Q What percentage of the total laborer was the responsibility of Sauckel?
A You mean the total labor supply? over air armament as well -- perhaps thirty to forty per cent of all workers which were at our disposal. Of course the largest part of them were German worker When, in 1944, I took over air armament as well -- that was in August of 1944-I had no appreciable demand for workers because, since the ramifications of the bomber attacks on communications and transportation in the Reich, the armament production had markedly declined.
Q Was your need for workers unlimited or tremendously high?
A No. The magnitude of armament and entire production and the corresponding need for workers was governed by our raw material supply.
Q That meant your need was restricted to the availability of raw materials? reached under you. In order to achieve this increase, did the workers used increase in numbers as well?
A No. From 1942 to 1944 production was multiplied seven times as far as arms was concerned, armored vehicles five times. and general munitions six times. The number of workers in these brackets was increased by only thirty per cent. This success was not brought about through a higher utilization or exploitation of labor but rather through the doing away with various methods of production and through an improved system of planning and coordinating the armament industry and production.
Q What do you mean by the concept "production for war", "Kriegsproduktion"?
A The concept which is frequently used here, "production for war", is nothing different from the ordinary concept of production. It comprised everything which is fabricated industrially or in a business-like manner, including the civilian needs.
Q What did you mean in Germany by the Concept of "armaments"? What did that include?
A The concept of "armament" in no way restricted itself to that sphere which was delineated through the Geneva Convention.
The modern concept of "armaments " is a much more extensive and comprehensive one, It includes a sphere of much greater and much more extensive activity. In Germany, for the concept of "armaments" there were no basic principles set down, but the characteristics of the armament industry was that the Armament Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to it, our foundaries, melting institutions, the production or the fabrication of aluminum and modern synthetic materials, chemicals, the bringing about of synthetic rubber or nitrogen, the production of synthetic wool, the fabrication of single parts, about which you can not say they are to be used in armament alone, such as ball bearings, gears, valves and so forth, or the production of tools; the establishing of chain production systems and the construction of commercial ships, of locomotives, heavy machinery, textile concerns, and concerns which worked with wood and leather.
determine what the percentage was, the figures of how many German industries produced armaments applicable to the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give you the figures. My co-workers agree to a man that between 14 and 20 per cent of cur armament program concerned itself with the production of planes, weapons, warships or the general equipment which the various branches of the Wehrmacht required. The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva Convention, and the reason for the expansion of the concept of armament in Germany was the preferential treatment which applied to these industries, treatment which resulted in numerous industries pressing to be called armament industries.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in the interrogatories which have not been submitted to the Tribunal because the book is not ready, the witness Sauer, under figures 7 and 10, the witness Schieber under figures 6 to 9, and the witness Kerrl under figures 4 to 7, concern themselves with the restrictions as applied to the concept of armament. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, just by way of example, you know the concern Krupp at Essen. How far did this concern produce armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva prisoner of war agreement, that is, weapons, munitions, and objects which are necessary for direct conduct of war? will devote only a fraction of its productivity to war. Of Course, I must point out the fact that this concern, the firm of Krupp, was one of those armament industries which participated least of all on a percentage basis in armament production. which concerned themselves with the production of steel. They comprised the main factors of production at Krupp. There was the manufacture of locomotives and some work to be done for chemical purposes. These were some of the specialties of Krupp. was the building of armored towers for warships, and special guns. That was a facility which they had, but which they did not utilize.
In the year 1944, Krupp erected the first works for the production of guns. Up until that time, Krupp concerned himself in the main with the development or the building of new weapons, and then the fabrication was turned over to other firms.
To summarize, one can say that at Krupp's, 10 to 15 per cent of the personnel turned out armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva prisoner of war agreement, even though the entire works was considered a war industry. would receive German or foreign workers?
