With the sucess of these attacks the war had been lost on the basis of technical considerations. The new weapons without gas were of no use to me at all. attacks and their effect on production; did you tell Hitler?
A Yes, I told him about this in detail, in writing, and orally. From June until December 1944, I sent twelve memoranda and all of them reported castastrophic news.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit the report which deals with a memorandum which speer sent in June of 1944. It is reproduced on page 56 of the document book and it shall be Exhibit 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer says and writes to Hitler; "But then perforce in September of this year the flow of the quantities necessary to cover the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot be guaranteed any more. which means that from that time on there will be an insurmountable gap which of course must lead to tragic consequences," lene, Speer informed Hitler in another memoranda, dated 30th of August, '44.
This may be found on Page 62 of the English text, and this will be exhibit No. 15. I should like to quote but one sentence: "And in this way, in important phases, those materials which are necessary for the products of maodern war are lacking." BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, how was it possible that you and the other co-workers of Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do everything possible to continue the war?
A In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. Through his man, Hewel, of the Foreign Office, beginning with summer of 1944, he had precise reports disseminated and he led us to believe that foreign political discussions had been started. This can be confirmed by Colonel General Jodl. In this way, the repeated presence of the Japanese ambassador with Hitler was interpreted in such a way that through Moscow we were carrying on conversations with Moscow, or the envoy, Neubacher, who has been here as a witness, allegedly in the Balkans, had initialed conversations with the united states, or the former Soviet Minister in Berlin allegedly was present in Stockholm in order to initiate and introduce conversations. In this way he spread the hope that, like Japan in this rather hopeless situation, conversations would be started so that the people would be saved from the very latest and worst and in this way it would be possible to stiffen resistance and make it as strong as possible. He deceived all of us inasmuch as he gave the military leaders false hopes in the way of diplomatic steps, and he promised the political leaders now victories through the use of now weapons and led them to believe that this could be expected. We told the people and the combat troops and systematically had the rumor spread of a new miracle weapon, so that resistance would be maintained.
I can prove, in the carrying through the policy of lying to the people and promising them a miracle weapon.
Q Mr. Speer, were there decrees for destruction of the industries in Belgium. Holland and France?
A Yes. In case of an occupation by the Allies, Hitler had planned a far reaching system of destruction of industries essential to war in all of these countries.
According to planned preparations, industries, mines and other installations were to have been destroyed. these orders?
Q And did you prevent them? West was responsible, since this decree was to be carried out in his operational zone. But I learned of it and told him that this destruction, as far as I was concerned, had no sense and no purpose, and that I, in my capacity as Armament Minister, did not consider this destruction essential. That is why the order to destroy was not given and therefore I had taken that responsibility against Hitler, that this destruction did not take place.
Q When was that?
Q How could you justify your position? would have to end in October or November, after the invasion had been a sucess. I personally had the same opinion, especially as it applied to gasoline. This may be seen from my memoranda which I sent to Hitler on the 30th of August, a document in which I told him that in view of this development with regard to gasolene, no operational actions on the part of the troops would be possible by October or November. The fact that the war did last longer than that may be traceable to a bogging down of the offensive on the part of the enemy in the fall of '44, In that way our need for gasolene could be met and the west front could be re-equipped with new weapons. In this situation I could answer for the fact that industries in the western countries would be left to the enemy undamaged, for at the outside, they could be of use to them after nine months. This step coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in the blocked industries a matter which I dealt with this morning.
Q Did Hitler agree with these measures? them. It was rather an exciting period of time in headquarters and he did not think of the fact that he should check on these measures dealing with destruction Later, in January of 1945, the Frenchmen reported in their press about the reconstruction of their undestroyed industries.
Then, of course, I had many and heavy accusations leveled against me.
