My entire pacification would have been made impossible from the beginning through it.
eign Minister Schmidt in connection with how many of such activities of mine were entirely unkown.
Q. I also refer to Glaise-Horstenau's testimony in this connection.
Further, Mr. Messersmith says that you had said to him during this discussion that you were using your good reputation as a good Catholic in connection with certain Austrian clergymen, for instance, Cardinal Innitzer. He "goes on to say that even without any scruples you had used your wife's reputation,who was a devout Catholic, for the same political ends. Messersmith?
A. Of all the accusations raised against me, this is the one that hurt most deeply. I can understand that you can criticize the policy pursued by a diplomat and how it is interpreted, but I cannot understand that one can accuse somebody of using his own religious conviction for dirty, political, commercial purposes. And I can understand it even less, and I find that it lacks taste that someone states that I even used the religious beliefs of my wife for such a purposes. Tribunal.
Q. Mr. Messersmith in his affidavit, refers to a document, the authori of which, however, he fails to mention. This document had been shown to Foreign Minister Berger-Waldeneck in 1939, and although the contents of your conference with Hitler, Schacht and von Neurath on the occasion of your visit to Berlin had yet to become known for the next two years, the avoidance of intervention iito Austria's inner political affairs was supposed to have been mentioned and finally Dr. Schacht is supposed to have promised two hundred thousand marks monthly for the support of the National Socialists in Austria.
What do you have to say to that statement of Dr. Messersmith?
A. According to Mr. Messersmith's statement, this is quite obviously the report of an agent which the Austrian Foreign Minister had received with reference to my returning to Berlin. The contents of that report are mostly wrong. The incorrectness with regard to the passage referring to Dr. Schacht has already been emphasized passionately by Dr. Schacht, but in that report there is something which is true. Austria, which was managed by a certain Langott. It has already been testified in this courtroom that this support fund for the women and children of Austrian National Socialists who had emigrated into Germany existed with the knowledge of the Austrian Government and police. But I had neither requested Mr. Schacht to make available official funds for this support fund, nor have I paid any such finance over myself. Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection therewith, I refer to GlaiseHorestenau's testimony before this Tribunal when he said that the Austrian Government know of the Langott support fund. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith believes that from information received from the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Waldeneck, he can permit himself to re-produce the following statement made by you in 1935.
"Yes, now you have your French and English friends and your independence can be maintained a little longer".
Had you said anything like that?
A. Such a statement would not only have been extremely foolish diplomatically, but impossible, because it would have meant an end of any diplomatic activity. In no case could the cooperation, which Mr. Messersmith states went on for years, or as he calls it "the policy of deceit"-- in no case could that be tallied with such an open admission to the effect that I would only allow Austrian independence to remain intact for a brief period.
Q. Mr. Messersmith goes on to say in his affidavit, that you had publicly assured that you wished to get rid of certain members of the Austrian Gove nment, among then Chancellor Schuschnigg. Is that true?
A. The contrary is true. I never aimed at removing Chancellor Schuschnigg. On the contrary, it was my aim to see that he should have confidence in my policy and a policy of understanding. I knew von Schuschningg as an upright Austrian patriot but also as a man who did not by any means deny his German ties.
In spite of many pertinent differences of opinion this German trend, German streak of his always presented an excellent basis for our collaboration and I could only add that if a diplomat desires that changes in a government should come about to which he is accredited, then would he state that before the broad public. and they have submitted it as proof for the fact that you wanted to tempt Schusehnigg into a government collaborating with the National Socialists -which is document U.S.A. Exhibit 64. In my document book it is once more contain ed under document number 66 on page 159 and 160.
What, Mr. Witness, were your real intentions?
