Then, in a letter addressed to the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, dated December 1943, I took a decided view and attitude that the workers in the occupied Western countries should not only receive wages, but that besides wages consumer goods should be put at their disposal. This was a policy which is quite contrary to the plundering and pillaging of the Western Regions, an accusation which the French prosecution has made about me.
These three documents are in my possession and they may be submitted; they are available. the records of the 3rd to the 5th of January, the policy of acting very harshly in France, was not endorsed by me and was not observed by me.
Mr. Speer, what did you have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?
A We have already discussed this -- no armament goods; only consumer goods. 1944, in which you allegedly discussed the proposal by the Reichsmarshal to put prisoners of war at the disposal of the SS. Can you comment on that?
A This record dates back to the 3rd of March, 1944. From January until May of 1944 I was seriously ill, and I did not take part in this discussion; one of my co-workers was in charge of this discussion. He was a man who had the confidence of Hitler. Apart from that, this proposal was not carried through anyway.
Q Mr. Speer, the session of the 30th of May was one that you did attend, on which occasion the question was discussed as to how the establishment of the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower was brought about. Will you tell us briefly just what you knew about this question? as they applied to armament production. My concern in the commitment problem, at the beginning of my assuming office, was chiefly concerned with the Gauleiters who carried on a policy of Gau particularism, and the non-political offices of the Work Ministry could not proceed against the Gauleiters.
Therefore, recruiting or labor commitment had been frozen in Germany, and I suggested to Hitler that for this delegate a man whom I knew, Gauleiter Hancke, should be chosen. Goering has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed to this proposal of mine. I did not know Sauckel, but I quite agreed to the selection, however. It is quite possible that Sauckel did not anything about this incident, that he can say he did not know anything about it, and that he can say he was chosen on my suggestion. Lammers declared that he could not issue authority for a special sector of labor commitment, that there would be misgivings on an administrative basis, and, in that way, the entire commitment problem would have to be subordinated to a plenipotentiary. They contemplated, first of all, a Fuehrer decree. Goering protested, since he thought it was a task which belonged to the Four Year Plan. Therefore, a compromise was reached whereby Sauckel was to be the General Plenipotentiary within the Four Year Plan, but that he would be appointed by Hitler.
P lan. In that way, Sauckel was in effect a subordinate of Hitler's, and Sauckel also looked upon it in that way. 30th of M ay, said that Goering participated in this meeting of the Control Planning Board. Is that true?
A No, that does not apply at all. It is not true. I would not have known what to do with him, for, after all, we had to carry out practical work. Sauckel on the 8th of October, 1945, according to which the arrangement of his delegates was supposed to have been caused by you. Is that true?
A N o. In 1941 I had nothing to do with armament, and even later, during the period of Sauckel's activity, I did not employ these delegates and plenipotentiaries. That was a matter which Sauckel handled; it was in his jurisdiction. testimony of Sauckel on the 27th of September, 1945, and they quoted from this record that you gave a special order to have trains put at the disposal of those responsible for the transporting of workers. by Sauckel as far as they apply to me and give my answer. taken by Sauckel and his co workers. It may be that through a sudden change in the production program or, in effect, on the request of my office, trains were changed. However, the responsibility for that always rested with the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower. Sauckel testified here and said after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war" theory. But that is not quite true. Stalingrad took place in J anuary of 1943, and Goebbels started on his program of total war in August of 1944 .
20 June A LJG 13-2 Williams reform program which was to give us more workers. I was one who endorsed the program. Neither Goebbels now I, however, could carry this plan. set up. But this task could not be carried out by these three men, because they lacked the technical background.
