BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN :
Q Mr. von Neurath, there was a talk on the 28th of May 1938, at which Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goering, the commanders in Chief of the Wehmacht, were present and at which it is asserted, in the affidavit of Mr. Wiedemann, that you were also present. was mentioned by Wiedemann. Keitel, Ribbentrop, Goering and Raeder knew nothing of this talk. Perhaps it is a mistake or a confusion with the talk mentioned by Schmundt of the 28th of April, 1938, but I was not present at this talk either. I was not in Berlin at all. In the Sudeten crisis in the fall of 1938, did you take an active part and advocate a peaceful policy ?
A Yes, After my dismissal in February, 1938, I lived on my estate. On about the 26th of September I received a telephone call from one of my former ministerial colleagues that Hitler had instructed the Wehrmacht to be ready to march by the 28th of September. Apparently he wanted to solve the Sudeten question by force. I was to come to Berlin immediately and attempt to dissuade Hitler from his intention. In the night I went to Berlin. After my arrival I inquired at the Foreign Office about the situation and reported to Hitler. I was turned away. But on the 28th I went to the Reich Chancellery. I met Hitler's entourage ready to march. I inquired after Hitler and the answer was given that he would receive no one. Nevertheless, I went to the door and entered Hitler's room. When he saw me he asked, in a harsh voice, "What do you want ?" I answered that I wanted to point out the consequences of this intended step. I explained to him that he would bring on a European war, probably a world war, while negotiations were still in progress on the Sudeten problem, by marching into Czechoslovakia, that Czechoslovakia would doubtless resist and it would not be an easy struggle; that France and England and Poland would go to war, and that it would be a crime on his part to shed so much blood unless all possibilities of peaceful settlement had been exhausted. I knew that Mr. Chamberlain was willing to come to Germany once more and that he would also be willing to have the Czechs turn over the Sudeten land if that could prevent war.
THE PRESIDENT : How did you know that Mr. Chamberlain would be willing to come ?
THE WITNESS : By the fact that I had met the English Ambassador on the Street.
THE PRESIDENT : Go on.
THE WITNESS : Hitler was not interested in this conference. During our talk Goering had appeared and he supported me in my efforts to persuade Hitler to a conference. Finally Hitler agreed, If I could bring Chamberlain, Daladier, and Mussolini to Berlin by the next day. As that was impossible for Mussolini, I suggested Munich as the place for negotiations. I established contact with the English and French ambassadors, who were both on their way to see Hitler. Hitler himself telephoned directly to Mussolini, By six o'clock the promise and answers had been received.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of my document No. 20 in Document Book No. 1, Page 72-b, an excerpt from the book of Ambassador Henderson, "Failure of a Mission". BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : took place ?
A Yes. In view of Hitler's attitude, I was concerned about the course of the conference. Therefore, I told him that I considered it expedient if I could go to Munich too, since I know the foreign representatives personally and for that reason could serve as mediator. When he agreed, Goering invited me to go in his special train. In the course of the long session I repeatedly talked to the three persons and to Hitler and tried to mediate differences which arose.
Mr. Chamberlain, at the end of this talk, asked me to arrange a talk with the Fuehrer alone, without Ribbentrop, on the next day, since he would like to make a suggestion. The Fuehrer did not want this at first, but finally I persuaded him. At this talk, an agreement was reached between England and Germany, which France later joined. Chamberlain, who was living at the same hotel as I, showed me this agreement with great joy after the talk, and I also was glad to see it. I hoped that English-German relationships which had suffered in the Godesberg and Berchtesgaden meetings might be brough back to normalcy and the way would be opened for further conferences.
As in the summer of '37, Chamberlain invited me to visit England. I immediately told him that I did not believe that Hitler who had forbidden me to go to England in the summer of '37, would now give his approval, especially since I was no longer Foreign Minister. In January 1938 the English ambassador repeated the invitation, but I had to tell him that I had no opportunity to obtain Hitler's approval.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document 21 in my document book. It is a letter of the French Ambassador Francois Poncet, of the 18th of October 1938, a few weeks after the Munich conference. I should like to quote only two sentences from it.