A I must be a little more explicit with reference to this document. This report was written eight months after Dollfuss assassination, that is to say during a *ime of which even the Prosecution themselves have said that during the first two years it had been my instructions to remain entirely passive. When this report was written we had news that Starhemberg was pursuing a policy together with Mussolini which would place serious hurdles in the way of an understanding between Austria and Germany. That is the reason why I am suggesting to Hitler an acute and immediate intervention. And I proposed that Schuschnigg should be played up against the hostile Christian Socialists elements in the country. I suggest that there should be an offer of a final coordination of Austrian and German interests. a state and if it were to undertake that the national opposition in Austria, that is to say the Nazis, are to remain uninfluenced, then that would have to lead to a coalition between these powers. situation.
Q. Just now you explained that you were pursuing the honest policy of coordinating the interests -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal would like to understand more clearly what the defendant means by what he just said.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I have just been told that the English translation came over extremely badly. Would you suggest, Mr. President, that the defendant repeat the entire answer?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, most certainly. That is the best way. I think it is very unlikely that the English translation came over badly. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Witness, will you please answer once again, but this time more slowly so that the interpreters encounter no difficulties.
A. When this report was written, we had news that Starhemberg-Starhemberg being the chief of the Home Guard - had joined Mussolini in a policy which would in the future mean a fight against any pro-German tendencies in Austria. In order to counter that maneuver of Starhemberg's, I am telling Hitler that he should suggest to Schuschnigg that, instead of coming to a condition with the Home Guard, he should do so with the Christian Socialists, who were not opposed to an understanding between Austria and Germany. In order to cause him, Schuschnigg, to enter into such a coalition, it was porposed that Hitler should offer him one final coordination of Germany's and Austria's interests; in other words, Hitler should tell him that Germany recognizes the independence of Austria and will undertake that in the future she will not intervene in the internal affairs of Austria. this being the combination of the French, Italians, the Czechoslovaks, who were always in favor of the pact of the Danube powers, with the inclusion of Austria. we feared that if Austria were to join a Danube Pact, then this would estrange Germany once and for all. If, on the other hand, we were to be good friends with Austria, and our relations were once more put in order, then we could, as I say here to Hitler, we might and could join this Danube Pact and by this means achieve something most constructive in favor of European pacification.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not forgetting your hopes that you expressed this morning? DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Just now you said that you were in favor of an honest policy and coordination of interests. Is it true that you were influencing Hitler with reference to his Reichstag speech on 31 May 1936 and he should make a statement in favor of Austria's independence?
A. Yes, that is perfectly true, because that statement was the prerequisite for normalizing the conditions and exchanging the views and interest of a revolutionary nature. Our joint policy could only be advanced from Austria. Austria was the country which, in the peace treaty of St. Germain and the protocol in Geneva, had been ordered to remain away from Germany. if Austria, therefore, were to take up the initiative and improve relations with Germany, then it was a prerequisite that we should first recognize its sovereignty.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I draw your attention to a mistake in the translation In the translation of the words spoken by the defendant, it was said "revolutionary character", instead of "evolutionary character". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Will you please refer to the pact of July 1935.
A. The agreement of July 11 was described by Sir David as a maneuver of deception. It was described as an attempt to get the Austrian government into renewed difficulties, to undermine it by means of introducing pro-German men like Glaise-Horstenau or Foreign Minister Schmidt. This judgment passed upon the pact is entirely incorrect, and I think historically untenable. The examinations here and the statements made by the Austrian Foreign Minister have, in fact, proved it. normal relationships between the two brother nations. The agreement was the wish of both governments, not only the German government, and Chancellor Schuschnigg admitted that himself.
It is contained in a report of mine of 1 September 1936, which deals with a speech made by Schuschnigg before Austrian workers. Why should the Austrian government have concluded this pact -- there was no coercion to conclude it -- unless they themselves had wanted it, unless they themselves had wanted to bring about normal, friendly relations with the German Reich?
