Would you please describe your activities in settling that incident? counsel because it is a typical example of Hitler's attempts, even during the days before 1938, to come to an aggressive policy in Austria. was hauled down by an Austrian civil servant. There was great excitement in the press about it. I tried to settle the matter in a friendly way with the Foreign Minister of Austria. Thereupon I received a telegram to come to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported to Hitler, but Hitler refused to see me. I waited three days and then, after three days, Iwrote a letter and told him: "It appears that you are trying to use the flag incident of Pinkfield to conduct an aggressive policy in Austria. Therefore, there is nothing else for me to do and I am applying for your permission to resign."
A quarter of an hour later I was called to the Reich Chancellory by him. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour. He was furious and almost out of his mind regarding the humiliations, he said, which the German Reich could not tolerate any longer. June ruled that the policy with Austria was to be conducted in an evolutionary manner, and that the agreement of July 11th emphasized that. I said: "If you wish to conduct your policy differently, then dismiss me."
At this very serious conversation Hitler told me: "No, no. You go back and you settle everything; we don't want to change our peaceful policy." the Austrian Foreign Minister within 24 hours. which you were pursuing?
policy. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I talked to the British ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: "I wrote a letter."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we haven't got that one; we haven't got that letter, and neither have we a copy in the files, because the files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin through air attacks.
THE WITNESS: My Lord, perhaps 1 may add that the Foreign Minister of Austria has confirmed the incident and the course it took, in this room. Herr von Neurath also knows the incident intimately.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Foreign Minister who confirmed it?
THE WITNESS: The Austrian Foreign Minister Schmidt, who was here as a witness; witness Guide Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
A (Continuing) Now, with reference to that question, may I remark that of course I talked to representatives of other powers about our Austrian Policy quite often. For instance, in June of 1937 I talked about it to Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin.
In 1937 I visited Paris, incognito.
There I talked to many of the leading politicians about the problen, among then the Preident of France, M. Daladier, and M. Leon Blum. I assured these gentleman that a solution of the Austrian problem was being attempted by us on an evolutionary basis only, and that the joining of the two states which we were hoping for would never mean a threat to the interests of France. I said that, to the contrary, we were looking for that solution only, within the European framework; that is to say, with France's agreement. well as in France, the realization was growing that the necessity for a settlement existed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof for the fact that the defendant could have been convinced that the other powers--based on an evolutionary development in Austria--might eventually be prepared to come to an agreement, I submit document number 74, at page 169. It is a report from von Papen to Hitler about the conversations which he has hinted at with Neville Henderson, on the 1st of June 1937. point out that Henderson has stated that he was well disposed towards a solution of the Austrian problem, and that he was hoping to exercise corresponding influence in Paris. 177. It is a statement of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Spaak, after the Anschluss. I draw your attention to the last sentence: "I have believed for a long time that the Anschluss corresponds to the logic of facts, and if it had been accomplished in a normal way, I would not have been astouneded by it". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith alleges that the Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid for with German funds. Did you ever raise or submit any funds for that purpose?
A. I personally, or through agencies of the German Embassy never paid a penny to the Austrian Party. It is perfectly possible, and even probable, that monies from the German Party flooded into Austria. But since, as is known, I did not enjoy the confidence of the Party in either country, I was never informed about any such transactions.
funds for that support fund which has already been mentioned here, the Langott support fund. with your report to Hitler on the 12th of May, in which you suggest that the Freedom Union should be supported financially with reference to its fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom Union? Union and the Christian Workers' Union. It was led by the president of the trade union. In 1934, Dollfuss had taken over its lead. It would be utterly ridiculou* that this Freedom Union, which consisted mostly of Catholic workers, should be accused of an anti-Semitic attitude in the sense of the National Socialist attitude in that respect.
Something the Freedom Union did fight for was the cleansing of Vienna's administration of unsuitable Jewish elements. The question of this estrangement was very similar to the conditions existing in Germany at the time, and about which I spoke in detail yesterday. Apart from this, this report presented by the Prosecution shows that I had learned that the Czechs were wishing to establish close connections with this Freedom Union, and that, for this purpose, they wished to support the Freedom Union with considerable amounts of money. Freedom Union through Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it ourselves. But naturally we could not tell this Freedom Union, "We are now going to give you money so that you will not go ever to the Czechs". For that reason, I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys with reference to the continuation of the fight of the Freedom Union against Jewry. This was camouflaged, in other words. If I had wanted to give this money for the fight against Jewry, then I should not have written "with reference to", but "for the continuation of the fight".
