At the same time he proclaimed again to the German people and he used the slogan "Victory or Collapse" and all of this took place at a period of time when it would have had to be clear to him and any intelligent man who was around him that the only thing possible was collapse. 1944, Hitler at that time already stated, and Schirach is my witness to this, that if the German people had to be vanquished in the struggle then the German people had been too weak, that it could not meet the examination of history and that it was meant for nothing but collapse. Now in this hopeless situation which existed in January and February of 1945 Hitler made remarks which showed that the statements which he had made at that time had not been pure oratory and rhetoric. In this period of time he saw in an increasing degree the guilt and failure of the German people in the conduct of the war but he never placed any blame upon himself. He used pretty strong language when talking about the failure of the German people, a people who made so many brave sacrifices in this war.
Q. Colonel General Jodl has already testified before this Court that Hitler and his co-workers as well saw the hopelessness of the military and economic situation; that they were quite clear about the situation. In this hopeless picture was not there a joint step taken by some of the advisors of Hitler so that he could be asked to terminate the war?
A No. A joint step of the leading men surrounding Hitler did not take place. A step like this was quite impossible for these men considered themselves either people who were to receive orders or they were experts and they had resigned themselves to the situation. In this situation no one undertook to take the leadership to bring about just a discussion for the prevention of further sacrifices. No one approached Hitler on that. with all means at their disposal, tried to intensify the struggle.
That was Goebbels, Bormann and Ley and as we have said Fegelein and Burgdorf. This group was responsible for the fact that Hitler should be persuaded to leave the Geneva Convention. Dr. Goebbels, beginning in February, gave Hitler a rather sharp memorandum in which he demanded our withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitler had already endorsed this proposal or intention, as the state secretary of Goebbels told me. With this step the struggle was to be carried on without consideration for any international agreement and was to be carried through at all costs. This was the sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler. He mentioned that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed because of the resistance of the military leaders. The state secretary to Goebbels, Neumann, told me this later on.
Q Mr. Speer, the witness Stahl, in his written testimony, said that in about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded a supply of now poinsonous gas in order to carry out the assassination of Bormann, Goebbels and Hitler. Why did you have this intention?
A In my opinion there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to undertake this step as beginning with February it was quite obvious to me that Hitler wanted to continue the war at all costs, ruthlessly, without consideration for the German people. It was quite clear to me that in the losing of the war he confused his own fate with that of the German people and that in his own mind ha saw the end of the German people as well. It was clear that the war was lost so completely that unconditional surrender would have to be accepted. it a failure ?
A I did not wish to testify as to the particulars. I could have carried it through personally only since from the 30th of July only a closer circle had access to Hitler. I had not with various technical difficulties.
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal would like to hear the details but will hear them after the adjournment.
(A recess was taken.) BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what the difficulties were against your carrying out your intentions ? unsympathetic about such matters but it is only because it is the wish of the Tribunal that I shall do so. shelter about the military situation with Ley, Goebbels and Bormann, who were particularly close to him in those days because they supported his military plans and cooperated. associates of Hitler to enter into that shelter of his without their briefcases being examined by the SS for high explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had an air-conditioning plaint similar to the one which has been fitted into this Courtroom.
21 June A LJG 18-1 H aynes in-take of this plant, which was in the garden of the Reichschancellory, and to insert gas into it. By means of this plant, the gas would then be distributed through the entire shelter in a very brief period. head of my department for munitions, and I had him come to me. Since I had worked closely with him during construction cases, I discussed with him openly my opinion and my intention, as the testimony shows. I asked that, being the man who was manufacturing munitions, I be supplied with modern poison gas. He inquired of one of his associates how one might get this poison gas, and in this connection it turned out that this new poison gas would only be effective if it was made to explode, since then the high temperature was reached which was necessary for gassing. an explosion was not possible, as this air conditioning plant was made of thin tin, just as it is here in this room, and since the explosion would have torn that tin to pieces. the Chancellory, Herr Henschel. This was in the middle of March 1945. By means of many discussions, I arranged that the anti-gas filter was not continuously switched on, by means of which I would have been able to use an ordinary typo of gas. which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time came, I inspected the air in-take in the garden of the Chancellory, together with Henschel, and there I found out that shortly before that, by personal order from Hitler, this in-take had been surrounded by a chimney which was four meters high. That can still be ascertained on the spot. Through this, the carrying out of my plan was no longer possible.
Q I shall now come to another problem. Mr. Speer, we have had the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this Courtroom, and they have stated what they knew about your activities after the 21 June A LJG 18-2 Haynes middle of February 1945, which you carried out in order to secure the food position.