It was for that very reason that I had asked Hitler to declare Austria's sovereignty in his Reichstag speech. That agreement was by no means meant to forego all wishes for a later joint getting together, but it recognized Austria's independence to act, Austria's freedom to act. The aim of the joining to the two states was now to be pursued in a proper and evolutionary manner. July. There was a second part of that agreement which had not been published. That second part contained all the elements necessary for a pacification. There was to be an amnesty, and the press relations were to be regulated, and the so-called "1,000 mark bar" was to be lifted, which was a frontier bar imposed upon people travelling into Austria which had been decreed by Hitler. Any German wanting to travel to Austria would have to pay 1,000 marks, and this bar was removed. promised that men in his confidence, members of the national opposition, were to be brought in to cooperate in Austria. It appeared to us that the inclusion of the Austrian opposition into the Parliamentary procedure of Austria would hive to be a condition for that peaceful solution; in other words, the Party should gradually emerge from its illegal status and become a legal factor.
Mr. Messersmith, if I may add this, states in his affidavit -- and erroneously -- that Part 2 of this pact or agreement contained a clause that a number of persons who were in the Chancellor's confidence should be called to positions in the Cabinet. That, obviously, is an error of thought on Mr. Messersmith's part, because we were not here concerned with people who had Hitler's confidence, but such person's who had Schuschnigg's confidence. This was an agreement or an arrangement made by Schuschnigg.
Apart from this, Mr. Messersmith says in this connection, with reference to this agreement, that the first penetration of German nationals into the Austrian Government was achieved through the nomination of Dr. Guido Schmidt to the position of Secretary of State for foreign Affairs. This is utterly incorrect. Dr. Schmidt was an Austrian and he was making Austrian policy. He was representing Austrian interests, which was absolutely natural. At no time did Germany exert any influence to make him, Dr. Schmidt, Foreign Minister. agreement as an instrument of peace and a great step forward. It was left to the prosecution to call it a maneuver of deception.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Erbach's affidavit, document number 96, which, in the English book, is on page 233 and 234. I refer to questions numbers 4 to 7, and questions 12 and 13. They deal with the subject which we have just discussed. That is questions 4 to 7 and questions 12 and 13. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: mission in Austria as terminated?
A Yes, I considered it as being at an end. That is proved by my application to resign, which I wrote on the 16th of July, 1936, and addressed to Hitler.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to document number 71, page 165, and I quote the beginning. That is the second document.
"On the 26th of July, 1934, you proposed to the late Field Marshal that I should be sent to Vienna on a temporary mission, for the restoration of normal and friendly relations.
"With the agreement signed on 11 July, the decisive stop has been taken in this direction."
go on to quote the last but one paragraph:
"Even though the German question will need very careful and considerate handling in the future too, especially after the incredible difficulties which have gone before, I would like now, at the end of the task you entrusted to me, to lay my office back in your hands." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: September 1936 -- the number is PS-2246 -- and they are accusing you of having remained in contact with the illegal leaders of the Austrian National Socialists, that you had attempted to bring that opposition into the Fatherland Front, and also that you intended to change the Schuschnigg regime. normalizing the relations to Germany, which was hindered by the staying power of the Ministry of Security, where the old officials opposed to National Socialism were located, and that therefore changes of personnel were urgent. If, therefore, I used the expression in this report "changes of the regime", then that means, in its proper sense, "changes of personnel". In that connection I go on to say, in the following sentence, that there will be economic negotiations in the near future. This shows quite clearly that with those words we are not concerned with the removal of Schucchnigg's person. in the Danube theater, and it contains a proposal for a peaceful solution. communicated with the Nazi opposition, although the July agreement had excluded any intervention in Austrian affairs, then I must say that I was perfectly entitled to such keeping in touch because I was interested in ascertaining whether and how far Herr von Schuschnigg would keep his promise if he were to bring the National Opposition in for collaboration. of July is proved by the statement of Leopold of January 1937, which Mr.
Messersmith has attached to his own affidavit.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to document number 75, on page 171, which contains this file reference of file note of Leopold's. The document is identical with the appendix, which has the number USA Exhibit 57. There is an error in the English translation. In the fifth last line, on page 1, the word "Anschluss" has been translated by "annexation". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, what do you have to say about Leopold's statement?
