I should assume, therefore, that at this moment I need not read from the document.
The document as such is Exhibit No. 8 in my document book. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q Did you light-heartedly decide to follow von Hindenburh's cal and take that difficult post, probably difficult in those days?
A No, no, not at all. I was not in the least bit keen about taking over that tricky post of Foreign Minister. I should have liked very much to remain at my post as ambassador in London, because I had a very excellent position with reference both to the government and the royal family, and I was hoping therefore, that I should be able to be of service to both countries, Great Britain and Germany.
However, I could not simply overlook Hindenburg's appeal, but even then I decided only when I had had a lengthy personal discussion with him during which I stated my own ideas regarding German policy to him, and during which I assured myself of his support for the peaceful aims and the aim of equality for Germany. There should be a strengthening of his position within Germany, and there was to be a reestablishing of Germany's entire sovereignty.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May I in this connection refer to a document already quoted? It is the affidavit of the former ambassador Pruefer, which I have included in my document book under No. 4. May I quote from this document, sub-paragraph 7, which refers ro the appointment of the defendant by Hindenburg? In my German text, this is Page 27.
"In the circles of higher-up functionaries of the Foreign office none of whom at that time were in sympathy with National Socialism, it was a welll known fact that when appointing Hitler as Reich Chancellor Hindenburg had, so to speak, attached the condition that Neurath should remain in office as foreign Minister. Baron Neurath was in no way anxious to obtain this office when he assumed it in 1932. On the contrary, as early as 1929, when Hindenburg had asked him to accept the ministerial post, he had declined on the ground that, not being a member of a party and thus being without party support, he could not consider appointment to a ministry as suitable in a country ruled according to the parliamentary principle. It was not until 1932, when Reich President von Hindenburg, whom he venerated deeply, formed his first so-called presidential cabinet, that Neurath dropped his scruples and entered the cabinet as foreign minister.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: time? such an extent that I was of the opinion that there were obviously only two possibilities: Either there would have to be some participation of the * National Socialist Party, which had grown considerably in the government, or should this demand be turned down, there would have to be civil war. the details of Hitler's seizure of power have been described by the defendant von Papen.
attitude towards Hitler, the National Socialists generally and the National Socialists' idea in particular, what was your opinion about the Party?
A I didn't know Hitler personally. Theo methods of the Party during their fight for power in the State were dispised by me. Some of then, particularly in the social sphere, appeared good to me and others I considered to be a phenomena of a revolution which I thought would dwindle gradually, as I had observed it to happen during the German revolution in 1918 and later during the Fascist revolution in Italy also. On the whole, however, I refused to sympathize with them; in any case, I considered in those days that s decisive role played by Hitler in the National Socialist Party, in German foreign policy r even its being led by Hitler was considered by me to be wrong and certainly not in the interests of Germany but least of all in the Interests of German foreign policy.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: May I in this connection refer to another passage from the affidavit of Ambassador Pruefer which I should like to quote. It is No. 4 in my document book and it is on page 28. It is interesting ** so far as Pruefer was an official of the defendant's ministry: "B*ron on Neurath was not a National Socialist. By unbringing and addition he even was decidedly agains the doctrines of National Socialism, to the extent that they endorse radical and violent principles. This dislike which he did not attempt to conceal was particularly directed against processes of Party Spokesmen towards people with different views, especially with regard to the Jews and persons of partly Jewish ancestry; beyond that against the all-around into ference of the National Socialist party in every vital expression of the German people and state; in other words against the claim of totalitarianism, the Fuehrer principle, briefly against dictatorship. Especially during the years 1986, until early 1938, when in my "capacity as head of the budget and personnel section I saw him very frequently, Baron von Neurath expressed himself to me and to others in unmistakable terms as to how much concern and aversion he felt toward the progressively more extreme tendency in German internal and foreign policy."