Then the labor commitment department was mentioned. This consisted of the following. L arge industry and labor had a manager, and its branches, which were centralized in my office. But this was not something which hurt Sauckel's interest. They had no special sphere of interest. This may be shown from the fact that this was one of the 50 to 60 departments in my office. If it had been very important, it would have been one of my six or eight special branches. session which took place in his office was representative of my office, which took place for army and naval armament and for construction work. In these meetings, there were about fifteen people who were responsible for labor commitments, and in these discussions the urgency of supplies and workers was dealt with. Sauckel, of course, had an overall picture of the economic setup. That was the activity which erroneously is ascribed to the Central Planning Board. foreign workers to Germany in April of 1942 was done on my initiative, that I had demanded this step, and that I was responsible for the fact that the foreign workers were transported to Germany at all. That, however, is not true. In that way, I reall would not have had to use any influence on Sauckel; and apart from that, from a Fuehrer decree of the 4th of May, 1943,.a document which is in my possession, it may be seen that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region took place at the suggestion of Sauckel, and it was granted by the Fuehrer. of April, 1942 , which shows that at that period of time I was 20 June A LJG 13-3 Williams still of the opinion that the German construction business, which had 1,800,000 workers, was to be inactivated to a large extent so that the necessary labor could be transferred to armament production.
In this rather fundamental speech, in which I also talked about labor commitments, a speech which I hold before my co-workers, not word is said about the planning of a foreign labor draft. then naturally I should have mentioned this fact in this speech of mine.
Finally, as far as Sauckel's testimony is concerned, the plan of the organization which was submitted here was not correct insofar as the various sectors which were mentioned as being divided into ministries were concerned. In reality these sectors were distributed according to the various economic branches, quite independent of the ministry. They coincided with my sphere of work only in my ministry and in the Air Ministry. of economy, construction was represented. That industry belonged in my jurisdiction; and beginning with 1943 , chemistry and mining, both of which are mentioned in the Ministry of Economy, belonged in my sphere of jurisdiction. According to my knowledge, already, prior to September of 1943 , these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan, and, quite independent of the Ministry of Economy, had put their demands to Sauckel direct. those workers went directly to Hitler. It would have been quite impossible for Hitler to have this quarrel between 15 men settled. As I have already said, this matter was dealt with in the Stabsleiter conferences.
Q Mr. Speer, at the end of the war, what did you do with your documents?
20 June A LJG 13-4 Williams that during reconversion the necessary measures could be taken. I refused to have the matters looked up. Nurnberg was one of my branch archives. They were well kept here, and they were turned over to the Allies in good condition. I turned them over at the time when I was still at liberty in the Flensburg Zone. In this way, the prosecution is in posession of various documents, about a thousand of them; three Stabsleiter speeches, all public speeches, speeches which applied, to armament; about 4,000 Fuehrer decrees, 5,000 pages of stenographic records of the Central Planning board, memoranda, and so forth. it can be seen unambiguously how far and how largely my task was an economic one and a technical one. you over make statements of an ideological nature such as antiSemitism, or other problems?
A No; nor in memoranda did I ever say anything like that. I assumed that otherwise the prosecution would have been in a position to present these matters to no.
Q Mr. Speer, as armament minister, you were also mentioned on the list of the new government which the men carrying out the Putsch had set up after the 2 0th of July. Did you participate in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July?
A No. Neither did I participate, nor had I been advised of this matter in advance. At that time I disapproved of an assassination attempt upon Hitler.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, at this point, there are interrogatories of the witness Kemp f in Point 9 and the witness S*ahl in Point 1 that concern themselves with this matter. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: the National Socialist regime placed on the list of the opposition? men who were of the General Staff of the army and the commanderin-chief of the Home Guard. Both staffs were the nucleus for 20 June A LJG 13-5 Williams the attempted assassination on the 20th of July.
the Home Guard, was particularly close, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the chief of the General Staff of the army. After the 20th of July, Fromm was hanged, and Zietzler was dismissed from the army.
From this collaboration a very close contact arose. Those circles knew of my technical achievements. At that time, I assumed that those were the technical reasons why they wanted to retain me.
A Not directly, certainly not. Of course, I was well known for *---* fact that for quite sometime I had disapproved the excesses which took place in the vicinity of Hitler and as I later found out, that I was in many ways in one opinion with the men of the 20th of July.
