DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, my Lord. This exhibit No. 5 is an extract from the sentence of the State Tribunal, dated the 20th of October 1932. On page 19 in the beginning, the judgment is maintained and it is stated there that the decree of the Reichspresident of the 20th of July 1932 was entirely legal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Document No. 8 will be Exhibit No. 8, won't it?
DR KUBUSCHOK: Yes. This is No. 5, your Honor. If it said 8, I misspoke. It is No. 5.
THE PRESIDENT: It is quite clear, anyhow, that the exhibit numbers will be the same as the document numbers.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, your Honor; they will be identical.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are now on Document No. 5, Exhibit No. 5.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Braun, act when this judgment was made known? recognized this judgment, and this is shown by discussions which I personally had later on in October with the Prussian Prime Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding the position taken by the Prussian Government, I should like to submit Document No. 86, which is contained in Volume 3 of my document book. However, because of technical difficulties, this volume is not completely translated and cannot be submitted today. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: press Correspondent and you stated in detail your position on the armament problem. Since this topic is of special significance for your case and your defense, I should like to have you comment on this matter. is the some which I held at the time that I became Vice Chancellor under the government of Hitler. I should like to refer to Document 1, which sets forth my interview to the United Press, and 1 should like to quote from Document No. 86 which is the radio speech which I made on the 12th of September. On that occasion I said -
Q (Interposing): Perhaps, Witness, you could just give us the few main key words, and in that way tell us the contents.
it will be found in Document 86, and upon looking at this document the Tribunal willfind that I was for disarmament and for peace. On that occasion I appealed to the major powers and told them -- and I would like to quote this sentence:
"In those days, Germany will undertake a gigantic attempt through the mobilization of her last internal reserves, in order to bring about work and social peace and satisfaction, so that the leading statesmen of the major powers now, for their part, will take the decision to bring an end to the poisoning of agreements, and that that shall be brought to an end."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the 31st of July of 1932, the Reichstag election took place. First of all, I should like to submit a diagram in which the election results of the various elections held in the years 1930 to 1933 are tabulated. This is Exhibit No. 98, which 1 should like to submit to the Tribunal. From the figures shown there we can see the political development of Germany and follow it. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK you drew on the eve of the election ?
A On the 30th of July I spoke to the United States and I said, "The world does not realize that Germany is confronted with a civil war. The world did not help us to vanquish our difficulties at Lausanne, and it is unbearable that 14 years after the end of the war there is no parity, no equality of rights for Germany." votes. from 6.4 million the figure rose to 13.7 million votes cast for this party; 230 members of the Reichstag as opposed to 110. no majority government could have been formed from the utmost rightist to the Social Democrats without the NSDAP. with that, the Party had a parliamentary key position. the rescinding of the decree on prohibition of wearing a uniform, and that is an explanation which is altogether too simple.
In fact, the prohibition of wearing of uniforms was a decree which had been rescinded, and that resinding had been in effect for one month, from June until July, and two weeks prior to the election I had issued the edict.
The real reason for the tremendous .growth in the Nazi votes was the entire economic condition in which Germany found herself and the fact of the general disappointment about the lack of foreign political successes at Lausanne.
Q. Now, what was the conclusion that you drew from the results of this election ?
A. The conclusion I drew was the same opinion which I had held before. On the next day I gave an interview t* the Associated Press, and through this interview I told the entire world, "the National Socialists have to share responsibility, have to be given responsibility, and when that has come about we have to bring about a reform of the constitution."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Because of the nature of the historical facts, I would like to refer to Exhibit No. 1 which has already been submitted, and especially to pages 4, 5, and 6. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, please tell the Tribunal briefly about your negotiations with
A. On the 12th of Adjust, I had a long discussion with Hitler. In order to clarify my position, I showed him the necessity of his participation in the government, and I declared my own readiness to resign as Chancellor in a few months if our collaboration was futile, and after von Hindenburg had found confidence in Hitler. rightist parties had supported my cabinet. The Zentrum party was the opposition. Now, after those elections, the Zentrum Party asked for Hitler as Chancellor, but Hitler himself did not want to become the head of a majority or coal*tion government. paragraph, last page. I quote :
"Kaas, the leader of the Zentrum Party, demands a final solution of this crisis by the full responsible participation of the former opposition in the Reichscabinet." However, Hitler declined. On the next day, we continued with our negotiations, and we did this in the presence of the Reichspresident.
together with his Party, but only on the condition that he himself be appointed Chancellor. And this may be seen in this document on Page 6. plete authority to Hitler and rejected his proposal. At this point, our efforts for bringing National Socialism into a responsible Government had failed. a speech which can be found in the Document Book, Exhibit No.1, Page 10. into the most intense opposition of the Government. Was your course changed in any way through that opposition? the attitude against me and my Government did not change my course at all. On 28 August, I deal with this order in detail. I spoke at Muenster about this matter.
