BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q What happened in order to get negotiations going again? On the 16th of March the English Prime Minister submitted a new plan -
THE PRESIDENT: We have nothing to do with the disarmament program.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I must show this in order to explain the motives for our resigning from the League of Nations. In the fall of 1933-
THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing against von Neurath in having influenced Germany to resign from the League of Nations, is there?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes there is. basis of the preceding events. I cannot say in three words that this, this, and this was the reason. I must develop what the atmosphere was, how the situation arose, gradually, which left no other choice for the German Government than to leave the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. This explains the decision of the German Government to rearm, which is a charge against us. Historical and political events, decisions, and acts are always the result of what has preceded them. In the development of political events, there is a period of several years of development, and it is not a spontaneous event or a spontaneous decision. I cannot,as in the case of a military order, say that this decision was based on an order of the other side. I must describe -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Luedinghausen, we don't need all this argument. We only desire you to get on. I am pointing out to you that you have been nearly the whole of the morning and we haven't yet got up to 1933.
THE WITNESS: Mr. President, I will attempt to be very brief as to this period of resignation from the League of Nations and the disarmament conference. 1933. In the fall there was a disarmament conference session which debated the same subject over and over again. The result of this conference was that disarmament was definitely refused by the Western Powers. That was the reason why we withdrew from the disarmament conference, since we considered any useful work impossible.
had failed in various fields. of Nations. The reasons which induced us to do so at the time were expressed by no in a speech, which my defense counsel may submit. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q What date do you mean, Mr. von Neurath?
A October 1933 -- the 16th of October. I have the date here, 16 October 1933. It was made to the foreign press. In this speech I said, that the resignation from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations by no means meant that Germany would not take part in any negotiations or discussions with the other powers, especially with the Western Powers.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, this speech, or excerpts from it, will be found under number 59 in my document book. It is essentially the same thing that Mr. von Neurath has just stated, except that it is in more detail. I had intended to read it, but I am willing to dispense with that. time which we have skipped, so that you may have the picture of how things developed gradually, until the middle of October. of Mr. von Neurath to the foreign press; then, Hitler's appeal to the German people, number 58; the document just quoted, number 59, the German memorandum on the armament question and equal rights question of 18 December, 1933, document 61; Number 62, an interview of Mr. von Neurath with the Berlin representative of the New York Times on the 29th of December, 1933; the German answer to the French memorandum of the 1st of January, 1933, number 64 in my document bock 3; the German memorandum of the 13th of March, 1934, number 67; the speech of the President of the Disarmament Conference, Sir Neville Henderson, of the 10th of April, 1934, number 68; and finally, the Aide Memoir of the German Reich Government to the English disarmament memorandum of the 16th of April.
I have just been informed that I gave the wrong name. That was Arthur Henderson. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q In the middle of April 1934 a very importance event occurred. Willly comment briefly on it? This note caused a complete change in European politic answer to an English inquiry, and to a German memorandum of 13 march 1934, which had spoken of continuation of negotiations.
It refers to a speeching the Berlin press which was just mentioned. With this French note, the effort in the disarmament question failed because of the attitude of the French government.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to various documents which I have submitted in my document book 3: No. 66, excerpt from a speech of the Belgian Prime Minister Brouqueville, of March, 1934, an excerpt from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, No. 63; then, No. 70, an excerpt from the note of the French Government, which was just mentioned, to the English Government of the 17th of April, 1934; the speech of Foreign Minister von Neurath, the defendant, to representatives of the Berlin press, in which he committed on this French note, No. 74 in my document book; finally, an except from the speech of the American delegate at the disarmament conferences Norman Davies of the 29th of May, 1934.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give the number of that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: The last one, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes,.
DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN: No. 76.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; go on.
THE WITNESS: Before I answer this question, perhaps I may "*---*" on something else. The prosecution sh**ed me a speech of Hitler's of the 23rd of September, 1939, to the commanders in chief of the army in which he speaks of political and organizational measures which preceded the war.
THE PRESIDENT: You say that was on the 23rd of September?
THE WITNESS: The 23rd of September, yes; 1939. and the disarmament conference, for aggressive intentions, which already existed at that time, and charges me with thiw. As I have repeatedly emphasized, up to 1937 there was no question at any time of any intention orpreparation for aggression.
after these events, and one and a half years after my resignation as foreign minister.
