BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, which consequences arose for the labor program between Germany and France ? recruiting of labor came to a complete end.
DR. FLAECHSNER: About the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and the tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to carry out this principle, I shall speak later on the strength of documents. At this moment I shall, therefore, discontinue the question on the subject and I shall confine myself to this. From the official French document, RF 22, which is on page 20 of the English text of my document book, page 17 of the German and French text, I shall quote. In this report it says and I quote : "Finally a real hostility started between Sauckel and Speer who was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the occupied territories..." and then a few lines later : "The superiority of the first mentioned over the latter which made itself felt more and more during the last seven months of the occupation made the resistance against the removal much easier." This text shows that with the first mentioned and the military commander---
THE PRESIDENT : That is all cumulative; you have proved it three or four times already.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Very well, I shall not continue with it.
Q Only to rectify a mistake, Mr. Speer, I want to ask you about the document, that you had something to do with the organizing for forced labor with Frenchmen; is that true ?
Q You have already hinted that this program of transfer of goods wasn't only confined to France. Will you tell me to which other countries that also applied ?
A I shall summarize right away the following questions : The program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, where all the entire production was also declared block, and these blocked firms were given the same protection regarding labor as had been given in France, After the meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January 1944, during which the new program for 1945 for the West was agreed upon, I adhered to this policy and the result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany compared with five hundred thousand which had been planned during that conference and in other countries, too, only about ten percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.
Q How about the figures applying to workers from the Protectorate ? cution. It is on page 23 of the English text of my document book and it is a report from Sauckel, dated December 1942; also, there is a document 1290-PS, on page 24 of the English text which has also been submitted and these document appear to show that according to assertions of Sauckel's from the beginning of his activities until March 1943, there was an excess of laborers, of workers. is that true ?
Document 16 PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 168, which is on Page 25 of the English text of my document book, also shows that Sauckel was not in favor of using German women in the armament industry, but in the summer of '42 several hundred thousand Ukranian girls were placed at the disposal of German householders. Ministry, was not responsible for the total figure of workers coming into Germany.
I should also like to present a do document under No. 02, Exhibit No. 8. Mr President, it is given the number 02 in the document book and it is on Page 2* of the English. It refers to a meeting of the Central Planning Board.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.
DR. FLAECHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit No. 8?
THE PRESIDENT: What about No. 4? Oh, that is already in. Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall certainly do that.
I should like to quote -- this is a remark made by Speer: "In this connection, it is necessary that we should get new German workers, unskilled labor, into the firm because I can not replace by foreigners the number which we have to give up as soldiers. The German supply becomes simply too scanty. In shell production there is now already one burst barrel after another and we do not know what is the cause. Cases of sabotage may be taking place. The measures which will have to be taken in order to switch at least one million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard and will, in my view, practically depress the whole living standard of the upper classes. This, therefore, means that we, roughtly speaking, are going to become proletarians for the duration of the war if it will last long. This matter has to be con sidered cooly and soberly.
There is, therefore, no other way out."
This view of Speer, namely, of exploiting the workers' reserve within Germany to a larger degree, was not realized until the summer of 1944. There was an argument between Speer on one side and Sauckel and Gauleiters on the other. About this, the testimony of the witnesses in the interrogatories will speak. To assist the Tribunal, I should like to draw your attention to Schieber, question and answer 22; Roland's, it is question 2; Kerrl, it is No. 9; and in the case of Schmelte it is questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I can not give you the page numbers of the English book, Mr. President, because I haven't seen them yet.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the interrogatories which have been filled in are in the supplement volume of my document book and which I hope is now in the hands of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes it is.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to reserve the right to submit those documents at the end of my examination in total. I am only taking the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses are referring to it. About the different opinions presented by Sauckel and Speer, we are informed, through a conference of Speer, during a meeting of the Central Planning Board on the 21st of December, 1943 -- this is on Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my Exhibit No. 9 -- quote: -- "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, I thought. I had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency of inefficiency of these plans.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President. BY DR: FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, there is an important document submitted by the prosecution It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January, 1944. I has been submitted as 1292 PS, USA Exhibit 225, Page 28 of the English text of my document book. How did the meeting come about?
