On the 24th, Hindenburg received Monsignor Kaas, the leader of the Center Party.
He declared that Hitler had not even tried to find out whether a majority government could be formed, but Monsignor Kaas promised the Reich President to try once more to form a majority government. attempt had been in vain, that the leader of the Nazi fraction, at that time Mr. Frick, had stated that the Party would not be interested in such promises, and the entire result, the formation of a coalition government with Hitler, was quite impossible.
Q Did other possibilities of coalition present themselves ? Were there other possibilities for a majority ? had, or a majority cabinet. to document 2, pages 14 and 15. leader of the Party had failed, on the 1st of December, there was a conversation between the Reich President and between you and General von Schleicher. This meeting was especially important for the future political development of Germany, and it is of tremendous historical significance. Therefore, I should like to ask you to refer in detail to this conversation. General von Schleichter and I meet him for a conference. I should like to remark that there had been not previous conversation between Mr. von Schleicher and myself about the possibilities of a future government formation taking place.
Mr. von Hindenburg asked us about our attitude and our opinion and I set forth the following : cabinet of Hindenburg had twice failed. Hitler was also rejecting a coalition government. On the other hand, he was bringing about a tremendous amount of opposition and was trying to have all of my decrees rescinded or lifted through the Reichstag.
I said :
" Therefore, if there is not possibility to form a parliamentary government or to incorporate Hitler into our Presidential cabinet or Presidential government without making him chancellor, then a state of emergency has arisen which requires extraordinary measure and steps to be taken. Therefore, I propose to have a recess of the parliament for several months, and then deal with a constitutional reform by setting to work on it immediately." These constitutional reforms were to be presented to the Reichstag or to the people. greet soldier and a great statesman was doing that under state oath. However, as far as my conscience was concerned, a violation of the constitution seemed quite justifiable, because of the extraordinary situation which obtained. The German Constitution had not made any provisions for this situation.
Then he mentioned von Schleicher, and von Schleicher said : " Mr. Field Marshal, I have a plan which will make it unnecessary for you to break your oath to the Constitution. If your are ready and willing to put the government into my hands, I"--"I" being von Schleicher-- " hope that I will be able to create a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag by a schism of the National Socialist Party. By a splitting of that Party, I will bring that about." value to me whether a splitting up of that Party-- a party which was loyal to Hitler-- could be brought about.
I reminded the Field Marshal of the fact that he should free himself of weak parliamentary majorities through a basic reform. However, the proposals were thrown overboard through the solution offered by Schleicher. The solution offered by Schleicher was only a provisinal matter, and a very doubtful measure. Q: What was the decision of the Reich President ? A: The decision of the Field Marshal was perhaps the most difficult that he had to make in his long life. Without giving any further reasons, he told us: "I shall decide for the solution of Mr.von Papen, and I am asking you to immediately take up negotiations so that you can form a government and so that I can give instructions to your government; that is, the proposals that you have just made." The conference was at an end. Q: What did Mr.von Schleicher do then ? A: I just exchanged a few brief words with Mr. von Schleicher. I tried to move him to acquiesce and recognize the dicision that the Reich President had made, but Mr. von Schleicher said " no." Then, the same evening, I tried to bring about negotiations for the formation of a new cabinet, or a new government. I spoke with several ministers, and these ministers all told me, " The plan is excellent, but Mr. von Schleicher has told us that we will have a civil war as a result of this. If there is a civil war, the Reichswehr will not be in an position to keep law and order in the country." I interrupted my negotiations and I called the cabinet together the very next mornung. I pictured the situation to the cabinet and I told them of the dicision which von Hindenburg had made. I asked Mr. von Schleicher, then, to tell the cabinet just he believed that there would be a civil war, and why the Reichswehr would not be in a position to keep law and order in the country. Mr. von Schleic had one of his general staff officers summoned, who told the cabinet that this had to be considered from a practical point of view and that, for theoretical reasins as well, it followed that the Reichswehr and police would not be in a po* sition to keep law and order in the country.
Then I said to the gentleman, "This is a new situation which I have to report to the Reich president about."
