However, my position during those days was so difficult that I did not want to make it any worse. My official, Ketteler, had disappeared, and I had to expect that I might be involved in an official trial because I had removed my files to Switzerland. Thus, I accepted the Emblem, but I deny that by so doing, my membership in the Party is established. I believe that no one who knows me--even amongst the gentlemen in this dock with me--could possibly state that over in my life have I been a National Socialist.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I shall now come to a very brief period during the activities in Turkey. Should I start that now?
THE PRESIDENT: Why is it necessary to go into the affairs after the Anschluss in March 1938, in view of what the Prosecution has stated? I mean, does it throw any light upon the past? As I understand it-
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I have completed the entire Austrian complex of questions. I now have to deal only with a very brief subject, which is the defendant's activities during his time as ambassador to Ankarra, and I am asking you whether this would be a suitable moment to begin with this part, or whethwe you now, Mr. President, wish to have the recess. I shall be completely through with this in an hour.
MR. PRESIDENT: I will in a moment, but what I was asking you was Why is it necessary to go into the history of the defendant in Ankarra in view of what the Prosecution have said with reference to their charges against the defendant? As I understand it, the Prosecution have said that they make no charges againsttthe defendant in connection with his work at Ankarra. Unless the history of that time throws light upon the past, upon the time up to March 1938, it does not appear to be relevant to this trial.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In discussing his activities in Turkey, I shall confine myself to very few points, and, quite rightly, they are only to throw light upon the previous activities of the defendant von Papen.
The evidence will, therefore, refer to the fact that in that time the defendant made it quite clear that he was a definite opponent of this war in every one of its phases, and that in every phase of this war he was merely trying to achieve peace. This material from the period in Turkey, is, therefore, t o be rebuttal for the accusation that previously the defendant had been in anyway an active participant in the policy for war. is under the indoctment of conspiracy. If he, in an official post, immediately before the outbreak of war, and during the war,rcommitted certain acts, we must then investigate whether his attitude during that time does not precisely disprove the statement by the Prosecution that before that he had been connected with the plans which were actually carried out during the time he was active in Turkey . The questions are brief.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken).
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. In April 1939, under what circumstances were you appointed Ambassador to Ankara? Why did you accept this post? quite extraordinary circumstances. On the day of the occupation of Albania by Italy, Mr. von Ribbentrop called no up and urged me to come to Berlin. There, he explained to me that the post in Ankara, which had been vacant for six months, would immediately have to be filled because of the complications which had arisen from the occupation of Albania in the Southeast, which could arise from the occupation of Albania. Before I accepted this post, I considered carefully whether I could do anything for the Hitler government again, whether I had to do anything. Since the 15th of March, the entry into Prague, we know that we were sitting on a powder keg. In this European question there were two possibilities of conflect; one was the Polish question. I could do nothing acute through the occupation of Albania. I felt that I could do something here in order to contribute to the maintenance of European peace. For that read , I offered my services at this moment to go to Ankara. up the situation there, and then in a written and oral report you explained your opinion. Please comment on this. tical situation because I knew all the leading personalities there. As a result -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, you aren't proposing to take the defendant through all the intricacies of Turkish politics, a you?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not my intention, Mr. President, The defendant made a report in Berlin not only to Hitler but also to other agencies. The content of this report shows positive activity for the maintenance of peace. That is why I went into this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got the report?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, this report was also in the files of the Foreign office to which I do not have access.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, you better deal with the subject but deal with it shortly.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.
THE WITNESS: I will be very brief. I came back from Turke* I told Hitler in a report what had to be done in order to maintain European peace. I sent this memorandum to Keitel and Brauchitsch as well. I stated in this report that it was necessa* in order to keep peace in the Southeastern area, for Italy immediately to give promises to withdraw her military forces from Albania and to adjust her relationship with Turkey in order to prevent any doubt of the uprightness of the Italian policy. A very lively discussion arose on this question between Count Ciano and I. Count Ciano was in Berlin on this day to sign the GermanItalian Alliance. When I made my suggestions to him, he was indignant at the implication and complained to Mr. von Ribbentrop about me. A lively discussion with Mr. von Ribbentrop followed. He told me that he was in charge of German foreign policy and not I and that it was not my task to make suggestions about keeping peace. Then I offered my resignation to von Ribbentrop. I told him it was useless under such circumstances for me to be sent to Ankara but Mr. von Ribbentrop withdrew his statement and I wont back. BY Dr. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. In this report, did you warn in general against a war and what reasons did you give for this warning?