A My ministry had no influence in that direction at all. The need for workers was reported by the industries which were subordinate to me. I received a total figure of workers needed, but there was no special segregation as to German or foreign workers. This total figure was transmitted to the General Plenipotentiary for Labor. Sauckel refused to take over detailed demands, and he was quite right in this matter, for he could not issue detailed directives to the offices which were subordinate to him, that is, dealing with the percentage of German or foreign workers which were to be allocated to the various industries. care of by the labor offices without any intervention of my offices or agencies. Therefore, in this case we did not exert influence as to whether Germans, prisoners of war, or foreigners were allocated to any special industry. The industry then had to report back to us about the number of workers that they had received. This report was turned in to my ministry in a total or lump figure so that I had no knowledge of the number of foreign workers or prisoners of war contained in the total figure. Of course, I knew that foreign workers worked on armament equipment, and I quite agreed with that.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, for the assistance of the Tribunal I would like to remark that figures 7 and 17 of the interrogatory of the witness Schmelte, and figures 1 and 8 of the same interrogatory deal with these questions. In the interrogatory of Schieber, numbers 10, 11, 30 and 31 apply to this point. Both of these witnesses deal with these questions in their interrogatories. Furthermore, in the interrogatory deposed by Kerrl, numbers 8 and 9 apply to this point, and relevant material is contained therein.
BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, who was responsible for demanding the manpower needed for armament from the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower? were distributed according to demands in the various economic sectors, There were perhaps 15 different sectors which placed their demands. I placed demands for army and navy armament and for building, and beginning with September of 1943 for the sectors of chemisty, mining, and the balance of production. Air armament had its special labor department, and their demands were voiced by the Reichsluftfahrt Ministerium, the Reich Air Ministy.
DR. FLAECHSNER: In his interrogatory, the witness Schmelte has dealt with this matter in his answer to figure 2; the witness Schieber in his answer to figures 2, 3, and 5 concerns himself with this point also. Then the witness Kerrl deals with this matter an figures 2 and 3 of his interrogatory. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Weren't the demands for workers for these three branches of the Wehrmacht centralized in your Ministry? taken over the Armament Office from General Thomas, and this office was a *---* or joint office of all three Wehrmacht branches and labor questions were discussed. Through an agreement between Goering and myself, we had established that air armament should be independent of my ministry and should look out for its own interests. Armament and had my own interests, and since he wanted to make decisions of his own regarding labor power about a unit that was not subordinate to me.
Q. In how far are you responsible for supplying work to prisoners of war in armament, a patter which is dealt with in the Geneva Convention?
A. I did not exert my influence that prisoners of war be employed contrart to the directive given out by the OKW. I knew the point of view held by the OKW and according to which the Geneva Convention was to be strictly observed. Of course, I knew as well, that these Geneva Conventions and regulations did not apply to Russian prisoners of war and Italian internees. I could not exert any influence on the allocation of prisoners of war to the various industries. This allocation was determined by the Labor Office in connection with the lower levels of the prisoner of war system with the socalled Stalag. That was a matter that was handled by them. the witness Schmelte and his reply as given under figure 14.
Mr. Speer, who was the decisive officer who was under the OKW and who made decisions?
A. The supervision of the actual usage and employment of prisoners of war was carried out through the economy officer (Wirtschaftsoffizier) and that was incorporated into the system of the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber and was under the jurisdiction of the army.
Q The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Duess, who is an American statistics expert. This is document 2520-PS. hundred thousand prisoners of war were employed. These figures supposedly originate from statistics in your ministry. Will you comment on this figure?
A. The figures are well-known to me on the basis of my activity as a minister and they are correct. In this figure of four hundred thousand prisoners of war we are concerned with the total number of prisoners of war employed in armament production. assume that these prisoners of war were connected with the production of munitions along the lines of the Geneva Convention. Statistics applying to the number of prisoners of war employed in those industries which produced goods in in compliance with the Geneva Convention, such statistics were not kept and it is a figure that cannot be deduced from my figures.
two to three hundred thousand Italian military internees are counted in who at that time were brought into the sphere of my activity and production at the time. This affidavit does not prove that prisoners of war were concerned with the production of war products and munitions, as such.