Mr. President, may I also beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the interrogatory of Count Schwerin Krosigk, the former Reichsminister of Finance, which is contained in my document book under No. 25. BY DR. VON LUSDINGHAUSEN: thoughts and principles, what was your attitude towards the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations? Treaty which was bringing disorder to the economic system of the entire world, we find the roots of National Socialism and in that way the causes of the second world war. By combining this Treaty with the League of Nations and by making the League of Nations, sha we say, the guardian of this Treaty, its original purpose, namely, that of creating understanding amongst the nations and preserving the peace, became impossible. The Charter allowed for the possibility. When the United States had withdrawn from participating and when Russia and later Japan were also standing outside this so-called League of Nations, its majority consisted only of a meeting of interested parties who were interested in maintaining the status quo, of status quo, mind you, which had been created by means of the Treaty of Versailles. Instead of removing the tension which appeared again and again, it was the aim of this League not to alter the existing state of affairs at all-that a great and living nation discriminated against, as it was by the Versailles Treaty could not stand for this; that was something which any statesman who was a little farsighted would recognize and it was not only in Germany that it was pointed out gain and again that this would load to a nasty and. Even Gene**, however, the playground of brilliant orators and politicians, was deaf to that argument. It is an undeniable historic fact that German foreign policy under all governments preceding Hitler's was aiming at a change in the Treaty of Versailles, though exclusively by peaceful means.
Q Was this also Hindenburg's policy or would Hindenburg have been accessivle to another shall we say, forcible solution by means of war? tools for that purpose. He told me again and a pain that a new war would have to be a voided at all costs.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I draw your attention in this connection and ask you to take judicial notice of an extract from a speech made by Count Bernstorff, who was Germany's representative in the League of Nations? The speech was made on the 25th of September 1928 and can be found under No 34 in my document book No. 2. The translation, however, has not yet *** available. It will be submitte , I hope, on Monday. I also refer to and beg you to take judicial notice of an extract from me speech of former Reichschancellor Bruening at Kiel, which he made on the 19th of May 1931, and which is No. 36 in my document book No. 2. Then there is an extract from the speech made by former Reich Foreign Minister Curtius, who was the successor and friend of the deceased Reichschancellor Stresemann, which Curtius made to the League of Nations Assembly.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I was telling Mr. von Luedinghausen that I have got Volume 2. I don't know if the Tribunal have the English translation.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think we have. Sir David, have the prosecution agreed to the relevancy, the admissibility of these documents?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FIFE: My Lord, we are not going to make an objection Jo short references as have been done so far. Your Lordship will appreciate that I have already stated the position of the prosecution with regard to the Treaty of Versailles, but as long as it as kept within reasonable bounds as a matter of introduction, I am not taking any formal objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. von Luedinghausen, the Tribunal has ruled out of evidence of variety of documents which are alleged to show the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles; as the prosecution have adopted the attitude which they have, the Tribunal will regard these as more historical documents but the matter is really irrelevant.
The only question is whether the defendants have attempted to overturn the Treaty of Versailles by force. We are not concerned with the justice or injustice.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I know, Mr. President, and that wasn't the reason why I submitted the document. I did not wish to state criticisms with reference to the Versailles Treaty. I wanted to establish the fact that previous governments, too, had had the same aims with peaceful means which my client later pursued in his capacity as Reich Foreign Minister also, so that under his direction, therefore, there were no changes whatever in the tendency and targe of Germany's foreign policy with reference foreign powers. That was the only reason and not criticism as such.
THE PRESIDENT: I know, Dr. Luedinghausen, but all the evidence that the defendant has been giving in the last few minutes was criticism of the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Yes, that was his general introdcution but now we are only trying to prove the continuity of this policy. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: the foreign policy of the Reich, with reference to the questions which we have just treated or dealt with? cal problem could only be achieved by peaceful means and step by step. It was a prerequisite, of course, that there should be complete equality for Germany in every sector and that, of course, therefore includes the military field. it would also mean the restoration of sovereignty in the entire Reich and the end to any discrimination. To achieve this, at any rate, would be the first task of Germany's foreign policy.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, in this connection, I should once more like to refer you to the affidavit from Ambassador Dr. Pruefer, which is No. 4 in my document book and I should like, with permission of the Tribunal, to quote for the purpose of underlining the statement just made by the defendant.
I quote from paragraph 12: "Neurath's policy was one of international understanding, and peace. This policy was not in contradiction with the fact that Herr von Neurath also strove for a revision of the hardships resulting from the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about exclusively through negotiations, in no case by force. All his utterances and directives, which as his assistant I over heard or saw, tended in that direction. The fact that Baron Neurath considered himself as a defender of the peace is perhaps best illustrated by a statement he made when leaving the foreign office. He declared at that time among a small group of his colleagues that now war could probably no longer be avoided. He probably meant by this that from now on the foreign policy would be transferred from his hands into those of reckless persons."