It is clear that in the case of a man like Hitler, these events at such a moment after the victorious end of the Polish war appeared different fromwhat they had actually been. There events cannot be judged from the date of the speech any more than German policy today, but they must be regarded from the point of view of the time at which they took place.
And now in answer to your question I will say this. In my opinion, the reasons were more or less from the fact that in the course of this preceding diplomatic negotiation, it had been shown that England and Italy were no longer unconditionally behind France and were no longer willing to support France's antagonistic attitude towards equal rights for Germany. The same point of view was held by the neutral states, Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
In a note addressed to the disarmament conference of 14 April 1934; France apparently feared being isolated and thus falling into the danger of being unable to maintain here refusal to disarm. I myself commented on this attitude on the part of France fromthe German point of view in my speech to the German press on 27 April, 1934. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 17th of April, inher own foreign political attitude? Bathou,undertook a trip to the East to Warsaw and Prague. As was seen evidenced the purpose of this trip to Poland and Czechoslovakia was to feel out and reconnoitre the opportunities for resuming diplomatic relations with these countries and other countries, the so called little Entente, and to prepare the way for the inclusion of Russia in European politics.
Bathou's efforts were successful. Poland and Czecholsovakia resumed diplomatic relations with Russia. On his second trip, Bathou returned with the permission of all the states of the little Entente for the Eastern pact suggested by France and Russia. pact which later was an instrument against Germany?
A Yes. I just mentioned it. An Eastern pact was worked out. We accepted the basic principle, but we were to undertake obligations which we could not keep, namely an obligation to give aid in all cases of conflict which might develop between the Easter peoples.
We were in no position to do this, and the plan failed.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May I refer in this connection to the three documents in my document book 3: No. 72, an official communique on the Warsaw talk of the French foreign minister of the 24th of April, 1934; No. 73, an official communique on the Prague talk of the French foreign minister on the 27th of April, 1934, and an excerpt from a speech of the French foreign minister of the 30th of May 1934. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: negotiations by this French note? dividual powers to obtain a practical recognition of equal rights and general understanding with all peoples for a really permament permanent peace. I had given the German missions abroad the assignment to carry on talks to this effect with the respective governments. an invitation of Mussolini for a friendly talk in Venice. The purpose of this meeting, as Mussolini later said, was to attempt to disperse the clouds on the political horizon of Europe. speech in wich he reaffirmed Germany's will for peace.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer to my document no. 80 in the Document Book 3, which is an excerpt fromthis Hitler speech in Gera on the 17th of June, 1934.
Would you like to break off now, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, the Tribunal hopes that on Monday, whom you continue, you will be able to deal in less detail with this political history which, of course, is very well known to everyone who has lived through it, and particularly to the Tribunal who have heard it all gone into before here.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: I shall endeavor to do so, Mr. President.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1946 at 1000 hours).
BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for defendant Von Neurath):
Q Mr. von Neurath, I heard on the radio yesterday that there has apparently been a mistake in the translation regarding your activity from 1900-1914. Perhaps you can repeat it.
A Probably about my stay in London. From 1903 to 1907 I was in London, and after that I was in the Foreign Office in Berlin. Foreign Minister. I should like to ask the following questions: Foreign Minister, in the spring of 1935, a general rearmament was begun, general military service was introduced, and that the Luftwaffe was created, proof of your guiet in the conspiracy against peace. Will you comment on this? plans in Germany in this year and in the following years. I am also convinced that neither Hitler nor his entourage had any aggressive plans, or even considered any aggressive plans, which would have been possible, however, without my knowing about it. other than defense. There was no such decision and no such preparation at that time. The same charge of preparations for aggressive war could be maintained against all neighboring states of Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Dr. Luedinghausen, this is argument, not evidence.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must hear how things speared to him. Decisions can only be explained if he states what considerations he had at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: BNo, we are not prepared to hear argument in the course of evidence. It is evidence for him to say that there were no plans made at that time for offensive action, but it is argument to say that rearmament does not necessarily involve offensive action. We do not desire to hear argument at this stage.
DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes. BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Then please answer the question once more; There were no plans to use the weapons created by re-armament for any aggressive purposes or for other violent action?