"But of us, it is not I who have contracted the greater debt of gratitude. I have always found with you, even at the most delicate moments, the most courteous, the most indulgent and the most confident reception. You made a difficult task easy for me. I shall never forget what I owe you."
Mr. President, at this point I should like to submit a letter of the French Ambassador Poncet which was received only a few days ago, which I mentioned at the beginning of my case. I asked that the French Ambassador be called as a witness, and in answer a letter of the ambassador of the 7th of June was sent to the French Prosecution, a copy of which I received through the General Secretary's office at the end of last week -- I believe Thursday or Friday.
prescribed form of an affidavit but is a private letter, I would ask that you honor it as if it were in the form of an affidavit. The original of this letter is in the possession of the French Prosecution and the French Prosecution has promised me that the original will be submitted to the court on the request of the court. I submit the certified copy.
THE PRESIDENT: The original document should be presented to the court now, or as soon as it conveniently can be.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The day before yesterday I talked to a member of the French Prosecution and he said they did not have it at the moment. I don't know where they have it. Therefore, I ask that it be submitted; otherwise I would already have submitted it.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, but it must be submitted as soon as possible.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish to offer it in evidence, do you DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes; 162.THE PRESIDENT:
There is no objection, I take it.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: No objection, my Lord.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: This letter reads -- if I may quote one brief passage -
THE PRESIDENT: You gave it a number, did you?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No. 162.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "He" -- that is Mr. von Neurath-"made efforts to facilitate the task of foreign diplomats in the German capital. They, like myself, were grateful to him. I do not doubt that he often turned Hitler's mind to the dangers he was exposing Germany to by the excesses of his regime, and that he made him listen to the voice of prudence and moderation."
Now I come to another subject. I should like to present the following: BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: during your period in office as Reich Foreign minister, a representative of the Foreign Office took part in sessions of the Reich Defense Counsel, and by the Reich Defense Law of 1936, you, as President of the Secret Cabinet, were a member of this Reich Defense Counsel. the Secret Cabinet, did I have anything to do with matters of the Reich Defense Counsel. I never took part in any session or talk. It has been stated here that all Ministers from the tine of Koch in 1933 had so-called Reich Defense experts who were to deal with certain questions resulting from possible motilization in case of a defensive war.
As Dr. Schacht has already testified, the Reich Defense Counsel of 1935 wasnothing but legalization of a committee which had existed before 1933. Reich Defense, did you see signs of preparation for a war of aggression?
A In no way. The designation indicates that it was preparations for the defense of the Reich against attack, and not preparationsfor attack. Moreover, I know that in France as well as in England such arrangements had existed for a long time.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to submit Document 78 which is on page 213 of my Document Book 3. It is an excerpt from a statement of the French Bar Minister Petain of the 6th of June 1934, before the Army Commission of the French Chamber, which mentions the necessity of a defense counsel or committee.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The Tribunal doesn't think that any evidence that other countries had other organizations is really relevant to this case.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: honors than some of the Nazi leaders themselves, and concludes that you were especially close to Hitler. Will you please comment on this
A That is a rather remarkable assumption. It was clear that as the oldest minister who had served the state for over 40 years, Hitler could not avoid giving me honors and honorary titles, but they were limited to what is customary for the incumbents of high state positions. charge is made against you. You held the Order of the German Eagle, the War Merit Cross First Class.
A Yes. The Order of the German Eagle was founded in 1937 and was to be warded only to foreigners.
It would have had no great value abroad but would have been considered more a type of special order, such as the colonial order if no German had held it. For that reason in my capacity as Foreign Minister, immediately when the order was founded, Hitler gave me the Grand Cross of the order.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, is it not sufficient for the defendant to have said that it was usual to give these titles? It is not necessary for us to investigate the particular merits of the particular order, is it? It seems to me to be very remote.
DR. VON LUEDING HAUSEN: Mr. President, I mentioned it only because the Prosecution brought it out especially. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: in that well-known cabinet, you received the Golden Party insignia from Hitler and thus became a member of the Nazi Party. What about that?
