concerned with decisions which were made in the Central Planning Board or made to you?
Q Now I should like to put to you one more question . You had another special function in the Four Year Plan? 1942, on my proposal, Goering established this office, and I was the one who was charged with this office. This was purely a matter of form. It was generally known that Goering had quarrelled with my predecessor, Todt, since armaments problems had not been subordinated to him, and in assuming this capacity as Armaments Plenipotentiary, I had subordinated myself to Goering. In actual fact, The Armaments Plenipotentiary was not effective in any way. I issued no directives in that capacity, In my capacity as Minister, I had sufficient authority, and it was not necessary that I use any authority which I might have had under the Four Year Plan.
DR. FLAECHSNER: For the assistance of the High Tribunal, when we deal with the question of the Central Planning board, perhaps I might refer to the fact that the witness Schieber in his interrogatory under figure (4) and (45), and the witness Kerrl in his interrogatory under figure (2) have made statements and have testified in this connection. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: foreign workers in general. Mr. Speer, the Prosecution charges you with co-responsibility for the entire figure of foreign workers who were transported to Germany. Four co-defendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that he work for you, first of all, in this matter and that his activity in the final analysis was determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this? it is quite out of the question that me took care of my demands, for, beginning with one spring of 1943, I received only a part of the workers I needed. If my highest demands and figures had been at, I would have received all of them. I need cite but one example. Some 200,000 Ukranian women were made available for housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they could be put to better use in armaments production.
Beginning with January 1943 these German reserves were still on hand in ample degree. I was interested in having German workers--and, of course, women--and this non-utilization of German reserves meant that I could not be responsible for the demands for foreign workers.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses have made statements in connection with this question: The witness Schmelte deals with points 12, 13 and 16 in an interrogatory. The witness Schieber, in reply to figure 22. The witness Roland in figure 1 and 4, and the witness Kerrl under figure 9. They have testified on points relating to this problem. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then. of course, you know that you would receive foreign workers among the number. Did you need these foreign workers?
A I needed then only for a part of my work. For instance in the matter of coal, the coal mines could not function without Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to meet the demands with German workers, who consisted mainly of female labor, and there were, furthermore, special areas in which it was desirable to have foreign workers, but the majority of the needs could be not through German workers and German female workers. The war production of England and America and of the Soviet Union--all of these countries--followed the same principle.
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you go on, Dr. Flaechsner? There is no need to wait.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes. I shall return to this point in more detail when I come to my document. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, I should like to return to your testimony of the 18th of October, 1915, once more. On that occasion you stated several times that you knew that the workers from occupied countries were being used and brought to Germany against their will. The prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror. Willyou comment on that? no influence upon that. If the workers were brought to Germany against their will -- I mean by that, that they were obligated, by law, to work for Germany. Whether these legal measures were justified or not, that was a matter I did not check into at the time, and of course it wasnot any concern of mine to do so. As far as the application of force and terror is concerned -- I mean by that police measures such asraids and arrests, and matters of that kind. I did not approve of these violent means, and that may be seen from the attitude I held and the discussion I had with Lammers on the 11th of June, 1944. power, nor raids, nor measures of force or violence, were correct or just. In this document I am mentioned, at the same time, asone who expressed misgivings\ and objections to these violent measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, that is document 3819-PS, which the prosecution used in the cross-examination of the defendant Keitel, I believe it was, and of the defendant Sauckel. They submitted that document at that time. I did not incorporate it in my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, why were you against measures of that kind, measures using violence? the occupied countries would have to be destroyed. I wasinterested in having a regulated order of production in the occupied countries.
Measures of violence caused a loss of manpower to me from the occupied countries, because there was the danger that these people would flee to the woods in increasing numbers so that they would not have to go to Germany, and that they would strengthen the lines of the resistance movement. a limiting or a restriction of production in the occupied countries. groups, as well as myself, again and again protested against measures of violence on a large scale. concerned, were you especially interested in that, and if so, why?
A Yes. As far as the labor recruitment from France, Belgium and Holland was concerned -- that is, countries in the West -- and workers from Italy, that was the recruitment I was especially interested in because the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, beginning with the spring of 1943, had set down and established that in the main the workers from these regions would be at the disposal of war production. On the other hand, the workers from the East were to be used for agriculture, for regular industry, and for the building of railroads. 1944.
DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I should like to refer to document 3012-PS, which is USA Exhibit 190. This document is found on page 19 of the English text, and page 16 of the French text. I should like to quote from a conference of the Economic Inspectorate South, in Russia:
"Staatsrat Peukert" -- the delegate for Sauckel in Russia -- "states in the introduction that the labor commitment in the German agriculture and the armament programs ordered by the Fuehrer" -- he states that workers from the West, especially those skilled workers required by Minister Speer, should be made available to the armament industry. page 42of the English text, and page 39 of the French and German texts. Here we are concerned with a remark by Sauckel, on the 26th of April, 1944, and I quote :"Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied Western territories can the urgent need of German armament for skilled workers be satisfied.
For this purpose the reserves from other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent of the markers from the West have always been allocated to armament."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, speaking for myself, I don't know what the problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are putting forward in the very least. I don't know what relevance this has at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant's argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?
I mean, I only want to know because I don't understand in the least what you are getting at.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is in preparation for the question to which we are now turning, and that is the question of the Speer industries, or the S industries, of these blocked industries, if I may put it that way. Speer wanted to stop the transportation of workersfrom the West into Germany. Therefore, in advance, I have to establish that up to that point his workers, in the main, came from the West. I should like to establish that up until that time.-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the West; what difference doesit make?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Speer is charged with and accused of the fact that he was active and participated in the deportation of workers from the West, workers which were used in his armament industries. Of course, the date is the important point.
policy from what he had pursued before. Before that time, as we have seen from the evidence, the workers who had come to Germany up until that time, to a large extent, had been voluntary workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were all voluntary workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing evidence to that at all.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final reason for this evidence, and I should like to carry it on to that end.
THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don't understand what that end is.
Go on; don't wait any further. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, the General Plenipotentiary for Labor named Italy and the occupied Western countries as the countries from which the laborers would come into Germany for armament industries.
How did you endorse Sauckel's measures in these countries; to what extent, and how long? his. Up until that period of time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, the refusal of workers to go to Germany increased among the workers of the West. That may be connected with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on Germany. more or less voluntarily. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, only a part of the workers who had been called up, and who were being recruited, came voluntarily to the places to which they were to report. Military Commander-in-Chief in France, I established the so-called Sperr Betriebe Belgium, Holland and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these industries; that is, Sperr Betriebe, or S industries. It was important that each of the workers employed in one of these blocked industries, Sperr Betriebe, automatically was excluded from recruitment and commitment in Germany; and any worker who was recruited to go to Germany was free to go into a blocked industry, or an S industry, in his own country without the labor authorities having the possibility of taking this man out of the S industry that he had entered.
laborers in the occupied Western countries? from the West into Germany decreased to a small fraction. Before that, eighty to a hundred thousand workers came from France into Germany. After the establishment of these blocked industries, or the S industries, this figure decreased to three to four thousand a month, which is an insignificant figure. This may be seen from document RF-22. these figures was also brought about through the resistance movement which, at that time, began to expand considerably in the West. followed by Sauckel?
A No. The first serious differences arose at this time, especially about the blocking of these workers in relation to labor commitments in Germany, This came about through the fact that the loss of workers, whom I had working in production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West. four hundred thousand workers were transported from France to Germany. The production of France, however, decreased by eight hundred thousand workers, and the French workers in France, who worked for Germany, decreased by four hundred and fifty thousand workers. entire German production from the Minister of Economics? German production, since the German peace economy had not been converted into a war economy on a large enough scale. In my opinion, the supply of German women workers was the largest source of labor that I could tap.
of total economy to your sphere of work ?
AAt that time, I had worked out the following plan already. In Germany a large part of industry was concerned with the production of socalled consumer goods. Consumer goods are, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other necessary articles for the civilian population and for the armed forces. In the occupied western territories, however, the means for supplying this were absent where the raw materials were lacking. These industries were lying idle, especially in the western territories, and they had a great potential. were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, out of the sphere of work of German industries and transplanted this phase to the west. One million workers in the final analysis were to be supplied with work in the country itself; and in this way I could use one million German workers for armament.
Q Did you not want to increase armament production in France as well ?
A No. All of these plans were not successful. Before the outbreak of the war, the French government did not succeed in establishing intensified armament production, and I also was unsuccessful in carrying through this plan.
Q What did you intend to do with this now plan ? What advantages did you expect to gain ?