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Document 32 on Page 112 of the document book. This is an excerpt from the Austrian Annual Book of 1933-1934, an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of the second paragraph, in which it is explained that the League for Freedom originated from the Cristian Worker's Union and the Christian Trade Union.
quote:
"At the beginning of 1934, late federal chancellor, Dollfuss, took over the supreme Leadership of the League of Freedom".
I also draw your attention to Document No. 72 on Page 166. It is a report of von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes instructions from the Prague secret service. What is interesting in this connection is a reference to the fact that the freedom Union is working towards an understanding with social democracy.
The next document is No. 70. It has already been presented as GB 243. Czech diplomacy.
This is Document 70, on Page 164. This is the document which has been submitted by the prosecution under GB 243, at least part of it. The first paragraph is important, mentioning the activities of Czech diplomacy, Just as the defendant mentioned it a few minutes ago. von Papen contained on Page 167, Document No. 73. I merely want to draw your attention to it.
Another report of von Papen is interesting, Document 69, Page 163. It shows that there were efforts to include the Freedom Union in the political constellation of that time. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, in the summer of 1937, Schuschnigg was making efforts to get the national opposition to collaborate. What do you know about it, and what were the further developments?
A In the summer of 1937, Schuschnigg was making efforts to keep the promis* that the national opposition should be brought in to collaborate. The visit of Minister Glaise-Horstenau to Hitler in June, 1937, took place with Schushnigg's agreement. Later he founded the so-called 7-man committee with Dr. Jury and Tofe. in any way. Obviously these pacifying measures of the chancellor were not far reaching enough for the party in Austria, or they were too slow.
The Austrian police found, in November of 1937, in the office of this 7-man committee, papers known under the name of Tofs Papers, which indicated there were new, illegal, and radical in tentions.
The Austrian Government did not in anyway inform me of these papers, and no official demarche took place. But I did learn that amongst these papers there was a plan of assassination against me. The proposal was made that there should be an attempt on my life, and that for that reason there should then be a march into Austria. yesterday in this court room, and it appears to me that this proposal, this plan against me, seems the best probable proof of just how much harmony existed between my policy and that of the Austrian or German National Socialists.
was including Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who was known to me, into this pacification work. I consider it is fair for me to make a correction in this connection. The Austrian Foreign Minister has reported about a conversation which he had with me in October, '34 at Ankara. I told him at that time -- and I have repeated it during my interrogations here before the trial -- that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had been the greatest disappointment of my life. I assumed that it had been he who, after the march into Austria of the German troops on the 11th of March, was the responsible party for the Notification of Austria after the Anschluss. I have to correct that judgment of mine after having gained the knowledge which we have today on the strength of documents. recalled from Vienna was prince Erbach. His successor was an embassy councilor, von Stein. Since, after you had been recalled on February the 4th, 1938, he took over your office, it would be interesting to know what his attitude was towards both the party and you. von Stein was appointed to the embassy's council by special request of the party because he could carry out, or was to carry out control over my policy in the sense of the party. Herr von Stein was an ardent National Socialist. His relationship to me was entirely different to that I had with his predecessor, Erbach, but I want to state that during that period, too, I continued to pursue my original political line and that von Stein merely had the running of the technical affairs.
Q The Hoszbach document of November 5, '34 has been mentioned frequently -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the translation came through "'34". It was '37, wasn't it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: '37, My Lord, yes, 5th of November, '37. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
which forms the basis for this document? document of the prosecution I did, of course, never have as much as a hint. The first time I have seen the document was here in this court room. But if I may be permitted to say something in connection with this document, then it is this: The connection between events of the 11th of March and this document appear to me to be rather loose just the same, because this document indicates that Hitler was only intending to carry out the march into Austria by force -- that is the Anschluss -- if the constellation in Europe would make this possible. He expected this constellation to be apparent in the years '43 to '45.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this is mere argument, isn't it? He says he never saw the document until he came into this court. He is now arguing to us about his connection with the events of March, 1938. Well, that is a matter for you, not for the defendant.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well then, I shall deal with that BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, on the 4th of February, 1938, you were dismissed from your post in Vienna, much to your surprise. Please will you report the details of this to the Tribunal? see Hitler. I had talked to him about the conversation which I had had with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch and there were no indications of any kind that he intended to dismiss me from his service. That was communicated to me by telephone by Dr. Lammers on the 4th of February. The sudden and for me unfounded dismissal in connection with von Fritsche's and Bromberg's dismissal and the dismissal of other leading diplomats led, of course, to one final conclusion. I was quite aware of the fact that with this recall there was a change, of course, which was at least probable. The following day I talked about this to the Austrian Foreign Ministe* and I communicated my worries to him.
