice of it so I shall not have to read it, paying especial attention to paragraph 2, page
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that this document -- the article from Time -- may be admitted, but it is not necessary to refer to it.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Thank you. This is document number 9, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is document number 9. I say it may be admitted.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Thank you very much. Tribunal to document number 16, which is an attempt to resign by the defendant von Neurath, to Hitler, dated 27 July 1936, because of the intended appointment of Mr. von Ribbentrop as State Secretary. That was the occasion for his resignation request. It is probably just as well if I do not read this document, but I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal not only to the contents, but also to the manner of speech, to the greeting, and to the conclusion. The beginning states only "Esteemed Reich Chancellor", and the conclusion states, "Ihr Ergebener", "Yours respectfully". figures of speech were used in addressing letters to Hitler which exceeded ordinary courtesy. Any such figures of speech were never used by Mr. von Neurath. document book number 1. That is also an a ttempt at resignation, dated the 25th of October, 1935. I am asking the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of this document as well. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, aside from your official policy, weren't their other agencies which independently undertook action; signed treaties, for instance? In other words, they carried through things in which you did not participate; is that right?
A Yes. That was the case, for instance, when the so-called BerlinRome-Tokyo policy was under consideration. Hitler pursued this plan stubbornly. and, of course, Ribbentrop supported him in this. I had rejected this policy, since I considered it detrimental and partially fantastic as well, and I refused my collaboration in the handling of this matter. Ribbentrop, therefore, in his capacity as Ambassador for a special purpose, carried on these negotiations independently, and, on Hitler's instructions, concluded the so-called AntiComintern pact.
This pact, therefore, carried the signature of Ribbentrop rather than my own, even though I was still Foreign Minister at that time, and, as a matter of course, I would have had to sign treaties.
Mr. von Neurath, when did you realize that Hitler's foreign political alliance, above all to bring about parity or German equality, exceeded peaceful means and that the conduct of war and the use of violence was to be part of the means to be considered? to the commanders-in-chief of the Wehrmacht on the 5th of November, 1937, a speech which has been mentioned here frequently, and a speech at which I was present. The notes regarding the contents on this speech, as we have seen from the Hoszbach minutes which were made five days later -- and from a speech which lasted two or three hours -- the notes were made from memory and set down in that way. no concrete contents, and various possibilities were envisaged. However, it was quite obvious to me that the whole tendency and all the plans were of an aggressive nature. This speech of Hitler's upset me very, very much, because the whole policy which I had pursued -- the police of using only peaceful means -- and the entire channel of our foreign policy had had the props knocked out from under it. It was a matter of course that I could not assume responsibility for a policy of that nature.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In connection with this I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, which I have already mentioned, which is number 3 in document book number 1. From this affidavit I should like to quote a paragraph under figure 17 of my document book, a paragraph which seems so significant to me that I should like to ask the High Tribunal to grant me permission to quote this entire paragraph. I quotes "When Mr. von Neurath had to recognize for the first time, from Hitler's statements on 5 November 1937, that the latter wanted to achieve his political aims by using force toward the neighboring states, this shook him so severely mentally that he suffered several heart attacks.
"He discussed this with us in detail on the occasion of his visit on Now Year's day in 1938, and we found him to be suffering very much physically and spiritually. He was, above all, very shaken by the fact that Hitler in the meantime had refused to receive him, and he could not see any possibility under these circumstances of drawing the latter from his plans, plans which he condemned to the utmost. 'It Is horrible to play the part or Cassandra', he often said. He categorically declared that he could not participate in this policy under any circumstances, and that he would draw the immediate consequences from this. He did not falter from this decision either when Hitler declared to him, on 2 February 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday, that he could not do without him as Foreign Minister. He discussed this with us the same evening during a telephone call of congratulations on the occasion of his birthday." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: you gained from this speech?
Fritsch, who had also been present on the occasion of this speech; and together with him and the chief of the German staff, Bock, I discussed what perhaps we could do in order to change over Hitler. We agreed that, first of all, Colonel General von Fritsch, who in the days following was scheduled to report to Hitler during the next few days, was to explain the military reasons to him, which were in contradiction to this policy. Then I wanted to explain the political reasons to him. not receive, or did not wish to receive me. Unfortunately I could not see Hitler. Then on the 14th or 15th of January, I could not speak with him until nighttime. On that occasion I tried to show him that his policy would lead to a world war, and that I would have no part of it.
Many of his plans could be carried out in a peaceful way; however, it would take a little longer that way. Then he told me that he did not have time any longer. I called his attention to the risk of a war and to the serious admonitions which the generals had given to him. I reminded him ofhis speech to the Reichstag in 1933 in which he himself had declared every new war to be utter nonsense, and so forth.