Q. The Central Planning Board is mentioned in this connection. You were a member of this Board. Can you picture the origin of the Central Planning Board and its sphere of activity and go into detail?
A. When in 1942 I assumed my office it was an urgent necessity that the allocation and distribution of various materials be centralized for the three branches of the Wehrmacht and that the direction of war economy in the long run be guaranteed. Up until that time this matter had been taken care of in the Ministry of Economy and some of the duties were carried on in the OKW. Both of these agencies were much too weak to make their will prevail against the three parts of the Wehrmacht. ed by the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and the people who could make decisions were the three members, Milch, Koerner and myself. We could make decisions only through a common decision, a joint decision, which, however, could be brought about without any difficulty in every case. It is quite obvious that on the basis of my predominant position that I was the decisive man, the decisive factor in the Central Planning Board. designated and the decree which I had drafted was set down and established by Goering in the form of a decree. matter which was incorporated in this decree. This activity was not carried through systematically by the Central Planning Board despite the documents which have been presented here. But I tried, as far as the decisions regarding demands and allocation of labor was concerned, to have that decision made by me since this was an essential factor in the direction and managing of the entire economy.
However, Sauckel always refused on this point because he considered that I was interfering or intervening in his rights.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to submit the decree of Goering regarding the establishment of a Central Planning Board, under the Four Year Plan. It was published on the 25 April, 1942 and this shall be Speer document number 2, Exhibit number 7. I should like to submit this.
Mr. President, this document may be found on page 17 of the English document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What number are giving to it? On the document here it has Speer number 142.
DR. FLAECHSNER: No, Mr. President, that must be a typographical error. It should be 42, Mr. President. The "one" should be struck out.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Speer Exhibit number 7.
THE PRESIDENT: What does 42 mean? What is the point of putting 42 on it if its Exhibit number 7?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, that is the number according to which the document was admitted, when we compiled out document book. However, the exhibit number, number 7, is the decisive number in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. FLAECHSNER: The other number is only used for the assistance in finding this document more readily. It is on page 17 of the English text and on this occasion I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to figure three of this decree, according to which the Central Planning Board had to decide about all industrial mattes, about raw materials, about the distribution of raw materials and the inclusion of demands of the total economy and of the transportation system. This decree does not contain any regulation about workers and workers' problems. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q. Mr. Speer, how did it come about that despite this labor demands were discussed in the Central Planning Board?
A. All of the sixteen meeting of the Central Planning Board which took place from 1942 until 1945, those minutes are contained in the stenographic records. These five thousand typed ages give a clear picture of the activities carried on and show the activities and the sphere of activity of the Central Planning Board. Any export can see from that there was no planning with regard to manpower. It is quite clear that a plan regarding labor would have to be carried through at least on a three month basis, a system which we had to follow in regard to the plans as to raw materials. In fact in the Central Planning Board three to four meetings did take place which concerned themselves with labor. These three or four discussions came about in the following manner. They were hold for the following reasons:
the total economy, when soldiers were taken into the Wehrmacht, I had reserved for myself the right to distribute and allocate the various recruitment quotas among the various sectors. This distribution was discussed in the Central Planning Board because it was considered a neutral topic. At this session, of course there was a representative of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor, since at the same time the problem of replacements had to be dealt with. Another problem which was discussed in the Central Planning Board on another sector was the distribution and allocation of coal for the following year. As it was in England coal was the decisive factor in our war production. At these discussions we had to determine at the same time how the demands for labor supply for the mines could we make plans which could be carried through for the following year. From this discussion resulted the use of Russian prisoners of war in mines, a matter which has been mentioned here. parties were discussed. They were discussed in the way the Prosecution would like to generalize in regard to the sessions of the Central Planning Board. These sessions took place in February and March of 1944, and neither before nor after were these sessions ever repeated. These two sessions took place during my illness. At that time I was not quite clear why Sauckel at first complied with my wish to have the Central Planning Board put under my ministry and then later on went back on his promise. Central Planning Board. Are these extracts, as far as you know, from the stenographic record, or are they taken from the minutes? with the results of the meeting, and these minutes are the actual results of the meeting. From the minutes themselves the Prosecution has thus far submitted no material. The matters contained in the stenographic record and the material the has been submitted here are, of course, remarks and debates which always take place when matters of such importance are dealt with, in very war economy of every country, even when the authorities involved are not directly responsible, as in the use of manpower.
concerned with decisions which were made in the Central Planning Board or made to you?