What do you yourself have to say to this in regard to your work in that direction? plies which I put into effect at the time myself were arranged for the purpose of going from a war situation to a peace situation. This was at the expense of the armament, which I personally represented. be too extensive to describe here. All of these decrees are still available. The point was that, contrary to the official policy, we wanted to arrange that shortly before their occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food, and that, considering the catastrophe in transportation, every stop should be taken that the crop in 1945 should be transported in good time, and that the seeds should be transported in good time, which was a burning problem at that time. Had the seeds arrived a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad. effect on armament production, which can not be measured, but at any rate, armaments could maintain production through its reserve only until the maddle of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning. This is owing to the fact that we only had 20 to 50 per cent of the traffic volume at our disposal, and my unconditional preference for food transport over armament transport did, therefore, exclude in practice all armament transport. against the official war slogan--"Resistance to the L ast"--were broadly carried out? Were there people who were prepared to carry out such measures as you were suggesting, and to carry them into practice? so dangerous as one might perhaps describe them, because in those days--after J anuary 1945--andy reasonable measure could be 21 June A LJG 18-3 Haynes carried out in Germany against the official policy.
Any reasonable man would be in favor of reasonable measures and would be satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of those conferences took place amongst a large circle of experts. Everyone of these participants know, without its ever being said, what the meaning of these orders was. During these days I had close contacts with reference to various other measures with the Secretary of State of the Traffic Ministry, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Propaganda, and later, even with the State Secretary of the P arty Chancellery; that is, Bormann, the State Secretary, himself, and they were all old Party members. In spite of that, they did their duty to the nation at that time differently from the way in which many loading men in the P arty were doing it. I kept them currently informed, in spite of Hitler's prohibition, of the developments in the military field, and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the insane orders of those days. existence of the German people through the unnecessary continuation of the war? once more on the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied, including the territories of Polish Upper Silesia belonging outside the borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during retreat was actually the greatest danger because a bridge blown up by engineers is much mere difficult to repair than a bridge which has been destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to the destruction of the spirit of life in a modern state. circles in the P arty were making demands for the destruction of industry, and it was also Hitler's opinion that this should be so. In February, 1945, therefore, I stopped production and 21 June A LJG 18-4 H aynes supply of the so-calle d industrial dynamiting materials.
The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines and private professions should be diminished. As a witness of mine will say, these orders were actually carried out. to stop the ordered destruction of bridges or to reduce it to a minimum.
he demanded to the contrary, that there should be increased orders for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on the 18th of March 1945, he had eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in connection with the destruction of a bridge. He mentioned this fact in the Armed Forces Bulletin so that there would be a warning for future cases. By this means it was extremely difficult to disobey orders for the destruction of bridges. to Hitler on the 18th of March, 1945, the contents of which were most clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the knowledge of numerous of his associates.
DR. FLAECHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on page 69 of the English text of the document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Will you continue, please? Mr. President:
"The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic installations. Economic transportation has thereby been considerably reduced.
"In four to eight weeks the final collapse of Germany must therefore be expected for certain. In four to eight weeks, after that collapse, the war cannot even be continued militarily.
"We at the head have the duty that the nation should be helped in these serious hours, which must be expected.
"In this connection, we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the more remote future.
"If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation and its basis of life, then he must do the job himself. We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most primitive manner, a basis of life for the nation to the last."
them. I quote:
"It must be guaranteed that if the battle advances further into the territory of the Reich nobody has the right to destroy industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply facilities, as well as traffic facilities, internal shipping routes etc.
"The blowing up of bridges to the extent which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last weeks have been able to achieve. Their destruction, in the end, means the removal of any further possibility for existence of the German Nation."
Then, I shall quote briefly from the end of the memorandum:
"We have no right, at this stage of the war, to-carry out destructions on our part which might affect the life of the Nation.
"If the enemies wish to destroy this Nation, which has fought with a unique bravery, then this historical shame shall rest exclusively upon them.
"We have the obligation of leaving to the Nation all possibilities which, in the more remote future, might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction." Hitler would have to know in any case, because there was not the need for much economic understanding to realize the results of such destruction for the future of the Nation. knowledge of which he already had since I had discussed it with some of his associates --Hitler made statements which are typical of the attitude which he had towards this principal question. to draw Germany into an abyss, is something I would not have raised here if there had not been the letter of 29 May 1945, which confirmed the statements of view in that respect.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that the 29th of May or March?
THE WITNESS: March, Mr. President.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, you will find this document on page 72 of the English text in my document book, and it is page 75 in the French text. I submit it as Exhibit No. 24. It is Speer's letter to Hitler, dated the 29th of March, 1945. BY DR. FAECHSNER:
Q Will you continue, please?
THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read the letter?