Q The French prosecution has submitted a document, RF 132. This is a report of the Field Economic Office dealing with the Netherlands According to this report, in September of 1944 there still existed the decree of the Commander in Chief of the West that only in the coastel town destruction was to take place but nowhere else, and the officer who was competent for the Netherlands sets down, as may be seen from the document, that the order of the Commander in Chief of the West was obsolete and that he had decreed on his own initiative that the industries should be destroyed in Holland. How was this possible and what did you do at that time? decrees not to destroy in the western region were crushed and our instruments for carrying through orders had been destroyed through bombing attacks. SeyssInquart had told me of the fact that destruction was to take place in Holland, and he has already testified that I authorized him that this was not to take place. This was in December of 1944. So that this destruction could be prevented, on the 5th of September, 1944, on my own initiative, I told the managers of the coal and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in Luxwmbourg that destruction in the monet mines and Saar mines of Belgium and Holland and so forth, was to be prevented. At that time, in the face of the hopeless war situation, we went so far that the man who was responsible for electric current furnished current to the other side so that the pumping stations in the mines would not have to stop, because a stopping of these pumping stations would have caused a flooding of the mines.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a copy of a letter from Speer to the Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Speer Exhibit No. 16. It will be found on Page 57 of the English text in my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, as far as the other occupied countries were concerned, that is outside of France, Belgium and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent destruction?
the Government General, the ore works in the Balkans, the nickle works in Finland; beginning with September, 1944, the industrial installations in Upper Silesia; beginning with February, 1945, the oil fields in Hungary and the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this connection that, to a great extant, I had the support of Colonel General Jodl, who quietly tolerated this policy of non-destruction. the German population did Hitler have at the beginning of September, 1944, when hostile troops approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich?
A He had no intention at all to save industry. On the cotrary, he ordered especially as applying to Germany, the policy of the scorched earth, a nd that meant the ruthless destruction of all installations at the approach of the enemy. Behind this policy were Bormann, Ley and Goebbels, whereas the various branches of the Wehrmacht and the expert ministries opposed this policy of his.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Since there were efforts on the part of Speer to prevent those intentions to destroy, measures which had been intensified in those areas which were considered part of the German Reich, such as Upper Silesia, Austria Poland, the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part of my evidence. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, in the greater German Reich, in the areas that I have just delineated, did the Commanders in Chief of the Army have instructions for carrying out works of destruction?
A No. The executive powers for that, so far as industries were concerned, rested with no. As far as bridges and cocks were concerned, the responsibility rested with the Wehrmacht.
Q. In your measures for the protection of industry, did you differentiate between the areas of the so-called old Reich and the territories which were added after 1933?
A. No. The Polish and Upper Silesian industrial region, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia were protected against destruction in the same way as the German areas, and especially in the eastern territories. Through personal visits I took the necessary steps right then and there in the localities involved.
Q. What did you undertake against the scorched earth policy?
A. On the 14th of September 1944, I returned, having taken a trip to the West front, and on that day I found the decree that everything was to be destroyed ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counter-decree which officially prescribed the protection of industrial installations. to be destroyed in Germany, especially since the war situation was hopeless, and I was all the more excited because I believed that I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western countries from destruction.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a document which is a decree by Speer dated the 14th of September 1944, for it deals with the protection of industries. It may be found on page 48 of the English text of my document book. This will be Exhibit No. 17. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, could you carry through this order?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of it? The 14th of September, did you say?
DR. FLAECHSNER: The 14th of September, Mr. President, 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is it?
DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 58 of the English text. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Could you carry through this order of yours, Mr. Speer?
A. At the same time, in the newspaper Der Voelkischer Beobachter, through an official article by the Reich Press Chief, the scorched earth policy was publicly proclaimed, so it was quite clear to me that my counter-decree could not have any effect for any length of time.
Hitler's circle. In order to dissuade him from the scorched earth policy, I used the tool of the faith which the people had that the territories which had been lost would be recaptured. I told him that if these industrial areas would be lost, a third of my potential would be lost; therefore we would have to recapture them, and if they were recaptured they would be of value only i they were intact and not destroyed by us.
Q. Therefore you addressed a letter to Bormann.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit No. 18, Mr. President. It will be found on page 59 of the English text of my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Did you send this teletype message to Bormann before you discussed the contents with Hitler?
A. Yes. I should like to summarize -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Would you give the French page as well so that the French members may have it.
DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 56 of the French text of the document book.
A. (Continuing): Hitler approved of the text which I submitted to him, and I suggested the alternatives, either to consider the war as lost, or to have the areas remain intact. The destruction of the Monet mines was demanded with much emphasis by Hitler, but in this case I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing the destruction of these mines through the fact that I turned Hitler's hopes to victory.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant just referred is an extract from the Fuehrer decree of the 18th of August 1944 and I should like to submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 19. It is reproduced in the supplementary volune of my document book on page 101. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, how did this originate?