Despite all of my arguments, he maintained his position. I told him not be one of the people who would be co-guilty in this policy. Then Hitler refused to accept my request for a resignation. However, I remain ed steadfast, and on the 4th of February he gave me my resignation.
Q Did you have the impression, Mr. von Neurath, that Hitler reluctantly decided to grant your resignation, or that with your request for a resignation you went ahead of his own wishes a little?
A I believe the latter applies. For some time I believed Hitler must have had the wish -
THE PRESIDENT: That is not evidence. You cannot say what you think another man thought. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: were made president of thenewly instituted and secret cabinet council What did that appointment mean?
of a secret cabinet council took place only for the purpose of having changes in foreign policy and changes on the military side covered up. Further witnesses' testimony has established and confirmed that fact that the secret cabinet council was never called together. of working, for since my resignation on the 4th of February I was cut off from receiving any foreign political messages. as Reich minister. But actually, were you a member of the Reich cabinet or not?
A No. Apart from the fact that according to my knowledge the Reich cabinet did not function at all any longer, for there were no longer any sessions of the Reich cabinet, the title "Reich minister" was just atitle of form, which was in no way connected with any activity, and with which no department was connected. In contrast to the members of the Reich government, I did not receive any laws which I had to sign. of von Ribbentrop, you represented him as foreign minister; and they gather this from an entry in the diary of Colonel General Jodl,which said that Neurath in the meantime is taking over the foreign office. Will you please comment on this? associations with my former colleagues, and I had retired completely. However, I still remained in Berlin. On the 11th of March, 1938, late in the afternoon, suddenly Hitler rang me up in my flat and asked me to come and see him.
In the anteroom I met, besides Mr. von Papen, von Brachitsch and a number of other high officials and officers in close companionship with Hitler. Geering was in the room with Hitler when I arrived. Hitler told me that the Anschluss with Austria was a fact, and that German troops in the night of the 11th and 12th would cross the border. When I objected and asked whether that had to be, Hitler told me the reason why he did not wish to wait any longer. He asked me what was to be done by the Foreign Office as a matter of routine, since the foreign minister was absent in London at the time.
I told him that as a matter of form we would receive pretests which, of course, would have to be answered. And apart from that, on our part, a report was to be given to the various powers, and this report was a purely formal treatment of the situation. I also told him immediately to recall the foreign minister from London.
Goering, however, contradicted me on this. Finally Hitler asked me to tell the State Secretary or the Foreign Office what he just told me, so that the Foreign Office would be au courant and would know what was going on. which Hitler had given; and complete with the events as they had taken place, I told these things to the State Secretary, who was the official representative of Ribbentrop. Foreign Minister was absent. Then on the 12th of March, I personally told them about a letter which had been addressed to me and had come from the British ambassador protesting on the part of Britain against the occupation of Austria. I told him that the foreign office would submit a note of reply. fact and told him about the contents of the note over the telephone. Goering as a deputy of Hitler asked me to sign the reply in his stead, since the letter of the British ambassador had been addressed to me. This is something which Goering has stated as a witness here in this courtroom; hence the phrase in this letter which says "in the name of the Reich Government. " and to advise him of the state of affairs. From the telephone conversation which has already been mentioned here, between Goering and Ribbentrop, it can be seen that Goering did this. I found out the explanation of why the British note was sent to me here through the testimony of Goering. I have learned that he himself on the evening of the 11th had told the British ambassador that he, Goering, was representing Hitler during his absence, and that he was his deputy, and that Hitler had asked me to assist him on matters of foreign political advice.
which, in a very remarkable way, was made on the 10th of March, when I did not make any appearance, perhaps may be traced back to the fact that someone saw me on the 11th of March in the Reich chancellory. In any event, I took part in no other activities as the deputy of Ribbentrop.
Foreign Office, did you use that paper?