Q This speech may be found in document No. 7, Exhibit No. 7. I beg your pardon, document 1, Page 7. And on this page, I would like to have you peruse a report on a judgment of a special court at Beuthen. Here the very first death sentence pronounced on the terror directors of the 8th was passed, and this terror directive . . . The Prosecution wishes to incriminate defendant von Papen because of this terror directive. A death sentence against 5 National Socialists was found. economy. Since this decree is a nucleus in your Government when it comes to the solution of economic problems, I should like to have you comment on this emergency decree. stated that it comprised a program dealing with 2.2 billion Reichsmarks with the aim of creating work for one and three-fourths million workers, people who were unemployed, to supply them with employment. We made this gigantic effort without incurring even a penny more of increased foreign debt, and if I may use these words to characterize the situation, it was the utilization of our utmost and our last reserves of strength.
The success already made itself noticeable in the first month in that the unemployment figures decreased during the first month by 120,000.
Q In one month? concerned with rearmament?
A Not at all. My Government did not support rearmament with one penny. 1, on pages 8 and 9. Reichstag? what did you say about this on that evening over the radio?
A The new Reichstag met according to the constitution. my Government, as I have already said, could not bring about a majority, but any other Government without Hitler was quite impossible. We could not form a Government without him. Therefore, it was my suggestion, which was justified, that this Reichstag would give my Government a reprieve, and especially since I had submitted a very decisive and a very comprehensive program to the Reichsstag.
Then, something happened. Something quite unexpected -- something quite fantastic and unheard of. The thing that happened was, so to speak, the prostitution of the German parliament. Mr. Goering, the President of the German Reichsstag, now gave to the communist delegate, Clara Zetkin, the impetus to an unheard of attack on my government. when I asked for conditions to be heard, I who was the responsible Chancellor of this Government, in order to answer, I was refused to speak, and the Reichsstag President asked for a vote of no confidence and when the vote was brought in, it brought the Communists, the Socialists and the National Socialists. The fact of this concerted motion on the part of the three parties really was meant to show what was to take place in Germany if and when these three parties were to rule in Germany together, and such symptoms, such signs, showed how imperative it was for me to try not to crowd National Socialism into the Leftist wing, but to bring them into My Government instead.
it on the table, and to leave. document which I have already referred to without having submitted it, Document 86, Page 192. of a Constitutional Regime. Please tellus briefly just whatyour opinions were that you voiced on that occasion. of the more urgent objectives and aims of my Government. The reasons for this are shown in this document on page 9. This regime was to comprise a regime of the right to vote so that this multiplicity of parties would be ended. Above all, it was to get more authority into the Government, and more of a possibility to rule than was possible under the Weimar Constitution. Regimes wanted to do away with some of the circumstances under which Article 48, Emergency Decrees, was issued. The magnitude to which this took place may be seen in Document 4, which is an extract from the wealth of emergency decrees which were issued. What was the election slogan of the Government and what was your opinion about the result?
A Unfortunately, we had to vote once more. The program of my Government was identical with what it had been before. That meant it was an attempt to bring about a new state leadership or a new way of carrying on the Government so that the Government and the authoritarian government could work together with a parliamentary regime.
In this appeal for election of 4 November, I turned to Hitler, and I told him:
"It is the exclusiveness of your party, the fact that you demand everything or nothing--that was something that the Reich President could not recognize or accept, and this is the thing that brought about his decision of 13 August. The things that are at stake today are not whether this or that party leader will occupy the Chancellor's chair, whether his name be Bruening, Hitler or*von Papen, but, rather, that thin* that is at stake is the fact that we meet on common ground so that vital interests of the German people can be assured". Socialists, whom I was fighting against, would be weakened in such a way that this party would be squeezed out of the central parliamentary position. This result was not achieved. The National Socialists lost 34 seats in the Reichstaf, but that was not sufficient to crowd them out of their key position, for, again, the formation of a majority in the Reichstag from the Socialists to the extreme Right was possible only with Hitler. Without him, no majority. erning in a constitutional way, I tried once more to negotiate with the various parties and the National Socialists.
Q. Please give us a picture of these negotiations.
A. These negotiations are interesting, and the Tribunal must be made familiar with them so that they can judge the events of 30 January. parties that were in opposition to my government, and especially with the Social Democrats and with the Center Party. The Center Party hold an adverse position. It wished a majority, a coalition government with Hitler, but Mr. Hitler did not wish to govern or rule with a parliamentary majority. From document 2, page 13, we can see what the attitude of the Center Party was.
