Goering and Papen have testified to that effect here.
Q. What feelings did you have on this question of the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor, in other words, the seizure of power by the Party?
A. I had misgivings, but as I said at the beginning, in view of the party situation and the impossibility of forming a government against the National Socialists, I saw no other possibility unless one wanted to start a civil war, about the outcome of which there could be no doubt in view of the large number of followers of Hitler.
Q. For what reason, in view of your attitude which you have just expressed, did you remain Reich foreign Minister in the newly formed Hitler Government?
A. At the express desire of Hindenburg.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, No. 3 in my document Book 1 which has already been mentioned, and with the permission of the court I should like to read a short passage from it.
"When in the year 1933 a now government was formed under Hitler as Reich Chancellor, Hindenburg made the condition to Hitler that Neurath would have to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs. In accordance with this, Hindenburg asked Neurath to stay, and Neurath fulfilled Hindenburg's request in accordance with his previous promise. I know that Neurath in the course of time frequently harbored considerable misgivings, but was of the opinion that it was his patriotic duty to remain.
"In this connection, an especially fitiing comparison with a large rock comes to my mind, which right in the middle of the river can decrease the force of the roaring current, while on the shore it would remain without influence. He frequently stated, 'If the Germans often wonder that I am cooperating with this government, then they always think only of the bad conditions without appreciating how much disaster in excess of it I am still able to prevent. They forget what strength it takes to advance alone to Hitler through the wall of the "Myrmidons"."
to advance through that to Hitler. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Do you know for what reasons Hindenburg wanted you to remain or to enter the Hitler Cabinet as Foreign Minister?
A. To secure the continuation of a peaceful foreign policy, and to precent Hitler from rash steps which were possible in view of his nature; in a word, to act as a brake.
Q. Did Hindenburg make your remaining or entering the cabinet a condition for the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor?
A. Yes, he told me so later.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to the affidavit of the farmer ambassador Kurt Pruefer, No. 4 in my document book, and I should like to read a short excerpt from it.
"In his basic political attitude" -
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Page 27, Exhibit No. 4.
"Inasmuch as Hindenburg was a conservative, his basic political attitude was probably about the same as that of Baron Neurath. There was no doubt in the mind of anybody with even a moderate understanding of conditions that Hindenburg himself, in vesting power in Hitler, had done this only most reluctantly and yielding to the heavy pressure of developments in the field of home policy. If, under such circumstances, he insisted and made it a condition that Baron Neurath, his former adviser in the foreign field, remained in office, this undoubtedly was due to the fact that within the seething new forces which were surely displeasing and unsympathetic to him personally, he wanted to assure himself of one steady pillar at least for foreign policy, that is, for peace." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Did you talk to Hindenburg about this, and did you tell him of your reluctance, your misgivings against joining the Hitler Cabinet?
A. Yes, I did not leave him in any doubt about that.
Q. What did Hindenburg answer?
A. He told me that I would have to make this sacrifice; otherwise, he would not have a quiet hour. Hitler had no experience in foreign politics.
Q. Did you, for this reason, decide to join Hitler's cabinet?
A. Yes. The English Prosecution, Sir David, in the session of March 1 of this year, asserted that through joining the cabinet of Hitler I had sold my honor and reputation. I will not comment on this serious insult.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to quote a single sentence from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, which is No. 13 in my document book.
that is page 55 of the German text, which reads as follows. It is a remark of Dodd's which refers to von Neurath:
"I am sorry for these clear-headed Germans who know world affairs fairly well and who must work for their country and yet must submit to the ignorance and autocracy of Hitler and his followers." BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: in the cabinet as long as it would be at all possible for you to keep the foreign political course a peaceful one and avoid warlike action, even if Hindenburg should die?
A Yes. He repeatedly expressed that wish to me. remained in office?
A. Yes. But also because in the meantime I had experienced, because of Hitler's excitable temperament, he was often carried away an made rash steps. I also experience that in such cases he would listen to my objections. in Hitler's cabinet as foreign minister and remaining after the death of Hinder burg particularly place a special charge against you.