A I shall try to be very brief. Through this plan, In Germany I could ear-mark certain industries for armament; and in that way I received not only workers, but also rooms, and administrative personnel. I also received electricity. Apart from that, these industries, since they never had been important for work, had not received any foreign workers. So in that way, almost exclusively, I received German workers whom I could use for my German production and whom I valued much more in armament production than any foreign workers.
Q Was this plan not detrimental to German armament production ? an industry meant the taking away of a machine, and at the end of the war there would have to be a reconversion which would last at least six to eight months.
At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted to be successful in this war, we would have to be the ones who would have to make the greater sacrifices.
Q How was this plan made into reality ?
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Flaechsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the details of these plans ? What do we care whether his plans were efficient or whether they were inefficient ? The only question this Tribunal has to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the Charter of international law. It does not matter to us whether his plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT : It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of these plans.
DR. FLAECHSNER : In that way, I wanted to show that that the course followed by the defendant in later policy was to have the German reserves used for his own purposes; that is, the end purposes of armament, and to have the foreign workers work in their own country.
THE PRESIDENT : But, Dr. Flaechsner, that is a question of efficiency, not of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers, good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other western countries.
What have we got to do with that ? If they were forced to work there, it is just as illegal as it is to be brought to Germany to be forced to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the prosecution.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, but I thought and believed-
THE PRESIDENT : (Interposing) The Tribunal will recess.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will hear defendants' counsel at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the defendants' counsel's speeches. BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, please, will you tell us briefly, summarizing how you worked with Mr. Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, and how he agreed on the program; but, please, will you summarize this ? I arranged with Bichelonne that a program of removing goods from Germany to France should operate, which incidentally I have already described, and that the system should be introduced. Bichelonne, in a final conference, stated that he wasn't authorized to talk about labor employment with me but that to the contrary, Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to point out, he said, that a continuation of recruitment of workers to the extent existing at the time would make impossible the program which had been introduced between us and I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the entire production of France, beginning with gold, right up to the final product, should be declared "blocked enterprises", being blocked firms. In this connection, we were both perfectly aware of the fact that this would make almost impossible the recruitment of workers for Germany since, as I have already explained, it was free to every Frenchmann to go to one of these blocked firms once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a lengthy period and in spite of all the difficulty which occurred, I kept that word to him.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Mr. President, in connection with this, I should like to quote from document R-124, which is USA Exhibit 179. It is on page 37 of the English document book. With this, we are concerned with a speech of Sauckel which has been touched upon frequently before the Central Planning Board and I shall only quote from it : " But my agencies on France stated to me the next time I came to France : Everything is at an end here, it is useless to go on; it is stated in all prefectures here : Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with Minister Speer according to which only French workers are considered for employment in France and none of them need go to Germany any more. This coincided with the first large conference."
BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, which consequences arose for the labor program between Germany and France ? recruiting of labor came to a complete end.
DR. FLAECHSNER: About the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and the tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to carry out this principle, I shall speak later on the strength of documents. At this moment I shall, therefore, discontinue the question on the subject and I shall confine myself to this. From the official French document, RF 22, which is on page 20 of the English text of my document book, page 17 of the German and French text, I shall quote. In this report it says and I quote : "Finally a real hostility started between Sauckel and Speer who was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the occupied territories..." and then a few lines later : "The superiority of the first mentioned over the latter which made itself felt more and more during the last seven months of the occupation made the resistance against the removal much easier." This text shows that with the first mentioned and the military commander---
THE PRESIDENT : That is all cumulative; you have proved it three or four times already.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Very well, I shall not continue with it.
Q Only to rectify a mistake, Mr. Speer, I want to ask you about the document, that you had something to do with the organizing for forced labor with Frenchmen; is that true ?
Q You have already hinted that this program of transfer of goods wasn't only confined to France. Will you tell me to which other countries that also applied ?
A I shall summarize right away the following questions : The program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, where all the entire production was also declared block, and these blocked firms were given the same protection regarding labor as had been given in France, After the meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January 1944, during which the new program for 1945 for the West was agreed upon, I adhered to this policy and the result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany compared with five hundred thousand which had been planned during that conference and in other countries, too, only about ten percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.
Q How about the figures applying to workers from the Protectorate ? cution. It is on page 23 of the English text of my document book and it is a report from Sauckel, dated December 1942; also, there is a document 1290-PS, on page 24 of the English text which has also been submitted and these document appear to show that according to assertions of Sauckel's from the beginning of his activities until March 1943, there was an excess of laborers, of workers. is that true ?