A The fact that I used stationery with the heading "President of the Secret Cabinet Council", stationery which was found in an adjoining room, shows that this rather fictitious institution actually existed and shows as well that I did not represent the Foreign Office or the Foreign Minister, otherwise I would have used their stationery. answered by you in a note which you have just described. The prosecution is accusing you of the fact that the reasons given by you in this letter and the picture of events in Austria and the event which preceded the marching into Austria are not correct; since, I assume, that the High Tribunal is cognizant of the passages with which the accused is charged, I do not feel that I need to quote these passages for Mr. Ribbentrop and you know these passages as well and I should like to have your opinion. incorrect is quite true and justified but the reason fir it was just this, that I had no other reports or information except the report given me by Hitler and these pieces of information were the basis of the contents of the note -- this information I had transmitted to the Foreign Office which, for their part, was completely ignorant of incidents and in that way the draft originated; and I should like to add that a planning of the incidents which led to a marching into Austria, which applies to my period of the Foreign Office, that there was never any talk of those plans. Hitler never had any foreign political plans at all; rather, he made decisions very suddenly and in as brief a period of time at possible, transformed decisions into action so that oven his closest collaborator, and co-workers had knowledge of these decisions but a few days in advance and thi expression "Anschluss" of Austria, which is used generally and commonly and which is used here, is on the whole not identical with the things that took place, which was the incorporation of Austria and this incorporation of Austria, that is the thing we are concerned with; but this incorporation of Austria into Germany, that was something which Hitler told us about in the very last moment and that is a decision which Hitler made at the very last moment, that is, when we were marching into Linz; and as a further piece of proof that the plan for a violent marching in had not been made in advance, that may be seen from the circumstances and free the fact that Hitler just a few days before that, had sent his Foreign Minister to London to straighten out some diplomatic matters there.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to an excerpt from the book which we have mentioned, a book by Sir Neville Henderson, "Failure of a Mission", and this excerpt is number four in my document book, under the number 129; and may I ask that the High Tribunal kindly take judicial notice of this document. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: after the marching in, you told the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Berlin regarding the ramifications of the measures as they would apply to a relationship with Czechoslovakia. According to a report which the Czechoslovakian Ambassador in Berlin, Dr. Mastny, has given concerning this discussion, you allegedly declared that the German government did not wish to take any stops against Czechoslovakia and had no intention of that sort but rather was above all concerned with and intended to, in the future, observe the arbitration treaty which w as concluded in the twenties. Will you please comment on this report, which is found under number 141 in my book, volume 5, and asyou know about this matter, define your attitude.
A It is quite correct that on the 12th of March, to Mastny I made the statement that he alleges I made in a conversation with him; only the course of the conversation was a little bit different from the way he described it.
On the 12th of March, I was called by phone by von Weizsaecker who at that time was Iminsterial Director. He called me at my home, telling me that the Czechoslovakian Ambassador Mastny was with him and wanted to know whether he could see me sometime during the course of the day. I asked Mr. Mastny to come to my home during the afternoon. Mr. Mastny asked me if I believed Hitler, now, that is, immediately in connection with the Austrian Anschluss, would undertake something against Czechoslovakia as well. I replied that he could be at case, that Hitler had just told me on the previous evening in reply to my questionand to my reference to the point that the Anschluss of Austria would create unrest in Czechoslovakia, that in reply to this, Hitler had told me that he did not think of undertaking anything against Czechoslovakia. Then Mastny further asked whether according to that, Germany would observe the agreement which was concluded in the year 1920, on whether Germany still considered herself bound by this agreement. On the basis of the answer given to me by Hitler, I, with a clear conscience, affirmed and told him that Germany did consider herself bound by this agreement. Hitler added in this connection that he believed that the connections with Czechoslovakia from now on would improve considerably, that the settlement of the Austrian matter, the Austrian Affair, had after all been a domestic one. Hitler and on his instructions; that, however, is not true. I purely and simply referred to my discussion with Hitler which was fresh in my mind and the further emphasis in this report that I spoke as the president of the Secret Cabinet Council, that must be an expression of speech used by Mr. Mastny in order to give more weight to his report. between the statements thatyou made and the plans as they developed on the fifth of November, and the prosecution accuses you, that despite the realization of the plans which existed, you acted in bad faith up to a certain point in that you gave a statement to Mastny, a statement which was calming.
A From this discussion, you could see but generally that Hitler was concerned with plans of war.
In no way was there any conversation or talk about an aggressive plan against the Czechoslovakian State but we talked only of the eventuality that in case a war should break cut, Czechoslovakia and Austria would have to be occupied so that cur right flank would be protected and kept free. The form of the attack or that an attack of Czechoslovakia was to take palace, and actual thinking there would be any conflict in the East, that was a mute and very disputed question which was not touched and for a fact, the Sudetenland which was a border region and strategically in fact a key position of the Czech defense, was settled in a peaceful manner by agreement with the Powers and was relinquished in a peaceful way but concrete war plans against Czechoslovakia, as Colonel General Jodl has testified to, were made towards the end of May 1933 and handed over to the General Staff for their handling. About the existence of these plans, I learned for the first time here and apart from that, when Hitler told me thathe would do nothing against the Czechoslovakian State, I had to rely on the fact that this was his real opinion; that the ideas that Hitler had at that time were changed by the time the 5th of November came around, and that he had given up his ideas as set forth on the 12th of March.
THE a RESIDENT: Shall we break off?
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours) AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 24 June 1946.)