laborers from occupied territories in Germany?
A No. I shall have to tell you openly that I did use my influence to reduce the recruitment of laborers or to stop measures of foce and raids but I did not use it to stop the employment of labor completely. Can you explain to the Tribunal the organization Todt?
A Here again I shall summarize somewhat. The organization Todt only had technical tasks, that is to say they had to carry out technical construction work in the east, particularly road construction and rail construction, and in the west the construction of concrete shelters such as we used in the so-called Atlantic Wall. for this purpose the organization Todt used, to an a considerable degree, foreign workers. In the west there were about twenty foreigners to one German worker. In Russia there were about four foreigners, four Russians, to one German. This could only be carried out if the organization Todt in the west could use local builders and their staffs to a considerable extent and if they supplied the technicians and technical leaders. These firms recruited their own workers and it is clear that these firms had no possibility of recruiting by force. working for The Todt organization were volunteers. But it is also clear that a certain percentage were working in the Todt organization under the calling-up system. forces and it is merely necessary to state in this connection that foreign workers did not, of course, come under it but that only German workers were part of it in that respect, and who, of course, in occupied territories had to become members of the armed forces in some way or other. Of course, the Prosecution had a different view of this. ached to my ministry who were working in occupied territories and it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were principally and always recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution have alleged that the organization Todt was the all-inclusive organization for all military construction work in the occupied territories and that is not the case.
They had from one quarter to one fifth of the building program as their task. Todt was being made responsible for so large a scale a construction program and the management of the apparatus by the General Plenipotentiary in the Four Year Plan for building occurred. This Plenipotentiary for building was responsible for the tasks he received from the Central Planning Board and he was responsible for the general direction but he was not responsible for the carrying out and supervision of the actual building. Through this the authority was in the Reich and in particular the SS building administration was acting on their own initiative and responsibility in connection with the building program which they were carrying out. of concentration camp inmates in German armament industry and that is document RF 24, US Exhibit 179, which was submitted to the Tribunal.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this document is on page 47 of the English text in my document book. It is a conference with Hitler in 1942. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q How did that conference come about Mr. Speer? increases everywhere; amongst them the necessity for certain construction of new factories. In this connection Himmler was offering his concentration camps, both to Hitler and myself. It was his plan that within the concentration camps some of these necessary new constructions should be erected, together with the necessary machinery, under the supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the armed forces, Colonel General Fromm was against this plan and so was I. Apart from general reasons, there was the point that uncontrolled production on the part of the SS should be prevented. Secondly, no had to expect that the techinal supervision in these firms would be removed from my jurisdiction. For that reason, when planning the extention program of armament in the spring of 1942. I did not take into consideration these demands by the SS at all.
Himmler went to Hitler and the minutes of this conference, which is available here, is the defense against the wishes which Hitler pronounced following Himmler's proposal.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw your attention to page 44 of the German text, which is page 45 of the English text. It is point 36 of a Fuehrer protocol.
THE PRESIDENT: It is page 47 of the English text.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, that is correct.
There it says, and I quote:
"Beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to organize armament production in the concentration camps."
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has just given us the substance of it, has he not?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, according to this document you were proposing that factories should be staffed entirely by internees from concentration camps. Did you carry that out? that it was Himmler's intention to influence those businesses and in some way or other no would, no doubt, have succeeded in getting jurisdiction over these firms entirely. For that reason, in principle, only a part of the firm or the staff would consist of internees from concentration camps so as work against Himmler's aims. Thus, the labor camps came about that were attached to the armament firms. The participation of five to eight percent in arms and armament production which had been planned was something that was never handed over to Himmler and was duo to an agreement with the general of the Army Staff in the OKW, General Buhle.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In that case may I draw your attention to page 48 of the English text in my document book which is document 1584-PS. It is U.S. Exhibit it 221. It is a letter from Himmler to Goering,dated 9 March, 1944 and there it says that Himmler is emphasizing that if the possibility of the SS would be extended then there would be a speeding up and an increase in the results from those firms.
The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows that there is the aim to supervise and control the employment of concentration camp inmates and that the SS is even to be used as the responsible work leader which was to be proposed. The increased employment internees in the firms would, according to his experience and knowledge, not be sufficient and the SS wished therefore to supervise and control the employment of these people in those firms.