Document 16 PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 168, which is on Page 25 of the English text of my document book, also shows that Sauckel was not in favor of using German women in the armament industry, but in the summer of '42 several hundred thousand Ukranian girls were placed at the disposal of German householders. Ministry, was not responsible for the total figure of workers coming into Germany.
I should also like to present a do document under No. 02, Exhibit No. 8. Mr President, it is given the number 02 in the document book and it is on Page 2* of the English. It refers to a meeting of the Central Planning Board.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.
DR. FLAECHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit No. 8?
THE PRESIDENT: What about No. 4? Oh, that is already in. Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall certainly do that.
I should like to quote -- this is a remark made by Speer: "In this connection, it is necessary that we should get new German workers, unskilled labor, into the firm because I can not replace by foreigners the number which we have to give up as soldiers. The German supply becomes simply too scanty. In shell production there is now already one burst barrel after another and we do not know what is the cause. Cases of sabotage may be taking place. The measures which will have to be taken in order to switch at least one million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard and will, in my view, practically depress the whole living standard of the upper classes. This, therefore, means that we, roughtly speaking, are going to become proletarians for the duration of the war if it will last long. This matter has to be con sidered cooly and soberly.
There is, therefore, no other way out."
This view of Speer, namely, of exploiting the workers' reserve within Germany to a larger degree, was not realized until the summer of 1944. There was an argument between Speer on one side and Sauckel and Gauleiters on the other. About this, the testimony of the witnesses in the interrogatories will speak. To assist the Tribunal, I should like to draw your attention to Schieber, question and answer 22; Roland's, it is question 2; Kerrl, it is No. 9; and in the case of Schmelte it is questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I can not give you the page numbers of the English book, Mr. President, because I haven't seen them yet.
THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the interrogatories which have been filled in are in the supplement volume of my document book and which I hope is now in the hands of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes it is.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to reserve the right to submit those documents at the end of my examination in total. I am only taking the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses are referring to it. About the different opinions presented by Sauckel and Speer, we are informed, through a conference of Speer, during a meeting of the Central Planning Board on the 21st of December, 1943 -- this is on Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my Exhibit No. 9 -- quote: -- "
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, I thought. I had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency of inefficiency of these plans.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President. BY DR: FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, there is an important document submitted by the prosecution It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January, 1944. I has been submitted as 1292 PS, USA Exhibit 225, Page 28 of the English text of my document book. How did the meeting come about?
A. It was called by request of Hitler.
Q. For what reason?
A. To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.
Q. And what was Hitler's decision?
A. His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked firms were to be maintained, and Sauckel had the order given to himself that for this purpose three and a half million workers should be obtained from occupied territories. In this connection, Hitler gave severe instruction to OKW, the military commanders, and they were that Sauckel request should be met with every means.
Q. Did you agree to this decision?
A. No, not at all, because I had heard that the program of removal which I had drafted to the west had collapsed.
Q. And what action did you take after that?
A. Contrary to the Fuehrer's decision during that meeting, I informed the Military Commander in Paris, General Studt, in connection with the order from the OKW military commanders which was expected, that the two interpretations of the meeting would be on his desk. Since the Military Commander was agreeable to my interpretation, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document which is or Page 29 of the English text of my document book, Page 26 of the German and French text. This is a telephonic message from Speer to General Studt in Paris. It will be Exhibit No. 10. Two things appear from this letter. One, and I quote: "Gauleiter Sauckel will for the time being start negotiations with the appropriate agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in order to clear up the manner and possibility of the execution --"
THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flaechsner?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the prosecution has referred to this document, 1292 PS, and they have attempted to prove with it -
THE PRESIDENT: He has told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. This document will show the reaction on the part of the Defendant, namely, what he has done so that Hitler's decision, as such, would be contravened or at least weakened.
In this letter the Defendant says to General Studt -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest possible indication of the view which they take about these matters of different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why don't you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other part of it?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as to put his point of view into practice. This isn't referring to -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just now, the Defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all out to us again.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book, page 27 of the German and French text. Here we are concerned with a letter from Speer to Sauckel, dated January the 6th, 1944, and it is ascertained in this letter that for the firms working in the French industries 400,000 workers, plus 400,000 future workers, should be reserved erring the following months which, therefore, would be removed from possible deportation.