A What reproach they can have against me I cannot see. I never belonged to a party I never sworn allegiance to party pr rams and I never swore allegi nee to the party leaders. I served under the Kaiser, The socialist government, under Ebert, asked me to re-enter the foreign service and appointed me minister and ambassador. I served as a diplomat with liberal and conservative governments without identifying myself with their various programs. I was often in opposite to the government parties. I represented only the interests of my fatherland in its cooperation with other powers. the national Socialist Party. One could put different opinions into effect only from the inside as a member of the government with any prospect of success. Freedom od speech, the use of the press were forbidden in Germany or at least made difficult. Personal freedom was endangered. Moreover, it is not greatly different in other countries. I mean to say particiption in the governments of various parties, for example I mentioned Lord Vansittart, whom I know well myself, who was in the English Foreign Office under conservative as well as labor governments.
why did you remain in the government? Why did you not resign at that time? ing in the government. as to the Putsch at that time from which I had to conclude that it had been a serious revolt, I experienced a number of revolutions, for example the Russian revolution and, as I said, the facist revolution in done and I saw that in such revolutions innocent people have to suffer. I adapted myself to Hindenburg's attitude, who, even if I wanted to resign would never have let me do so. Hitler's description of it I should like to mention briefly an episode on this day, the 30th of June. to dinner. Colonel General von Fritsch was also present at this dinner and a number of other people -- high officers ans officials of the Foreign Office. The prince did not appear, that is, he came an hour late. When I asked for the reason I learned that my house had been surrounded by the SA and the prince had been prevented from entering. A few days later, Colonel General von Fritsch, after he had described events on the military side, asked me whether I knew that he himself had been on the list of Mr. Roehm. revolt, this revolt was not as harmless as described here. himself about the principles and the policy, foreign policy which you intended to pursue ?
A Yes, in detail. I explained to him that only by way of negotiations and a policy corresponding to the international situation could we achieve our ends. This would demand patience. Hitler seemed to understant this at the time and I had the same impression during the following years. I am convinced that he approved the continuation of this policy and was honest.
He repeatedly emphasized that he knew war and did not want to have another war.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : I should like once more to refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Pruefer, number 4 in my document book one and with the permission of the Court I should like to quote the following :
"This policy was not in contradiction with the fact that Herr von Neurath also streve for a revision of the hardships resulting from the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about exclusively through negotiations, in no case by force."
THE PRESIDENT : Have you not read this already ?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Yes. I want to read another passage.
"I am certain that Baron von Neurath, as well as other career officials in the Foreign Office, had no concrete knowledge of any possible plans for violence on Hitler's part. On the contrary, during the first years after the change of government one lent general credence to the oft-repeated protestations of peaceful intentions by the National Socialist leaders. I an even of the opinion that the latter themselves, especially during the first years, did not want to bring about a war. Rather was it believed and hoped in the higher circles of the Party, where Neurath did not count at all, that it would be possible to continue reaping cheap laurels without war through the hitherto successfully practiced tactics of bluff and sudded surprise. It was not until later that the megalomania arising from success and a belief in their own luck and their own infallibility and invincibility, which had become mystical through unrestrained sycophantism, led Hitler and his immediate entourage only later to include war among their instruments of political power. We, the functionaries of the foreign service, and with us Baron von Neurath our chief, became aware of this development only gradually, as outsiders. Until about the beginning of 1936 only a very few functionaries had been admitted into the Party which, on its part, treated the staff of the office, including the recently admitted members, with suspicion and distrust.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Luedinghausen, isn't this really argument ? You are reading at great length.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I have already finished, Mr. 22 J une A - LJG- 9-1 P resident.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: National Socialists any intention or will for war with other powers?
A No. Contrary to the allegations of the P rosecution, which do not gain in truthfulness by repetition, I could not see any intention to resort to hostilities in the event of the failure to reach our aims, and from the various statements of Hitler, I know that he himself at that time--that is to say, at the beginning of his period of government--had no such intentions. He wanted close cooperation with England and with France and stable relationships which would remove the old hostilities between the two peoples. He told me that after the Saar plebiscite he would once and for all dispense with regaining Alsace. of the P arty's program you should have seen that the Nazis had aggressive political ends and that they were aiming at war from the very beginning. It reads:
"We demand the union of all Germans in a greater Germany. We demand equal rights for the German people in respect to other nations, end the repeal of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain."