This document shows something else, however; namely it confirms the testimony of the defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps were also paid premiums if they proved themselves particularly useful. detainees 240 hours per month, which corresponds to sixty hours per week. it is number 44 and has already been submitted by no as Exhibit number 6 and it is in the second volume of my document book. It is on page 88. Mr. President, it is the first document in the appendix volume.
firms was a matter of Himmler's and Pohl's ambition. The document also makes clear, and I quote:
"The working hours contributed by concentration camp inmates monthly did not amount to even 8,000,000 hours, so that most certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from concentration camps can be working in our armaments establishments. This amount is constantly diminishing."
Mr. President, this sentence is on page 90, at the bottom. hours with reference to output as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, through this letter you had knowledge of the fact that workers, particularly foreigners, were not returning to their old places of work after they had come in contact with the police for certain acts but that they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take? I received the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin during my illness, and its contents upset me a great deal because, after all, this is nothing other than kidnapping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the number of people who would be removed from the economic system in this manner. 1944, and I demanded that the workers, even if they were taken east, should nevertheless be returned to their own firms at once. This remark, as such, is not logical, because, naturally, the number of crimes in the individual firms was very low, so that such a measure was not practical, but what I wished to express through it in any case was that the workers would have to go back to their own places of work. This statement from the Central Planning Board has been submitted by the Prosecution. to see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944, and the minutes of the conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for any such thing, and I cited many reasons of being reasonable, since any other arguments would not have been effective. Hitler stated to me, as the record shows, that the workers would at once have to be returned to their old professions, and after a conference between Hitler and Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision of his to Himmler.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I submit Exhibit 13, which is extracts from the Fuehrer conference of 5 June 1944, which you will find on page 92.
THE WITNESS: Immediately after the results of the conference were clear, I went to see Himmler and communicated to him Hitler's decision. He told me that no such number had ever been arrested by the police but he told me that he would immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler's demands; namely that these workers would no longer be detained by the SS. that he should once again get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to distrust Himmler's statement because, after all, it is not customary for Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much, but I did not have any further complaints from my associates in this respect, and I must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my affair but that the information appeared so incredible to me that I decided to intervene at once. similar action, and that in this letter -- a letter which has been submitted here -
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is document 1063-PS, and it is USA Exhibit 219. I have reproduced it on page 51 of the English text of my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now referring. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: from concentration camps?
A Wait a minute. I should like to say something about the document. that he would correctly obey his order upon Hitler's instructions because this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept a secret. Only the Plenipotentiary for Labor and my own service department could receive this order.
duty to interest myself as Armaments Minister in the use of any workers who were available for war production and armaments. I considered it proper that workers from concentration camps should also work in war production or armament industries. the number of concentration comp detainees or that I caused their employment is by no means correct. I was interested in just the opposite from the point of view of the production in which I was interested.
DR. FLAECHSNER: May I remark in this connection that I have asked the witness Schmelte under Nos. 9 and 35 in the interrogatory which were submitted to him, and the question was put to the witness Schieber under No.20; BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, No.124, US Exhibit 179 was submitted by the Prosecution. It contains several remarks which you have made during the meetings of the Central Planning Board.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to page 53 of the English text of my document book.
BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, what do you want to say about your remark concerning idlers in the meeting of 30 October 1942?
A The record reproduces my remark the way I made it. I had an opportunity to read through the shorthand notes of the Central Planning Board, and I discovered that nothing was done after I made this remark. No measures were demanded from me after it.
DR. FLAECHSNER: On the same page, Mr. President, there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark Regarding Russian prisoners of war?
A It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that the conception of armaments must be understood in the way which I have explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians who were employed in armaments, according to this document, were iron, stool and metal industries with 29,000, and machine and boiler construction with 63,000.
Q Mr. Speer, there has also been mention of the statement made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on page 53 of the English text of the document book. There you said that, in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer, the foreign volunteers groups should be dissolved and that there should be a transfer of these Russians. explained briefly. The HIBIS mentioned in the document are the so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in Russia. As the months wont by, they had grown to a tremendous number, and during the retreat they followed along since their own countries would probably have treated them as traitors. These volunteers were however not, as was my wish, handed over to the production program, since the conference which was planned did not take place.
Q Will you please say something briefly about PS 556? It is the note from Sauckel about a telephone call on 4 January 1943, which also refers to the labor employment program.
in France, which would also increase the number of workers. Minutes from the Fuehrer which I found during recent days, namely, those of the meeting of January 3 to 5, 1943, show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for the local industry and economy.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to prepare it.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long youare goint to be, Dr. Flaechsner?