AAs to the way in which this was awarded, Mr.Schacht as well as Raeder have testified here. I was not a member of any party. Between 1933 and 1937 I had several times been requested to join the party but had refused. My attitude toward the Party was generally know n. For that reason I was repeatedly attacked. As to the reason this insignia was awarded in 1937 to various members of the cabinet and to the generals who were not allowed to become members of the Party, I believe that has been described in enough detail and that I need not go into it again. the SS.
A Yes, that was a complete surprise to me. In September 1937 Mussolini had announced his visit to Germany. In the last days before this visit I was not in Berlin. When I returned in the morning I found my tailor at the entrance of my house with the uniform of an SS Gruppenfuehrer. I asked him what that meant. He told me the Reichschancellor had instructed him to make me a uniform immediately. I went to see Hitler and asked him why he had done this. He said he wanted all the men who were to be present at the reception of Mussolini to be in uniform. I told him that was not very agreeable to me and I had to explain in no case would I be subordinate to Himmler and did not want to have anything to do with the SS. Hitler assured me solemnly that this would not asked of me, that I would have no obligation to the SS and this actually did not happen.
fuehrer was apparently done in the course of general promotions without any special emphasis.
Q Did you wear this uniform at all?
A Only twice as far as I can recall; at the reception of Mussolini and then when in 1938 I went to Ankara to the funeral of Kemal pasha. In Prague, at official occasions, I always wore the diplomatic uniform without any insignia. congratulations and other expressions of the honoring of your person and your activities from various sources. You were congratulated, amongst others, by Hitler and you received a check for 250,000 marks.
Will you please tell us what was the significance of this gift?
A. The Prosecution recently mentioned this gift
A. The Prosecution recently mentioned this gift. They forget to say that I refused it.
The events were as follows. On the day of my 70th birthday, in the morning, a deputy of Hitler called on me and brought me a congratulatory letter from Hitler and an oil painting by a young German painter, showing an Italian landscapte. The letter enclosed a check for 250,000 marks. I was painfully embarrassed. I immediately told the envoy I considered the gift an insult. I am not a lackey whom one dismisses with a tip and told him he should take the check back with him. He said he was not authorized to do so. check for the Reich treasury. He said that he believed the check was on a special account of Hitler's and he could not accept it. At his advice I turned the check over to the Reich Credit Association for a special account end informed the competent finance office in writing. I never touched one penny of this sum. refuse because it was within the limits of a normal birthday gift and sending it back would have been considered an insult.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I ask permission to submit two letters of the Reich Credit association in this connection which I received on Saturday, upon my inquiry, from the Reich Credit Association. They contain confirmation that this sum of 250,000 marks in its full extent, plus the interest which has accumulated, is still today in a special account of the Reich Credit Association. This is proof that Mr. von Neurath did not, in fact, touch a penny of this sum.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number of it?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 160 and 161.
Mr. President, in my haste I have only been able to have the English translation made. The French and Russian translation will be prepared in the next few days.
I received it myself only Saturday afternoon. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. The further charge is made against you that in the conservative circles of Germany you were considered as a sort of member of the fifth column to induce them to agree to the National Socialist regime and the fact of your remaining in the N.S.D.A.P. was considered as an example.
A. This statement is nonsense because it was known throughout Germany and abroad that I was no National Socialist and that I opposed National Socialist excesses against the church and the Jews and that I opposed a policy which endangered peace. This was clearly shown when I was dismissed in February 1938. The general consternation was not expressed in the German press because there was no press available. assumed that I was with all my heart behind the Nazis, as the Indictment says. Other countries knew this just as well and saw in me an obstacle to Nazi policy. That I was not a blind follower of Nazi theories the foreign diplomats in Berlin knew best as they could observe my constant struggle against the Party.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit in 24 June A LJG 15-1 this connection on excerpt from a magazine, Number 127, and an excerpt from an article, with the speech which the dean of the Berlin diplomatic corps made in the name of the whole diplomatic corps to Mr. von Neurath on his birthday on 2 February 1938.
Both documents are contained in my document book Number 4, Number 127, and in Document Book Number 1, Hunter 18. and the personal points in the charge against Mr. von Neurath. Now I come to the second aspect of the charge, his activity as Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia. BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: from political life; is that true?
A Yes. I was in Berlin very seldom. For the most part I was in the mountains. have any knowledge of Hitler's plans for an invasion of Czechoslovakia?