A. I have already told you about that.
Q. In your letters we repeatedly find the concept of paralyzing, laehmen, and this concept is mentioned in connection with industrial installations. Will you tell the Tribunal just what you mean by this term "paralyzing".
A. I can say but briefly that we were concerned with the taking out of some special parts by which the works might be put out of commission temporarily, but these parts were not destroyed; they were just concealed.
Q. Just a little while ago you emphasized that up until January 1945 you tried to bring about armament to the highest possible degree. What were your reasons for the fact that after January 1945 you gave up these ideas?
A. From January of 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter began. We were entering the last phase of this war, and to realize that Hitler was identifying the fate of the German people with his own, and beginning with March of 1945 there was the realization that Hitler was deliberately trying to destroy the means of life for the people in view of the fact that the war was lost. but this is a matter of honor which I have to defend, and that is the reason why I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.
Q. Mr. Speer, what was the production situation in the various areas which were under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?
A. The fuel production, since the beginning of the attacks on the fuel plants in May 1944, was quite inadequate and the situation did not recover or improve. The bombing attacks on our transportation centers, beginning with November 1944, had eliminated the Ruhr area as a center of German raw material and with the successful offensive of the Soviet armies on thecoal areas of Upper Silesia, beginning with the middle of January 1945 the largest supply of coal was cut off from that region. would have to collapse, and at that point the situation would have been reached at which even if there were a complete cessation of operations on the part of the enemy, the war would be lost in a short time, for the Reich, because of its deficiency of coal and other things, would have to collapse economically of its own accord.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to quote a memorandum which Hitler received from Speer on the 11th of December 1944. Mr. President, you will find an extract on page 64 of the English text and page 61 of the German and French texts. It states -- and I quote:
"According to the whole structure of the Reich economy it is obvious that a failure of the territory of the Rheinish Westphalian industry in the long run will be unbearable for the whole German economy and the successful continuation of the war. In fact, at present, the Ruhr territory, with the exception of the products manufactured within the sector, is a total loss for the German economy.
"it is not necessary to discuss the consequences for the whole German Reich which will result from a long deprivation of the Ruhr territory." Hitler pointed out in detail the consequences of the possible loss of Upper Silesia, and in this connection I should like to submit a memorandum written by Speer which may be found on page 102 of the supplementary volume of my document book in the English text, and at page 101 in the French text. This is on extract from a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, dated the 15th of December 1944, and will have Exhibit number 21. This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.
I shall not need to quote from this extract. It is proved here that the possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting impossible even after a few months. A large part of Upper Silesia was lost in actuality shortly thereafter. which will be found on page 67 of the English text of the document book. It is page 64 in the French text. This document will be Exhibit No. 22, and I should like to quote from it:
"After the loss of Upper Silesia, German armament will not be in a position to cover even partially the requirements of the front in munitions, weapons and tanks, the losses on the front and the need for replacements."
Then there follows, as special emphasis, the sentence -- and I quote:
"The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers." BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, what did you mean to say by this last sentence which I quoted?
A. At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in the defense of the home country, the bravery of the soldiers would be increased tremendously, and that vice versa, the allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied territories, would have a lessened will to fight. That was the chief argument used by Goebbels and Bormann as well, since they wanted to intensify war at all costs and by all means.
Q. Mr. Speer, was Hitler advised from other sources as well as by yourself?
A. I shall summarize several points in this connection. Guderian, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to Hitler, and Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of February that the making of statements of that sort, that is, by memorandum or anything like that, would be considered as high treason and would be punished accordingly. Later, in a situation report, he prohibited any close collaborators from making any statements about the complete hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who violated that, without regard for his position or rank, would be shot and his family would be arrested. hopelessness of the war situation had an unexpected result. In fact, nothing was expected because in the first days of February, just a few days before the beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler had his press expert come to his office and in my presence told him to say, in the most drastic manner through the German press, "Never capitulate". At that time he declared that he was doing this so that in no event would the German people receive any offer from the enemy, and the language used would, have to be so strong that the enemy statesmen would not even want to try to separate the people.