Will you comment on this? sentences which have just been quoted. The right of selfdetermination is a basic prerequisite of the modern sta te, recognized in modern law. A t least in theory, the Treaty of Versaille was based on this right, and on this basis the plebiscites in the border areas took place. The inclusion of all Germans on the basis of this recognized principle was an absolutely permissible political stop on the basis of international law.
The removal of the discriminatory toms of the Treaty of Versailles by changing the terms of the treaty was the essential aim of German foreign policy.
As I have already said, all governments which had preceded the national Socialists had had the same objective. I con not see how one can deduce any intention of aggressive war if a people wants to free itself from the burden of an unjust treaty, on condition that it is done by peaceful means. I represented until the tine at the end of 1937 when I had to realize that Hitler included war as a part of his policy. Before, there had been no question of it. Germany by Hitler on foreign countries? immediately. The antagonism was quite clear. It was especially clear at the world Economic Conference in 1933 in London, where I had an opportunity to talk to many old friends and members of other delegations and to orient myself to this change of attitude. The practical effect of this attitude was to be observed in all negotiations, and particularly in the sessions of the disarmament conference.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. P resident, I should like to refer to a letter which is Number 11 in my document book. It is a report of Mr. von Neurath to the Reich P resident von Hindenburg from the London Conference. It is dated 19 June 1933. I shall quote a very short passage:
"Unfortunately I have to state that the impressions I received here are alarming to the highest degree."
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: P age 47.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that where you are reading--47?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 47, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "My reason of the reports of the Chiefs of our Mission I was prepared for many bad aspects, for many gloomy events and for disturbing opinions of foreign countries.
Nevertheless, despite all apprehensions, I had hoped that various effects would be only transitory, that much could be settled. However, my apprehensions proved more justified than my hopes. I hardly recognized the City of London. I found a mood--first in the English world and then in international circles--showing a reaction in the political and psychological attitude towards Germany which cannot be considered seriously enough." BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: there were further negotiations. That was in the winter of 193334. Can you briefly describe the course of those negotiations? It is important in view of later events. the time, 14 November 1932. This plan, surprisingly enough, provided for the transformation of professional armies into armies with a short period of service. According to the opinion presented by the French representative at that time, only armies with a short period of service could be considered as defensive armies, while standing armies, consisting of professional soldiers, had an offensive character.
This point of view of France was completely new. It was now only exactly opposite to the previous point of view of France, but it was also a change from the terms of the Versailles Treaty for the disarmament of Germany. This meant for Germany-and this was apparently the reason for the plan--it meant the abolition of the plan that she did not intend to disarm. A statement by the French representative, P aul Boncour, in the session of 8 February 1953 confirmed this.
confirming the so-called working program presented by England on the 30th of January, 1933, in which England wanted to speed up the negotiations of the conference. This attempt to speed up negotiations, which would and the diverging tendencies of the various powers, failed because of France's stubborn attitude. A change in the program had been made to attempt to got over these difficulties. The question of army strength was debated first.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of my document number 49, in my document book number 2. It contains excerpts from the English program of the 30th of January, 1933. which contains excerpts from the French plan on the unification of continental European systems. speech of Mr. von Neurath in the session of the League of Nations Assembly on 7 December 1943, concerning the negotiations up to that time. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: of disarmament as such; that is, reduction of armament strength? to remember all these individual cases, these resolutions, motions, formulation and so forth. This is material that goes into detail to such an extent that I can only do it on the basis of notes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, we have been the whole morning and we haven't yet really gotten up to 1933. The Tribunal thinks this is bein done in far too great detail. As I have already pointed out, a great deal of it is an attempt to show that the Treaty of Versailles was unjust, which is irrelevant.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, if I may answer with the following, I do not wish to show the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Luedinghausen, willyou kindly got on? As I say, we think you are going into it in far too great detail.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q What happened in order to get negotiations going again? On the 16th of March the English Prime Minister submitted a new plan -
THE PRESIDENT: We have nothing to do with the disarmament program.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I must show this in order to explain the motives for our resigning from the League of Nations. In the fall of 1933-
THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing against von Neurath in having influenced Germany to resign from the League of Nations, is there?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes there is. basis of the preceding events. I cannot say in three words that this, this, and this was the reason. I must develop what the atmosphere was, how the situation arose, gradually, which left no other choice for the German Government than to leave the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. This explains the decision of the German Government to rearm, which is a charge against us. Historical and political events, decisions, and acts are always the result of what has preceded them. In the development of political events, there is a period of several years of development, and it is not a spontaneous event or a spontaneous decision. I cannot,as in the case of a military order, say that this decision was based on an order of the other side. I must describe -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Luedinghausen, we don't need all this argument. We only desire you to get on. I am pointing out to you that you have been nearly the whole of the morning and we haven't yet got up to 1933.
THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I will attempt to be very brief as to this period of resignation from the League of Nations and the disarmament conference. 1933. In the fall there was a disarmament conference session which debated the same subject over and over again. The result of this conference was that disarmament was definitely refused by the Western Powers. That was the reason why we withdrew from the disarmament conference, since we considered any useful work impossible.
had failed in various fields. of Nations. The reasons which induced us to do so at the time were expressed by no in a speech, which my defense counsel may submit. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q What date do you mean, Mr. von Neurath?
A October 1933 -- the 16th of October. I have the date here, 16 October 1933. It was made to the foreign press. In this speech I said, that the resignation from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations by no means meant that Germany would not take part in any negotiations or discussions with the other powers, especially with the Western Powers.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this speech, or excerpts from it, will be found under number 59 in my document book. It is essentially the same thing that Mr. von Neurath has just stated, except that it is in more detail. I had intended to read it, but I am willing to dispense with that. time which we have skipped, so that you may have the picture of how things developed gradually, until the middle of October. of Mr. von Neurath to the foreign press; then, Hitler's appeal to the German people, number 58; the document just quoted, number 59, the German memorandum on the armament question and equal rights question of 18 December, 1933, document 61; Number 62, an interview of Mr. von Neurath with the Berlin representative of the New York Times on the 29th of December, 1933; the German answer to the French memorandum of the 1st of January, 1933, number 64 in my document bock 3; the German memorandum of the 13th of March, 1934, number 67; the speech of the President of the Disarmament Conference, Sir Neville Henderson, of the 10th of April, 1934, number 68; and finally, the Aide Memoir of the German Reich Government to the English disarmament memorandum of the 16th of April.
I have just been informed that I gave the wrong name. That was Arthur Henderson. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q In the middle of April 1934 a very importance event occurred. Willly comment briefly on it? This note caused a complete change in European politic answer to an English inquiry, and to a German memorandum of 13 march 1934, which had spoken of continuation of negotiations.
It refers to a speeching the Berlin press which was just mentioned. With this French note, the effort in the disarmament question failed because of the attitude of the French government.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to various documents which I have submitted in my document book 3: No. 66, excerpt from a speech of the Belgian Prime Minister Brouqueville, of March, 1934, an excerpt from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, No. 63; then, No. 70, an excerpt from the note of the French Government, which was just mentioned, to the English Government of the 17th of April, 1934; the speech of Foreign Minister von Neurath, the defendant, to representatives of the Berlin press, in which he committed on this French note, No. 74 in my document book; finally, an except from the speech of the American delegate at the disarmament conferences Norman Davies of the 29th of May, 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the number of that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The last one, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes,.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: No. 76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
THE WITNESS: Before I answer this question, perhaps I may "*---*" on something else. The prosecution sh**ed me a speech of Hitler's of the 23rd of September, 1939, to the commanders in chief of the army in which he speaks of political and organizational measures which preceded the war.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that was on the 23rd of September?