A Leopold's proposals show the following:
The leaders of the Austrian Nazis were fully accepting the policy containe* in the July agreement. They recognized that in the future the question of the Anschluss would be an internal Austrian affair, which would be solved by the Austrian Government. It was proposed that the solution would be found in an evolutionary manner by the Austrian Government. They were in favor of a solution where, by means of the declaration of sovereignty for Austria, these arguments would, in the future, no longer represent foreign political dangers for the Reich. 17 June-A-JF-23-1-Williams by the Austrian National Socialists and approved of, and that they are prepared to find a legal way, together with the Austrian government.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
(An adjournment was taken until 1000 hours, Tuesday, 18 June, 1946) Official Transcript of the International Military BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:1937.
Would you please describe your activities in settling that incident? counsel because it is a typical example of Hitler's attempts, even during the days before 1938, to come to an aggressive policy in Austria. was hauled down by an Austrian civil servant. There was great excitement in the press about it. I tried to settle the matter in a friendly way with the Foreign Minister of Austria. Thereupon I received a telegram to come to Berlin at once. I arrived in Berlin and reported to Hitler, but Hitler refused to see me. I waited three days and then, after three days, Iwrote a letter and told him: "It appears that you are trying to use the flag incident of Pinkfield to conduct an aggressive policy in Austria. Therefore, there is nothing else for me to do and I am applying for your permission to resign."
A quarter of an hour later I was called to the Reich Chancellory by him. He gave me a lecture, which lasted half an hour. He was furious and almost out of his mind regarding the humiliations, he said, which the German Reich could not tolerate any longer. June ruled that the policy with Austria was to be conducted in an evolutionary manner, and that the agreement of July 11th emphasized that. I said: "If you wish to conduct your policy differently, then dismiss me."
At this very serious conversation Hitler told me: "No, no. You go back and you settle everything; we don't want to change our peaceful policy." the Austrian Foreign Minister within 24 hours. which you were pursuing?
policy. For instance, in the summer of 1937 I talked to the British ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this letter which the witness speaks of been produced, or a copy of it? He has spoken of a letter to Hitler: "I wrote a letter."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, we haven't got that one; we haven't got that letter, and neither have we a copy in the files, because the files of the witness were destroyed in Berlin through air attacks.
THE WITNESS: My Lord, perhaps 1 may add that the Foreign Minister of Austria has confirmed the incident and the course it took, in this room. Herr von Neurath also knows the incident intimately.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the Foreign Minister who confirmed it?
THE WITNESS: The Austrian Foreign Minister Schmidt, who was here as a witness; witness Guide Schmidt.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
A (Continuing) Now, with reference to that question, may I remark that of course I talked to representatives of other powers about our Austrian Policy quite often. For instance, in June of 1937 I talked about it to Sir Neville Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin.
In 1937 I visited Paris, incognito.
There I talked to many of the leading politicians about the problen, among then the Preident of France, M. Daladier, and M. Leon Blum. I assured these gentleman that a solution of the Austrian problem was being attempted by us on an evolutionary basis only, and that the joining of the two states which we were hoping for would never mean a threat to the interests of France. I said that, to the contrary, we were looking for that solution only, within the European framework; that is to say, with France's agreement. well as in France, the realization was growing that the necessity for a settlement existed.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: As proof for the fact that the defendant could have been convinced that the other powers--based on an evolutionary development in Austria--might eventually be prepared to come to an agreement, I submit document number 74, at page 169. It is a report from von Papen to Hitler about the conversations which he has hinted at with Neville Henderson, on the 1st of June 1937. point out that Henderson has stated that he was well disposed towards a solution of the Austrian problem, and that he was hoping to exercise corresponding influence in Paris. 177. It is a statement of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, Spaak, after the Anschluss. I draw your attention to the last sentence: "I have believed for a long time that the Anschluss corresponds to the logic of facts, and if it had been accomplished in a normal way, I would not have been astouneded by it". BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Mr. Messersmith alleges that the Nazi propaganda in Austria had been paid for with German funds. Did you ever raise or submit any funds for that purpose?