Q "What was your working connection with Hitler? as an architect was the closest phase of connection; then, because of war circumstances, this relationship decreased -- after I was appointed to be the successor of Todt, a closer but much more official working relationship was established rather. Because I had large demands in industry, I had very little time to go to headquarters because my time was taken up with armament matters; perhaps once in two or three weeks I was at the Fuehrer's headquarters The fact of my illness, which lasted for four months in the spring of 1944, was utilized and exploited by many people to weaken my position and after the 20th of July, the fact that I was a minister or that I was a nominee for the ministry, brought about a shock to the ministers on the part of Bormann and Goebbels and this fact was used for an open fight and the details for this may be seen from a letter which on the 20th of December 1944 was sent to Hitler and which has been submitted as a document.
Q Could you carry on political discussions with Hitler?
A No, he considered me purely a technical minister. Attempts to discuss political or personal problems with him were always fruitless and they were fruitless because of the fact that he was unapproachable. Beginning with 1944, as far as general conversations were concerned and conversations dealing with the general war situation, he was so adverse that I set them down myself in writing and handed them to him. Hitler was able to deal with every man as far as his own speciality was concerned. He was the only coordinating factor. This was something which exceeded his power and his knowledge; the consequence was the lack of the unified political leadership and there was the lack of a technical military decisive post. responsibility as to your sphere of work?
This war brought quite inconceivable catasrophe to the German people and it started a world catastrophe. Therefore, it is my duty, of course, to assume my place of responsibility before the German people This duty and obligation was mine--this is all the move my responsibility since the head of the government did not claim responsibility before the world. I, as an important member of the management of the leadership of the people, of the Reich, therefore will willingly assume my share of the responsibility, beginning with 1942, my arguments will be mentioned.
Q Would youassume responsibility of your extensive sphere of influence? to the principles which apply and was dealt with according to my directive.
Q Do you wish to refer to Fuehrer decrees in this connection?
A No. In so far as Hitler gave me the decrees and orders and I carried them through, I assumed the responsibility for them. Of course, I did not carry through all the orders which he gave me. DR. FLAESCHNER: Mr. President, now I am turning to a second part in my examination in chief. This presentation is not meant to exonerate the Defendant from those accusations which apply to his actual sphere of activity. This part, on the other hand, concerns itself with these accusations which the prosecution has raised against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint conspiracy. This second chapter is relatively brief and I assume that I shall be able to conclude this matter and conclude my entire examination in chief within an hour.
In this matter, we are concerned with Speer's activity as to the prevention of the destruction intentions on the part of Hitler in Germany and of the Occupied Countries and of the measures and attempts which had the intention to shorten the war which he assumed was already lost and I assume that the high Tribunal will quite agree to my presentation. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, up until what point did you use your entire strength and power for an armament program and for the continuation of the war?
Q Hadn't the war been lost before that? prior to that time; however, it is difficult to consider a war as lost and to draw the last personal consequences if only an unconditional surrender is the thing that you are faced with.
Q Wasn't there a consideration for the production situation--didn't that situation which you had to consider, didn't it force you to consider the war as lost long before this? I succeeded up until that time, despite bombing attacks, to bring about a constant rising production schedule. Just to mention one figure, in the year 1944, one hundred infantry divisions and forty armored divisions could be requipped by me completely and that was the new equipment for two million men. If it had been thirty percent higher--it would have been thirty percent higher if we had not had the bombing attacks. Our top achievements during the entire war took place in August of 1944, as far as munitions are concerned--in September 1944 for airplanes and in December of 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats; we reached our top production in those months, The new weapons, perhaps beginning with February, March of 1945, would have been put into use. I should like to refer to the jet planes, the new U-boats, and the new anti-aircraft installations and so forth. Of course, because of the bombing attacks, the mass production of these new weapons was retarded and perhaps in the last phases they might have changed the situation. Towards the end, we did not have sufficient numbers at our disposal. All of these attempts of ours were fruitless, since beginning with the 12th of May 1944, our aviation gasoline plants were heavily attacked from the air by the enemy and we had heavy losses after that time.
With the sucess of these attacks the war had been lost on the basis of technical considerations. The new weapons without gas were of no use to me at all. attacks and their effect on production; did you tell Hitler?