Subsequently, in a note to the Austrian government, I took leave of them. Then the following day -- I beg your pardon. First of all I have to say this: This development, through my being recalled, appeared so serious to me that in the evening of the 4th I decided that my entire political reports, made during those four years, should be removed into Switzerland. I wanted to be in a position to prove to the world that I, during those four years, had pursued a peaceful and evolutionary policy in Austria; I wanted to be in a position to prove this to the outside world if it should happen that Hitler would commit an aggression. The decision, particularly for a high official to do this, was certainly not easy, because I would have to bear all consequences which this prohibitive file might bring. Subsequent to that, I went to Hitler. I felt the urge to tell him that even if he didn't want me any more, then he should at least find another reasonable and moderate man and send him to Austria. During the discussion which I had with him he did not speak about the reasons for which he was dismissing me. I had suspected that this had been a wish of Herr von Ribbentrop, who had become Foreign Minister on this 4th of February, but Hitler told me that this was not the case. During the discussion about the Austrian situation, I told Hitler, among other things, that I regretted very much that he had recalled me because, particularly during recent weeks, Chancellor Schuschnigg had declared himself prepared to have a personal conference with Hitler during which all differences between the two states should be removed as far as possible. When Hitler heard this, he told me: "If that is the case, then I should be very glad if you would go back to arrange for this discussion with Herr von Schuschnigg." I told him: "That is rather a peculiar task. Yesterday you have recalled me and today you want me to go back, but of course, if there is something I can do in the interest of this Austrian problem, if I can bring about such a di cussion I am only too willing to do it."
Q. And how did you prepare that conference?
A. After my return, I went to see von Schuschnigg, and I discussed with him, too, the changed situation which had occurred with my recalling and the replacement in the post of the German minister. I told Herr von Schuschnigg that it appeared to me that in that situation a discussion between the two heads of state regarding the differences which had arisen from the interpretation of the July agreement could only be extremely helpful. The Austrian Foreign Minister, of course, has confirmed here that regarding this personal discussion we had had preliminary conferences since November 1937. talks about every one of the differences. A definite program was not drafted. It was arranged that these conferences should take place entirely on the basis of the July agreement, that is to say that there should be the basis of the maintenance of Austrian sovereignty. The only definite question was this one, the inclusion of a minister into the Autrian cabinet who should be the liaison man of the two states and have the task of taking care of the pacification between the Austrian and German National Socialist Party. That is to say, intervention or interference of the German party with Austrian conditions in the future should thus be made impossible. was demanded that Dr. Seyss-Inquart should receive the Ministry of Security. That demand was entirely unknown to me, and I did not discuss it with Schuschnigg either. It was merely mentioned that a stuiable man, possible SeyeeInquart, should be given the Ministry of the Interior. Today we know from the testimony of witnesses that besides that official conference which I had, there wan the Austrian Party courier who took proposals to Hitler, but proposals that were unknown to me.
Q. Please will you describe the discussions, the confer-
ences at Berchtesgaden.
A. These conferences have already been repeatedly described here. I accompanied Mr. Schuschnigg and Mr. Schmidt there personally, and it is perfectly possible that when I received tham at the German border I told tham that apart from Hitler, they quite probably find one or several generals up there, because quite possibly I had talked to Berchtesgaden on the telephone in the morning and found out that these generals would be present. conferences in normal diplomatic life, but it wasn't quite as dramatic as has been described here by various sources. To my knowledge, these generals who were called in by Hitler the evening before and without my knowledge, did only have effect merely by their presence, and were meant to have that sort of effect. They were not, as far as I know, called into the political conferences, at least not as far as I participated in such political discussions. which he raised against von Schuschnigg, were most unpleasant to my mind, and for that reason I acted as an intermediary repeatedly. I remember very well an incident which happened when Hitler and Schuschnigg were alone together, and when the discussion became extraordinarily loud, I entered the conference room to find that Hitler was accusing Herr von Schuschnigg of not being a German man, of lacking any national feeling, so I found it necessary to intervene and tell Herr Hitler, "You are misjudging Herr von Schuschnigg entirely. Herr von Schuschnigg's thiking is just as German as yours and mine, only he doesn't want the joining of our two countries under the doctrine of state which you are at present representing in Germany." Schuschnigg and Herr Speck which was unknown to me personally, as I have already said.