A You mean the winter?
THE PRESIDENT: September 1539?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : That was my mistake. I meant in the winter.
THE PRESIDENT: of 1938, you mean?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I n the late winter of 19381939--February or march 1939.
THE WITNESS: The differences between us and Czechoslovakia on the treatment of the Sudeten Germans by the Czechs had been solved by the separation of the Sudetenland. The way to friendly cooperation seemed open to me. One of the focal points of danger for the peace of Europe had been cleared up. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
the P resident of Cz echoslovakia in the night of 14-15 March 24 June A LJG 15-2 1959 in Berlin.
This talk has already been discussed here. I do not believe I need to go into it in much detail, but you know of it. I should like to ask you, Did you know of these events as described, particularly as given in PS-2798?
A No, I did not know of then. I learned of then only much later. I only learned here of the notes of Hewel, but after I learned of these events, I disapproved strongly, and would I not have token office as Reich Protector if I had known of these things at the time. I was completely surprised by the events in March 1939. I did not receive foreign political information. I was dependent upon the radio and the newspapers. The possibility of attach on Czechoslovakia in 1938 I considered to have been eliminated after the Munich agreement.
As for Hacha's visit to Berlin, I learned, like every other German, by radio and newspapers the next morning. The official statement of the taking over of protection of Czechoslovakia seemed not improbable after S lovakia had become independent, and after I learned that the Czech Foreign Minister, in the course of the winter 1953-1939 in Berlin, had said that the previous policy would be completely changed and that the union would be sought with Germany. would react to this development, which was in contravention of the agreement which had been reached in Munich. My first question to Hitler when I went to Vienna at his request was whether England and France had been informed beforehand and had given their approval. When he said No, that that was quite unnecessary and that the Czech' government had asked us to take over the protection, I immediately realized how dangerous the situation was and said so to Hitler. cussion of the Czech government. Hitler's request that I take the post of Reich Protector was a complete surprise to me, and I had misgivings against taking the office, which I expressed 24 June A LJG 15-3 to Hitler.
I realized that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would antagonize the signatory powers of the Munich Agreement, even if Hacha had asked fro protection voluntarily, and it was clear to no that any intensification of the situation through the bad attitude of the Czechs would bring about on immediate danger of war. The permission of England and France had to be exacted.
I explained this to Hitler, too. Hitler's answer was that that was precisely the reason why he was asking no to take over the post--to show that he was not carrying on a policy hostile to Czechoslovakia. I was known abroad as a moderate man, and he would give no the most extensive powers to oppose all excesses, especially by the Sudeten German element.
I still hesitated. I said that I did not know conditions in Czechoslovakia and that I was not an administrator. Hitler said that I should try it, that it could be changed at any time and that he would give me two experienced men who know the conditions.
The police and the SS were not under my orders. This, in effect, made it impossible for no to prevent the rule by force of Himmler and his organ. This I did not know at the time, but I must point out that great responsibility for further developments lies with the other powers, especially the signatory powers of Munich. Instead of making paper protests, I had expected that they would at least recall their ambassadors. Then, perhaps, the tension might have been increased for the moment, but the German people would have realized how serious the situation was, and Hitler would have avoided taking further aggressive steps.
Q. The charge is made that you took this office so that my misuse of your humane and diplomatic reputation the impression could be given to the world that the Czechs were to be treated moderately, while the contrary was to be the case. Will you comment briefly on this point?
A. What is absolutely wrong. Hitler said that I was to attempt to reconcile the Czechs with the new conditions. Because of the years of nationality struggles, and through measures of suppression, I was to keep the hate-filled German population from excesses.
Q. What assurances did Hitler give you with regard to your office?
A/ He assured me that my activity in balancing national confidence, by winning over the Czechs by a conciliatory and moderate policy, would be supported at all times. In particular, he would protect my administration from all attacks by political radicals, particularly from the SS and police and Sudeten Germans. I had pointed, out this danger particularly.
Q. Were you convinced at that time that, in making these assurances of humane treatment for the Czechs, Hitler was serious and honest?