A Yes, I told him about this in detail, in writing, and orally. From June until December 1944, I sent twelve memoranda and all of them reported castastrophic news.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit the report which deals with a memorandum which speer sent in June of 1944. It is reproduced on page 56 of the document book and it shall be Exhibit 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer says and writes to Hitler; "But then perforce in September of this year the flow of the quantities necessary to cover the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot be guaranteed any more. which means that from that time on there will be an insurmountable gap which of course must lead to tragic consequences," lene, Speer informed Hitler in another memoranda, dated 30th of August, '44.
This may be found on Page 62 of the English text, and this will be exhibit No. 15. I should like to quote but one sentence: "And in this way, in important phases, those materials which are necessary for the products of maodern war are lacking." BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, how was it possible that you and the other co-workers of Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do everything possible to continue the war?
A In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. Through his man, Hewel, of the Foreign Office, beginning with summer of 1944, he had precise reports disseminated and he led us to believe that foreign political discussions had been started. This can be confirmed by Colonel General Jodl. In this way, the repeated presence of the Japanese ambassador with Hitler was interpreted in such a way that through Moscow we were carrying on conversations with Moscow, or the envoy, Neubacher, who has been here as a witness, allegedly in the Balkans, had initialed conversations with the united states, or the former Soviet Minister in Berlin allegedly was present in Stockholm in order to initiate and introduce conversations. In this way he spread the hope that, like Japan in this rather hopeless situation, conversations would be started so that the people would be saved from the very latest and worst and in this way it would be possible to stiffen resistance and make it as strong as possible. He deceived all of us inasmuch as he gave the military leaders false hopes in the way of diplomatic steps, and he promised the political leaders now victories through the use of now weapons and led them to believe that this could be expected. We told the people and the combat troops and systematically had the rumor spread of a new miracle weapon, so that resistance would be maintained.
I can prove, in the carrying through the policy of lying to the people and promising them a miracle weapon.
Q Mr. Speer, were there decrees for destruction of the industries in Belgium. Holland and France?
A Yes. In case of an occupation by the Allies, Hitler had planned a far reaching system of destruction of industries essential to war in all of these countries.
According to planned preparations, industries, mines and other installations were to have been destroyed. these orders?
Q And did you prevent them? West was responsible, since this decree was to be carried out in his operational zone. But I learned of it and told him that this destruction, as far as I was concerned, had no sense and no purpose, and that I, in my capacity as Armament Minister, did not consider this destruction essential. That is why the order to destroy was not given and therefore I had taken that responsibility against Hitler, that this destruction did not take place.
Q When was that?
Q How could you justify your position? would have to end in October or November, after the invasion had been a sucess. I personally had the same opinion, especially as it applied to gasoline. This may be seen from my memoranda which I sent to Hitler on the 30th of August, a document in which I told him that in view of this development with regard to gasolene, no operational actions on the part of the troops would be possible by October or November. The fact that the war did last longer than that may be traceable to a bogging down of the offensive on the part of the enemy in the fall of '44, In that way our need for gasolene could be met and the west front could be re-equipped with new weapons. In this situation I could answer for the fact that industries in the western countries would be left to the enemy undamaged, for at the outside, they could be of use to them after nine months. This step coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in the blocked industries a matter which I dealt with this morning.
Q Did Hitler agree with these measures? them. It was rather an exciting period of time in headquarters and he did not think of the fact that he should check on these measures dealing with destruction Later, in January of 1945, the Frenchmen reported in their press about the reconstruction of their undestroyed industries.
Then, of course, I had many and heavy accusations leveled against me.
Q The French prosecution has submitted a document, RF 132. This is a report of the Field Economic Office dealing with the Netherlands According to this report, in September of 1944 there still existed the decree of the Commander in Chief of the West that only in the coastel town destruction was to take place but nowhere else, and the officer who was competent for the Netherlands sets down, as may be seen from the document, that the order of the Commander in Chief of the West was obsolete and that he had decreed on his own initiative that the industries should be destroyed in Holland. How was this possible and what did you do at that time? decrees not to destroy in the western region were crushed and our instruments for carrying through orders had been destroyed through bombing attacks. SeyssInquart had told me of the fact that destruction was to take place in Holland, and he has already testified that I authorized him that this was not to take place. This was in December of 1944. So that this destruction could be prevented, on the 5th of September, 1944, on my own initiative, I told the managers of the coal and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in Luxwmbourg that destruction in the monet mines and Saar mines of Belgium and Holland and so forth, was to be prevented. At that time, in the face of the hopeless war situation, we went so far that the man who was responsible for electric current furnished current to the other side so that the pumping stations in the mines would not have to stop, because a stopping of these pumping stations would have caused a flooding of the mines.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a copy of a letter from Speer to the Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Speer Exhibit No. 16. It will be found on Page 57 of the English text in my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, as far as the other occupied countries were concerned, that is outside of France, Belgium and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent destruction?