Then, after collaboration of Hitler for a coalition gov-
ernment was quite out of the question, I again turned to Hitler in order to ask him whether he was now ready to enter my government. I did this because I had a feeling of responsibility in order to achieve any sort of result at all, and, therefore, I wrote him the letter dated 13 November 1932, which is found in document D-633, which was submitted by the Prosecution as an "undignified"document". to Hitler, in this letter I said that I considered it a violation of duty if I did not turn to him, in spite of everything, once more, and that I was of the opinion that the leader of such a movement or party, whose worth to the country and the people I appreciated even though I had criticized them, should not turn down a discussion with the head of the State.
Q. Then on 8 November you again turned to the foreign press and you voiced-
A. May I interrupt? I should like to add, in regard to the judgement by the Prosecution of the letter, that in every parliamentary state, it is customary that if the leader of the government turns to the opposition to ask for its cooperation and collaboration, he extends a courteous and cordial letter to the leader of the opposition, and that he would not call him an ass. Therefore, I can not quite see why these remarks of nine are characterized as a lack of dignity on my part.
Q. On 8 November you turned to the foreign press, and you spoke about the revision of the Versailles Treaty. Will you please comment briefly on that and tell us what you said at that time?
A. I should like to mention the speech made to the representatives of the foreign press so that the High Tribunal will be fully aware of the repeated appeals I made to foreign countries, to the victorious powers, so that they could be ready to meet the Reich on moral grounds and moral atonement, for then, Gentlemen, the radical movements in Germany would have disappeared of their own accord and there would have been an ebb to all of these movements.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech before the foreign press will be found in document 1, pages 11 and 12. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. What were the consequences of your failure to come to any agreement with the party leaders?
A. The failure of my negotiations with the party leaders led to my resignation, which took place on 17 November. I was instructed to carry on the affairs of the government until a new regime could be formed.
Q. What efforts were made by the Reich President after your resignation toward forming a new government?
A. My resignation gave to the Reich President the opportunity to start afresh and to try once more to bring about a parliamentary majority and to form a government on that basis. ember, he received all the party leaders, beginning with the Rightists and through the Lestists, and on the 19th he received Hitler. The topic of conversation was: How can we create a parliamentary majority government? He instructed Hitler to form a coalition majority government. Hitler would then be Chancellor. Hindenburg; and it read as follows: That Hitler could not undertake the formation of a majority or coalition majority government.
On the 24th, Hindenburg received Monsignor Kaas, the leader of the Center Party.
He declared that Hitler had not even tried to find out whether a majority government could be formed, but Monsignor Kaas promised the Reich President to try once more to form a majority government. attempt had been in vain, that the leader of the Nazi fraction, at that time Mr. Frick, had stated that the Party would not be interested in such promises, and the entire result, the formation of a coalition government with Hitler, was quite impossible.
Q Did other possibilities of coalition present themselves ? Were there other possibilities for a majority ? had, or a majority cabinet. to document 2, pages 14 and 15. leader of the Party had failed, on the 1st of December, there was a conversation between the Reich President and between you and General von Schleicher. This meeting was especially important for the future political development of Germany, and it is of tremendous historical significance. Therefore, I should like to ask you to refer in detail to this conversation. General von Schleichter and I meet him for a conference. I should like to remark that there had been not previous conversation between Mr. von Schleicher and myself about the possibilities of a future government formation taking place.
Mr. von Hindenburg asked us about our attitude and our opinion and I set forth the following : cabinet of Hindenburg had twice failed. Hitler was also rejecting a coalition government. On the other hand, he was bringing about a tremendous amount of opposition and was trying to have all of my decrees rescinded or lifted through the Reichstag.
I said :
" Therefore, if there is not possibility to form a parliamentary government or to incorporate Hitler into our Presidential cabinet or Presidential government without making him chancellor, then a state of emergency has arisen which requires extraordinary measure and steps to be taken. Therefore, I propose to have a recess of the parliament for several months, and then deal with a constitutional reform by setting to work on it immediately." These constitutional reforms were to be presented to the Reichstag or to the people. greet soldier and a great statesman was doing that under state oath. However, as far as my conscience was concerned, a violation of the constitution seemed quite justifiable, because of the extraordinary situation which obtained. The German Constitution had not made any provisions for this situation.
Then he mentioned von Schleicher, and von Schleicher said : " Mr. Field Marshal, I have a plan which will make it unnecessary for you to break your oath to the Constitution. If your are ready and willing to put the government into my hands, I"--"I" being von Schleicher-- " hope that I will be able to create a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag by a schism of the National Socialist Party. By a splitting of that Party, I will bring that about." value to me whether a splitting up of that Party-- a party which was loyal to Hitler-- could be brought about.
