Q. And how did you prepare that conference?
A. After my return, I went to see von Schuschnigg, and I discussed with him, too, the changed situation which had occurred with my recalling and the replacement in the post of the German minister. I told Herr von Schuschnigg that it appeared to me that in that situation a discussion between the two heads of state regarding the differences which had arisen from the interpretation of the July agreement could only be extremely helpful. The Austrian Foreign Minister, of course, has confirmed here that regarding this personal discussion we had had preliminary conferences since November 1937. talks about every one of the differences. A definite program was not drafted. It was arranged that these conferences should take place entirely on the basis of the July agreement, that is to say that there should be the basis of the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty. The only definite question was this one, the inclusion of a minister into the Autrian cabinet who should be the liaison man of the two states and have the task of taking care of the pacification between the Austrian and German National Socialist Party. That is to say, intervention or interference of the German party with Austrian conditions in the future should thus be made impossible. was demanded that Dr. Seyss-Inquart should receive the Ministry of Security. That demand was entirely unknown to me, and I did not discuss it with Schuschnigg either. It was merely mentioned that a stuiable man, possible SeyeeInquart, should be given the Ministry of the Interior. Today we know from the testimony of witnesses that besides that official conference which I had, there wan the Austrian Party courier who took proposals to Hitler, but proposals that were unknown to me.
Q. Please will you describe the discussions, the confer-
ences at Berchtesgaden.
A. These conferences have already been repeatedly described here. I accompanied Mr. Schuschnigg and Mr. Schmidt there personally, and it is perfectly possible that when I received tham at the German border I told tham that apart from Hitler, they quite probably find one or several generals up there, because quite possibly I had talked to Berchtesgaden on the telephone in the morning and found out that these generals would be present. conferences in normal diplomatic life, but it wasn't quite as dramatic as has been described here by various sources. To my knowledge, these generals who were called in by Hitler the evening before and without my knowledge, did only have effect merely by their presence, and were meant to have that sort of effect. They were not, as far as I know, called into the political conferences, at least not as far as I participated in such political discussions. which he raised against von Schuschnigg, were most unpleasant to my mind, and for that reason I acted as an intermediary repeatedly. I remember very well an incident which happened when Hitler and Schuschnigg were alone together, and when the discussion became extraordinarily loud, I entered the conference room to find that Hitler was accusing Herr von Schuschnigg of not being a German man, of lacking any national feeling, so I found it necessary to intervene and tell Herr Hitler, "You are misjudging Herr von Schuschnigg entirely. Herr von Schuschnigg's thiking is just as German as yours and mine, only he doesn't want the joining of our two countries under the doctrine of state which you are at present representing in Germany." Schuschnigg and Herr Speck which was unknown to me personally, as I have already said.
A number of points were removed from that program after negotiations, as, for instance, the staffing of the Austrian army with General von Tass, and all economic demands, so that when towards the evening the conferencess were coming to an end, I told Herr von Schuschnigg that he had better accept the remainder so that our further peaceful development should not be disturbed.
reservation in connection with this program that the agreement as such would have to be confirmed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian Chancellor's office, so that possibilities for corrections on the part of Austria perfectly obviously existed afterwards.
Q. In one point your story has not been quite clear. Did you arrive simultaneously with Dr. Schuschnigg and Dr. Scmidt at Berchtesgaden, or were you there before, or had you spent the night elsewhere?
A. No, I traveled from Vienna to Salzburg with von Schuschnigg. I spent the night with him there, and together with him I went to Berchtesgaden on the following morning. In other words, I had not been to Berchtesgaden previously. before our visit I told him that generals were up there. I cannot remeber that, but it is possible, because it may be that I put a telephone call through from Salzburg in the morning, during which I was informed of it.
Q. Then, there is one more point which we must supplement in this connection. Schechnigg says that you received him at the border. Perhaps you can elucidate on that point.
A. Von Schuschnigg and I had spent the night together in Salzburg, as I have said. The next morning I went ahead as far as the border, and on the German border I waited for him.
Q. Well then, how did the Berchtesgaden agreement differ from the 11th of July agreement?
A. The result of the Berchtesgaden arrangement was cer-
tainly an enlargement of the agreement of July, but the actual basis of the July agreement, its principles, that is to say, the maintenance of Austria's sovereignty, was not departed from at all. This is confirmed in the two communiques from the two governments which were issued on the occasion of the acceptance of the agreement.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I draw the attention of the Tribunal to Document No.78 on page 174, which is the official communique.