A. The memorandum which I gave to General Keitel and Genera Brauchitsch contained a military presentation of the situation. I stated that the beginning of a war about the Polish Corridor would of necessity lead to a world war. If such a world war were to break out, Germany's situation was hopeless, for there was no doubt that England would keep her promise to Poland and that England and France would join Poland.
of war on the 1st of September 1939? war in Ankara, I was astonished. I hoped that Hitler would avoid this step which would plunge us into the greatest misfortune. private secretary of the witness von Papen. I will quote a passage on page 64, the second paragraph from the end:
"The radio announcement of the outbreak of war was heard by me at the Embassy at Ankara together with the Ambassador and all the other colleagues. Afterwards I walked across the Embassy Park with the Ambassador. The Ambassador was extraordinarily excited and shaken. I had never seen him like this before, not even in the darkest days of the 30 June 1934 and not even after the murder of his friend Ketteler. That is why I can recall exactly every word which the ambassador said to me on that occasion 'Remember my words: To have provoked this war is the greatest crime and the greatest madness which Hitler and his people could possibly have committed. Germany can never win this war. All will be buried under the ruins!".
Witness, what were your decisions for the future?
A What could I do? I could either protest---then in order not to be shot as a traitor in Germany, I would have to remain abroad. I could emigrate. I would never have done that, for I always found that one can work better in one's own country than as an emigrant. I could resign. Then I would return to Germany and become a soldier. The best thing, it seemed to me, was to remain where I was and where I could help my fatherland.
Q Now I speak of your various efforts towards peace. Please des-
cribe first your negotiations with the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser. Dutch delegate in Ankara at that time, Dr. Visser. He declared himself willing to have his foreign minister mediate in London. The condition for a peace would naturally, of course, have been the restoration of Poland, with a corresponding adjustment of the Corridor question.
I reported this possibility for peace negotiations to Mr. von Ribbentrop, but it seemed to me that it was not followed up in Berlin. For that reason, in November of 1939, I went to Berlin personally. Mr. von Ribbentrop told me: "The Fuehrer does not want to hear anything of peace negotiations; please do not take any more steps."
Nevertheless, I went to Hitler. I reported the Dutch offer to him and expressed the wish of the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser, to come to Berlin personally. Unfortunately, Hitler rejected all of my arguments.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I wish to point out that with the approval of the Court a questionnaire was sent to Mr. Visser, but the questionnaire has not yet been received. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q In 1939 did you make further suggestions towards ending the war? I am thinking of a report on the restoration of legal life in Germany.
A Yes. In December of 1939 I sent a detailed report to Mr. von Ribbentrop, for Hitler. In this report I said that the first condition for any peace and for any willingness of other countries to conclude peace would be a change in the present government methods in Germany; that is, a return to constitutional methods in Germany. I then told Hitler: "If you do this, you will have more credit abroad, and it may be possible to begin peace negotiations." gard to peace efforts, and what did you do nevertheless? no circumstances to undertake or to make any peace feelers; such attempts, in the opinion of the Foreign Office, would be a sign of weakness. initiative, to do everything to shorten the war. For that reason, in the spring of 1941, before the Balkan crisis, I addressed his Majesty, the King of Sweden, with a request to begin peace mediation.
I also asked the President of Turkey, Ismet Inonue, to consider the possibilities of mediation, and President Inonue promised to do so. His Majesty the King of Sweden refused, and said that he did not consider the situation suited for such efforts. The Turkish President asked only that he should be officially requested to mediate, but that, of course, was not done. entry of German troops into Holland and Belgium, and what did you do? the whole first World War, why Germany violated Belgium neutrality. Itwas completely incomprehensible to me that this psychological mistake should be repeated. I expressed this opinion in a letter which I sent, on the 10th of May, to the Dutch delegate, Dr. Visser.