I wont to Hindenburg and reported to him. Mr. von Hindenburg, obviously deeply stirred because of my report, said to me, "I am an old man, and I cannot see a civil war in my country in any way. I cannot quite see the possibility. But if Mr. von Schleicher is of this opinion, I must say -- and I do this regretfully -- that I have to take back the instructions on the mission which I charged you with last night".
With that, Mr. von Schleicher was made and appointed chancellor on the conditions which he had told to the Reich president at this meeting.
Q Did Mr. von Schleicher offer you the post of ambassador at Paris?
A Mr. von Schleicher, who knew of my interest in creating an understanding between Germany and France, now asked me whether I wanted to assure the post of Ambassador in Paris. This was something I wanted to do very much. But the Reich president objected to this, and -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing ): The Tribunal thinks that this is going in far too great detail into all this, all of which is known through history, and most of which we have heard before. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Now we shall turn to the year 1933. On the 4th of January, there was a conference between Hitler and you, and this took place at the home of the banker, Schroeder in Cologne. The prosecution is showing this conference to be the beginning of your common conspiracy. the background of this conference, and how it came about?
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Kubuschok, we have been hearing for the whole of the afternoon the background of the conference. Surely we can hear of the conference now.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The defendant is accused of being the motive power i* the negotiations which started on the 4th of January, and that be was one of t* motive powers for convening the movement which took over on the 30th of January The role which von Papen played is of great significance, and therefore, it seems important to me that he tell us briefly about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The negotiations did not start on the 4th of January. The defendant told us earlier, about a couple of hours ago, that they started on the 12th of august, 1932. The negotiations started earlier than this.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps I should like to say briefly, Mr. President, what we are concerned with here. This conference on the 4th of January, about which the prosecution assorts that I on the occasion of the conference conspired with the National Socialist*, was a conference which resulted at the instigation and on the initiative of Hitler. government of von Schleicher; and there was nothing said about the formation of a government by Hitler, as it actually took place on the 30th of January. On this occasion, we talked solely about the necessity of Hitler's having to decide to participate and assure responsibility, not as a chancellor, but together with his party. And, My Lord, that I did not engineer or cause this conference to be called may be seen clearly from the statement of Mr. von Schroeder, at whose home this conference took place.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This may be seen from Document 9, Page 26. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: made plans for the overthrow of the cabinet of von Schleicher, and that you discussed those plans. Did you keep the news of this conference from Mr. von Schleicher?
A Quite the contrary. Immediately after this conference at Cologne, I wrote a letter to Mr. von Schleicher, which he would have to receive the next morning. And after I had returned to Berlin, I went at once to Mr. von Schleicher and told him just what had been discussed at this conference. Thereupon, Mr. von Schleicher issued an official communique. Document No.9.
Q 9-A?
A Yes; 9-A deals with this communique. I should like to submit Document 9-A. In this document it says that these official reports showed that there was nothing to do with these controversies which existed between Reichschancellor von Schleicher and Mr. von Papen. political discussions about the forming of a nwa government?
A No. Between the 9th and 22nd of January. I did not participate in any political discussions about the formation of a government. political development, starting with the 10th until the 21st of January? and the 30th of January, I was the chief factor in forming the government of Hitler as it assumed power on the 30th of January. the 11th and the 30th how completely wrong this claim and assertion of the prosecution actually is. Therefore, I shall have to mention a few dates in this connection.
On the 11th of January: "Hitler is in Berlin. He did not see von Schleicher, von Hugenberg, or von Papen. But the Reichstag decided through the council of elders that we have to give a reprieve to the government of von Schleicher".
On the 13th of January: "Schleicher received Hugenberg, the chief of the rightist movement".
On the 14th: "Hindenburg received Hugenberg". leader of the "right flank" negotiated with von Schleicher about his entry into the cabinet, not about the formation of a government with Hitler. These Lippe Wahlen gave the National Socialists more strength.