A. Yes, I definitely had that impression.
Q. Then you believed that the assurances he gave you would be kept?
A. Yes
Q. At that time did you not have any plan or intention for forcible Germanization of Czechoslovakia?
A. No, that was completely unknown to me. I would have considered that nonsense; I would not have believed that anyone could have such an idea.
Q. Do you still believe that Hitler's assurances and express intentions at that time were meant honestly, and that they were only made illusory through further developments?
A. Yes, they were certainly meant honestly at that time.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to a document in my document book 5, under number 142, which is an excerpt from Henderson's "Falure of a Mission". I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of that. BY DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN:
Q. From that time at the conclusion of the Ferman-Slovakian Treaty of March 1939 on the independence of Slovakia, a charge is made against you. Did you have anything to do with drawing up this treaty or with declaring Slovakia autonomous ?
A. No. I learned of the autonomy declaration of Slovakia, and of all these events, only after they had been made public.
Q. What were the principles of your program for your administration in Prague?
A. It was quite clear to me that reconciliation of the Czech people with the newly created conditions could be brought about only gradually, by sparing the national feeling as far an possible, and without radical measures. Under more favorable circumstances that would have taken several generations. I attempted a gradual coordination, and weakening of previous hostile policies.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to refer to document 143, in my document book 5. This is a reporduction of an article which Mr. von Neurath wrote about the end of his administration in Prague, in the European Review, at the end of March 1939. I ask the Court to take judicial notice of this. It shows quite clearly with what intentions and with what tendencies Mr. von Neurath took up his office at that time. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. What were the conditions which you found when you took over your office in April? That is, conditions in Prague?
A. The Czechs were generally disillusioned by the conduct of their former allies in the fall of 1938. To a large extent they seemed ready to be loyal and to cooperate. However, the influence of anti-Czech and Sudeten German circles, supported by Himmler and the SS, was considerable. This influence was personified especially in the Sudeten leader Karl Hermann Frank, who had been appointed as my State Secretary at Himmler's instigation. I had the greatest difficulty with him from the very beginning, because he represented a completely contrary policy toward the Czechs.
The office of the Reich Protector was still being built up. The head of the Administration was an experienced administration official under Secretary of State von Burgsdorff, who was examined here. Under him were the various departments, which were built up directly by the Berlin Ministries.
supervisory officers, each for several Czech districts. They were appointed by the Reich Ministry of the Interior.
Q. To whom was the police subordinate?
A. The police was completely independent of my office. It was directly under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police; that is to say, Himmler Himmler appointed my own Secretary of State Frank as Higher SS and Police Chief, who thus had a double position. Under Frank was the Commander of the Security Police. All police measures were ordered by Frank or directly by Himmler and the Reich Security Main Office, without my approval, without my even having been informed previously From this fact resulted most of the difficulties with which I had to struggle in Prague.
Q. The discussion of the position of the police is in a Czechoslovakian report under the number USSR-60, which was submitted by the prosecution. This presents things in a somewhat different light. Do you support the description which you have just given?
A. Yes, absolutely.
Q. You were informed of police measures only afterwards, but not beforehand? You were not asked for your approval beforehand?
A. That is true, and I was informed afterwards only sporadically. I frequently learned only from the Czech Government, or through private persons of incidents which I had not been informed about by the police even afterwards: I had to inquire of Frank.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I refer to the decree of the 1st of September, 1939, which I submit as number 149 in my document book 5, and I should like to point out the following.
This order is divided into two completely separate sections: Part I is the building up of the administration of the Reich Protector; and Part II, completely separate, is the establishment of the German Security Police under the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police. This outer form of the order, the separation of the two branches, if I may express it in that way, proves that the police and the policepower were only under Himmler or under the Berlin authorities. This alone expresses the fact that the Reich Protector could exert no influence on them.
This is the great tragedy of Mr. von Neurath' s activities as Reich Protector. Matters are charged against him for which he cannot take the responsibility, and did not take the responsibility. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: which mentions the administrative measures according to which the Reichs Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, as well as the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the Ger,an Police, in agreement with the Reichs Protector, can take the necessary administrative measures for the maintenance of security and public order in tie Protectorate, and i t states that they may take these measures, even outside of the limits determined upon.
What does this mean?