Q What did you do in order to avoid the spread of war in the Balkans? Bulgaria, I asked Hitler to send a personal letter to the Turkish President. In this letter he assured the Turkish President that under no circumstances did he intend to fight Turkey, and for that reason he had ordered the German troops to remain 40 kilometers away from the Turkish border. Will you briefly give the reasons for that?
A The reason was very simple: to limit the war. Turkey was to know that in spite of our alliance with Italy, in spite of the war in the Balkans, in spite of the war with Greece, we would never threaten Turkey. Turkey was also to know that we would not attempt to advance through Turkey to the Suez Canal.
The negotiations were very long and difficult because Mr. von Ribbentrop did not want this treaty to mention Turkey's alliances with the Allies. I then pointed out to Mr. von Ribbentrop that the Turks were in the habit of keeping their treaties.
Q Did you know of Hitler's intentions against Russia? What did you think about the war? prise to us. We had heard of the massing of troops on both sides but, of course, I assumed and hoped that Hitler would keep his pact with Russia and that he would rot begin this war.
of view of German as well as European interests, as a crime. did you continue your efforts towards peace? no peace could be established with the Hitler Government. My friends and I--including military friends--discussed this question. In the fall of 1943 I was initiated into the so-called Beck plan, which has been mentioned here by the witness Gisevius. This plan, at that time, did not intend to eliminate Hitler through an attack on his life, but the intention was to have his headquarters surrounded by troops and then to try Hitler. The reasons for this were obvious. Even if many generals were of the opinion that this war had to come to an end, they were afraid of taking action against Hitler because they were of the opinion that Hitler still had great prestige.
removed, no one knew what the allies would do with us.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks this should be taken more shortly Dr. Kubuschok.
THE WITNESS: I shall be very brief. As a result of all these considerations, I attempted to learn what the allies would do with Germany in such a case. For this purpose, I turned to the American Minister Earl, who reported on the matter to the press.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 93, Page 214. This is the interrogatory of Freiherr von Lersner, whom I wanted to call as a witness, but who could not come because of transportation difficulties. On Page 214, the answer to question 7 is:
"My activities for the mediation of peace negotiations were always based on my own initiative and extended to the attempt of the mediation of general world peace between all belligerent countries. Prior to all steps towards peace, I engaged in detailed discussions with Ambassador von Papen and was always supported by him to the utmost extent with verve, although every peacestep was forbidden to him and was at least just as perilous to his life as to myself. He also brought me together with a number of foreigners, above all with the Apostolic Delegate to Istanbul, Archbishop Roncalli.
"when in 1942 I resolved to travel to the Vatican, Ambassador von Papen not only urgently advised me to make the journey but also personally procured all the necessary papers and passports for me to Rome, where in spite of the special, express prohibition of the Reich Government I suggested a world-peace drive of Pope Pius XIII with all belligerent powers to Cardinal Maglione and the diplomatic director of the Curia, Bishop Montini.
"When in April, 1944, the opportunity presented itself to me to establish contact with George Earl, former ambassador to Vienna and Sofia, the friend of President Roosevelt with whom I had already been personally acquainted for a long time, Papen again helped me in every possible way. He even took it upon himself --"
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) These are details. Is it not sufficient to say that the defendant said that he endeavored in every way to make peace?
Then you can refer, if you like, to any interrogatories or affidavits which confirm what the defendant says.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I will not read any further this answer to Question 8. to Mr. Kirkpatrick. He points out in the letter that in 1939, already, the defendant von Papen intended to bring Lersner to Turkey, so that on the basis of his international connections he could work towards peace. He describes the difficulties in connection with this plan, which, however, was carried out by Papen. The letter also describes further peace efforts with Admiral Horthy and King Boris of Bulgaria. Gisevius and to bring documents in support of that. I wish to prove that von Papen wasnot received unfavorably in a circle of conspirators of the 20th of July, but on the contrary that he was promised the office of a foreign minister. Count Bismarck, in the course of the events of the 20th of July, was sent to a concentration camp. This is to explain the character of the witness. In Document 90 Bismarck points out that in case of a change of government, Papen placed himself at their disposal. News was sent to Herr von Trott, who worked in the Foreign Office. Trott was condemned to death following the events of the 20th of July. of the witness von Papen. Pfeil points out that Count Stauffenberg intended to have the defendant made foreign minister later. By DR. KUBUSCHOK: the Party?