A. I personally, or through agencies of the German Embassy never paid a penny to the Austrian Party. It is perfectly possible, and even probable, that monies from the German Party flooded into Austria. But since, as is known, I did not enjoy the confidence of the Party in either country, I was never informed about any such transactions.
funds for that support fund which has already been mentioned here, the Langott support fund. with your report to Hitler on the 12th of May, in which you suggest that the Freedom Union should be supported financially with reference to its fight against Jewry. What was this Freedom Union? Union and the Christian Workers' Union. It was led by the president of the trade union. In 1934, Dollfuss had taken over its lead. It would be utterly ridiculou* that this Freedom Union, which consisted mostly of Catholic workers, should be accused of an anti-Semitic attitude in the sense of the National Socialist attitude in that respect.
Something the Freedom Union did fight for was the cleansing of Vienna's administration of unsuitable Jewish elements. The question of this estrangement was very similar to the conditions existing in Germany at the time, and about which I spoke in detail yesterday. Apart from this, this report presented by the Prosecution shows that I had learned that the Czechs were wishing to establish close connections with this Freedom Union, and that, for this purpose, they wished to support the Freedom Union with considerable amounts of money. Freedom Union through Czech politics should be eliminated by supporting it ourselves. But naturally we could not tell this Freedom Union, "We are now going to give you money so that you will not go ever to the Czechs". For that reason, I proposed to Hitler that he should give these moneys with reference to the continuation of the fight of the Freedom Union against Jewry. This was camouflaged, in other words. If I had wanted to give this money for the fight against Jewry, then I should not have written "with reference to", but "for the continuation of the fight".
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer you to Document 32 on Page 112 of the document book. This is an excerpt from the Austrian Annual Book of 1933-1934, an official publication. I draw your attention to the beginning of the second paragraph, in which it is explained that the League for Freedom originated from the Cristian Worker's Union and the Christian Trade Union.
quote:
"At the beginning of 1934, late federal chancellor, Dollfuss, took over the supreme Leadership of the League of Freedom".
I also draw your attention to Document No. 72 on Page 166. It is a report of von Papen to Hitler in which he quotes instructions from the Prague secret service. What is interesting in this connection is a reference to the fact that the freedom Union is working towards an understanding with social democracy.
The next document is No. 70. It has already been presented as GB 243. Czech diplomacy.
This is Document 70, on Page 164. This is the document which has been submitted by the prosecution under GB 243, at least part of it. The first paragraph is important, mentioning the activities of Czech diplomacy, Just as the defendant mentioned it a few minutes ago. von Papen contained on Page 167, Document No. 73. I merely want to draw your attention to it.
Another report of von Papen is interesting, Document 69, Page 163. It shows that there were efforts to include the Freedom Union in the political constellation of that time. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, in the summer of 1937, Schuschnigg was making efforts to get the national opposition to collaborate. What do you know about it, and what were the further developments?
A In the summer of 1937, Schuschnigg was making efforts to keep the promis* that the national opposition should be brought in to collaborate. The visit of Minister Glaise-Horstenau to Hitler in June, 1937, took place with Schushnigg's agreement. Later he founded the so-called 7-man committee with Dr. Jury and Tofe. in any way. Obviously these pacifying measures of the chancellor were not far reaching enough for the party in Austria, or they were too slow.
The Austrian police found, in November of 1937, in the office of this 7-man committee, papers known under the name of Tofs Papers, which indicated there were new, illegal, and radical in tentions.
The Austrian Government did not in anyway inform me of these papers, and no official demarche took place. But I did learn that amongst these papers there was a plan of assassination against me. The proposal was made that there should be an attempt on my life, and that for that reason there should then be a march into Austria. yesterday in this court room, and it appears to me that this proposal, this plan against me, seems the best probable proof of just how much harmony existed between my policy and that of the Austrian or German National Socialists.