A number of points were removed from that program after negotiations, as, for instance, the staffing of the Austrian army with General von Tass, and all economic demands, so that when towards the evening the conferencess were coming to an end, I told Herr von Schuschnigg that he had better accept the remainder so that our further peaceful development should not be disturbed.
reservation in connection with this program that the agreement as such would have to be confirmed by the Austrian Government and the Austrian Chancellor's office, so that possibilities for corrections on the part of Austria perfectly obviously existed afterwards.
Q. In one point your story has not been quite clear. Did you arrive simultaneously with Dr. Schuschnigg and Dr. Scmidt at Berchtesgaden, or were you there before, or had you spent the night elsewhere?
A. No, I traveled from Vienna to Salzburg with von Schuschnigg. I spent the night with him there, and together with him I went to Berchtesgaden on the following morning. In other words, I had not been to Berchtesgaden previously. before our visit I told him that generals were up there. I cannot remeber that, but it is possible, because it may be that I put a telephone call through from Salzburg in the morning, during which I was informed of it.
Q. Then, there is one more point which we must supplement in this connection. Schechnigg says that you received him at the border. Perhaps you can elucidate on that point.
A. Von Schuschnigg and I had spent the night together in Salzburg, as I have said. The next morning I went ahead as far as the border, and on the German border I waited for him.
Q. Well then, how did the Berchtesgaden agreement differ from the 11th of July agreement?
A. The result of the Berchtesgaden arrangement was cer-
tainly an enlargement of the agreement of July, but the actual basis of the July agreement, its principles, that is to say, the maintenance of Austria's sovereignty, was not departed from at all. This is confirmed in the two communiques from the two governments which were issued on the occasion of the acceptance of the agreement.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I draw the attention of the Tribunal to Document No.78 on page 174, which is the official communique.
Reichstag speech Hitler delivered on the 20 of February with reference to this subject. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 26th of February you paid an official farewell visit to Schuschnigg. The Prosecution have presented a file reference, a file note in this connection. Please will you speak about this farewell visit?
A. This note from the files obviously *---* what I had communicated to von Ribbentrop by telephone regarding this farewell visit of mine. In this note I draw the attention of the Foreign Office to the fact -
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this note?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The file note is dated 26 February and was submitted by the Prosecution.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL_FYFE: Document book 11A, page 1.
THE WITNESS: In this file memorandum I mention the pressure brought to bear on Schuschnigg under which he acted as well as the fact that I am communicating this to the Foreign Office to indicate that I dissaproved of this pressure otherwise I would not have made a report about it. On the 26 of February my temporary activities had then also come to an end. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 9th of March, 1938, Schuschnigg proclaimed the plebiscite. Please will you speak about this?
A. The plebiscite announced by Schuschnigg was, of course, a complete surprise. In my view it was contrary to the spirit of the matters which had been agreed upon at Berchtesgaden and contrary to the tendency of a peaceful settlement of the tension. The plebiscite was a violation of the Austrian constitution too. It had not been passed by the Austrian government. It was a spontaneous measure of the Austrian Federal Chancellor and it was quite clear in my opinion that those elements in Austria who were in favor of a joining together of the two states would be most displeased with this plebiscite
Q. The witness Raeder during his testimony and in the speech which was quoted, has said that on the evening of March 9 he had been to your apartment or an exchange of views?
A. Not at all. I was absent from Vienna from the evening of the 26th, as far as I remember, until the 9th of March. On that day I returned to Vienna talked to me.
There was no question of there being anything pre-arranged
Q. Were you in Berlin on the 11th of March?
A. On the evening of the 10th a telephone call reached me at the that same night I was to come to Berlin at once.
I flew to Berlin the arrived at the Reichschancellory.
Why Hitler sent for me I do not know.
I assumed that as this crisis developed he might wish my advice. Possibly he Goebbels, Neurath, secretaries of state and some military persons.
He greeted me with the words:
"The situation regarding Austria is intolerable. Von Schuschnigg is plebiscite by force."
mise given to me by him at Beyreuth. I warn him urgently against hasty decisions but on that morning he told me:
"Either the plebiscite is cancelled or the government will have to resign.
We know from the letter sent to Dr. Seyss by a special courier of this ultimatum submitted to the Austrian government.
At that time he did not inform office.