Reichstag speech Hitler delivered on the 20 of February with reference to this subject. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 26th of February you paid an official farewell visit to Schuschnigg. The Prosecution have presented a file reference, a file note in this connection. Please will you speak about this farewell visit?
A. This note from the files obviously *---* what I had communicated to von Ribbentrop by telephone regarding this farewell visit of mine. In this note I draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact -
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this note?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The file note is dated 26 February and was submitted by the Prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE: Document book 11A, page 1.
THE WITNESS: In this file memorandum I mention the pressure brought to bear on Schuschnigg under which he acted as well as the fact that I am communicating this to the Foreign Office to indicate that I dissaproved of this pressure otherwise I would not have made a report about it. On the 26 of February my temporary activities had then also come to an end. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 9th of March, 1938, Schuschnigg proclaimed the plebiscite. Please will you speak about this?
A. The plebiscite announced by Schuschnigg was, of course, a complete surprise. In my view it was contrary to the spirit of the matters which had been agreed upon at Berchtesgaden and contrary to the tendency of a peaceful settlement of the tension. The plebiscite was a violation of the Austrian constitution too. It had not been passed by the Austrian government. It was a spontaneous measure of the Austrian Federal Chancellor and it was quite clear in my opinion that those elements in Austria who were in favor of a joining together of the two states would be most displeased with this plebiscite
Q. The witness Raeder during his testimony and in the speech which was quoted, has said that on the evening of March 9 he had been to your apartment or an exchange of views?
A. Not at all. I was absent from Vienna from the evening of the 26th, as far as I remember, until the 9th of March. On that day I returned to Vienna talked to me.
There was no question of there being anything pre-arranged
Q. Were you in Berlin on the 11th of March?
A. On the evening of the 10th a telephone call reached me at the that same night I was to come to Berlin at once.
I flew to Berlin the arrived at the Reichschancellory.
Why Hitler sent for me I do not know.
I assumed that as this crisis developed he might wish my advice. Possibly he Goebbels, Neurath, secretaries of state and some military persons.
He greeted me with the words:
"The situation regarding Austria is intolerable. Von Schuschnigg is plebiscite by force."
mise given to me by him at Beyreuth. I warn him urgently against hasty decisions but on that morning he told me:
"Either the plebiscite is cancelled or the government will have to resign.
We know from the letter sent to Dr. Seyss by a special courier of this ultimatum submitted to the Austrian government.
At that time he did not inform office.
What was telephoned is something we, who were waiting in the large hall, could only gather by means of fragments, but, of course, today we know it from the documents that we have seen.
There is only one incident which I want to bring up. It was five o'clock in the afternoon. The report was received from Vienna that Schuschnigg's government was prepared to resign. Thereupon, I pressed Hitler that he should now cancel his military orders. Hitler did that. Between five and six o'clock in the afternoon the order was given to the military forces, which had been preparing, cancelling previous orders. On that occasion I congratulated Generals Keitel and Brauchitsch, who were present, that we were saved from that affair. But one hour later the situation was once more entirely different, when a telephone call came through from Vienna stating that the Federal President refused to nominate a government headed by Seyss-Inquart and then Hitler renewed his orders to the troops. government had requested that German troops should march in since otherwise they could not continue to control the situation. I can still see von Neurath standing next to me telling me:
"This is so important a report from Vienna that we have got to have it in wiritng." comes to us from Vienna and the further events of the evening are known and I can only say that I personally was deeply shaken by the solution because it was perfectly clear that if one were to use the army to march into Austria then there could be incidents and there could be blookshed. A renewed bloodshed between our two nations would not only once more compromise the interests of Germany but it would also make the worst possible impression in Europe about the leaders and the conduct of German policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I draw your attention to document 97 or page 241 of the third document book. I beg your pardon, I have noticed it is not yet contained in the book, it is just being presented -- document 97, page 241. It is an affidavit of Thoss, who was a friend of the witness von Papen and who talked to him on the evening of March 11th.
I quote approximately from the middle of the document:
"On the 11th of March, 1938, at the beginning of the march of German troops into Austria, Herr von Papen appeared at the Union Club late in the evening where he very excitedly and despairingly declared:
'I am just coming from the Reichschancellory. I tried to talk Hitler out of the march into Austria and strongly advised against it. But he is committing the madness and just gave the orders for the march into Austria.' BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Did you, Mr. Witness, know anything about the military plan "Case Otto"?