A. It was called by request of Hitler.
Q. For what reason?
A. To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.
Q. And what was Hitler's decision?
A. His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked firms were to be maintained, and Sauckel had the order given to himself that for this purpose three and a half million workers should be obtained from occupied territories. In this connection, Hitler gave severe instruction to OKW, the military commanders, and they were that Sauckel request should be met with every means.
Q. Did you agree to this decision?
A. No, not at all, because I had heard that the program of removal which I had drafted to the west had collapsed.
Q. And what action did you take after that?
A. Contrary to the Fuehrer's decision during that meeting, I informed the Military Commander in Paris, General Studt, in connection with the order from the OKW military commanders which was expected, that the two interpretations of the meeting would be on his desk. Since the Military Commander was agreeable to my interpretation, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document which is or Page 29 of the English text of my document book, Page 26 of the German and French text. This is a telephonic message from Speer to General Studt in Paris. It will be Exhibit No. 10. Two things appear from this letter. One, and I quote: "Gauleiter Sauckel will for the time being start negotiations with the appropriate agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in order to clear up the manner and possibility of the execution --"
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flaechsner?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the prosecution has referred to this document, 1292 PS, and they have attempted to prove with it -
THE PRESIDENT: He has told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. This document will show the reaction on the part of the Defendant, namely, what he has done so that Hitler's decision, as such, would be contravened or at least weakened.
In this letter the Defendant says to General Studt -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest possible indication of the view which they take about these matters of different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why don't you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other part of it?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as to put his point of view into practice. This isn't referring to -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just now, the Defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all out to us again.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book, page 27 of the German and French text. Here we are concerned with a letter from Speer to Sauckel, dated January the 6th, 1944, and it is ascertained in this letter that for the firms working in the French industries 400,000 workers, plus 400,000 future workers, should be reserved erring the following months which, therefore, would be removed from possible deportation.
Which results did these two letters have, Mr. Speer, with reference to Hitler's order that one million workers should be obtained from France and taken to Germany ?
A. I should like to summarize the entire subject and say few words about it. We had a system of dealing with uncomfortable orders from Hitler and how they could be got around. Jodl has already said in his testimony that he used that technique. Of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only recognizable to the connoisseur, the expert, regarding what they mean and which results they would have to have.
The document which is being presented now, from Sauckel's speech on the first of March 1944, also shows how these results become apparent in the labor program. The result is clear and I have already described: it here, and I think we can therefore pass to page no. 49. That is, of course page 49 in our book.
Q. Mr. Speer, can you explain to me the situation regarding the results of air attacks on the traffic system in the occupied western territories ?
A. yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few questions. traffic not in the occupied western territories, and the result of that was that beginning in May and June 1944, production in France was paralyzed one million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of removing production had collapsed as far as I was concerned, and after normal expectations of the departments in France, one was now under the impression that there would be a large air action towards Germany. try, the restricted or blocked firms should be kept up, although I knew as an expert that their restarting, considering the damage to the traffic net, wouldn't be possible in less than nine to twelve months even if the air attacks should cease. In this connection, therefore, I was acting against my own interests. quotes the corresponding passages in the document book.
I obtained a decision, according to which the workers in the occupied territories should, in spite of the difficulties of transport, remain on the spot whatever happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar decision was applied to Holland. Upon my orders, the workers in these blocked firms were even paid their wages.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection I submit Speer Exhibit No. 12. It is an extract from the Fuehrer conference from the 19th to the 22nd of June 1944, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is on page 22 of the English text of my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that with this decision which you made, at least one million workers would be unproductive for a lengthy period, that is to say, in all the western territories. How could you justify such a decision ?
A. I shall have to say quite openly that this was my first decision which had its inner justification in the war situation which had progressed catastrophically. The invasion had succeeded. The heavy air attacks on production were bringing decisive collapses, and with that an early end of the war had to foreseen. This was the cause of my realization that there was a new situation and the consequences I drew from this new situation will become apparent through various other examples which I shall bring up in the course of the trial. He believed to the contrary, that everything ought to be done in order to utilize even the last strength.