THE WITNESS: The 23rd of September, yes; 1939. and the disarmament conference, for aggressive intentions, which already existed at that time, and charges me with thiw. As I have repeatedly emphasized, up to 1937 there was no question at any time of any intention orpreparation for aggression.
after these events, and one and a half years after my resignation as foreign minister.
It is clear that in the case of a man like Hitler, these events at such a moment after the victorious end of the Polish war appeared different fromwhat they had actually been. There events cannot be judged from the date of the speech any more than German policy today, but they must be regarded from the point of view of the time at which they took place.
And now in answer to your question I will say this. In my opinion, the reasons were more or less from the fact that in the course of this preceding diplomatic negotiation, it had been shown that England and Italy were no longer unconditionally behind France and were no longer willing to support France's antagonistic attitude towards equal rights for Germany. The same point of view was held by the neutral states, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
In a note addressed to the disarmament conference of 14 April 1934; France apparently feared being isolated and thus falling into the danger of being unable to maintain here refusal to disarm. I myself commented on this attitude on the part of France fromthe German point of view in my speech to the German press on 27 April, 1934. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 17th of April, inher own foreign political attitude? Bathou,undertook a trip to the East to Warsaw and Prague. As was seen evidenced the purpose of this trip to Poland and Czechoslovakia was to feel out and reconnoitre the opportunities for resuming diplomatic relations with these countries and other countries, the so called little Entente, and to prepare the way for the inclusion of Russia in European politics.
Bathou's efforts were successful. Poland and Czecholsovakia resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On his second trip, Bathou returned with the permission of all the states of the little Entente for the Eastern pact suggested by France and Russia. pact which later was an instrument against Germany?
A Yes. I just mentioned it. An Eastern pact was worked out. We accepted the basic principle, but we were to undertake obligations which we could not keep, namely an obligation to give aid in all cases of conflict which might develop between the Easter peoples.
We were in no position to do this, and the plan failed.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May I refer in this connection to the three documents in my document book 3: No. 72, an official communique on the Warsaw talk of the French foreign minister of the 24th of April, 1934; No. 73, an official communique on the Prague talk of the French foreign minister on the 27th of April, 1934, and an excerpt from a speech of the French foreign minister of the 30th of May 1934. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: negotiations by this French note? dividual powers to obtain a practical recognition of equal rights and general understanding with all peoples for a really permament permanent peace. I had given the German missions abroad the assignment to carry on talks to this effect with the respective governments. an invitation of Mussolini for a friendly talk in Venice. The purpose of this meeting, as Mussolini later said, was to attempt to disperse the clouds on the political horizon of Europe. speech in wich he reaffirmed Germany's will for peace.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer to my document no. 80 in the Document Book 3, which is an excerpt fromthis Hitler speech in Gera on the 17th of June, 1934.
Would you like to break off now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, the Tribunal hopes that on Monday, whom you continue, you will be able to deal in less detail with this political history which, of course, is very well known to everyone who has lived through it, and particularly to the Tribunal who have heard it all gone into before here.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: I shall endeavor to do so, Mr. President.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1946 at 1000 hours).
BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant Von Neurath):
Q Mr. von Neurath, I heard on the radio yesterday that there has apparently been a mistake in the translation regarding your activity from 1900-1914. Perhaps you can repeat it.
A Probably about my stay in London. From 1903 to 1907 I was in London, and after that I was in the Foreign Office in Berlin. Foreign Minister. I should like to ask the following questions: Foreign Minister, in the spring of 1935, a general rearmament was begun, general military service was introduced, and that the Luftwaffe was created, proof of your guiet in the conspiracy against peace. Will you comment on this? plans in Germany in this year and in the following years. I am also convinced that neither Hitler nor his entourage had any aggressive plans, or even considered any aggressive plans, which would have been possible, however, without my knowing about it. other than defense. There was no such decision and no such preparation at that time. The same charge of preparations for aggressive war could be maintained against all neighboring states of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Dr. Luedinghausen, this is argument, not evidence.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must hear how things speared to him. Decisions can only be explained if he states what considerations he had at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: BNo, we are not prepared to hear argument in the course of evidence. It is evidence for him to say that there were no plans made at that time for offensive action, but it is argument to say that rearmament does not necessarily involve offensive action. We do not desire to hear argument at this stage.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Then please answer the question once more; There were no plans to use the weapons created by re-armament for any aggressive purposes or for other violent action?