Q Now I should like to put to you one more question . You had another special function in the Four Year Plan? 1942, on my proposal, Goering established this office, and I was the one who was charged with this office. This was purely a matter of form. It was generally known that Goering had quarrelled with my predecessor, Todt, since armaments problems had not been subordinated to him, and in assuming this capacity as Armaments Plenipotentiary, I had subordinated myself to Goering. In actual fact, The Armaments Plenipotentiary was not effective in any way. I issued no directives in that capacity, In my capacity as Minister, I had sufficient authority, and it was not necessary that I use any authority which I might have had under the Four Year Plan.
DR. FLAECHSNER: For the assistance of the High Tribunal, when we deal with the question of the Central Planning board, perhaps I might refer to the fact that the witness Schieber in his interrogatory under figure (4) and (45), and the witness Kerrl in his interrogatory under figure (2) have made statements and have testified in this connection. BY DR. FLAECHSNER: foreign workers in general. Mr. Speer, the Prosecution charges you with co-responsibility for the entire figure of foreign workers who were transported to Germany. Four co-defendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that he work for you, first of all, in this matter and that his activity in the final analysis was determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this? it is quite out of the question that me took care of my demands, for, beginning with one spring of 1943, I received only a part of the workers I needed. If my highest demands and figures had been at, I would have received all of them. I need cite but one example. Some 200,000 Ukranian women were made available for housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they could be put to better use in armaments production.
Beginning with January 1943 these German reserves were still on hand in ample degree. I was interested in having German workers--and, of course, women--and this non-utilization of German reserves meant that I could not be responsible for the demands for foreign workers.
DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses have made statements in connection with this question: The witness Schmelte deals with points 12, 13 and 16 in an interrogatory. The witness Schieber, in reply to figure 22. The witness Roland in figure 1 and 4, and the witness Kerrl under figure 9. They have testified on points relating to this problem. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then. of course, you know that you would receive foreign workers among the number. Did you need these foreign workers?
A I needed then only for a part of my work. For instance in the matter of coal, the coal mines could not function without Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to meet the demands with German workers, who consisted mainly of female labor, and there were, furthermore, special areas in which it was desirable to have foreign workers, but the majority of the needs could be not through German workers and German female workers. The war production of England and America and of the Soviet Union--all of these countries--followed the same principle.
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you go on, Dr. Flaechsner? There is no need to wait.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes. I shall return to this point in more detail when I come to my document. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, I should like to return to your testimony of the 18th of October, 1915, once more. On that occasion you stated several times that you knew that the workers from occupied countries were being used and brought to Germany against their will. The prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror. Willyou comment on that? no influence upon that. If the workers were brought to Germany against their will -- I mean by that, that they were obligated, by law, to work for Germany. Whether these legal measures were justified or not, that was a matter I did not check into at the time, and of course it wasnot any concern of mine to do so. As far as the application of force and terror is concerned -- I mean by that police measures such asraids and arrests, and matters of that kind. I did not approve of these violent means, and that may be seen from the attitude I held and the discussion I had with Lammers on the 11th of June, 1944. power, nor raids, nor measures of force or violence, were correct or just. In this document I am mentioned, at the same time, asone who expressed misgivings\ and objections to these violent measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, that is document 3819-PS, which the prosecution used in the cross-examination of the defendant Keitel, I believe it was, and of the defendant Sauckel. They submitted that document at that time. I did not incorporate it in my document book. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, why were you against measures of that kind, measures using violence? the occupied countries would have to be destroyed. I wasinterested in having a regulated order of production in the occupied countries.