A. The first time I heard about the "Action Otto" was during this trial. Just one moment. This "Case Otto", as it is known, was a theoretical preparation for Germany's march into Austria, in the event of, because of the restoration of the Hapsburgs, the Czechs and Hungarians marching into Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: This is exactly what the defendant was doing just now when I interrupted you. He said he did not know anything about the document and he is now trying to explain it. This is argument, not evidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, quite, Mr. President. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Let us pass on to the next question. which were the documentary proof for the activities in Vienna were to be taken to Switzerland by you. Was this actually carried out by you later on?
A Yes, that was done. My Secretary von Ketteler, took these files to Switzerland at the beginning of March 1938. of your official, Baron von Ketteler after the March of the German troops into Austria? What did you do toward having that case cleared up? Ketteler, had suddenly disappeared. I alarmed the Viennese police at once, as well as Himmler, Heydrich, and DR. Kaltenbrunner. I was promised that there would be an investigayion, and for a long time that investigation was without success Originally I had assumed that von Ketteler, since his relations with the Austria Party had been very bad, had fled, but then a few weeks later it transpired that von Kettelers' body was found in the River Danube below Vienna. son. Upon my intervention, I requested that the body should be examined, and then brought the result that were no signs of any death by force. an act of revenge of the Gestapo against me, my policies, and my friends.
I therefore addressed myself to Goering, under whose command the Gestapo w* and asked for his assistance. Goering demands the files from the Gestapo and to me that there is proof that von Ketteler had prepared an attempt on Hitler's life I state that that is quite out of the question, but then it is ascertained by Goering through the Gestapo that I had taken my files to Switzerland and that Herr von Ketteler had assited in that connection. Goering promises me to negotiate with Hitler and to demand that the Gestapo people who had taken part in this case should be punished. I believe that he actually did that, but sucess upon his intervention was lacking.
Q After your departure from Vienna you retired into private life. Did you have renewed offers for posts abroad as in Austria, were not such that I could have aimed at a new post. I can only say that during the subsequent time, von Ribbentrop asked me twice to go to Ankarra as an ambassador, and that twice I refused. you, Did Hitler award the Golden Party Emblem to you after the march into Vienna Will you please tell us about that?
A That is correct. As we know, it was Hitler's habit after sudden dismissals--and he dismissed me abruptly on 4 February and solved the Austrian question without me--that for the outside world he used to camouflage such acts by Friendly letters and decorations. because I was no longer in an official position, and therefore, there was no reason why I should,have accepted it.
However, my position during those days was so difficult that I did not want to make it any worse. My official, Ketteler, had disappeared, and I had to expect that I might be involved in an official trial because I had removed my files to Switzerland. Thus, I accepted the Emblem, but I deny that by so doing, my membership in the Party is established. I believe that no one who knows me--even amongst the gentlemen in this dock with me--could possibly state that over in my life have I been a National Socialist.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I shall now come to a very brief period during the activities in Turkey. Should I start that now?
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into the affairs after the Anschluss in March 1938, in view of what the Prosecution has stated? I mean, does it throw any light upon the past? As I understand it-
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have completed the entire Austrian complex of questions. I now have to deal only with a very brief subject, which is the defendant's activities during his time as ambassador to Ankarra, and I am asking you whether this would be a suitable moment to begin with this part, or whethwe you now, Mr. President, wish to have the recess. I shall be completely through with this in an hour.
MR. PRESIDENT: I will in a moment, but what I was asking you was Why is it necessary to go into the history of the defendant in Ankarra in view of what the Prosecution have said with reference to their charges against the defendant? As I understand it, the Prosecution have said that they make no charges againsttthe defendant in connection with his work at Ankarra. Unless the history of that time throws light upon the past, upon the time up to March 1938, it does not appear to be relevant to this trial.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In discussing his activities in Turkey, I shall confine myself to very few points, and, quite rightly, they are only to throw light upon the previous activities of the defendant von Papen.