DR. FLAECHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be through before five o'clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been adducing up to date?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 20 June 1946) BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, this morning we left off with a discussion of your telephone notice regarding the matter of Sauckel and labor commitments, the date of this document being the 4th of January 1943. As you have already stated, the Fuehrer protocol, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later on, is concerned with this matter. were at that time? taken so that the economy in France would be raised to a higher level. Rather sharp remarks were made by Hitler concerning the methods that he contemplated in this regard. It is stated that every act of sabotage would be prosecuted with the sharpest means and measures, and that humanitarian motives would not be tolerated here. the management of production matters to me, a step which was actually carried out several months later. can speak in my own behalf -- only to show that this plan of Hitler not to regard humanitarian motives was a policy of Hitler's that I did not carry through. because they carried on acts of sabotage against industry in the Northern Moselle Sector. At that time I was successful in bringing about the fact that the shooting was not carried through. Roechling, who at that time regulated iron production in the Western regions, is my witness in this case. That is the only case about which I was informed that, because of sabotage in production, hostages were to be shot. France -- through a decision by Hitler dated September 1943 -- I was responsible for furnishing an additional meal to the workers in these plants; I was responsible for the extra food rationing.
Then, in a letter addressed to the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, dated December 1943, I took a decided view and attitude that the workers in the occupied Western countries should not only receive wages, but that besides wages consumer goods should be put at their disposal. This was a policy which is quite contrary to the plundering and pillaging of the Western Regions, an accusation which the French prosecution has made about me.
These three documents are in my possession and they may be submitted; they are available. the records of the 3rd to the 5th of January, the policy of acting very harshly in France, was not endorsed by me and was not observed by me.
Mr. Speer, what did you have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?
A We have already discussed this -- no armament goods; only consumer goods. 1944, in which you allegedly discussed the proposal by the Reichsmarshal to put prisoners of war at the disposal of the SS. Can you comment on that?
A This record dates back to the 3rd of March, 1944. From January until May of 1944 I was seriously ill, and I did not take part in this discussion; one of my co-workers was in charge of this discussion. He was a man who had the confidence of Hitler. Apart from that, this proposal was not carried through anyway.
Q Mr. Speer, the session of the 30th of May was one that you did attend, on which occasion the question was discussed as to how the establishment of the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower was brought about. Will you tell us briefly just what you knew about this question? as they applied to armament production. My concern in the commitment problem, at the beginning of my assuming office, was chiefly concerned with the Gauleiters who carried on a policy of Gau particularism, and the non-political offices of the Work Ministry could not proceed against the Gauleiters.
Therefore, recruiting or labor commitment had been frozen in Germany, and I suggested to Hitler that for this delegate a man whom I knew, Gauleiter Hancke, should be chosen. Goering has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed to this proposal of mine. I did not know Sauckel, but I quite agreed to the selection, however. It is quite possible that Sauckel did not anything about this incident, that he can say he did not know anything about it, and that he can say he was chosen on my suggestion. Lammers declared that he could not issue authority for a special sector of labor commitment, that there would be misgivings on an administrative basis, and, in that way, the entire commitment problem would have to be subordinated to a plenipotentiary. They contemplated, first of all, a Fuehrer decree. Goering protested, since he thought it was a task which belonged to the Four Year Plan. Therefore, a compromise was reached whereby Sauckel was to be the General Plenipotentiary within the Four Year Plan, but that he would be appointed by Hitler.
P lan. In that way, Sauckel was in effect a subordinate of Hitler's, and Sauckel also looked upon it in that way. 30th of M ay, said that Goering participated in this meeting of the Control Planning Board. Is that true?
A No, that does not apply at all. It is not true. I would not have known what to do with him, for, after all, we had to carry out practical work. Sauckel on the 8th of October, 1945, according to which the arrangement of his delegates was supposed to have been caused by you. Is that true?
A N o. In 1941 I had nothing to do with armament, and even later, during the period of Sauckel's activity, I did not employ these delegates and plenipotentiaries. That was a matter which Sauckel handled; it was in his jurisdiction. testimony of Sauckel on the 27th of September, 1945, and they quoted from this record that you gave a special order to have trains put at the disposal of those responsible for the transporting of workers. by Sauckel as far as they apply to me and give my answer. taken by Sauckel and his co workers. It may be that through a sudden change in the production program or, in effect, on the request of my office, trains were changed. However, the responsibility for that always rested with the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower. Sauckel testified here and said after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war" theory. But that is not quite true. Stalingrad took place in J anuary of 1943, and Goebbels started on his program of total war in August of 1944 .