was including Dr. Seyss-Inquart, who was known to me, into this pacification work. I consider it is fair for me to make a correction in this connection. The Austrian Foreign Minister has reported about a conversation which he had with me in October, '34 at Ankara. I told him at that time -- and I have repeated it during my interrogations here before the trial -- that Dr. Seyss-Inquart had been the greatest disappointment of my life. I assumed that it had been he who, after the march into Austria of the German troops on the 11th of March, was the responsible party for the Notification of Austria after the Anschluss. I have to correct that judgment of mine after having gained the knowledge which we have today on the strength of documents. recalled from Vienna was prince Erbach. His successor was an embassy councilor, von Stein. Since, after you had been recalled on February the 4th, 1938, he took over your office, it would be interesting to know what his attitude was towards both the party and you. von Stein was appointed to the embassy's council by special request of the party because he could carry out, or was to carry out control over my policy in the sense of the party. Herr von Stein was an ardent National Socialist. His relationship to me was entirely different to that I had with his predecessor, Erbach, but I want to state that during that period, too, I continued to pursue my original political line and that von Stein merely had the running of the technical affairs.
Q The Hoszbach document of November 5, '34 has been mentioned frequently -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the translation came through "'34". It was '37, wasn't it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: '37, My Lord, yes, 5th of November, '37. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
which forms the basis for this document? document of the prosecution I did, of course, never have as much as a hint. The first time I have seen the document was here in this court room. But if I may be permitted to say something in connection with this document, then it is this: The connection between events of the 11th of March and this document appear to me to be rather loose just the same, because this document indicates that Hitler was only intending to carry out the march into Austria by force -- that is the Anschluss -- if the constellation in Europe would make this possible. He expected this constellation to be apparent in the years '43 to '45.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, this is mere argument, isn't it? He says he never saw the document until he came into this court. He is now arguing to us about his connection with the events of March, 1938. Well, that is a matter for you, not for the defendant.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well then, I shall deal with that BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Mr. Witness, on the 4th of February, 1938, you were dismissed from your post in Vienna, much to your surprise. Please will you report the details of this to the Tribunal? see Hitler. I had talked to him about the conversation which I had had with Dr. Seyss-Inquart at Garmisch and there were no indications of any kind that he intended to dismiss me from his service. That was communicated to me by telephone by Dr. Lammers on the 4th of February. The sudden and for me unfounded dismissal in connection with von Fritsche's and Bromberg's dismissal and the dismissal of other leading diplomats led, of course, to one final conclusion. I was quite aware of the fact that with this recall there was a change, of course, which was at least probable. The following day I talked about this to the Austrian Foreign Ministe* and I communicated my worries to him.
Subsequently, in a note to the Austrian government, I took leave of them. Then the following day -- I beg your pardon. First of all I have to say this: This development, through my being recalled, appeared so serious to me that in the evening of the 4th I decided that my entire political reports, made during those four years, should be removed into Switzerland. I wanted to be in a position to prove to the world that I, during those four years, had pursued a peaceful and evolutionary policy in Austria; I wanted to be in a position to prove this to the outside world if it should happen that Hitler would commit an aggression. The decision, particularly for a high official to do this, was certainly not easy, because I would have to bear all consequences which this prohibitive file might bring. Subsequent to that, I went to Hitler. I felt the urge to tell him that even if he didn't want me any more, then he should at least find another reasonable and moderate man and send him to Austria. During the discussion which I had with him he did not speak about the reasons for which he was dismissing me. I had suspected that this had been a wish of Herr von Ribbentrop, who had become Foreign Minister on this 4th of February, but Hitler told me that this was not the case. During the discussion about the Austrian situation, I told Hitler, among other things, that I regretted very much that he had recalled me because, particularly during recent weeks, Chancellor Schuschnigg had declared himself prepared to have a personal conference with Hitler during which all differences between the two states should be removed as far as possible. When Hitler heard this, he told me: "If that is the case, then I should be very glad if you would go back to arrange for this discussion with Herr von Schuschnigg." I told him: "That is rather a peculiar task. Yesterday you have recalled me and today you want me to go back, but of course, if there is something I can do in the interest of this Austrian problem, if I can bring about such a di cussion I am only too willing to do it."