At the same time he proclaimed again to the German people and he used the slogan "Victory or Collapse" and all of this took place at a period of time when it would have had to be clear to him and any intelligent man who was around him that the only thing possible was collapse. 1944, Hitler at that time already stated, and Schirach is my witness to this, that if the German people had to be vanquished in the struggle then the German people had been too weak, that it could not meet the examination of history and that it was meant for nothing but collapse. Now in this hopeless situation which existed in January and February of 1945 Hitler made remarks which showed that the statements which he had made at that time had not been pure oratory and rhetoric. In this period of time he saw in an increasing degree the guilt and failure of the German people in the conduct of the war but he never placed any blame upon himself. He used pretty strong language when talking about the failure of the German people, a people who made so many brave sacrifices in this war.
Q. Colonel General Jodl has already testified before this Court that Hitler and his co-workers as well saw the hopelessness of the military and economic situation; that they were quite clear about the situation. In this hopeless picture was not there a joint step taken by some of the advisors of Hitler so that he could be asked to terminate the war?
A No. A joint step of the leading men surrounding Hitler did not take place. A step like this was quite impossible for these men considered themselves either people who were to receive orders or they were experts and they had resigned themselves to the situation. In this situation no one undertook to take the leadership to bring about just a discussion for the prevention of further sacrifices. No one approached Hitler on that. with all means at their disposal, tried to intensify the struggle.
That was Goebbels, Bormann and Ley and as we have said Fegelein and Burgdorf. This group was responsible for the fact that Hitler should be persuaded to leave the Geneva Convention. Dr. Goebbels, beginning in February, gave Hitler a rather sharp memorandum in which he demanded our withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitler had already endorsed this proposal or intention, as the state secretary of Goebbels told me. With this step the struggle was to be carried on without consideration for any international agreement and was to be carried through at all costs. This was the sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler. He mentioned that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed because of the resistance of the military leaders. The state secretary to Goebbels, Neumann, told me this later on.
Q Mr. Speer, the witness Stahl, in his written testimony, said that in about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded a supply of now poinsonous gas in order to carry out the assassination of Bormann, Goebbels and Hitler. Why did you have this intention?
A In my opinion there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to undertake this step as beginning with February it was quite obvious to me that Hitler wanted to continue the war at all costs, ruthlessly, without consideration for the German people. It was quite clear to me that in the losing of the war he confused his own fate with that of the German people and that in his own mind ha saw the end of the German people as well. It was clear that the war was lost so completely that unconditional surrender would have to be accepted. it a failure ?
A I did not wish to testify as to the particulars. I could have carried it through personally only since from the 30th of July only a closer circle had access to Hitler. I had not with various technical difficulties.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal would like to hear the details but will hear them after the adjournment.
(A recess was taken.) BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what the difficulties were against your carrying out your intentions ? unsympathetic about such matters but it is only because it is the wish of the Tribunal that I shall do so. shelter about the military situation with Ley, Goebbels and Bormann, who were particularly close to him in those days because they supported his military plans and cooperated. associates of Hitler to enter into that shelter of his without their briefcases being examined by the SS for high explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had an air-conditioning plaint similar to the one which has been fitted into this Courtroom.
21 June A LJG 18-1 H aynes in-take of this plant, which was in the garden of the Reichschancellory, and to insert gas into it. By means of this plant, the gas would then be distributed through the entire shelter in a very brief period. head of my department for munitions, and I had him come to me. Since I had worked closely with him during construction cases, I discussed with him openly my opinion and my intention, as the testimony shows. I asked that, being the man who was manufacturing munitions, I be supplied with modern poison gas. He inquired of one of his associates how one might get this poison gas, and in this connection it turned out that this new poison gas would only be effective if it was made to explode, since then the high temperature was reached which was necessary for gassing. an explosion was not possible, as this air conditioning plant was made of thin tin, just as it is here in this room, and since the explosion would have torn that tin to pieces. the Chancellory, Herr Henschel. This was in the middle of March 1945. By means of many discussions, I arranged that the anti-gas filter was not continuously switched on, by means of which I would have been able to use an ordinary typo of gas. which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time came, I inspected the air in-take in the garden of the Chancellory, together with Henschel, and there I found out that shortly before that, by personal order from Hitler, this in-take had been surrounded by a chimney which was four meters high. That can still be ascertained on the spot. Through this, the carrying out of my plan was no longer possible.
Q I shall now come to another problem. Mr. Speer, we have had the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this Courtroom, and they have stated what they knew about your activities after the 21 June A LJG 18-2 Haynes middle of February 1945, which you carried out in order to secure the food position.