Which results did these two letters have, Mr. Speer, with reference to Hitler's order that one million workers should be obtained from France and taken to Germany ?
A. I should like to summarize the entire subject and say few words about it. We had a system of dealing with uncomfortable orders from Hitler and how they could be got around. Jodl has already said in his testimony that he used that technique. Of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only recognizable to the connoisseur, the expert, regarding what they mean and which results they would have to have.
The document which is being presented now, from Sauckel's speech on the first of March 1944, also shows how these results become apparent in the labor program. The result is clear and I have already described: it here, and I think we can therefore pass to page no. 49. That is, of course page 49 in our book.
Q. Mr. Speer, can you explain to me the situation regarding the results of air attacks on the traffic system in the occupied western territories ?
A. yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few questions. traffic not in the occupied western territories, and the result of that was that beginning in May and June 1944, production in France was paralyzed one million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of removing production had collapsed as far as I was concerned, and after normal expectations of the departments in France, one was now under the impression that there would be a large air action towards Germany. try, the restricted or blocked firms should be kept up, although I knew as an expert that their restarting, considering the damage to the traffic net, wouldn't be possible in less than nine to twelve months even if the air attacks should cease. In this connection, therefore, I was acting against my own interests. quotes the corresponding passages in the document book.
I obtained a decision, according to which the workers in the occupied territories should, in spite of the difficulties of transport, remain on the spot whatever happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar decision was applied to Holland. Upon my orders, the workers in these blocked firms were even paid their wages.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection I submit Speer Exhibit No. 12. It is an extract from the Fuehrer conference from the 19th to the 22nd of June 1944, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is on page 22 of the English text of my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that with this decision which you made, at least one million workers would be unproductive for a lengthy period, that is to say, in all the western territories. How could you justify such a decision ?
A. I shall have to say quite openly that this was my first decision which had its inner justification in the war situation which had progressed catastrophically. The invasion had succeeded. The heavy air attacks on production were bringing decisive collapses, and with that an early end of the war had to foreseen. This was the cause of my realization that there was a new situation and the consequences I drew from this new situation will become apparent through various other examples which I shall bring up in the course of the trial. He believed to the contrary, that everything ought to be done in order to utilize even the last strength.
Q. Will you please describe briefly your attitude towards the meeting of the 11th of July 1944, which we have already referred to once before. This is Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.
A. During this meeting of the 11th of July, I maintained my point of view. It becomes apparent from the minutes that I announced the decision that the transport difficulties should not be allowed to influence production, and that therefore the blocked firms in these territories and I were perfectly aware of the fact that with this, the known results for these clocked firms would also be maintained, that is, the stopping of employment from occupied territories and transfer of it to Germany.
Q. The French Prosecution have presented a document No. 823. They presented it during the session of the 30th of May, if I remember correctly. It came up during the cross examination of co-defendant Sauckel. Please, will you briefly state your views on that. So as to refresh your memory, I want to say that in this telegram there is a reference to the meeting of the 11th of July.
A. The record of the meeting shows clearly enough that I opposed measures of force. I didn't see Keitel's actual order myself.
Q. No. 1824 is a document submitted by the French Prosecution on the same occasion. It is a document from General von Kluge dated the 25th of July 1944. It refers to the telegram from Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about the question of whether that order was ever actually carried out ?
A. I know that the order was not carried out. To appreciate the situation it is necessary that you should place yourself in the atmosphere prevailing during those days on or about the 20th of July. At that time, not every order from the leaders was carried out. As the investigations after the 20th of July proved, Kluge, even at that time in his capacity as Supreme Commander in the West, was planning negotiations about a capitulation and probably he made his initial attempts during that time. That, incidentally, was also the reason for his suicide after the attempt of the 20th of July had failed.
THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean ?
DR. FLAECHSNER: No. 824 is the number which the French Prosecution have given to this document. That is the number under which they have submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit number. I have made inquiries, but I haven't had an answer yet.
I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit number.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
A. (continuing): It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge at that moment, in that military situation, considering hiw views, should have given orders for forcible measures and raids which, according to the Sauckel-Laval agreement which was mentioned in the document, have no practical significance, since the blocked firms remained in force, and this could therefore not become effective. for this fact, namely that the order wasn't carried out, is Document RF-22 of the French prosecution which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000 workers came to Germany from France. If there had been forcible measures by the military, it would have been easy to produce a very much larger figure instead of the 3,000 workers and bring them from France to Germany.