A That is what I just said. I do not believe I need repeat it. Germany appear particularly in danger? by her highly armed neigbors. Russia and France concluded a treaty of mutual assistance, which could be called only a military alliance. A similar treaty between Russia, and Czechoslovakia was imminent. Russia had, according to her own statements, increased the peacetime strenth of her army by over half. Howhigh it actually was could not be ascertained. In France, under the leadership of Petain, efforts toward a considerable increase of the army were made. On 1 March 1935 France issued a new defense law, which also increased the p eriod of service. an immediate threat. Germany could no longer lock on inactively. The decision which Hitler made then to re-introduce military service and gradually to build up an army of 36 divisions was not, in view of these facts, an act seriously threatening the neighboring countries, which were joined by alliances.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to ask you to take judicial notice of the following documents in my document book:
League of Nations in September of 1934, in document bock 3. of the Army Committee of the French Chamber, of the 23rd of November, 1931. the Russian-French protocol on the Eastern pact negotiations of the 5th of December, 1934.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I should like to say that document 89 has not been submitted to us as yet, and we have not been able to see it. Therefore, it has not been possible to examine this document and to say whether or not this document is relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get the book you will have the right to object to the document, if necessary. Dr. von Luedinghausen is only telling us what documents he contends support the evidence which has just been given, that is all. He is offereing these documents in evidence, and as soon as you get the book and can scrutinize the document, you will have the opportunity of making an objection to its admissibility.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly the point, Mr. President. I wish to reserve for myself the right to do that, may it please the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we agree with you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Then comes document 92, in document back of the appeal of the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic of the 28th of December, 1934, to the Army. of the 15th of March, 1935. Paris of the 15th of June, 1934. 2nd of May, 1935. Minister, Flandin, of the 5th of February, 1935, to the French Chamber.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
cooperation in international efforts to limit general rearmament were to be discontinued?
A No, by no means. An English inquiry, as to whether Germany would be ready to continue to participate in general disarmament negotiations in the same manner and to the same extent as contained in the so-called London Communique of February, 1935, was immediately answered in the affirmative. military service--the Embassy in London was instructed to resume negotiations and, in particular, to suggest an agreement to limit fleet strength. he developed a concrete German peace plan. He emphasized particularly the German will forpeace, and again declared himself willing to cooperate in any system for the maintenance of international peace, even in collective agreements. The only condition he made was, as had always been the case, the recognition of German's equal rights. He also declared himself willing to rejoin the League of Nations. He wanted to prove, by doing this--in spite of the concluding of military alliances and cur own rearmament--that Germany continued to desire peace.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I wish to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the following documents in my document bock number 3: 1935, to the so-called London Communique. ment of the 16th of March, 1935, for the restoration of the German military service. 18th of March, 1935. The communique of the 26th of March, 1985, on the talk of the English Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, and Lord Privy Seal, Councillor Eden, with the German Reich Government. Foreign Minister Laval in Moscow.
Number 104, Hitler's speech of the 21st of May, 1935, on the Russian-French pact.
1035, to the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Did tie German willingness to negotiate have any success?
A Yes; that led to the conclusion of the first and only agreement to limit armament which actually went into effect, on the basis of the German suggestion to the signing of the English-German agreement in June of 1935. Of course, I would have preferred a successful negotiation of the general armament limitation suggestion among all states. However, this agreement or treaty between only two States was welcomed by us as the first stop in this direction. It was shown that England, at ]east, kept aloof from the decision of the League of Nations, and that Germany had broken the Versailles Treaty by rearming; but the German step was thus recognized as justified.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of two documents from my document took 3: Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, on the English radio, on the 19th of June, 1935. of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, Shakespeare, in the House of Commons, on the occasion of the ratification of the London Fleet Agreement on the 20th of July, 1936.