A My attitude towards the Party was extraordinarily poor. For years I waged a battle with the Landesgruppenleiter of the Party in Turkey. This man told my embassy officials, "Mr. von Papen belongs in a concentration camp, or he must be shot."
I had a *ong struggle to have this man removed.
Q What did you do during that time regarding church matters? my position with respect to the Church. That means that I took all such institutions in Turkey under my personal protection.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 53, Page 141 and Document 51, Page 138. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: period in Turkey? Jews. A long party trial took place because German members of my embassy had consulted a Jewish doctor. I defended these officials of mine against this charge, and I refused to take the passports from the German Jews in Turke* and to deprive them of their citizenship.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 95, Page 227. This is the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. In questions 4, 5, and 6 it discusses this problem. The answer to Question 6, the last paragraph, is so noteworthy; yet, on the other hand, the witness von Papen has not yet mention it.
I should like to quote it. Page 229, the last paragraph of the answer to Question 6: "I remember particularly clearly an incident in spring of 1944, when I called upon von Papen at the request of Herr Barlas, the Refugee's Commissioner of the Jewish Agency, in order to request his assistance in saving 10,000 Jews in France from deportation to Poland for extermination.
There Jews had formerly held Turkish nationality which they had later renounced. Herr von Papen complied with my wish and through is intervention the lives of these Jews were saved, which I learned a short time later from Mr. Barlas himself."
I continue: "Details of this incident, with which Mr. Steinhardt, then United States Ambassador in Ankara, Mr. Numan Menemencioglo, then Foreign Minister of Turkey, were acquainted, can be obtained by questioning Herr Baslas."
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to point out to you again, Dr. Kubuschok, that you have taken very much longer than you said you were going to take.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In a very few minutes I will be finished, Mr. President. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q I ask the last question. When, on the 2nd of August, 1944, Turkey broke off relations with German, why did you return to Germany? Why did you not remain in Turkey and why did you not separate finally from Germany? and Germany were broken off, the English Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, said the following in the House of Commons: "The breaking off of relations between Turkey and Germany will have many consequences, including consequences for Mr. von Papen. On the 30th of June he escaped the blood bath. This time he will not succeed."As a result, I received requests from the Allies to remain in Turkey. I refused to do so. I said: "I shall return to Germany where I belong. I will not emigrate. Perhaps It will still be possible to do something for my Fatherland." And so I returned to Germany. When I arrived there I observed that, as a result of the terror methods which had been launched after the 20th of July, there was no possibility to do anything at all. For the rest of the time a Gestapo guard was placed before my door.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I refer to Document 95, Page226, which has already been mentioned, the interrogatory of Professor Marchionini. I refer to the answer to Question 3. I should like very briefly to read the last half of this answer in connection with the problem just mentioned by the witness: "The last conversation on this subject took place on the 2nd of August, 1944, on the eve of his final departure from Ankara after the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and Turkey. To my advice not to leave Turkey and to address an appeal from here to the German people and the German Army to overthrow Hitler and discontinue the senseless war, von Papen answered in substance as follows: ' I have learned from history that dictatorships cannot be done away with from within a foreign country; one must be in the country itself in order to fight the regime effectively. I have therefore determined to return to Germany and there to conduct the fight against the Hitler regime and thereby hasten the end of the war. "
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of defense counsel want to ask any questions?
DR. VON LUEDINGHAUSEN: Dr. von Leudinghausen, for the defendant von Neurath? BY DR. VON LEUDINGHAUSEN:
Q Mr. von Papen, I should like to ask you a few questions, with the permission of the Court. Since when have you known von Neurath? von Hindenburg, that Mr. von Neurath wasto be taken into your government as Reich Foreign Minister, your government which you formed in 1932?