DR. FLAECHSNER: I was going to suggest it. I think the defendant wants to read it. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Will you read it?
A I quote:
"When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you I was of the firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the present situation for the maintenance of our national power would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had once determined that it was the task of the government to preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.
"However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as follows: If the war is to be lost the nation will also perish. This fate is inevitable. There was no necessity to take into consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be wiser to destroy even these things ourselves, because this nation had proved to be the weaker one and the future belonged solely to the stronger Eastern Nation. Besides, those who remain after the battle are only the inferior ones; for the good ones have fallen."
I go on to quote:
"After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward the realization of these intentions."
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I refer in this connection to a document of Speer which is the destruction order of Hitler, dated the 19th of March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on page 73 of the French and page 76 of the English text of my document book. communication systems which you will find on page 78 of the English text and page 75 of the French text. They become Speer Exhibit No. 26. Bormann dated 23 March, 1945, which is contained in the supplementary volume of my document book, where it appears on page 102. The latter exhibit will have the number 27. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?
THE PRESIDENT: You said that lost one was at page 102 of the second volume. In my copy that is a document of General Guderian of December 15, 1944.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake. It isn't page 102, it is page 93. I beg to apologize; it is at pages 93 and 94. I have only just received the document book today. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?
A I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the Gauleiters to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, public facilities, water works, gas works, and so on and so forth, and also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My jurisdiction had specifically been excluded, by means of that order, and the right to give instructions to industry, which I had, had been cancelled.
destruction of all bridges, and over and above that, all railway installations, communications systems, the Reichsbahn, the German railway, and also the waterways, of all ships, of all railway transportation, and of all locomotives. tion of a traffic desert. center of the Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and prisoners of war were to be added to it. on foot. No provisions for their existence had been made or could be carried out, considering the situation. unimaginable hunger catastrophe as its result. Add to this that on the 19th of March, 1945, there was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiters, saying that the fight should be conducted without consideration for our own population.
broken, saying that it would not be necessary that the basic live principles for the leadership should have been saved, but it would be better to destroy these things. Considering the discipline which came into force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its contents were, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out. the Greater German Reich. and by means of discussions with my associates, tried to stop the carrying out of the orders, and I ordered that the high explosives which were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and that the stores of high explosives which were on the building site should be hidden. We issued machine pistols to the most important plants so that they could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat exaggerated, but the atmosphere of the time was such that if a Gauleiter had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was one machine pistol on the spot, then they would have fired. character of the task which had been given to them, and furthermore, by talking to the local authorities, I succeeded in stepping most of the evacuation which had been ordered. Once again the secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klepper, earned my recognition by holding up the evacuation orders which were to be sent to the Gauleiters. This was on the 29th of March, 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiters so openly that my resistance had to become known to him. Witnesses are available from that period who know that that is what I wanted to achieve.
I did not want to deceive him behind his back in this case. I wanted to put the alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference, he stated that he had had reports from Hermann showing that I considered the or as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not consider the war lost, and I replied by saying, "The war is lost". letter was written, the extract from which hasbeen quoted, and which hasbeen submitted to the Tribunal.
reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that he could, rely on me, even in the future. And by that means, I achieved it that he handed over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.
DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer to Hitler's order dated the 30th of March, 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English text and 19 of the French text in the document book, which I new submit as Exhibit 23? BY DR. FLAECHSNER: had? get around the destruction which had been ordered. I gave an order at once reestablishing all my old orders for the protection of industry. In this connection, I did not submit this now order of mine before Hitler, although it was expressly stated in his order, contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely that I would stand behind him unconditionally. stated here, and I said to him, too, that the war was lost. I then discussed the consequences fully. On that occasion I found a great deal of understanding from Seyss-Inquart. Both my decrees for the prevention of that destruction, as well asmy conferences, were contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on the 21st of March. I considered that this was my natural duty.
DR. FLEICHSNER: I submit under Speer Exhibit 29 the instructions issuer by Speer on the 30th of March with reference to the order which has already been mentioned. In the French and German texts that appear on Page 81, and in the English document book, on Page 85.