Measures of violence caused a loss of manpower to me from the occupied countries, because there was the danger that these people would flee to the woods in increasing numbers so that they would not have to go to Germany, and that they would strengthen the lines of the resistance movement. a limiting or a restriction of production in the occupied countries. groups, as well as myself, again and again protested against measures of violence on a large scale. concerned, were you especially interested in that, and if so, why?
A Yes. As far as the labor recruitment from France, Belgium and Holland was concerned -- that is, countries in the West -- and workers from Italy, that was the recruitment I was especially interested in because the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, beginning with the spring of 1943, had set down and established that in the main the workers from these regions would be at the disposal of war production. On the other hand, the workers from the East were to be used for agriculture, for regular industry, and for the building of railroads. 1944.
DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I should like to refer to document 3012-PS, which is USA Exhibit 190. This document is found on page 19 of the English text, and page 16 of the French text. I should like to quote from a conference of the Economic Inspectorate South, in Russia:
"Staatsrat Peukert" -- the delegate for Sauckel in Russia -- "states in the introduction that the labor commitment in the German agriculture and the armament programs ordered by the Fuehrer" -- he states that workers from the West, especially those skilled workers required by Minister Speer, should be made available to the armament industry. page 42of the English text, and page 39 of the French and German texts. Here we are concerned with a remark by Sauckel, on the 26th of April, 1944, and I quote :"Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied Western territories can the urgent need of German armament for skilled workers be satisfied.
For this purpose the reserves from other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent of the markers from the West have always been allocated to armament."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, speaking for myself, I don't know what the problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are putting forward in the very least. I don't know what relevance this has at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant's argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?
I mean, I only want to know because I don't understand in the least what you are getting at.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is in preparation for the question to which we are now turning, and that is the question of the Speer industries, or the S industries, of these blocked industries, if I may put it that way. Speer wanted to stop the transportation of workersfrom the West into Germany. Therefore, in advance, I have to establish that up to that point his workers, in the main, came from the West. I should like to establish that up until that time.-
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the West; what difference doesit make?
DR. FLAECHSNER: Speer is charged with and accused of the fact that he was active and participated in the deportation of workers from the West, workers which were used in his armament industries. Of course, the date is the important point.
policy from what he had pursued before. Before that time, as we have seen from the evidence, the workers who had come to Germany up until that time, to a large extent, had been voluntary workers.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were all voluntary workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing evidence to that at all.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final reason for this evidence, and I should like to carry it on to that end.
THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don't understand what that end is.
Go on; don't wait any further. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
Q Mr. Speer, the General Plenipotentiary for Labor named Italy and the occupied Western countries as the countries from which the laborers would come into Germany for armament industries.
How did you endorse Sauckel's measures in these countries; to what extent, and how long? his. Up until that period of time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, the refusal of workers to go to Germany increased among the workers of the West. That may be connected with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on Germany. more or less voluntarily. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, only a part of the workers who had been called up, and who were being recruited, came voluntarily to the places to which they were to report. Military Commander-in-Chief in France, I established the so-called Sperr Betriebe Belgium, Holland and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these industries; that is, Sperr Betriebe, or S industries. It was important that each of the workers employed in one of these blocked industries, Sperr Betriebe, automatically was excluded from recruitment and commitment in Germany; and any worker who was recruited to go to Germany was free to go into a blocked industry, or an S industry, in his own country without the labor authorities having the possibility of taking this man out of the S industry that he had entered.
laborers in the occupied Western countries? from the West into Germany decreased to a small fraction. Before that, eighty to a hundred thousand workers came from France into Germany. After the establishment of these blocked industries, or the S industries, this figure decreased to three to four thousand a month, which is an insignificant figure. This may be seen from document RF-22. these figures was also brought about through the resistance movement which, at that time, began to expand considerably in the West. followed by Sauckel?