the Government General, the ore works in the Balkans, the nickle works in Finland; beginning with September, 1944, the industrial installations in Upper Silesia; beginning with February, 1945, the oil fields in Hungary and the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this connection that, to a great extant, I had the support of Colonel General Jodl, who quietly tolerated this policy of non-destruction. the German population did Hitler have at the beginning of September, 1944, when hostile troops approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich?
A He had no intention at all to save industry. On the cotrary, he ordered especially as applying to Germany, the policy of the scorched earth, a nd that meant the ruthless destruction of all installations at the approach of the enemy. Behind this policy were Bormann, Ley and Goebbels, whereas the various branches of the Wehrmacht and the expert ministries opposed this policy of his.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Since there were efforts on the part of Speer to prevent those intentions to destroy, measures which had been intensified in those areas which were considered part of the German Reich, such as Upper Silesia, Austria Poland, the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part of my evidence. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, in the greater German Reich, in the areas that I have just delineated, did the Commanders in Chief of the Army have instructions for carrying out works of destruction?
A No. The executive powers for that, so far as industries were concerned, rested with no. As far as bridges and cocks were concerned, the responsibility rested with the Wehrmacht.
Q. In your measures for the protection of industry, did you differentiate between the areas of the so-called old Reich and the territories which were added after 1933?
A. No. The Polish and Upper Silesian industrial region, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia were protected against destruction in the same way as the German areas, and especially in the eastern territories. Through personal visits I took the necessary steps right then and there in the localities involved.
Q. What did you undertake against the scorched earth policy?
A. On the 14th of September 1944, I returned, having taken a trip to the West front, and on that day I found the decree that everything was to be destroyed ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counter-decree which officially prescribed the protection of industrial installations. to be destroyed in Germany, especially since the war situation was hopeless, and I was all the more excited because I believed that I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western countries from destruction.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a document which is a decree by Speer dated the 14th of September 1944, for it deals with the protection of industries. It may be found on page 48 of the English text of my document book. This will be Exhibit No. 17. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, could you carry through this order?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of it? The 14th of September, did you say?
DR. FLAECHSNER: The 14th of September, Mr. President, 1944.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is it?
DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 58 of the English text. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Could you carry through this order of yours, Mr. Speer?
A. At the same time, in the newspaper Der Voelkischer Beobachter, through an official article by the Reich Press Chief, the scorched earth policy was publicly proclaimed, so it was quite clear to me that my counter-decree could not have any effect for any length of time.
Hitler's circle. In order to dissuade him from the scorched earth policy, I used the tool of the faith which the people had that the territories which had been lost would be recaptured. I told him that if these industrial areas would be lost, a third of my potential would be lost; therefore we would have to recapture them, and if they were recaptured they would be of value only i they were intact and not destroyed by us.
Q. Therefore you addressed a letter to Bormann.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit No. 18, Mr. President. It will be found on page 59 of the English text of my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Did you send this teletype message to Bormann before you discussed the contents with Hitler?
A. Yes. I should like to summarize -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Would you give the French page as well so that the French members may have it.
DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 56 of the French text of the document book.
A. (Continuing): Hitler approved of the text which I submitted to him, and I suggested the alternatives, either to consider the war as lost, or to have the areas remain intact. The destruction of the Monet mines was demanded with much emphasis by Hitler, but in this case I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing the destruction of these mines through the fact that I turned Hitler's hopes to victory.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant just referred is an extract from the Fuehrer decree of the 18th of August 1944 and I should like to submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 19. It is reproduced in the supplementary volune of my document book on page 101. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, how did this originate?