A That is what I just said. I do not believe I need repeat it. Germany appear particularly in danger? by her highly armed neigbors. Russia and France concluded a treaty of mutual assistance, which could be called only a military alliance. A similar treaty between Russia, and Czechoslovakia was imminent. Russia had, according to her own statements, increased the peacetime strenth of her army by over half. Howhigh it actually was could not be ascertained. In France, under the leadership of Petain, efforts toward a considerable increase of the army were made. On 1 March 1935 France issued a new defense law, which also increased the p eriod of service. an immediate threat. Germany could no longer lock on inactively. The decision which Hitler made then to re-introduce military service and gradually to build up an army of 36 divisions was not, in view of these facts, an act seriously threatening the neighboring countries, which were joined by alliances.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to ask you to take judicial notice of the following documents in my document book:
League of Nations in September of 1934, in document bock 3. of the Army Committee of the French Chamber, of the 23rd of November, 1931. the Russian-French protocol on the Eastern pact negotiations of the 5th of December, 1934.
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I should like to say that document 89 has not been submitted to us as yet, and we have not been able to see it. Therefore, it has not been possible to examine this document and to say whether or not this document is relevant.
THE PRESIDENT: When you get the book you will have the right to object to the document, if necessary. Dr. von Luedinghausen is only telling us what documents he contends support the evidence which has just been given, that is all. He is offereing these documents in evidence, and as soon as you get the book and can scrutinize the document, you will have the opportunity of making an objection to its admissibility.
M. DEBENEST: That is exactly the point, Mr. President. I wish to reserve for myself the right to do that, may it please the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we agree with you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Then comes document 92, in document back of the appeal of the President of the Czechoslovakian Republic of the 28th of December, 1934, to the Army. of the 15th of March, 1935. Paris of the 15th of June, 1934. 2nd of May, 1935. Minister, Flandin, of the 5th of February, 1935, to the French Chamber.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
cooperation in international efforts to limit general rearmament were to be discontinued?
A No, by no means. An English inquiry, as to whether Germany would be ready to continue to participate in general disarmament negotiations in the same manner and to the same extent as contained in the so-called London Communique of February, 1935, was immediately answered in the affirmative. military service--the Embassy in London was instructed to resume negotiations and, in particular, to suggest an agreement to limit fleet strength. he developed a concrete German peace plan. He emphasized particularly the German will forpeace, and again declared himself willing to cooperate in any system for the maintenance of international peace, even in collective agreements. The only condition he made was, as had always been the case, the recognition of German's equal rights. He also declared himself willing to rejoin the League of Nations. He wanted to prove, by doing this--in spite of the concluding of military alliances and cur own rearmament--that Germany continued to desire peace.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I wish to ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the following documents in my document bock number 3: 1935, to the so-called London Communique. ment of the 16th of March, 1935, for the restoration of the German military service. 18th of March, 1935. The communique of the 26th of March, 1985, on the talk of the English Foreign Minister, Sir John Simon, and Lord Privy Seal, Councillor Eden, with the German Reich Government. Foreign Minister Laval in Moscow.
Number 104, Hitler's speech of the 21st of May, 1935, on the Russian-French pact.
1035, to the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Did tie German willingness to negotiate have any success?
A Yes; that led to the conclusion of the first and only agreement to limit armament which actually went into effect, on the basis of the German suggestion to the signing of the English-German agreement in June of 1935. Of course, I would have preferred a successful negotiation of the general armament limitation suggestion among all states. However, this agreement or treaty between only two States was welcomed by us as the first stop in this direction. It was shown that England, at ]east, kept aloof from the decision of the League of Nations, and that Germany had broken the Versailles Treaty by rearming; but the German step was thus recognized as justified.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection I should like to ask the Court to take judicial notice of two documents from my document took 3: Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, on the English radio, on the 19th of June, 1935. of the Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty, Shakespeare, in the House of Commons, on the occasion of the ratification of the London Fleet Agreement on the 20th of July, 1936.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
German and English fleet agreement?