The evidence will, therefore, refer to the fact that in that time the defendant made it quite clear that he was a definite opponent of this war in every one of its phases, and that in every phase of this war he was merely trying to achieve peace. This material from the period in Turkey, is, therefore, t o be rebuttal for the accusation that previously the defendant had been in anyway an active participant in the policy for war. is under the indoctment of conspiracy. If he, in an official post, immediately before the outbreak of war, and during the war,rcommitted certain acts, we must then investigate whether his attitude during that time does not precisely disprove the statement by the Prosecution that before that he had been connected with the plans which were actually carried out during the time he was active in Turkey . The questions are brief.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. In April 1939, under what circumstances were you appointed Ambassador to Ankara? Why did you accept this post? quite extraordinary circumstances. On the day of the occupation of Albania by Italy, Mr. von Ribbentrop called no up and urged me to come to Berlin. There, he explained to me that the post in Ankara, which had been vacant for six months, would immediately have to be filled because of the complications which had arisen from the occupation of Albania in the Southeast, which could arise from the occupation of Albania. Before I accepted this post, I considered carefully whether I could do anything for the Hitler government again, whether I had to do anything. Since the 15th of March, the entry into Prague, we know that we were sitting on a powder keg. In this European question there were two possibilities of conflect; one was the Polish question. I could do nothing acute through the occupation of Albania. I felt that I could do something here in order to contribute to the maintenance of European peace. For that read , I offered my services at this moment to go to Ankara. up the situation there, and then in a written and oral report you explained your opinion. Please comment on this. tical situation because I knew all the leading personalities there. As a result -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren't proposing to take the defendant through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, a you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention, Mr. President, The defendant made a report in Berlin not only to Hitler but also to other agencies. The content of this report shows positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I went into this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report was also in the files of the Foreign office to which I do not have access.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you better deal with the subject but deal with it shortly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I will be very brief. I came back from Turke* I told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to maintain European peace. I sent this memorandum to Keitel and Brauchitsch as well. I stated in this report that it was necessa* in order to keep peace in the Southeastern area, for Italy immediately to give promises to withdraw her military forces from Albania and to adjust her relationship with Turkey in order to prevent any doubt of the uprightness of the Italian policy. A very lively discussion arose on this question between Count Ciano and I. Count Ciano was in Berlin on this day to sign the GermanItalian Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was indignant at the implication and complained to Mr. von Ribbentrop about me. A lively discussion with Mr. von Ribbentrop followed. He told me that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I and that it was not my task to make suggestions about keeping peace. Then I offered my resignation to von Ribbentrop. I told him it was useless under such circumstances for me to be sent to Ankara but Mr. von Ribbentrop withdrew his statement and I wont back. BY Dr. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. In this report, did you warn in general against a war and what reasons did you give for this warning?
A. The memorandum which I gave to General Keitel and Genera Brauchitsch contained a military presentation of the situation. I stated that the beginning of a war about the Polish Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war were to break out, Germany's situation was hopeless, for there was no doubt that England would keep her promise to Poland and that England and France would join Poland.
of war on the 1st of September 1939? war in Ankara, I was astonished. I hoped that Hitler would avoid this step which would plunge us into the greatest misfortune. private secretary of the witness von Papen. I will quote a passage on page 64, the second paragraph from the end:
"The radio announcement of the outbreak of war was heard by me at the Embassy at Ankara together with the Ambassador and all the other colleagues. Afterwards I walked across the Embassy Park with the Ambassador. The Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and shaken. I had never seen him like this before, not even in the darkest days of the 30 June 1934 and not even after the murder of his friend Ketteler. That is why I can recall exactly every word which the ambassador said to me on that occasion 'Remember my words: To have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the greatest madness which Hitler and his people could possibly have committed. Germany can never win this war. All will be buried under the ruins!".
Witness, what were your decisions for the future?
A What could I do? I could either protest---then in order not to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain abroad. I could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I always found that one can work better in one's own country than as an emigrant. I could resign. Then I would return to Germany and become a soldier. The best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and where I could help my fatherland.
Q Now I speak of your various efforts towards peace. Please des-
cribe first your negotiations with the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser. Dutch delegate in Ankara at that time, Dr. Visser. He declared himself willing to have his foreign minister mediate in London. The condition for a peace would naturally, of course, have been the restoration of Poland, with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor question.
I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Mr. von Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin. For that reason, in November of 1939, I went to Berlin personally. Mr. von Ribbentrop told me: "The Fuehrer does not want to hear anything of peace negotiations; please do not take any more steps."
Nevertheless, I went to Hitler. I reported the Dutch offer to him and expressed the wish of the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin personally. Unfortunately, Hitler rejected all of my arguments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of the Court a questionnaire was sent to Mr. Visser, but the questionnaire has not yet been received. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q In 1939 did you make further suggestions towards ending the war? I am thinking of a report on the restoration of legal life in Germany.
A Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report to Mr. von Ribbentrop, for Hitler. In this report I said that the first condition for any peace and for any willingness of other countries to conclude peace would be a change in the present government methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional methods in Germany. I then told Hitler: "If you do this, you will have more credit abroad, and it may be possible to begin peace negotiations." gard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless? no circumstances to undertake or to make any peace feelers; such attempts, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, would be a sign of weakness. initiative, to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the spring of 1941, before the Balkan crisis, I addressed his Majesty, the King of Sweden, with a request to begin peace mediation.
I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inonue, to consider the possibilities of mediation, and President Inonue promised to do so. His Majesty the King of Sweden refused, and said that he did not consider the situation suited for such efforts. The Turkish President asked only that he should be officially requested to mediate, but that, of course, was not done. entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium, and what did you do? the whole first World War, why Germany violated Belgium neutrality. Itwas completely incomprehensible to me that this psychological mistake should be repeated. I expressed this opinion in a letter which I sent, on the 10th of May, to the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser.
Q What did you do in order to avoid the spread of war in the Balkans? Bulgaria, I asked Hitler to send a personal letter to the Turkish President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that under no circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason he had ordered the German troops to remain 40 kilometers away from the Turkish border. Will you briefly give the reasons for that?
A The reason was very simple: to limit the war. Turkey was to know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the war in the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never threaten Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to advance through Turkey to the Suez Canal.
The negotiations were very long and difficult because Mr. von Ribbentrop did not want this treaty to mention Turkey's alliances with the Allies. I then pointed out to Mr. von Ribbentrop that the Turks were in the habit of keeping their treaties.
Q Did you know of Hitler's intentions against Russia? What did you think about the war? prise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both sides but, of course, I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact with Russia and that he would rot begin this war.
of view of German as well as European interests, as a crime. did you continue your efforts towards peace? no peace could be established with the Hitler Government. My friends and I--including military friends--discussed this question. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the so-called Beck plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness Gisevius. This plan, at that time, did not intend to eliminate Hitler through an attack on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters surrounded by troops and then to try Hitler. The reasons for this were obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war had to come to an end, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler because they were of the opinion that Hitler still had great prestige.
removed, no one knew what the allies would do with us.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more shortly Dr. Kubuschok.
THE WITNESS: I shall be very brief. As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to learn what the allies would do with Germany in such a case. For this purpose, I turned to the American Minister Earl, who reported on the matter to the press.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 93, Page 214. This is the interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call as a witness, but who could not come because of transportation difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to question 7 is:
"My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt of the mediation of general world peace between all belligerent countries. Prior to all steps towards peace, I engaged in detailed discussions with Ambassador von Papen and was always supported by him to the utmost extent with verve, although every peacestep was forbidden to him and was at least just as perilous to his life as to myself. He also brought me together with a number of foreigners, above all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop Roncalli.
"when in 1942 I resolved to travel to the Vatican, Ambassador von Papen not only urgently advised me to make the journey but also personally procured all the necessary papers and passports for me to Rome, where in spite of the special, express prohibition of the Reich Government I suggested a world-peace drive of Pope Pius XIII with all belligerent powers to Cardinal Maglione and the diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop Montini.
"When in April, 1944, the opportunity presented itself to me to establish contact with George Earl, former ambassador to Vienna and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt with whom I had already been personally acquainted for a long time, Papen again helped me in every possible way. He even took it upon himself --"
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that the defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace?
Then you can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which confirm what the defendant says.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will not read any further this answer to Question 8. to Mr. Kirkpatrick. He points out in the letter that in 1939, already, the defendant von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so that on the basis of his international connections he could work towards peace. He describes the difficulties in connection with this plan, which, however, was carried out by Papen. The letter also describes further peace efforts with Admiral Horthy and King Boris of Bulgaria. Gisevius and to bring documents in support of that. I wish to prove that von Papen wasnot received unfavorably in a circle of conspirators of the 20th of July, but on the contrary that he was promised the office of a foreign minister. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events of the 20th of July, was sent to a concentration camp. This is to explain the character of the witness. In Document 90 Bismarck points out that in case of a change of government, Papen placed himself at their disposal. News was sent to Herr von Trott, who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was condemned to death following the events of the 20th of July. of the witness von Papen. Pfeil points out that Count Stauffenberg intended to have the defendant made foreign minister later. By DR. KUBUSCHOK: the Party?
A My attitude towards the Party was extraordinarily poor. For years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Turkey. This man told my embassy officials, "Mr. von Papen belongs in a concentration camp, or he must be shot."