Q Mr. von Neurath, you agreed entirely with Hindenberg regarding total refusal of the employment of force for the purpose of achieving this aim of yours, namely, the changes you wished to be made in the Treaty of Versailles, and you did consider the achievement of that a possibility and you were a convinced opponent of any military conflagration, which you considered the greatest misfortune not only for Germany but for the entire world ?
A Yes. Germany and the whole world were still suffering from a terrible economic crisis which had been caused by the regulations of the Treaty of Versailles. Any further military steps, therefore, could only lead to a huge disaster. activities as Foreign Minister, the meeting of the so-called Restoration Commission began in Lausanne and you end the new Reich Chancellor, von Papen, participated. Will you tell us very briefly what the purpose of that conference was ? been definitely fixed, were now to be removed formally or to be decided clearly in their final sum, an aim which was actually achieved.
Q At the same time, wasn't there a meeting of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva ? place.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Mr. President, in this connection, and for the purpose of general understanding, I should like to point out to you that the institution of the Disarmament Conference goes back to a resolution passed by the League of Nations on the 25th of September, 1928, during which the close connection between international security -- that is to say pence, the peace of Europe in general -- and the limitation of armament in general was being enphasized. In this connection, I should like to draw your attention to the text of the resolution passed by the League of Nations, which has No.33 in my document book. That is on Page 90 of Document Book 2. BY DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN : negotiations ?
A Yes, but than of course to give you a brief account is vary difficult.
The Disarmament Conference had been created by the League of Nations for the purpose of taking care of the disarmament of all states, which was provided for in Article 8, and which was to be the basis for the German disarmament which had already been carried out by 1927. The negotiations during that Disarmament Conference, and in spite of objections raised by Germany's representatives, were adjourned however. The previous negotiations and this adjournment made it abundantly clear, even at that early stage, that those states which had not disarmed were not prepared to carry through their own disarmament in accordance with the applicable measures and methods of Germany's previous disarmament. At this time a resolution which was proposed became inacceptible to Germany and the German Representative received his instructions, therefore, to declare that Germany would not participate in the negotiations of the Disarmament Conference any more until the equal participation of Germany in the results of the conference should be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. von Luedinghausen, shall we adjourn now ?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Yes, Mr. President.
( A recess was taken.)
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Mr. President, in regard to the question just answered, I should like to refer to various documents and ask you to take note of then. I have submitted, in my document book No.2, under No.40, excerpts from the German memorandum of the 29th of August, 1932; excerpts from an interview of von Neurath with the representative of the (W.T.B.), the official news bureau of the German Reich, No. 45 of Document Book 2; an excerpt from a letter of the Defendant to the President of the Disarmament Conference, No. 43 of my Document Book No. 2; and finally, I should like to refer to a speech of the German representative in Geneva at the Disarmament Conference, which is No. 39 in my Document book, which shows the development and the attitude of the Defendant and also the German policy toward the disarmament negotiations which were started on the 16th at the Disarmament Conference.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Mr. von Neurath, in the documents submitted you emphasized that the disarmament question must be solved exclusively by peaceful means, and that no force could be used. Was this actually your conviction and did it represent the line of your policy?
A. Yes. During the whole period when I was Reich Foreign Minister, no means were used which were not the general practice and permitted internationally.
Q. On the 16th, the negotiations in the disarmament conference were to begin again. What was the result of this meeting of the disarmament conference?
A. First, the disarmament conference dwindled away, but later a so-called Five-Power Statement was issued in December 1932. This statement referred to Germany's claim for equal rights, and the listing of discriminations, and recognized the German claims. that Germany's equal rights were recognized for all time. Therefore, from Part 5 of the Versailles Treaty with reference to the obligation undertaken by the signatory powers for general disarmament, Germany could put into effect her right to resign. To this Five-Power Declaration, the prerequisite was given of Germany's taking part in the disarmament conference.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to refer to the text of the Five-Power Declaration on the 11th of December 1932. It is No. 47 in my document Book No. 2. That was the time before the seizure of power. Now, in January 1933 Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor and then there was the so-called seizure of power by the NSDAP. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Now, did you participate in any form whatever in this seizure of power, in the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor?