Elders, decided to meet, and met on the 31st rather than on the 24th, as had been scheduled. declared in this connection, "The Reich government intends to clear the political situation as quickly as possible. But as far as questions of majority are concerned, the Reich government is really not interested in this majority problems" From that we could see that Mr. von Schleicher would not even consider the formation of a government on the basis of majority parties.
to your personal activities.
TEE PRESIDENT: If you are going into another subject, we had better adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, Monday, 17 June, 1946)
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, report is made that the defendants Fritsche and Speer are absent.
DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen): I should like to ball the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that we are concerned with certain incidents that took place in 1933. I shall have to devote some tire to these incidents. The other things I can take care of briefly, so that sometime in the course of the dry I shall conclude my examination in chief of the defendant von Papen. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: known conversation with Hitler on 4 January 1933, which took place at the home of Schroeder, you did not speak about the formation of the cabinet which came into being on 30 January. You further say that up until 22 January you did not take part in any political conversation. However, the Prosecution asserts that at that, time you influenced the Reich President to the effect that Hitler an 30 January was appointed Chancellor. Did you in that way influence Hindenburg? of something that happened Friday. Your Lordship asked me about the date of the evacuation of Jerusalem. At that time I said it was 1918. Your Lordship said 1917. Of course, Your Lordship is correct. It was 1917, and I beg your pardon. influence as you just mentioned on Reich President von Hindenburg, but even if I had, it would not have been decisive in the final decision taken by the Reich President.
It would not have affected his decision in any way. The political situation, as I shall point out and we shall see, left the Reich President only the choice between a violation of the constitution or a cabinet by Hitler. from the historical incidents which took plage on 1 January, which may be seen from Document 9, page 27 through 31, you can see the following very, very clearly: During the entire month of January up until the 22, without my cooperation daily conferences or negotiations of the Reich Government took place with the various parties and conferences and negotiations among the parties themselves. All of these conferences were concerned with the formation of a majority government in the Reichstag. All of these negotiations were fruitless and in vain. I have explained that the Reich Chancellor, von Schleicher, tried by splitting the Party -- that was the National Socialist Party -- to bring about a majority government in the Reichstag. This division of the Party did not succeed, and this attempt failed on 20 January, and this fact was obvious to the world public opinion, for on that day the Reich Chancellor stated in the Reichstag that he was not at all interested in having a formation in the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I should like to refer to Document 9, which is to be found in Volume 1. I shall limit myself to the reading of a very few sentences from this document. Document 9, Page 27. The heading is:
"January 11, Reich Chancellor von Schleicher receives party leader Dingeldey." bring about a division of the Party had ceased, that the attempts had not been concluded. I shall quote from the beginning:
"At the same time it only now becomes known that the Reich President received Gregor Strasser last week for a conference. Strasser apparently intends to keep in the background for a while; only in the event of an unexpectedly quick conflict between Hitler and Schleicher's Reich cabinet would Strasser be likely to play a definite part.
In the meantime, the Lippe elections took place. They gave another clear picture of the development of the National Socialists. I shall now quote from the center of the page, from the paragraph under15 January:
"The electoral victory of the NSDAP not only surprisingly refutes the assertions of the opposition regarding the decline of the National Socialist movement, but is also a proof that the stagnation of the movement is entirely overcome, and that a new upward development of the movement has now begun." negotiations with the Center Party, and I shall now refer to the last paragraph on page 28:
"Reich Chancellor von Schleicher receives Prelate Dr. Kaas, president of the Center Party, for a lengthy conference.
"In regard to the surmises concerning a reorganization of the Cabinet, the fiction is kept up in government circles that a Strasser-HugenbergStegerwald combination is possible, despite the difficulties these plans undoubtedly met with. Privy Councillor Hugenberg is said to have made it a condition that an undisturbed activity within the Cabinet of at least one year must be guaranteed."
On the next page, page 29, I would like to refer to the last ten lines or so, the statement of State Secretary Plank regarding the Aeltestenrat, that is, regarding the Committee of Elders of the Reichstag.