Q. Will you please describe briefly your attitude towards the meeting of the 11th of July 1944, which we have already referred to once before. This is Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.
A. During this meeting of the 11th of July, I maintained my point of view. It becomes apparent from the minutes that I announced the decision that the transport difficulties should not be allowed to influence production, and that therefore the blocked firms in these territories and I were perfectly aware of the fact that with this, the known results for these clocked firms would also be maintained, that is, the stopping of employment from occupied territories and transfer of it to Germany.
Q. The French Prosecution have presented a document No. 823. They presented it during the session of the 30th of May, if I remember correctly. It came up during the cross examination of co-defendant Sauckel. Please, will you briefly state your views on that. So as to refresh your memory, I want to say that in this telegram there is a reference to the meeting of the 11th of July.
A. The record of the meeting shows clearly enough that I opposed measures of force. I didn't see Keitel's actual order myself.
Q. No. 1824 is a document submitted by the French Prosecution on the same occasion. It is a document from General von Kluge dated the 25th of July 1944. It refers to the telegram from Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about the question of whether that order was ever actually carried out ?
A. I know that the order was not carried out. To appreciate the situation it is necessary that you should place yourself in the atmosphere prevailing during those days on or about the 20th of July. At that time, not every order from the leaders was carried out. As the investigations after the 20th of July proved, Kluge, even at that time in his capacity as Supreme Commander in the West, was planning negotiations about a capitulation and probably he made his initial attempts during that time. That, incidentally, was also the reason for his suicide after the attempt of the 20th of July had failed.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean ?
DR. FLAECHSNER: No. 824 is the number which the French Prosecution have given to this document. That is the number under which they have submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit number. I have made inquiries, but I haven't had an answer yet.
I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
A. (continuing): It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge at that moment, in that military situation, considering hiw views, should have given orders for forcible measures and raids which, according to the Sauckel-Laval agreement which was mentioned in the document, have no practical significance, since the blocked firms remained in force, and this could therefore not become effective. for this fact, namely that the order wasn't carried out, is Document RF-22 of the French prosecution which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000 workers came to Germany from France. If there had been forcible measures by the military, it would have been easy to produce a very much larger figure instead of the 3,000 workers and bring them from France to Germany.
laborers from occupied territories in Germany?
A No. I shall have to tell you openly that I did use my influence to reduce the recruitment of laborers or to stop measures of foce and raids but I did not use it to stop the employment of labor completely. Can you explain to the Tribunal the organization Todt?
A Here again I shall summarize somewhat. The organization Todt only had technical tasks, that is to say they had to carry out technical construction work in the east, particularly road construction and rail construction, and in the west the construction of concrete shelters such as we used in the so-called Atlantic Wall. for this purpose the organization Todt used, to an a considerable degree, foreign workers. In the west there were about twenty foreigners to one German worker. In Russia there were about four foreigners, four Russians, to one German. This could only be carried out if the organization Todt in the west could use local builders and their staffs to a considerable extent and if they supplied the technicians and technical leaders. These firms recruited their own workers and it is clear that these firms had no possibility of recruiting by force. working for The Todt organization were volunteers. But it is also clear that a certain percentage were working in the Todt organization under the calling-up system. forces and it is merely necessary to state in this connection that foreign workers did not, of course, come under it but that only German workers were part of it in that respect, and who, of course, in occupied territories had to become members of the armed forces in some way or other. Of course, the Prosecution had a different view of this. ached to my ministry who were working in occupied territories and it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were principally and always recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution have alleged that the organization Todt was the all-inclusive organization for all military construction work in the occupied territories and that is not the case.