A. No, I had no part in any stage of the negotiations regarding the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor. No one, not even the Reich President and certainly no party leader asked me for my opinion. I had no close relations with any party leader, especially the leaders of the National Socialist Party.
Goering and Papen have testified to that effect here.
Q. What feelings did you have on this question of the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor, in other words, the seizure of power by the Party?
A. I had misgivings, but as I said at the beginning, in view of the party situation and the impossibility of forming a government against the National Socialists, I saw no other possibility unless one wanted to start a civil war, about the outcome of which there could be no doubt in view of the large number of followers of Hitler.
Q. For what reason, in view of your attitude which you have just expressed, did you remain Reich foreign Minister in the newly formed Hitler Government?
A. At the express desire of Hindenburg.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to refer to the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, No. 3 in my document Book 1 which has already been mentioned, and with the permission of the court I should like to read a short passage from it.
"When in the year 1933 a now government was formed under Hitler as Reich Chancellor, Hindenburg made the condition to Hitler that Neurath would have to remain Minister for Foreign Affairs. In accordance with this, Hindenburg asked Neurath to stay, and Neurath fulfilled Hindenburg's request in accordance with his previous promise. I know that Neurath in the course of time frequently harbored considerable misgivings, but was of the opinion that it was his patriotic duty to remain.
"In this connection, an especially fitiing comparison with a large rock comes to my mind, which right in the middle of the river can decrease the force of the roaring current, while on the shore it would remain without influence. He frequently stated, 'If the Germans often wonder that I am cooperating with this government, then they always think only of the bad conditions without appreciating how much disaster in excess of it I am still able to prevent. They forget what strength it takes to advance alone to Hitler through the wall of the "Myrmidons"."
to advance through that to Hitler. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Do you know for what reasons Hindenburg wanted you to remain or to enter the Hitler Cabinet as Foreign Minister?
A. To secure the continuation of a peaceful foreign policy, and to precent Hitler from rash steps which were possible in view of his nature; in a word, to act as a brake.
Q. Did Hindenburg make your remaining or entering the cabinet a condition for the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor?
A. Yes, he told me so later.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: In this connection, I should like to refer to the affidavit of the farmer ambassador Kurt Pruefer, No. 4 in my document book, and I should like to read a short excerpt from it.
"In his basic political attitude" -
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Page 27, Exhibit No. 4.
"Inasmuch as Hindenburg was a conservative, his basic political attitude was probably about the same as that of Baron Neurath. There was no doubt in the mind of anybody with even a moderate understanding of conditions that Hindenburg himself, in vesting power in Hitler, had done this only most reluctantly and yielding to the heavy pressure of developments in the field of home policy. If, under such circumstances, he insisted and made it a condition that Baron Neurath, his former adviser in the foreign field, remained in office, this undoubtedly was due to the fact that within the seething new forces which were surely displeasing and unsympathetic to him personally, he wanted to assure himself of one steady pillar at least for foreign policy, that is, for peace." BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN:
Q. Did you talk to Hindenburg about this, and did you tell him of your reluctance, your misgivings against joining the Hitler Cabinet?
A. Yes, I did not leave him in any doubt about that.
Q. What did Hindenburg answer?
A. He told me that I would have to make this sacrifice; otherwise, he would not have a quiet hour. Hitler had no experience in foreign politics.
Q. Did you, for this reason, decide to join Hitler's cabinet?
A. Yes. The English Prosecution, Sir David, in the session of March 1 of this year, asserted that through joining the cabinet of Hitler I had sold my honor and reputation. I will not comment on this serious insult.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I should like to quote a single sentence from the diary of Ambassador Dodd, which is No. 13 in my document book.
that is page 55 of the German text, which reads as follows. It is a remark of Dodd's which refers to von Neurath:
"I am sorry for these clear-headed Germans who know world affairs fairly well and who must work for their country and yet must submit to the ignorance and autocracy of Hitler and his followers." BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: in the cabinet as long as it would be at all possible for you to keep the foreign political course a peaceful one and avoid warlike action, even if Hindenburg should die?
A Yes. He repeatedly expressed that wish to me. remained in office?