"In the conversations referred to, the National Socialists are to assume the lead and to attempt to realize the concentration of all groups from the National Socialists to the Center into a majority front which failed to materialize at the end of 1932. The leadership in these negotiations in which the Schleicher Cabinet is in no way involved, rests with Hitler. If, on the 31st of January, it comes to the summoning of the Reichstag and then to a conflict between Government and Reichstag, or also, on the other hand, if this conflict is superseded by other events or brought about by other events, the proclamation of the often-discussed state of emergency must increasingly be reckoned with. The Government would then dissolve the Reichstag and set the date for thenew elections in the early fall."
THEPRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal doesn't think it necessary to read all this detail. It is evident fromthe headlines of these entries that there were political negotiations which led to the assumption of power by the National Socialist Party. Isn't that allthat you want to say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. I should like to prove, however, Mr. President, that the formation of the government on the 30th of January was a forced situation and arose out of a difficult situation resulting from the political parliamentary incidents of the day. Therefore, it is important to explain what took place and whatattempts were made and failed, and what other possibilities existed.
THE PRESIDENT: What I mean is this. It appears, does it not, from the headlines of these entries, really? You can read the headlines without reading the details. For example, on page30, the entry on 21 January, and those other entries, give the substance of the matter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I quite agree, Mr. President, but if you permit me to refer to page 31 in this connection, dealing with the historical events leading to the overthrow of the cabinet of Schleicher on the 28th, I should like to read just part of thetext given there,just a brief extract. This was the decisive conversation between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President.
"The following is officially communicated regarding the decisive interview between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President:
"Reich Chancellor von Schleicher submitted today his report regarding the situation to the Reich President, and declared that the present Reich Cabinet, in keeping with its character as a presidential government -that is, the minority government--with the consent of the President, would only be in a position to represent its program and its point of view if the Reich President placed the dissolution order at its disposal. Reich President von Hindenburg declared that in view of the situation prevailing at the time, he could not accept this proposition. Reich Chancellor von Schleicher hereupon handed in the collective resignation of the Reich Cabinet, which the Reich President accepted, whilst entrusting the Cabinet with the duty of the provisional carrying on of official business." the parliamentary majority were not present, I should like to refer you to a brief extract on page 32:
"National Socialist sources again state categorically that for the National Socialist only a Hitler Government can be considered. Any other attempts towards a solution must be fought against with the utmost vigor. This, of course, applies particularly to a Papen Cabinet, but a Schacht Cabinet is also out of the question."
I should now like to refer to the next document, document 8. In this document we find the collective possibilities which were at hand for the formation of a new cabinet. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: political situation? A After efforts had failed to split the National Socialist Party and to bring about a majority in the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor Schleicher asked the Reich President to give him dictatorial powers, and that meant, of course, a violation of the Constitution. That is, he wanted the very thing which I had proposed on the 1st of December, 1932, to the Reich President. He considered this the only way out of a perilous situation. At that time the Reich President had acquiesced in this proposal, but General von Schleicher had prevented the carrying out of my proposal.
von Ribbentrop, at which, besides yourself, Goering, Meissner, and Oskar von Hindenburg participated. Did this discussion come about at your initiative, or who was responsible for this discussion? himself. At Hitler's suggestion, von Ribbentrop placed his home at our disposal. The Reich President wished to find out what opinion Hitler had about this solution of the political crisis and what proposals he intended to make. Therefore, the conversation of the 22nd pivoted completely and exclusively on the demands of the National Socialists. However, we did not discuss the formation of a government as it originated on the 30th. you to start negotiations about the formation of a new government. What possibilities for the formation of a government resulted from the political situation? What possibilities did you see? given up since the 20th of January, and had been considered quite impossible. Hitler wasnot willing to take over the leadership of such a government or to participate in such a government in any way. a declaration of a state of emergency and a postponement of the Reichstag, which was against the Constitution, hadbeen rejected by the President on the 23rd of the month. He had rejected these things, as we know, because von Schleicher had told him, in December, that a violation of the Constitution would mean civil war and a civil war would mean chaos, "because", he said, "with the army and with the police I am in no position to keep law and order in the country in a case of civil war." with the support of the president, this was the only possibility which was left, and every faction was ready to participate. These people were willing to support me, even in 1932.