They had from one quarter to one fifth of the building program as their task. Todt was being made responsible for so large a scale a construction program and the management of the apparatus by the General Plenipotentiary in the Four Year Plan for building occurred. This Plenipotentiary for building was responsible for the tasks he received from the Central Planning Board and he was responsible for the general direction but he was not responsible for the carrying out and supervision of the actual building. Through this the authority was in the Reich and in particular the SS building administration was acting on their own initiative and responsibility in connection with the building program which they were carrying out. of concentration camp inmates in German armament industry and that is document RF 24, US Exhibit 179, which was submitted to the Tribunal.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this document is on page 47 of the English text in my document book. It is a conference with Hitler in 1942. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q How did that conference come about Mr. Speer? increases everywhere; amongst them the necessity for certain construction of new factories. In this connection Himmler was offering his concentration camps, both to Hitler and myself. It was his plan that within the concentration camps some of these necessary new constructions should be erected, together with the necessary machinery, under the supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the armed forces, Colonel General Fromm was against this plan and so was I. Apart from general reasons, there was the point that uncontrolled production on the part of the SS should be prevented. Secondly, no had to expect that the techinal supervision in these firms would be removed from my jurisdiction. For that reason, when planning the extention program of armament in the spring of 1942. I did not take into consideration these demands by the SS at all.
Himmler went to Hitler and the minutes of this conference, which is available here, is the defense against the wishes which Hitler pronounced following Himmler's proposal.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw your attention to page 44 of the German text, which is page 45 of the English text. It is point 36 of a Fuehrer protocol.
THE PRESIDENT: It is page 47 of the English text.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, that is correct.
There it says, and I quote:
"Beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to organize armament production in the concentration camps."
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has just given us the substance of it, has he not?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, according to this document you were proposing that factories should be staffed entirely by internees from concentration camps. Did you carry that out? that it was Himmler's intention to influence those businesses and in some way or other no would, no doubt, have succeeded in getting jurisdiction over these firms entirely. For that reason, in principle, only a part of the firm or the staff would consist of internees from concentration camps so as work against Himmler's aims. Thus, the labor camps came about that were attached to the armament firms. The participation of five to eight percent in arms and armament production which had been planned was something that was never handed over to Himmler and was duo to an agreement with the general of the Army Staff in the OKW, General Buhle.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In that case may I draw your attention to page 48 of the English text in my document book which is document 1584-PS. It is U.S. Exhibit it 221. It is a letter from Himmler to Goering,dated 9 March, 1944 and there it says that Himmler is emphasizing that if the possibility of the SS would be extended then there would be a speeding up and an increase in the results from those firms.
The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows that there is the aim to supervise and control the employment of concentration camp inmates and that the SS is even to be used as the responsible work leader which was to be proposed. The increased employment internees in the firms would, according to his experience and knowledge, not be sufficient and the SS wished therefore to supervise and control the employment of these people in those firms.
This document shows something else, however; namely it confirms the testimony of the defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps were also paid premiums if they proved themselves particularly useful. detainees 240 hours per month, which corresponds to sixty hours per week. it is number 44 and has already been submitted by no as Exhibit number 6 and it is in the second volume of my document book. It is on page 88. Mr. President, it is the first document in the appendix volume.
firms was a matter of Himmler's and Pohl's ambition. The document also makes clear, and I quote:
"The working hours contributed by concentration camp inmates monthly did not amount to even 8,000,000 hours, so that most certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from concentration camps can be working in our armaments establishments. This amount is constantly diminishing."
Mr. President, this sentence is on page 90, at the bottom. hours with reference to output as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, through this letter you had knowledge of the fact that workers, particularly foreigners, were not returning to their old places of work after they had come in contact with the police for certain acts but that they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take? I received the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin during my illness, and its contents upset me a great deal because, after all, this is nothing other than kidnapping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the number of people who would be removed from the economic system in this manner. 1944, and I demanded that the workers, even if they were taken east, should nevertheless be returned to their own firms at once. This remark, as such, is not logical, because, naturally, the number of crimes in the individual firms was very low, so that such a measure was not practical, but what I wished to express through it in any case was that the workers would have to go back to their own places of work. This statement from the Central Planning Board has been submitted by the Prosecution. to see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944, and the minutes of the conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for any such thing, and I cited many reasons of being reasonable, since any other arguments would not have been effective. Hitler stated to me, as the record shows, that the workers would at once have to be returned to their old professions, and after a conference between Hitler and Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision of his to Himmler.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I submit Exhibit 13, which is extracts from the Fuehrer conference of 5 June 1944, which you will find on page 92.