20 June A LJG 13-2 Williams reform program which was to give us more workers. I was one who endorsed the program. Neither Goebbels now I, however, could carry this plan. set up. But this task could not be carried out by these three men, because they lacked the technical background.
Then the labor commitment department was mentioned. This consisted of the following. L arge industry and labor had a manager, and its branches, which were centralized in my office. But this was not something which hurt Sauckel's interest. They had no special sphere of interest. This may be shown from the fact that this was one of the 50 to 60 departments in my office. If it had been very important, it would have been one of my six or eight special branches. session which took place in his office was representative of my office, which took place for army and naval armament and for construction work. In these meetings, there were about fifteen people who were responsible for labor commitments, and in these discussions the urgency of supplies and workers was dealt with. Sauckel, of course, had an overall picture of the economic setup. That was the activity which erroneously is ascribed to the Central Planning Board. foreign workers to Germany in April of 1942 was done on my initiative, that I had demanded this step, and that I was responsible for the fact that the foreign workers were transported to Germany at all. That, however, is not true. In that way, I reall would not have had to use any influence on Sauckel; and apart from that, from a Fuehrer decree of the 4th of May, 1943,.a document which is in my possession, it may be seen that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region took place at the suggestion of Sauckel, and it was granted by the Fuehrer. of April, 1942 , which shows that at that period of time I was 20 June A LJG 13-3 Williams still of the opinion that the German construction business, which had 1,800,000 workers, was to be inactivated to a large extent so that the necessary labor could be transferred to armament production.
In this rather fundamental speech, in which I also talked about labor commitments, a speech which I hold before my co-workers, not word is said about the planning of a foreign labor draft. then naturally I should have mentioned this fact in this speech of mine.
Finally, as far as Sauckel's testimony is concerned, the plan of the organization which was submitted here was not correct insofar as the various sectors which were mentioned as being divided into ministries were concerned. In reality these sectors were distributed according to the various economic branches, quite independent of the ministry. They coincided with my sphere of work only in my ministry and in the Air Ministry. of economy, construction was represented. That industry belonged in my jurisdiction; and beginning with 1943 , chemistry and mining, both of which are mentioned in the Ministry of Economy, belonged in my sphere of jurisdiction. According to my knowledge, already, prior to September of 1943 , these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan, and, quite independent of the Ministry of Economy, had put their demands to Sauckel direct. those workers went directly to Hitler. It would have been quite impossible for Hitler to have this quarrel between 15 men settled. As I have already said, this matter was dealt with in the Stabsleiter conferences.
Q Mr. Speer, at the end of the war, what did you do with your documents?
20 June A LJG 13-4 Williams that during reconversion the necessary measures could be taken. I refused to have the matters looked up. Nurnberg was one of my branch archives. They were well kept here, and they were turned over to the Allies in good condition. I turned them over at the time when I was still at liberty in the Flensburg Zone. In this way, the prosecution is in posession of various documents, about a thousand of them; three Stabsleiter speeches, all public speeches, speeches which applied, to armament; about 4,000 Fuehrer decrees, 5,000 pages of stenographic records of the Central Planning board, memoranda, and so forth. it can be seen unambiguously how far and how largely my task was an economic one and a technical one. you over make statements of an ideological nature such as antiSemitism, or other problems?
A No; nor in memoranda did I ever say anything like that. I assumed that otherwise the prosecution would have been in a position to present these matters to no.
Q Mr. Speer, as armament minister, you were also mentioned on the list of the new government which the men carrying out the Putsch had set up after the 2 0th of July. Did you participate in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July?
A No. Neither did I participate, nor had I been advised of this matter in advance. At that time I disapproved of an assassination attempt upon Hitler.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, at this point, there are interrogatories of the witness Kemp f in Point 9 and the witness S*ahl in Point 1 that concern themselves with this matter. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: the National Socialist regime placed on the list of the opposition? men who were of the General Staff of the army and the commanderin-chief of the Home Guard. Both staffs were the nucleus for 20 June A LJG 13-5 Williams the attempted assassination on the 20th of July.
the Home Guard, was particularly close, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the chief of the General Staff of the army. After the 20th of July, Fromm was hanged, and Zietzler was dismissed from the army.