A I do not know what this order means by "administrative measures." It seems to me to be a very general order, presumably referring to the issuing of general prescriptions. At least, as long as I was in Prague, neither I nor the Reichsfueherer SS made any use of this power. Arrests were all made, without informing me previously, on the basis of paragraph 11 of the order. The police in the protectorate were not in any way subordinate to me. executive powers in the protectorate and that would include the police?
A No; I have already mentioned that. of the police, or at least influence on the police , from Hitler? A I repeatedly applied to Hitler in connection with the recurring excesses of the police/ He told me repeatedly that he would investigste these circumstances, but nothing was changed. From his influence on the police throughout the Reich, Himmler considered the police his own domain; he was too powerful.
Q The Czechoslovakian report on which the indictment is based states the possibility for subordination of the Gestapo to the Reich Protectorate Office; that is, up to September, 1941.
On the basis of the statements which you have just made, do you assume such responsibility to any extent ?
A No. I have to deny it. I have explained what the circumstances were, that I had no influence whatever.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two or three sentences in this connection from Document 153 in my document book 5, which consist of minutes from the examination of former State Secretary Frank by the Czechoslovakian delegation on the 30th of May, 1945. These minutes from Frank's testimony say :
"Neither the Reich Protectorate nor I myself am responsible for the police. The highest responsibilities lie with Heinrich Himmler as chief of the German police. The Gestapo received its instructions directly from Berlin, either from Hitler himself or from the Reich Security Office". BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : to prevent the worst measures either by the police or the Gestapo, or to minimize their effect afterwards ? Will you please describe how you acted and how Frank attempted to act in these matters ? constantly visiting me. My office was for the most part busy working on these cases. I had every request presented to me personally, and in all cases in which intervention was at all justified, I had Frank or the commander of the Security Police report. I worked on them in favor of releasing the arrested persons. There was a struggle between Frank and the police which was often successful. were released at my instigation. In addition, many sentences were lightened in regard to personal transportation, property, food, and so forth. families of the ministers and members of the foreign office who had gone abroad were not arrested ?
A Yes, that is right. Frank has ordered the arrest of the members of the families of these two ministers Necas and Feierabend. When I learned about it, I had it stopped.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Mr. President, may I make a suggestion to break off now, because this section is finished.
( A recess was taken. ) BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : which you have been held responsible to a greater or lesser degree by the prosecution. In the summer of 1939, were there many arrests of the members of the families by Czechoslovakian police ?
A No; the activity of the police in the summer of 1939 was very small, and I hoped that it would be possible to restrict increasingly these police measures more and more.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : The Czechoslovakian prosecution, under USSR 60 in Supplement 1, is submitting a proclamation which you gave out in August, 1938, as Reich Protectorate; that is, just prior to the outbreak of the war. This is a proclamation which was to serve a warning to the people of the Protectorate, to intimidate them, and to keep them from sabotage. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : should like to have you comment on it.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : This appendix is attached to the document USSR 60 Exhibit 1. I have just had the proclamation given to the defendant. It reads as follows : -- With the permission of the High Tribunal, I should like to read the most important pert :
"Each act of sabotage against the interests of the Greater German Reich, against German administration in the Protectorate, and against the German Wehrmacht will be prosecuted most harshly and will be punished most severely. By "Sabotage" as described in the line under Paragraph 1, all disturbances are meant : disturbances of the public and economic life, specifically the damaging of necessary installations such as railroads, telephones, and so forth, lines of communication, water works, electrical works, gas works, and factories, as well as the hoarding of consumer goods, and the spreading of rumors by word or in writing.
"The population must follow and observe all the directives of the organs of the Reich working in the Protectorate such as have been published or such as will be published in the future.
Refusal to obey or acting against these measures or against any organ of the Reich will be considered as sabotage and punished accordingly.
"Responsibility for all acts of sabotage will be placed not on the person who is committing the act, but rather on the entire Czechoslovakian population. I expect that under all conditions the Czchoslovakian population, through a loyal, peaceful, and quiet demeanor, will prove themselves worthy of the autonomy which the Fuehrer has guaranteed to the countries of Bohemia and Moravia." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN :
Q Will you please comment on this ?