A No; the willingness for a positive cooperation in limitation of armament, which was repeatedly emphasized, was further expressed in negotiations for a German disarmament in the air. From the beginning, as early as 1933, Hitler had emphasized the importance ff this point for the maintenance of peace. Germany was ready to cooperate in any limitation, and even in the complete abolition of air armament, if it was done on a mutual. But only England reacted to this subject for the time being. The difficulty was in persuading France to participate in the negotiation. of England. But France set up conditions which in effect made the success of these negotiations impossible. special bi-lateral agreements were to be permitted. In addition, the continuation of negotiations on air armament was to be made dependent on negotiations concerning the Eastern Pact. Germany could not participate in these eastern pacts, since it would have had to undertake military obligations whose outcome could not be foreseen. which made the difference among the western powers appear openly, the negotiations were stopped. German troops. The indictment sees in this a breach of the Locarno Treaty and further proof of your co-responsibility in the conspiracy against peace, which is claimed. Will you please comment on this?
A This assertion is completely untrue. A decision for a plan to wage aggressive war did not exist then any mere than the year before. The restoration of full sovereignty in all carts of the Reich had no military significance, but only political significance. only, and through this fact alone it had only a symbolic character. It was clear that a great and industrious people would not be satisfied forever with such a decisive limitation of its sovereignty, as had been imposed by the Versailles Treaty.
foreign policy could not resist. a plan which had been set up some time beforehand, or was the decision spontaneous? within a few days. sion? announced that after his return from Geneva he would present the Russo-French pact to the French Chamber for ratification. It did no good, that Hitler in an interview with the reporter of the French paper, "Paris Midi", M. Jouvenelle, attempted to point out the dangers of this pact, in offering his hand to France for an honorable and permanent understanding between the two peoples. I had discussed this interview in detail beforehand with Hitler, and I received the definite impression that he was absolutely serious in his for a permanent understanding between the two peoples. But this attempt was in vain, and the strong opposition to the pact by large parts of the French population, under the leadership of the Union Nationale de Combattants in the parliament itself could not prevent the French government from ratifying the pact. The vote took place on the 27th of February, in the French chamber.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to ask the Court to take note of the following two documents from my Document Book 4: The first is 108, the interview of Hitler with the correspondent of "Paris Midi", M. de Jouvenelle, of the 21st of February, 1936. The second is 107, an excerpt from the speech of Deputy Montigni in the French chamber on the 13th of February, 1936. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: treaty, the German troops marched in to the de-militarized Rhineland zone.
What considerations did the German government have on this serious step?
What determined them to take this step? danger that the western powers would not be satisfied with paper protests to the League of Nations as a solution this time, but would proceed with force of arms against this one-sided--
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, is this a question or a statement?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: It is a question. I should like to know the attitude of the government at that time. If I may make a comment on these explanations to clarify the decisions taken at that time, I must hear from the mouth of the defendant-
THE PRESIDENT: You were stating a number of facts. It is not for you to state facts. It is your duty to ask the witness.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: No, I did not want to give evidence. I wanted to know from the witness what considerations led to the decision.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
there were? the French-Russian ? act and other French policy, we saw, we had to see the most serious threat on the part of France. This accumulation of power in French hands through various treaties could be directed only against Germany. This was obvious. In the world there was no other country that could be considered for this-- in the case of hostilities the possibility of which had to be considered in view of the tota l situation by a responsible government; as the result of the demilitarization of the Rhineland, the Western Border of Germany was completely open. This was not only the documentary revision of the Versailles Treaty but also the ones which threatened Germany most, but it had become absolute through the decision of there 11th of December 1932 --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, the Tribunal thinks this is all argument. If there are any facts as to what there German government did at the time, after the French and Russian Pact and before the entry into the Rhineland, the witness can give those facts but this is mere argument and the Tribunal is well aware of the argument. It doesn't require them to be restated and certainly not to be restated in the course of the evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I merely wanted to avoid that later in my speech when I discuss this point, the objection might be made that these are my opinions. I want to show --
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Luedinghausen, that is quite a wrong conception. We are now hearing evidence. When we hear you we shall be hearing arguments and we shall be prepared to hear any argument from you.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes, but I want to avoid that it is said those are my arguments. These arguments come from the defendant.