A No. The first serious differences arose at this time, especially about the blocking of these workers in relation to labor commitments in Germany, This came about through the fact that the loss of workers, whom I had working in production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West. four hundred thousand workers were transported from France to Germany. The production of France, however, decreased by eight hundred thousand workers, and the French workers in France, who worked for Germany, decreased by four hundred and fifty thousand workers. entire German production from the Minister of Economics? German production, since the German peace economy had not been converted into a war economy on a large enough scale. In my opinion, the supply of German women workers was the largest source of labor that I could tap.
of total economy to your sphere of work ?
AAt that time, I had worked out the following plan already. In Germany a large part of industry was concerned with the production of socalled consumer goods. Consumer goods are, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other necessary articles for the civilian population and for the armed forces. In the occupied western territories, however, the means for supplying this were absent where the raw materials were lacking. These industries were lying idle, especially in the western territories, and they had a great potential. were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, out of the sphere of work of German industries and transplanted this phase to the west. One million workers in the final analysis were to be supplied with work in the country itself; and in this way I could use one million German workers for armament.
Q Did you not want to increase armament production in France as well ?
A No. All of these plans were not successful. Before the outbreak of the war, the French government did not succeed in establishing intensified armament production, and I also was unsuccessful in carrying through this plan.
Q What did you intend to do with this now plan ? What advantages did you expect to gain ?
A I shall try to be very brief. Through this plan, In Germany I could ear-mark certain industries for armament; and in that way I received not only workers, but also rooms, and administrative personnel. I also received electricity. Apart from that, these industries, since they never had been important for work, had not received any foreign workers. So in that way, almost exclusively, I received German workers whom I could use for my German production and whom I valued much more in armament production than any foreign workers.
Q Was this plan not detrimental to German armament production ? an industry meant the taking away of a machine, and at the end of the war there would have to be a reconversion which would last at least six to eight months.
At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted to be successful in this war, we would have to be the ones who would have to make the greater sacrifices.
Q How was this plan made into reality ?
THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Flaechsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the details of these plans ? What do we care whether his plans were efficient or whether they were inefficient ? The only question this Tribunal has to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the Charter of international law. It does not matter to us whether his plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT : It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of these plans.
DR. FLAECHSNER : In that way, I wanted to show that that the course followed by the defendant in later policy was to have the German reserves used for his own purposes; that is, the end purposes of armament, and to have the foreign workers work in their own country.
THE PRESIDENT : But, Dr. Flaechsner, that is a question of efficiency, not of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers, good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other western countries.
What have we got to do with that ? If they were forced to work there, it is just as illegal as it is to be brought to Germany to be forced to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the prosecution.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, but I thought and believed-
THE PRESIDENT : (Interposing) The Tribunal will recess.
(A recess was taken)
THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will hear defendants' counsel at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the defendants' counsel's speeches. BY DR. FLAECHSNER :
Q Mr. Speer, please, will you tell us briefly, summarizing how you worked with Mr. Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, and how he agreed on the program; but, please, will you summarize this ? I arranged with Bichelonne that a program of removing goods from Germany to France should operate, which incidentally I have already described, and that the system should be introduced. Bichelonne, in a final conference, stated that he wasn't authorized to talk about labor employment with me but that to the contrary, Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to point out, he said, that a continuation of recruitment of workers to the extent existing at the time would make impossible the program which had been introduced between us and I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the entire production of France, beginning with gold, right up to the final product, should be declared "blocked enterprises", being blocked firms. In this connection, we were both perfectly aware of the fact that this would make almost impossible the recruitment of workers for Germany since, as I have already explained, it was free to every Frenchmann to go to one of these blocked firms once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a lengthy period and in spite of all the difficulty which occurred, I kept that word to him.
DR. FLAECHSNER : Mr. President, in connection with this, I should like to quote from document R-124, which is USA Exhibit 179. It is on page 37 of the English document book. With this, we are concerned with a speech of Sauckel which has been touched upon frequently before the Central Planning Board and I shall only quote from it : " But my agencies on France stated to me the next time I came to France : Everything is at an end here, it is useless to go on; it is stated in all prefectures here : Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with Minister Speer according to which only French workers are considered for employment in France and none of them need go to Germany any more. This coincided with the first large conference."