From this collaboration a very close contact arose. Those circles knew of my technical achievements. At that time, I assumed that those were the technical reasons why they wanted to retain me.
A Not directly, certainly not. Of course, I was well known for *---* fact that for quite sometime I had disapproved the excesses which took place in the vicinity of Hitler and as I later found out, that I was in many ways in one opinion with the men of the 20th of July.
Q "What was your working connection with Hitler? as an architect was the closest phase of connection; then, because of war circumstances, this relationship decreased -- after I was appointed to be the successor of Todt, a closer but much more official working relationship was established rather. Because I had large demands in industry, I had very little time to go to headquarters because my time was taken up with armament matters; perhaps once in two or three weeks I was at the Fuehrer's headquarters The fact of my illness, which lasted for four months in the spring of 1944, was utilized and exploited by many people to weaken my position and after the 20th of July, the fact that I was a minister or that I was a nominee for the ministry, brought about a shock to the ministers on the part of Bormann and Goebbels and this fact was used for an open fight and the details for this may be seen from a letter which on the 20th of December 1944 was sent to Hitler and which has been submitted as a document.
Q Could you carry on political discussions with Hitler?
A No, he considered me purely a technical minister. Attempts to discuss political or personal problems with him were always fruitless and they were fruitless because of the fact that he was unapproachable. Beginning with 1944, as far as general conversations were concerned and conversations dealing with the general war situation, he was so adverse that I set them down myself in writing and handed them to him. Hitler was able to deal with every man as far as his own speciality was concerned. He was the only coordinating factor. This was something which exceeded his power and his knowledge; the consequence was the lack of the unified political leadership and there was the lack of a technical military decisive post. responsibility as to your sphere of work?
This war brought quite inconceivable catasrophe to the German people and it started a world catastrophe. Therefore, it is my duty, of course, to assume my place of responsibility before the German people This duty and obligation was mine--this is all the move my responsibility since the head of the government did not claim responsibility before the world. I, as an important member of the management of the leadership of the people, of the Reich, therefore will willingly assume my share of the responsibility, beginning with 1942, my arguments will be mentioned.
Q Would youassume responsibility of your extensive sphere of influence? to the principles which apply and was dealt with according to my directive.
Q Do you wish to refer to Fuehrer decrees in this connection?
A No. In so far as Hitler gave me the decrees and orders and I carried them through, I assumed the responsibility for them. Of course, I did not carry through all the orders which he gave me. DR. FLAESCHNER: Mr. President, now I am turning to a second part in my examination in chief. This presentation is not meant to exonerate the Defendant from those accusations which apply to his actual sphere of activity. This part, on the other hand, concerns itself with these accusations which the prosecution has raised against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint conspiracy. This second chapter is relatively brief and I assume that I shall be able to conclude this matter and conclude my entire examination in chief within an hour.
In this matter, we are concerned with Speer's activity as to the prevention of the destruction intentions on the part of Hitler in Germany and of the Occupied Countries and of the measures and attempts which had the intention to shorten the war which he assumed was already lost and I assume that the high Tribunal will quite agree to my presentation. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, up until what point did you use your entire strength and power for an armament program and for the continuation of the war?
Q Hadn't the war been lost before that? prior to that time; however, it is difficult to consider a war as lost and to draw the last personal consequences if only an unconditional surrender is the thing that you are faced with.
Q Wasn't there a consideration for the production situation--didn't that situation which you had to consider, didn't it force you to consider the war as lost long before this? I succeeded up until that time, despite bombing attacks, to bring about a constant rising production schedule. Just to mention one figure, in the year 1944, one hundred infantry divisions and forty armored divisions could be requipped by me completely and that was the new equipment for two million men. If it had been thirty percent higher--it would have been thirty percent higher if we had not had the bombing attacks. Our top achievements during the entire war took place in August of 1944, as far as munitions are concerned--in September 1944 for airplanes and in December of 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats; we reached our top production in those months, The new weapons, perhaps beginning with February, March of 1945, would have been put into use. I should like to refer to the jet planes, the new U-boats, and the new anti-aircraft installations and so forth. Of course, because of the bombing attacks, the mass production of these new weapons was retarded and perhaps in the last phases they might have changed the situation. Towards the end, we did not have sufficient numbers at our disposal. All of these attempts of ours were fruitless, since beginning with the 12th of May 1944, our aviation gasoline plants were heavily attacked from the air by the enemy and we had heavy losses after that time.