A. Yes. But also because in the meantime I had experienced, because of Hitler's excitable temperament, he was often carried away an made rash steps. I also experience that in such cases he would listen to my objections. in Hitler's cabinet as foreign minister and remaining after the death of Hinder burg particularly place a special charge against you.
A What reproach they can have against me I cannot see. I never belonged to a party I never sworn allegiance to party pr rams and I never swore allegi nee to the party leaders. I served under the Kaiser, The socialist government, under Ebert, asked me to re-enter the foreign service and appointed me minister and ambassador. I served as a diplomat with liberal and conservative governments without identifying myself with their various programs. I was often in opposite to the government parties. I represented only the interests of my fatherland in its cooperation with other powers. the national Socialist Party. One could put different opinions into effect only from the inside as a member of the government with any prospect of success. Freedom od speech, the use of the press were forbidden in Germany or at least made difficult. Personal freedom was endangered. Moreover, it is not greatly different in other countries. I mean to say particiption in the governments of various parties, for example I mentioned Lord Vansittart, whom I know well myself, who was in the English Foreign Office under conservative as well as labor governments.
why did you remain in the government? Why did you not resign at that time? ing in the government. as to the Putsch at that time from which I had to conclude that it had been a serious revolt, I experienced a number of revolutions, for example the Russian revolution and, as I said, the facist revolution in done and I saw that in such revolutions innocent people have to suffer. I adapted myself to Hindenburg's attitude, who, even if I wanted to resign would never have let me do so. Hitler's description of it I should like to mention briefly an episode on this day, the 30th of June. to dinner. Colonel General von Fritsch was also present at this dinner and a number of other people -- high officers ans officials of the Foreign Office. The prince did not appear, that is, he came an hour late. When I asked for the reason I learned that my house had been surrounded by the SA and the prince had been prevented from entering. A few days later, Colonel General von Fritsch, after he had described events on the military side, asked me whether I knew that he himself had been on the list of Mr. Roehm. revolt, this revolt was not as harmless as described here. himself about the principles and the policy, foreign policy which you intended to pursue ?
A Yes, in detail. I explained to him that only by way of negotiations and a policy corresponding to the international situation could we achieve our ends. This would demand patience. Hitler seemed to understant this at the time and I had the same impression during the following years. I am convinced that he approved the continuation of this policy and was honest.
He repeatedly emphasized that he knew war and did not want to have another war.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : I should like once more to refer to the affidavit of Ambassador Pruefer, number 4 in my document book one and with the permission of the Court I should like to quote the following :
"This policy was not in contradiction with the fact that Herr von Neurath also streve for a revision of the hardships resulting from the Versailles Treaty. However, he wanted to bring this about exclusively through negotiations, in no case by force."
THE PRESIDENT : Have you not read this already ?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN : Yes. I want to read another passage.
"I am certain that Baron von Neurath, as well as other career officials in the Foreign Office, had no concrete knowledge of any possible plans for violence on Hitler's part. On the contrary, during the first years after the change of government one lent general credence to the oft-repeated protestations of peaceful intentions by the National Socialist leaders. I an even of the opinion that the latter themselves, especially during the first years, did not want to bring about a war. Rather was it believed and hoped in the higher circles of the Party, where Neurath did not count at all, that it would be possible to continue reaping cheap laurels without war through the hitherto successfully practiced tactics of bluff and sudded surprise. It was not until later that the megalomania arising from success and a belief in their own luck and their own infallibility and invincibility, which had become mystical through unrestrained sycophantism, led Hitler and his immediate entourage only later to include war among their instruments of political power. We, the functionaries of the foreign service, and with us Baron von Neurath our chief, became aware of this development only gradually, as outsiders. Until about the beginning of 1936 only a very few functionaries had been admitted into the Party which, on its part, treated the staff of the office, including the recently admitted members, with suspicion and distrust.
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Luedinghausen, isn't this really argument ? You are reading at great length.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I have already finished, Mr. 22 J une A - LJG- 9-1 P resident.
BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: National Socialists any intention or will for war with other powers?
A No. Contrary to the allegations of the P rosecution, which do not gain in truthfulness by repetition, I could not see any intention to resort to hostilities in the event of the failure to reach our aims, and from the various statements of Hitler, I know that he himself at that time--that is to say, at the beginning of his period of government--had no such intentions. He wanted close cooperation with England and with France and stable relationships which would remove the old hostilities between the two peoples. He told me that after the Saar plebiscite he would once and for all dispense with regaining Alsace. of the P arty's program you should have seen that the Nazis had aggressive political ends and that they were aiming at war from the very beginning. It reads:
"We demand the union of all Germans in a greater Germany. We demand equal rights for the German people in respect to other nations, end the repeal of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain."