What was telephoned is something we, who were waiting in the large hall, could only gather by means of fragments, but, of course, today we know it from the documents that we have seen.
There is only one incident which I want to bring up. It was five o'clock in the afternoon. The report was received from Vienna that Schuschnigg's government was prepared to resign. Thereupon, I pressed Hitler that he should now cancel his military orders. Hitler did that. Between five and six o'clock in the afternoon the order was given to the military forces, which had been preparing, cancelling previous orders. On that occasion I congratulated Generals Keitel and Brauchitsch, who were present, that we were saved from that affair. But one hour later the situation was once more entirely different, when a telephone call came through from Vienna stating that the Federal President refused to nominate a government headed by Seyss-Inquart and then Hitler renewed his orders to the troops. government had requested that German troops should march in since otherwise they could not continue to control the situation. I can still see von Neurath standing next to me telling me:
"This is so important a report from Vienna that we have got to have it in wiritng." comes to us from Vienna and the further events of the evening are known and I can only say that I personally was deeply shaken by the solution because it was perfectly clear that if one were to use the army to march into Austria then there could be incidents and there could be blookshed. A renewed bloodshed between our two nations would not only once more compromise the interests of Germany but it would also make the worst possible impression in Europe about the leaders and the conduct of German policy.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection I draw your attention to document 97 or page 241 of the third document book. I beg your pardon, I have noticed it is not yet contained in the book, it is just being presented -- document 97, page 241. It is an affidavit of Thoss, who was a friend of the witness von Papen and who talked to him on the evening of March 11th.
I quote approximately from the middle of the document:
"On the 11th of March, 1938, at the beginning of the march of German troops into Austria, Herr von Papen appeared at the Union Club late in the evening where he very excitedly and despairingly declared:
'I am just coming from the Reichschancellory. I tried to talk Hitler out of the march into Austria and strongly advised against it. But he is committing the madness and just gave the orders for the march into Austria.' BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Did you, Mr. Witness, know anything about the military plan "Case Otto"?
A. The first time I heard about the "Action Otto" was during this trial. Just one moment. This "Case Otto", as it is known, was a theoretical preparation for Germany's march into Austria, in the event of, because of the restoration of the Hapsburgs, the Czechs and Hungarians marching into Austria.
THE PRESIDENT: This is exactly what the defendant was doing just now when I interrupted you. He said he did not know anything about the document and he is now trying to explain it. This is argument, not evidence.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, quite, Mr. President. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Let us pass on to the next question. which were the documentary proof for the activities in Vienna were to be taken to Switzerland by you. Was this actually carried out by you later on?
A Yes, that was done. My Secretary von Ketteler, took these files to Switzerland at the beginning of March 1938. of your official, Baron von Ketteler after the March of the German troops into Austria? What did you do toward having that case cleared up? Ketteler, had suddenly disappeared. I alarmed the Viennese police at once, as well as Himmler, Heydrich, and DR. Kaltenbrunner. I was promised that there would be an investigayion, and for a long time that investigation was without success Originally I had assumed that von Ketteler, since his relations with the Austria Party had been very bad, had fled, but then a few weeks later it transpired that von Kettelers' body was found in the River Danube below Vienna. son. Upon my intervention, I requested that the body should be examined, and then brought the result that were no signs of any death by force. an act of revenge of the Gestapo against me, my policies, and my friends.
I therefore addressed myself to Goering, under whose command the Gestapo w* and asked for his assistance. Goering demands the files from the Gestapo and to me that there is proof that von Ketteler had prepared an attempt on Hitler's life I state that that is quite out of the question, but then it is ascertained by Goering through the Gestapo that I had taken my files to Switzerland and that Herr von Ketteler had assited in that connection. Goering promises me to negotiate with Hitler and to demand that the Gestapo people who had taken part in this case should be punished. I believe that he actually did that, but sucess upon his intervention was lacking.
Q After your departure from Vienna you retired into private life. Did you have renewed offers for posts abroad as in Austria, were not such that I could have aimed at a new post. I can only say that during the subsequent time, von Ribbentrop asked me twice to go to Ankarra as an ambassador, and that twice I refused. you, Did Hitler award the Golden Party Emblem to you after the march into Vienna Will you please tell us about that?
A That is correct. As we know, it was Hitler's habit after sudden dismissals--and he dismissed me abruptly on 4 February and solved the Austrian question without me--that for the outside world he used to camouflage such acts by Friendly letters and decorations. because I was no longer in an official position, and therefore, there was no reason why I should,have accepted it.