Q Did you know, from the previous activity of Mr. von Neurath in his various positions, as ambassador, specifically, that in his last position in London, Mr. von Neurath was a follower, one of the most prominent representatives of a peaceful policy?
Q Did you yourself approve this peace policy?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you are going a little too fist. Go on.
Q Did you yourself approve of this peace policy?
A Of course I approved this policy. Otherwise, we could not have been working together in this cabinet.
Q Did Mr. von Neurath, a few months later, take any part in the negotiations for the transfer of the Reich Chancelleryship to Hitler? dition that Mr. von Neurath was to be retained as Reich Foreign Minister in the new Hitler government? of Hindenburg.
Q And what was Hitler's attitude? Did he accept this condition only in order to be able to form the government or did he approve Hindenburg's choice? Minister.
Q Did you yourself ever talk to Hitler about this? fidence -- that he thought highly of Mr. von Neurath's experience.
Q And did you ever speak to Mr. von Neurath about it?
Q Was he ready to do this? Was he willing to do this or not? I imagine that Mr. von Neurath shared my inner reservations. what were the foreign political aims and efforts of Hitler?
A Hitler's foreign political aims at that time were quite limited, abolition of discrimination by peaceful means add strengthening of the German position in the world. dicatijg that he might be determined to use arms if his peaceful efforts did not have the desired result?
A I never heard from Hitler of any such intentions.
Q Was it always asserted in leading party circles? Were such bloody intentions expressed?
A I never learned that, in the Party. Even the most radical National Socialists ever spoke of the idea of a war. the peaceful policy of von Neurath?
Q Now, Mr. Von Neurath is charged with cooperating in the rearmament of Germany. What was the reason and the motive of Hitler for this rearmament?
had resigned from the cabinet. Butas far as I am informed, all of my former colleagues held the view that rearmament would only have the purpose of giving Germany defensive protection along her borders.
Q Now I come to the problem of Austria. Do you know the attitude of Mr. von Neurath on the Austrian problem?
A The position of Mr. von Neurath in the Austrian problem was the same as my position, and like myself he constantly protested in the cabinet against the terror measures instituted by the Party in 33 and 34. to Vienna, under von Neurath? Did you receive instructions from him or only from Hitler?
A I was not subordinate to Mr. von Neurath. I had asked that I might be directly under Hitler, but of course I reported to Mr. von Neurath and the Foreign Office about all steps which I took,as is shown by the documents submitted here.
Q What was the attitude of Mr. von Neurath toward the negotiations in the summer of 36 which led to the treaty of the 25th of July between Germany and Austria?
A The 11th of July. Mr. von Neurath had exactly the same opinion is I, that this treaty was to and had to serve a final cause of peace between these two peoples.
Q Did he attempt to influence Hitler to this effect?
A I don't know, but I assume so.
Q And was he honest and upright in this treaty? What is your opinion? I point out that the Prosecution asserts and charges Mr. von Neurath that this treaty was concluded with a treacherous intention. against the charge of treacherous intention. Mr. von Neurath had such intentions as little as I did.
Do you know what attitude Mr. von Neurath held as to Germany's leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference in 1933?
A Yes, I know that very well. Mr. von Neurath was of the opinion that it was advisable to leave the Disarmament Conference, but like me he was of the opinion that it was a mistake to leave the League of Nations. With his approval, as I told the court yesterday, I followed Hitler to Munich in order to persuade him not to leave the League of Nations.
DR. VON LUEDINHAUSEN: I have no more questions.
DR. SEIDL (Counsel for defendants Hess and Frank): With the approval of the court, I should like to represent Dr. Stahmer and ask questions on behalf of the defendant Goering. BY DR. SEIDL: your friend Ketteler in 1938, you applied to Goering because he was in charge of the Gestapo. Is it not a fact, and were you not aware of this fact, that from 1936 on, at the latest, the Gestapo was exclusively under Himmler, and was formerly under the Reich Minister of the Interior? Austria I did not know that fact. It has been established here, in any case, I had the feeling when I applied to Goering that he was in a position to defend me against the Gestapo, and after Hitler had refused to speak to me on this matter it was only natural that I should turn to him as the second man in German
DR. SEIDL: I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine?