THE WITNESS: Immediately after the results of the conference were clear, I went to see Himmler and communicated to him Hitler's decision. He told me that no such number had ever been arrested by the police but he told me that he would immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler's demands; namely that these workers would no longer be detained by the SS. that he should once again get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to distrust Himmler's statement because, after all, it is not customary for Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much, but I did not have any further complaints from my associates in this respect, and I must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my affair but that the information appeared so incredible to me that I decided to intervene at once. similar action, and that in this letter -- a letter which has been submitted here -
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is document 1063-PS, and it is USA Exhibit 219. I have reproduced it on page 51 of the English text of my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now referring. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: from concentration camps?
A Wait a minute. I should like to say something about the document. that he would correctly obey his order upon Hitler's instructions because this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept a secret. Only the Plenipotentiary for Labor and my own service department could receive this order.
duty to interest myself as Armaments Minister in the use of any workers who were available for war production and armaments. I considered it proper that workers from concentration camps should also work in war production or armament industries. the number of concentration comp detainees or that I caused their employment is by no means correct. I was interested in just the opposite from the point of view of the production in which I was interested.
DR. FLAECHSNER: May I remark in this connection that I have asked the witness Schmelte under Nos. 9 and 35 in the interrogatory which were submitted to him, and the question was put to the witness Schieber under No.20; BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, No.124, US Exhibit 179 was submitted by the Prosecution. It contains several remarks which you have made during the meetings of the Central Planning Board.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to page 53 of the English text of my document book.
BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, what do you want to say about your remark concerning idlers in the meeting of 30 October 1942?
A The record reproduces my remark the way I made it. I had an opportunity to read through the shorthand notes of the Central Planning Board, and I discovered that nothing was done after I made this remark. No measures were demanded from me after it.
DR. FLAECHSNER: On the same page, Mr. President, there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark Regarding Russian prisoners of war?
A It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that the conception of armaments must be understood in the way which I have explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians who were employed in armaments, according to this document, were iron, stool and metal industries with 29,000, and machine and boiler construction with 63,000.
Q Mr. Speer, there has also been mention of the statement made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on page 53 of the English text of the document book. There you said that, in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer, the foreign volunteers groups should be dissolved and that there should be a transfer of these Russians. explained briefly. The HIBIS mentioned in the document are the so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in Russia. As the months wont by, they had grown to a tremendous number, and during the retreat they followed along since their own countries would probably have treated them as traitors. These volunteers were however not, as was my wish, handed over to the production program, since the conference which was planned did not take place.
Q Will you please say something briefly about PS 556? It is the note from Sauckel about a telephone call on 4 January 1943, which also refers to the labor employment program.
in France, which would also increase the number of workers. Minutes from the Fuehrer which I found during recent days, namely, those of the meeting of January 3 to 5, 1943, show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for the local industry and economy.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to prepare it.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long youare goint to be, Dr. Flaechsner?
DR. FLAECHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be through before five o'clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been adducing up to date?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 20 June 1946) BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, this morning we left off with a discussion of your telephone notice regarding the matter of Sauckel and labor commitments, the date of this document being the 4th of January 1943. As you have already stated, the Fuehrer protocol, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later on, is concerned with this matter. were at that time? taken so that the economy in France would be raised to a higher level. Rather sharp remarks were made by Hitler concerning the methods that he contemplated in this regard. It is stated that every act of sabotage would be prosecuted with the sharpest means and measures, and that humanitarian motives would not be tolerated here. the management of production matters to me, a step which was actually carried out several months later. can speak in my own behalf -- only to show that this plan of Hitler not to regard humanitarian motives was a policy of Hitler's that I did not carry through. because they carried on acts of sabotage against industry in the Northern Moselle Sector. At that time I was successful in bringing about the fact that the shooting was not carried through. Roechling, who at that time regulated iron production in the Western regions, is my witness in this case. That is the only case about which I was informed that, because of sabotage in production, hostages were to be shot. France -- through a decision by Hitler dated September 1943 -- I was responsible for furnishing an additional meal to the workers in these plants; I was responsible for the extra food rationing.