A. I have already told you about that.
Q. In your letters we repeatedly find the concept of paralyzing, laehmen, and this concept is mentioned in connection with industrial installations. Will you tell the Tribunal just what you mean by this term "paralyzing".
A. I can say but briefly that we were concerned with the taking out of some special parts by which the works might be put out of commission temporarily, but these parts were not destroyed; they were just concealed.
Q. Just a little while ago you emphasized that up until January 1945 you tried to bring about armament to the highest possible degree. What were your reasons for the fact that after January 1945 you gave up these ideas?
A. From January of 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter began. We were entering the last phase of this war, and to realize that Hitler was identifying the fate of the German people with his own, and beginning with March of 1945 there was the realization that Hitler was deliberately trying to destroy the means of life for the people in view of the fact that the war was lost. but this is a matter of honor which I have to defend, and that is the reason why I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.
Q. Mr. Speer, what was the production situation in the various areas which were under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?
A. The fuel production, since the beginning of the attacks on the fuel plants in May 1944, was quite inadequate and the situation did not recover or improve. The bombing attacks on our transportation centers, beginning with November 1944, had eliminated the Ruhr area as a center of German raw material and with the successful offensive of the Soviet armies on thecoal areas of Upper Silesia, beginning with the middle of January 1945 the largest supply of coal was cut off from that region. would have to collapse, and at that point the situation would have been reached at which even if there were a complete cessation of operations on the part of the enemy, the war would be lost in a short time, for the Reich, because of its deficiency of coal and other things, would have to collapse economically of its own accord.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to quote a memorandum which Hitler received from Speer on the 11th of December 1944. Mr. President, you will find an extract on page 64 of the English text and page 61 of the German and French texts. It states -- and I quote:
"According to the whole structure of the Reich economy it is obvious that a failure of the territory of the Rheinish Westphalian industry in the long run will be unbearable for the whole German economy and the successful continuation of the war. In fact, at present, the Ruhr territory, with the exception of the products manufactured within the sector, is a total loss for the German economy.
"it is not necessary to discuss the consequences for the whole German Reich which will result from a long deprivation of the Ruhr territory." Hitler pointed out in detail the consequences of the possible loss of Upper Silesia, and in this connection I should like to submit a memorandum written by Speer which may be found on page 102 of the supplementary volume of my document book in the English text, and at page 101 in the French text. This is on extract from a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, dated the 15th of December 1944, and will have Exhibit number 21. This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.
I shall not need to quote from this extract. It is proved here that the possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting impossible even after a few months. A large part of Upper Silesia was lost in actuality shortly thereafter. which will be found on page 67 of the English text of the document book. It is page 64 in the French text. This document will be Exhibit No. 22, and I should like to quote from it:
"After the loss of Upper Silesia, German armament will not be in a position to cover even partially the requirements of the front in munitions, weapons and tanks, the losses on the front and the need for replacements."
Then there follows, as special emphasis, the sentence -- and I quote:
"The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers." BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, what did you mean to say by this last sentence which I quoted?
A. At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in the defense of the home country, the bravery of the soldiers would be increased tremendously, and that vice versa, the allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied territories, would have a lessened will to fight. That was the chief argument used by Goebbels and Bormann as well, since they wanted to intensify war at all costs and by all means.
Q. Mr. Speer, was Hitler advised from other sources as well as by yourself?
A. I shall summarize several points in this connection. Guderian, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to Hitler, and Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of February that the making of statements of that sort, that is, by memorandum or anything like that, would be considered as high treason and would be punished accordingly. Later, in a situation report, he prohibited any close collaborators from making any statements about the complete hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who violated that, without regard for his position or rank, would be shot and his family would be arrested. hopelessness of the war situation had an unexpected result. In fact, nothing was expected because in the first days of February, just a few days before the beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler had his press expert come to his office and in my presence told him to say, in the most drastic manner through the German press, "Never capitulate". At that time he declared that he was doing this so that in no event would the German people receive any offer from the enemy, and the language used would, have to be so strong that the enemy statesmen would not even want to try to separate the people.