Q What were the instructions that the Reich president gave you?
A The instructions given me by von Hindenburg read as follows:
"Proposal for the formation of a government under the leadership of Hitler, with Hitler at the head, and with the utmost restriction of the influence of the National Socialists and of this government within the framework and background of the Constitution." president to ask any one person to form a government which was not to be headed by this person himself. In the normal course of events, Hindenburg, of course, would have had to entrust Hitler himself with the formation of a government. However, he instructed me to form this now government, for he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler in his cabinet as far as possible.
Q And with whom did you negotiate? with the formation of this government; that is. Rightist groups. By that I mean the leaders of the NSDAP, the German National People's Party, the "Steel Helmet Party" ("Stahlhelm"), and the German People's Party. president the formation of the new cabinet? was present. That was a coalitation government with all of these groups involved participating.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks that the defendant is going into far too much detail about this, because he has given his account of why the president sent for him and why he had anything to do wi* it. And that is the only matter that concerns him. After he has given that explanation, it should not be necessary to go into any further detail about it at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the prosecution is accusing the defendant the very act of forming the Reich government was in itself a crime. He is trying to defend himself along the lines that he tried to bring about certain safeguarding measures and to minimize Hitler's influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but that is what I said. He has given that explanation. He does not need to add all sorts of details to support that explanation.
asked him becaused he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler. Now he is going on with all sorts of details.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, he is trying to set forth now in what way he tried to minimize, limit and restrict Hitler's influence. This is a very important point, and he is trying to point out now just what safeguards he did take, that is, in the selection of the personalities involved in the new government, just so that Hitler's influence could not dominate. point in replying to the prosecution's assertion.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can do it as shortly as possible, and is not to do it in too great detail. That is all the Tribunal wants.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall be very bried, My Lord.
THE WITNESS: The measures for safeguarding the cabinet and the government which were brought into play at the request of the Reich president were the following: First of all, there was to be a very small number of National Socialist ministers in this now cabinet, only three out of eleven, including Hitler. Secondly, the decisive economic departments of this cabinet were to be placed in the hands of non-National Socialists, Thirdly, experts were to be put into the ministry posts as far as possible. Fourthly, there was to be a joint report of Reich Chancellor Hitler and Vice Chancellor von Papen to Hindenburg, so that the personal influence of Hitler measure of the NSDAP *---* internal counter-balance against the political ramifications of the National Socialist party.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : the selection of the men to himself ? foreign minister and the Reichswehr minister. These two decisive posts were to be given to von Neurath, in whom the president had every confidence. Also, the Reich defense ministry was to be given to General von Blomberg, who also was in the confidence of the Reich president. Apart from that, in this cabinet there was the Reich minister of the interior, Frick, whose activity as minister of interior in the state of Thuringia had been quite important, and Minister-without-portfolio, and later Prussian minister of the interior, Goering. These were the men in the cabinet. Book 3, Documents Nos. 87 and 93. In these documents you will find an affidavit by the former minister, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, and you will also find an interrogatory of Kurt Freiherr von Lers* ner.
THE PRESIDENT : What page in Book 3 did you say ?
DR. KUBUSCHOK : Pages 194-5. That is, Hugenberg's statement will be found on pages 210-212. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : of January took over the program of the NSDAP as its own program. please comment on this, witness. What was the basis for the police of the government which was established on the 30th of January ? The program which we decided to follow was not the program of the Nazi party, but rather it was the program of coalition. And this may be seen very clearly and obviously from the statements which this government gave to the German people on the 1st of February.
In order to fix this date and this matter in history, I should like to quote two excerpts from that appeal to the German people It says :
" The national government will consider as its utmost and first task to restore the spiritual unity of our people.This government will take Christianity as the basis of its general moral structure. The family will be the determining unit in the state, and this government will protect the family.