THE WITNESS: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still remained in force, and everywhere in Germany, Austria and Poland you can see the result today. the commanders of the troops at the front. Perhaps that may have caused one relief or the other. the 3rd of April, 1945, stopped the destruction by means of a new order of the postal and wireless communication departments. Finally, on the 5th of April, I issued six OKW orders under the name of General winter, who has been a witness in this court room; and these orders were to sad to the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still in existence. I gave these orders through my command channels and the channels of the Reich railway, and considering the tremendous muddle which there had been at the time, such order's, which I was not empowered to give, would at least have a distracting value. BY DR. FLEICHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, a number of attempts of yours to abbreviate the war became known to the press. Could you please refer to the problem, namely what has been hinted in the press, and state to the Tribunal what those were? I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the government and to force them to make themselves responsible for their deeds. To carry that and other plans out, eight officers from the front joined me, all of whom were holding the highest decorations. Amont them were the two best known pilots in Germany, Galland and Baumbach. The Secretary of State of the Propaganda Ministry made it possible for me on the 9th of April to speak briefly ever the entire German radio system. All preparations were made, and at the last moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should pass on the text of my speech; so that I submitted to him a very changed text. But he even prohibited that. a speech at the broadcasting station at Hamburg, which was meant to be the instructions for the final phase; and the recording officials demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler's death, which would relieve then of their oath of allegiance to him.
in the East -- that is, the Army Group Weichsel -- and we were both aware that a fight for Berlin must not take place, and that contrary to their orders, the armies should by-pass Berlin. persons empowered with special authority by Hitler who succeeded in leading one division into Berlin. The original intention, however, that entire armies should be lead into Berlin, did not find itself carried through. The chief of staff with whom I had those conferences was General Kinsler. April, and later on?
A Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, because Churchill, too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the end of July, 1945. plants and other economic installations. Did you act equally on behalf of the foreign workers?
A My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty, therefore, in the first place, to hand ever my sector undestroyed. In spite of this, several attempts of mine were in favor of foreign workers in Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war, through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were quire obviously the beneficiaries of my work during the last phase. Secondly, during local conversations, I did much to prevent detonations, contrary to the evacuation *---* which were available from the Party, and I worked a remaining-on-thespot of the foreign workers and prisoners, such conferences having taken place on the 18th of March in the Saar and on the 28th of March in the Ruhr.
At the beginning of March, I made the proposal that five hundred thousand foreigners should be transferred from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say, the Dutch to Holland the the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The railways, however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the traffic system had already been so destroyed, that the carrying out of this plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in connection with the intended speech over the German broadcasting system on the 9th of April as well as the attempt of the Hamburg speech, I drew everyone's attention to the duties which we had towards the foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the detainees from concentration camps during this last phase.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to page 88 of the English text in this connection; it is page 84 of the French and I submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 30. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not resign?
A. I had the possibility to resign on three occasions; one in April 1944, when my powers were considerably eliminated; the second time in September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my being eliminated, by resigning; and the third time on the 29th of March 1945, Hitler himself demanded that I should go on permanent leave, which was equivalent to resignation. I turned down all these possibilities because beginning with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.
Q. There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect that the last phase of the war, say beginning of January 1945, had been justified because unnecessary sacrifices should be made to save the nation. Were you of that same opinion?
A. No. It was said that military protection towards the East had been necessary to save refugees. In reality, until the middle of April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and munitions were used for the fight against the West.
The tactical principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if the fight had been carried out with those aims, which has been testified to here. The destruction of bridges in the best and the destruction orders against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were without sense. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler, just as much as the destroyed cities, destroyed in that last phase, who had lost tremendous cultural values and tremendous number of dwellings. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic installations, trucks and locomotives and ships. The German people remained faithful to Adolf Hitler until the end. He has betrayed, them knowingly. He has tried to throw it into the abyss. Only after the 1st of May 1945, did Doenitz try to use reason and act but it was too late.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I have one last question. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: phase of the war with your conceptions of faith and allegiance to Adolf Hitler; always the faith towards one's own people. That duty must come above everything. If I standing in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation are acted against in such a way then I, too, must act. That Hitler had broken the faith to the nation, that must have been clear to every intelligent member of his surrounding's and no later than January 1945, once Hitler was given the mission by his people, he had no right to combine and lose the destiny of the people with his own. That is why I found that it was necessary for me to do my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in every way but I am glad today that with my work, I rendered the last service to the workers in Germany and the Occupied Territories.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my examination of the defendant Speer. May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the following; namely, that with reference to the subjects which came up during this afternoon's session, there will be the witness Kehrl, or there is the witness Kehrl whose interrogatory has been referred in 10 and 12; Rohland, 5, 6, and 8; witness Schieber under 25; witness Guderian on the question, 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and with the same reference also under 6 and witness Stahl is mentioned under 1 and 2; the witness Kempf under No. 10. Still outstanding are the interrogatories from the witness Malzacher and the interrogatory which is most important to the defense, the statements of the witness von Peso, since he was the liaison man, the liaison officer between the General Staff of the Any and Speer's Ministry. Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory referring to General Buhle, who was the Chief of the Army Staff, and Oberst Baumbach, General Baumbach, who was the commander of an airforce wing. The remaining documents I should submit at the end of the re-examination of the defendant Speer, to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?