24 J une M LJG 4-2
THE PRESIDENT: I am pointing out to you that it is there function of counsel to argue and it is the function of there Tribunal to listen to argument. It is not the function of the Tribunal to listen to argument in the course of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps I may make one statement. In there course of the winter of 1938, through cur military intelligence service, we had learned that the French General Staff already had a military plan for invading Germany. This invasion was to be through the Rhineland, along the so-called Rhineland to Czechoslovakia to join the Russian ally. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: continue with evidence, I shall be satisfied with the evidence, and I will present the argument In my speech. I should like to ask just one more question. Regarding the decision to reoccupy the Rhineland, did it involve any aggressive intention for the moment or for later?
A No, under no circumstances. The reoccupation, as it can be seen from my statement, was of a purely defensive character and was not supposed to have any otter purpose. By there occupation with such weak forces as only one division, it was clear that it was a purely symbolic act. It has been testified to here by the military--the witness Milch, for example-- that the Luftwaffe had no part whatever and only two or three days before had learned of the action. That there were no aggressive plans for the future, is shown by the fact that the German government, at the suggestion of England, on the 12 th of March 1936, obligated itself until the understanding had been reached with the Western Powers, particularly with France, not to increase the garrisons in the Rhineland and not to move the troops any closer to the border than they were already, under the condition, however, that the same would be done by France.
France did not want to accept this offer. Then, in the memoran-
24 June M LJG 4-3 dum of the 7th of March 1936, to the signatory powers of Locarne, which the prosecution has already submitted here, Germany made suggestions for an agreement with Prance, Belgium and the other Locarne Powers and also explained her willingness to sign a general air pact to avoid the danger of sudden air raids and in addition, to join the Leave of Nations again. In a speech in the Reichstag on the 7th of March 1936, Hitler explained the reasons for the reoccupation of the Rhineland before the world. This speech and the memorandum, I had discussed beforehand with Hitler and I can only repeat that I did not have the slightest suspicion that Hitler was not honest and was trying to prevent his real intentions which tended towards war. Even today I have the firm conviction that at that time Hitler was not thinking of war. I need not emphasize that any such intention was far from my own thoughts. On the contrary, I considered the restoration of sovereignty throughout the Reich a step towards peace and understanding.
THE PRESIDENT:L et us got on. Dr. Luedinghausen, you are allowing the defendant to make long speeches. That is not the object of evidence.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit various documents in this connection and ask the Court to take note of the following document in my document book four. First, 100, memorandum of the Reich government to the signatory powers of the Locarne Treaty of the 7th of M arch 1936; the official statement of the German Reich Government of the 12th of M arch 1936, No. 112 ; No. 113, the announcement of the German ambassador in London to English foreign Minister Eden, of the 12 th of March 1936, and a memorandum of the German Government of the 3rd of J anuary 1936, sent to the extraordinary ambassador in London, Mr. von Ribbentrop, to the English Government. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: occupation of the Rhineland?
not comment on this question.
Q What did the western powers do? Did they take any diplomatic steps?
A Foreign Minister Eden said, in the House of Commons, that Germany's procedure did not involve any threat and promised careful examination of German peace suggestions.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit and ask the Court to take judicial notice of the following documents in my Document Book 4: No. 125 excerpts from a speech of the American Under Secretary of State Wells on "The Versailles Treaty and Europe", of the 7th of July, '37; Document 120, excerpt from the decree of the Peoples Commissars of Russia on the reduction of the age for military service; No. 117, a report of the Czechoslovakian Minister in th Hague of the 21st of April, '36. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Neurath, your further steps, or these of the Foreign Office, an attempt towards peaceful understanding with the other European powers, did they stop or were they continued?
A These efforts were constantly continued. The next opportunity was in our relationship with Russia. The development of this relationship up to 1933 -- since 1933, rather, has already been described in detail before the Court; but I should like to emphasize one point. My point of view on our relationship with Austria from the beginning to the end meant as follows: I wanted a close economic relationship, such as a customs union between the two countries and similar foreign policy on the basis of state treaties and close contact between the two governments, but I wanted to have the full independence of Austria guaranteed under all circumstances. For that reason, I was always an outspoken opponent of any interference in internal political affairs in Austria, and I resisted all support of the Austrian National Socialists by the German National Socialists in their fight against Dollfuss and Schuschnigg; an I was constantly urging Hitler to this effect. I sharply condemned the murder of Dollfuss from the moral as well as the political point of view. The Foreign Office, under my direction, had nothing whatever to do with this murder, as the prosecution asserted. I need not emphasize that. But that Hitler had nothing to do with the murder I can confirm iron various statements which he made to me.