Will you comment on this? sentences which have just been quoted. The right of selfdetermination is a basic prerequisite of the modern sta te, recognized in modern law. A t least in theory, the Treaty of Versaille was based on this right, and on this basis the plebiscites in the border areas took place. The inclusion of all Germans on the basis of this recognized principle was an absolutely permissible political stop on the basis of international law.
The removal of the discriminatory toms of the Treaty of Versailles by changing the terms of the treaty was the essential aim of German foreign policy.
As I have already said, all governments which had preceded the national Socialists had had the same objective. I con not see how one can deduce any intention of aggressive war if a people wants to free itself from the burden of an unjust treaty, on condition that it is done by peaceful means. I represented until the tine at the end of 1937 when I had to realize that Hitler included war as a part of his policy. Before, there had been no question of it. Germany by Hitler on foreign countries? immediately. The antagonism was quite clear. It was especially clear at the world Economic Conference in 1933 in London, where I had an opportunity to talk to many old friends and members of other delegations and to orient myself to this change of attitude. The practical effect of this attitude was to be observed in all negotiations, and particularly in the sessions of the disarmament conference.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. P resident, I should like to refer to a letter which is Number 11 in my document book. It is a report of Mr. von Neurath to the Reich P resident von Hindenburg from the London Conference. It is dated 19 June 1933. I shall quote a very short passage:
"Unfortunately I have to state that the impressions I received here are alarming to the highest degree."
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: P age 47.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that where you are reading--47?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: 47, yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: "My reason of the reports of the Chiefs of our Mission I was prepared for many bad aspects, for many gloomy events and for disturbing opinions of foreign countries.
Nevertheless, despite all apprehensions, I had hoped that various effects would be only transitory, that much could be settled. However, my apprehensions proved more justified than my hopes. I hardly recognized the City of London. I found a mood--first in the English world and then in international circles--showing a reaction in the political and psychological attitude towards Germany which cannot be considered seriously enough." BY DR. LUEDINGHAUSEN: there were further negotiations. That was in the winter of 193334. Can you briefly describe the course of those negotiations? It is important in view of later events. the time, 14 November 1932. This plan, surprisingly enough, provided for the transformation of professional armies into armies with a short period of service. According to the opinion presented by the French representative at that time, only armies with a short period of service could be considered as defensive armies, while standing armies, consisting of professional soldiers, had an offensive character.
This point of view of France was completely new. It was now only exactly opposite to the previous point of view of France, but it was also a change from the terms of the Versailles Treaty for the disarmament of Germany. This meant for Germany-and this was apparently the reason for the plan--it meant the abolition of the plan that she did not intend to disarm. A statement by the French representative, P aul Boncour, in the session of 8 February 1953 confirmed this.
confirming the so-called working program presented by England on the 30th of January, 1933, in which England wanted to speed up the negotiations of the conference. This attempt to speed up negotiations, which would and the diverging tendencies of the various powers, failed because of France's stubborn attitude. A change in the program had been made to attempt to got over these difficulties. The question of army strength was debated first.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: I should like to submit, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of my document number 49, in my document book number 2. It contains excerpts from the English program of the 30th of January, 1933. which contains excerpts from the French plan on the unification of continental European systems. speech of Mr. von Neurath in the session of the League of Nations Assembly on 7 December 1943, concerning the negotiations up to that time. BY DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: of disarmament as such; that is, reduction of armament strength? to remember all these individual cases, these resolutions, motions, formulation and so forth. This is material that goes into detail to such an extent that I can only do it on the basis of notes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. von Luedinghausen, we have been the whole morning and we haven't yet really gotten up to 1933. The Tribunal thinks this is bein done in far too great detail. As I have already pointed out, a great deal of it is an attempt to show that the Treaty of Versailles was unjust, which is irrelevant.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, if I may answer with the following, I do not wish to show the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Luedinghausen, willyou kindly got on? As I say, we think you are going into it in far too great detail.
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Very well.