Sir David, would you prefer to start after the adjournment?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I was thinking that I might have the documents arranged then and it might be more convenient forthe Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: We will sit again at 5 minutes to 2.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I am very much obliged, your Lordship.
(A recess was taken until 1355 hours).
(The hearing reconvened at 1355 hours, June 18, 1946.) BY SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFFE: ember of last year that your present view was that Hitler was the greatest cro* that you had ever seen in your life?
A That is quite true. That was the opinion which I arrived at after I learned here of all the crimes.
Q Well, that was on the 19 September,1945. But I am more interested in your next answer. Wasn't that when you were asked when you made your mind up that Hitler was the greatest crook you had over seen in your life.
"Only after I have known the facts after which he statrted to go to war."
Do you remember saying that?
Q Was not that rather a long time for you to discover that somewhat obvi* truth after your close cooperation with Hitler?
A My opinion about Hitler and his inner political significance was compl* ely clear after the 30th June, 1934. But somewhat as all other human beings, I could assume in the field of foreign politics at least he would be sensible and I was of this opinion until after the Munich agreement.
Q Well now, just let us see whether you had not had an opportunity of fo* ing that view much earlier. When you were Reichschancellor in 1932 it was necessary for you to aquaint yourself with the personalities and aims and methods of the Nazi Party, was it not?
Q And you did so, did you not? but you may take it as an exact quotation -- that on the 16th of November, 1932 Hitler wrote to you and said:
"You must be aware of my attitude, the attitude of my Party."
a coalition with another party it has to eliminate a great deal of its program and form a coalition program. That was what Hitler did on the 30th of January. your view in 1932. You had very little doubt in 1932, during the period of your chancellorship that if Hitler got into power Germany was in danger of being ruled by violent and unconstitutional methods, had you not, if Hitler got into power? this connection but I explained in detail to the Court that when we came to this forcible solution of the 30th of January we incorporated a number of safeguards and drew up a joint coalition program which in our opinion eliminated the points of danger which you have mentioned. of 1932, that it would be most dangerous to put power into Hitler's hands, was it not? ing his power which the Tribunal will find in document book 11A on page 43. This will be GB 495. The number is 3309-PS.
This was after, in August 1932. According to Meissner:
"Hindenberg stated that because of the tense situation he could not in good conscience risk transferring the power of government to a new party, such as the National Socialists, which did not command a majority and which was intolerant, noisy and undisciplined."
That is a very moderate statement of the Reich President's views at that time, is it not? talking about if the National Socialists came into power themselves -- It was obvious to you that they had few scruples and would make short work of their political opponents, is that not so?
A One cannot say that. In political life it is always so that a radical party, any party, but particularly radical parties if they come to power and are made responsible have to eliminate much of their program.
For example, we saw that in the case of the Socialist Parties of all countries. told you in 1932 that whtever else the Nazis would do Hitler would not become a "vice" or second man; that he would oppose any political set-up which did not give him the first place?
Is that correct? opportunity to put their program and intentions into effect, did you not?
A No, I did not know that. That is a statement which you make here which does not correspond to the conditions at that time. You need only to consider the Government program of our coalition of the 1st of February. coalition of January the 30th. For the moment I am just asking you one or twe questions about your view of Hitler and Hindenberg's view of Hitler in 1532 because I want to take it by very quick but very clear statges.
I am still asking you about 1932. The question I put to you was: wanted and would only be content with a full opportunity of putting their program and intentions into effect? 1933 to bring them into a joint coalition program. that your views as to what was necessary for Germany in the second half of 1932 was an easing of the political differences and strife internally and an adjustment of relations with the western powers to ease the requirements of Versaille. I am trying to put it quite shortly as I understand it from you. That is right? to be vice-Chancellor in your Government in August 1932, was it not? ber 1932, is that not right?