What do you yourself have to say to this in regard to your work in that direction? plies which I put into effect at the time myself were arranged for the purpose of going from a war situation to a peace situation. This was at the expense of the armament, which I personally represented. be too extensive to describe here. All of these decrees are still available. The point was that, contrary to the official policy, we wanted to arrange that shortly before their occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food, and that, considering the catastrophe in transportation, every stop should be taken that the crop in 1945 should be transported in good time, and that the seeds should be transported in good time, which was a burning problem at that time. Had the seeds arrived a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad. effect on armament production, which can not be measured, but at any rate, armaments could maintain production through its reserve only until the maddle of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning. This is owing to the fact that we only had 20 to 50 per cent of the traffic volume at our disposal, and my unconditional preference for food transport over armament transport did, therefore, exclude in practice all armament transport. against the official war slogan--"Resistance to the L ast"--were broadly carried out? Were there people who were prepared to carry out such measures as you were suggesting, and to carry them into practice? so dangerous as one might perhaps describe them, because in those days--after J anuary 1945--andy reasonable measure could be 21 June A LJG 18-3 Haynes carried out in Germany against the official policy.
Any reasonable man would be in favor of reasonable measures and would be satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of those conferences took place amongst a large circle of experts. Everyone of these participants know, without its ever being said, what the meaning of these orders was. During these days I had close contacts with reference to various other measures with the Secretary of State of the Traffic Ministry, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Propaganda, and later, even with the State Secretary of the P arty Chancellery; that is, Bormann, the State Secretary, himself, and they were all old Party members. In spite of that, they did their duty to the nation at that time differently from the way in which many loading men in the P arty were doing it. I kept them currently informed, in spite of Hitler's prohibition, of the developments in the military field, and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the insane orders of those days. existence of the German people through the unnecessary continuation of the war? once more on the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied, including the territories of Polish Upper Silesia belonging outside the borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during retreat was actually the greatest danger because a bridge blown up by engineers is much mere difficult to repair than a bridge which has been destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to the destruction of the spirit of life in a modern state. circles in the P arty were making demands for the destruction of industry, and it was also Hitler's opinion that this should be so. In February, 1945, therefore, I stopped production and 21 June A LJG 18-4 H aynes supply of the so-calle d industrial dynamiting materials.
The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines and private professions should be diminished. As a witness of mine will say, these orders were actually carried out. to stop the ordered destruction of bridges or to reduce it to a minimum.
he demanded to the contrary, that there should be increased orders for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on the 18th of March 1945, he had eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in connection with the destruction of a bridge. He mentioned this fact in the Armed Forces Bulletin so that there would be a warning for future cases. By this means it was extremely difficult to disobey orders for the destruction of bridges. to Hitler on the 18th of March, 1945, the contents of which were most clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the knowledge of numerous of his associates.
DR. FLAECHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on page 69 of the English text of the document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Will you continue, please? Mr. President:
"The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic installations. Economic transportation has thereby been considerably reduced.
"In four to eight weeks the final collapse of Germany must therefore be expected for certain. In four to eight weeks, after that collapse, the war cannot even be continued militarily.
"We at the head have the duty that the nation should be helped in these serious hours, which must be expected.
"In this connection, we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the more remote future.
"If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation and its basis of life, then he must do the job himself. We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most primitive manner, a basis of life for the nation to the last."
them. I quote:
"It must be guaranteed that if the battle advances further into the territory of the Reich nobody has the right to destroy industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply facilities, as well as traffic facilities, internal shipping routes etc.
"The blowing up of bridges to the extent which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last weeks have been able to achieve. Their destruction, in the end, means the removal of any further possibility for existence of the German Nation."
Then, I shall quote briefly from the end of the memorandum:
"We have no right, at this stage of the war, to-carry out destructions on our part which might affect the life of the Nation.
"If the enemies wish to destroy this Nation, which has fought with a unique bravery, then this historical shame shall rest exclusively upon them.
"We have the obligation of leaving to the Nation all possibilities which, in the more remote future, might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction." Hitler would have to know in any case, because there was not the need for much economic understanding to realize the results of such destruction for the future of the Nation. knowledge of which he already had since I had discussed it with some of his associates --Hitler made statements which are typical of the attitude which he had towards this principal question. to draw Germany into an abyss, is something I would not have raised here if there had not been the letter of 29 May 1945, which confirmed the statements of view in that respect.