The deed was carried out by Austrian National Socialists who were, in part, much more radical than the Germans. This attitude of mine is best proved by the fact that when, shortly after the murder of Dollfuss, the German minister in Vienna, Mr. Ried, without my knowledge, asked the Austrian government for free passage of several persons involved in the murder to Germany, I recalled him from Vienna and dismissed him from the Foreign Service. I, as well as a number of other ministers, was an opponent of the prohibition against Austrian travel which was imposed by Germany, but I welcomed the efforts which started in '35 and were carried out with success by von Papen and I always worked on Hitler to this effect. As for von Papen's actions in Vienna during this time, I was only imperfectly informed, since Mr. von Papen was not under me and received his orders directly from Hitler. I learned only here of a number of letters which von Papen wrote to Hitler.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to quote two passages, one from a letter of von Neurath to the head of the political section of the Foreign Ministry of the 28th of June, '34, No. 84 in my Document Book 3, Page 227, which said in regard to conditions at that time: "The Austrian events cannot be foreseen in their development. The acute dancer for us seems to me --"
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. You are going a little bit too fast. You didn't observe the light. The light came on. You are going a little bit too fast. Go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "The Austrian events cannot be foreseen in their development. The acute danger for us seems to me, however, that is to the fast acting, to have been averted. We should act with great reserve now and to this end I spoke to the Reich Chancellor yesterday. I found complete understanding." Bishop, Dr. Wurm, No. 1 in my Document Book 1, on Page 3. It says: "I remember especially his sharp condemnation of occurrences in Vienna at which Prime Minister Dollfuss was murdered and of the persons which were used by Hitler during the agitation in Austria."
Seyss-Inquart, or his defense counsel, have already submitted under No. E.S. 32, which is an interview of the Staff Chancellor, Dr. Renner, of the 3rd of April, '38. As a precaution, I have included it once more in my document book under No. 130, Document book under No. 130, Document Book 4. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Mr. von Neurath, you know that the charge is made against you that on the 11th of July, '36, a treaty was reached between Germany and Austria in the course of these negotiations by von Papen. This has been discussed her in detail. The charge is made that this treaty was concluded with traitorous intentions, that is with the purpose of lulling Austria in security and preparing its future incorporation into the Reich. Will you please comment on this point?
A. This assertion is untrue. I welcomed this treaty honestly. It corresponded to my point of view in every respect. I saw in this the best means of clearing up the unnatural differences. For that reason I cooperated as much as I could in bringing it about. The assertion of the prosecution has been disproved by the statements of the former Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido Schmidt; but to my satisfaction, the treaty had a special significance as far as foreign policy was concerned, in that this treaty, in which the Germans clearly recognized Austrian independence, the German-Austrian differences which had formed a danger to Europe were removed.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, from my Document Book 4, under No. 118, I have the agreement between Germany and Austria of the 11th of July, '36, and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Mr. von Neurath, aside from clearing up the Austrian question, in the years before '37, you carried on negotiations with Eastern European states. In the affidavit of the American Consul General Messersmith, which the prosecution has submitted as USA 68, PS 2385, it is asserted that the purpose of these negotiations was to have these southern states approce the destruction and splitting of Czechoslovakia which Germany intended and even active participation in it, and that for this purpose, in the course of these negotiations, you even promised these states, or had these states promised, that they would receive parts of Czechoslovakia and even Austrian territory as reqard.
Will you please comment on this?
A. This assertion of Mr. Messersmith is from beginning to end a pure invention, and figment of the imagination. There is not one true word in it. I can only call this affidavit phantasy. It is not even true that, as he says, Mr. Messersmith was a close friend of mine. I met Mr. Messersmith a few times at large meetings but I avoided discussing politics with him because I knew that in his reports and other statements he repeated talks which he had had with diplomats and interpreted them in a way which did not always correspond to the truth. This affidavit, significantly, does not contain accurate indications of the sourses from which he obtained his information.