" The large task of the reorganization of our economy will be met by this government with two large Four-Year Plans," I should like to add just one sentence :" This government fully realizes the sacred duty it has for the maintenance and the securing of peace, which is some thing that the world needs more than ever now," to look like the Nationalist program by the prosecution, this program contained the following points as well:
No doing away with the federal aspect of the Reich or doing away with the various States in the Reich; the maintaining of the legislative system and the integrity of the Judges; the bringing about of a reform of the constitution, and to take the necessary steps in that direction; the safeguarding of the rights of the Christian churches; and, above all, the abolishing of the caste struggle through a solving of the economic problems and difficulties. That meant the restoration of a true people's community, Volksgemeinschaft. through of your political thoughts would be established and safeguarded? had contributed to this political program, together with my political friends, and to carry these thoughts through and into active practice. At that time, the essential point to me seemed to be to create an internal counter-balance to National Socialism, and, therefore, I asked the leaders of the Rightist parties to give up the old party programs and to unite in a large common political organization with the purpose and aim of fighting for the principles which we would set up and had set up. However, the party leaders did not agree to this. Party limits were too strong. The only thing I succeeded in doing was the creation of a voting block of all these parties, and for this voting block I announced to the country in many, many speeches that program which, in actuality, was the coalition program.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now, I should like to refer you to a speech delivered by the witness on the 11th of February, which he hold on behalf of the voting block and which may be found in Document 12, Pages 54 and 55. I should like to quote from Page 55, the center of the page, briefly: "Therefore, I consider the circumstance that the present Reich cabinet is not made up of one single party or movement but of various groups of the Nationalist movement, of free politicians and experts, not a disadvantage, but rather an advantage." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
of this voting block? You stated your views about this in various speeches.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In order to save time, I should like to submit Document No. 10 to the High Tribunal. various questions. First of all, will you deal with the social problem? found there, for the social problem was the one that dominated everything else. It was our task to make satisfied citizens out of the warring and belligerent workers who were engaged in the class struggle and to give the workers a right to live and the opportunity to have their own home. At that time I stated in this speech, which is contained in this document: "There will always be and must be differences in property. But it should not be that a small group possesses everything and the predominating mass of the people nothing at all." Again and again I emphasized the fact that if we would succeed in solving the social problem that we would, in that way, contribute immensely and make an emminent contribution to the satisfaction and to the pacification of Europe.
Q What was your program when it came to foreign political matters?
A Our platform in that regard was very simple. It started and exhausted itself in the wish to do away with the discrimination against the German people, discrimination against our sovereignty, and to do away with the discrimination in a peaceful way.
Q What was your platform on religious questions? of the German people in a Christian sense and that I considered this to be the keystone and the prerequisite of the solution of the social and all other problems which confronted us. Later on I shall return to this point.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to submit the document which I have already mentioned, Document No. 10, and I ask that the High Tribunal take judicial notice of this document. There seems to be a mistake in translation on Page 39, something which completely disturbs the sense of the document. The question of doing away with trade unions is an important one and later on will play a large role. I should like to read a brief statement on Page 39, about the middle of the page: "I recognize that the trade unions have done many things to imbue the working classes with professional honor and professional price.
Many trade unions, for instance the union of office clerks, have accomplished marvels, though a real sudden change and definite work in this respect was in opposition to the ideaof class conflict. It was the socialist parties who prevented big scale consequences of the tendency of the trade unions to converts the working classes into a class. If the trade unions realize the signs of the times and keep off politics on a big scale, then they can become a big scale pillar of the new order." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: 5th of March, 1933?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this case, I should like to refer to Document No. 98, in which I am presenting a diagram on the development of the election results in the years in question. developments. First of all, I should like to state that this election was a really and truly free one, for it was held with the old functionaries of the Republic, and the fact that it was actually free is shown by the fact that the votes of the Communists and of the Social Democrats did not decrease in any way, I, personally, had counted on the fact that the NSDAP would be successful at the polls. In November of 1932 I had taken away 36 of their seats in the Reichstag, and I counted on the fact that they would make good this loss and regain these seats. I had also hoped that my own voting block would be very, very successful. I hoped that the people would realize the necessity of forming an internal counter-balance. However, this was not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the figures are sufficient for us. We can form our own conclusions from the figures. We can see the figures. We don't need to have them all explained and commented on to us. There are very much more important things for us to consider.