I reminded the Field Marshal of the fact that he should free himself of weak parliamentary majorities through a basic reform. However, the proposals were thrown overboard through the solution offered by Schleicher. The solution offered by Schleicher was only a provisinal matter, and a very doubtful measure. Q: What was the decision of the Reich President ? A: The decision of the Field Marshal was perhaps the most difficult that he had to make in his long life. Without giving any further reasons, he told us: "I shall decide for the solution of Mr.von Papen, and I am asking you to immediately take up negotiations so that you can form a government and so that I can give instructions to your government; that is, the proposals that you have just made." The conference was at an end. Q: What did Mr.von Schleicher do then ? A: I just exchanged a few brief words with Mr. von Schleicher. I tried to move him to acquiesce and recognize the dicision that the Reich President had made, but Mr. von Schleicher said " no." Then, the same evening, I tried to bring about negotiations for the formation of a new cabinet, or a new government. I spoke with several ministers, and these ministers all told me, " The plan is excellent, but Mr. von Schleicher has told us that we will have a civil war as a result of this. If there is a civil war, the Reichswehr will not be in an position to keep law and order in the country." I interrupted my negotiations and I called the cabinet together the very next mornung. I pictured the situation to the cabinet and I told them of the dicision which von Hindenburg had made. I asked Mr. von Schleicher, then, to tell the cabinet just he believed that there would be a civil war, and why the Reichswehr would not be in a position to keep law and order in the country. Mr. von Schleic had one of his general staff officers summoned, who told the cabinet that this had to be considered from a practical point of view and that, for theoretical reasins as well, it followed that the Reichswehr and police would not be in a po* sition to keep law and order in the country.
Then I said to the gentleman, "This is a new situation which I have to report to the Reich president about."
I wont to Hindenburg and reported to him. Mr. von Hindenburg, obviously deeply stirred because of my report, said to me, "I am an old man, and I cannot see a civil war in my country in any way. I cannot quite see the possibility. But if Mr. von Schleicher is of this opinion, I must say -- and I do this regretfully -- that I have to take back the instructions on the mission which I charged you with last night".
With that, Mr. von Schleicher was made and appointed chancellor on the conditions which he had told to the Reich president at this meeting.
Q Did Mr. von Schleicher offer you the post of ambassador at Paris?
A Mr. von Schleicher, who knew of my interest in creating an understanding between Germany and France, now asked me whether I wanted to assure the post of Ambassador in Paris. This was something I wanted to do very much. But the Reich president objected to this, and -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing ): The Tribunal thinks that this is going in far too great detail into all this, all of which is known through history, and most of which we have heard before. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Now we shall turn to the year 1933. On the 4th of January, there was a conference between Hitler and you, and this took place at the home of the banker, Schroeder in Cologne. The prosecution is showing this conference to be the beginning of your common conspiracy. the background of this conference, and how it came about?
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Dr. Kubuschok, we have been hearing for the whole of the afternoon the background of the conference. Surely we can hear of the conference now.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The defendant is accused of being the motive power i* the negotiations which started on the 4th of January, and that be was one of t* motive powers for convening the movement which took over on the 30th of January The role which von Papen played is of great significance, and therefore, it seems important to me that he tell us briefly about it.
THE PRESIDENT: The negotiations did not start on the 4th of January. The defendant told us earlier, about a couple of hours ago, that they started on the 12th of august, 1932. The negotiations started earlier than this.
THE WITNESS: Perhaps I should like to say briefly, Mr. President, what we are concerned with here. This conference on the 4th of January, about which the prosecution assorts that I on the occasion of the conference conspired with the National Socialist*, was a conference which resulted at the instigation and on the initiative of Hitler. government of von Schleicher; and there was nothing said about the formation of a government by Hitler, as it actually took place on the 30th of January. On this occasion, we talked solely about the necessity of Hitler's having to decide to participate and assure responsibility, not as a chancellor, but together with his party. And, My Lord, that I did not engineer or cause this conference to be called may be seen clearly from the statement of Mr. von Schroeder, at whose home this conference took place.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This may be seen from Document 9, Page 26. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: made plans for the overthrow of the cabinet of von Schleicher, and that you discussed those plans. Did you keep the news of this conference from Mr. von Schleicher?
A Quite the contrary. Immediately after this conference at Cologne, I wrote a letter to Mr. von Schleicher, which he would have to receive the next morning. And after I had returned to Berlin, I went at once to Mr. von Schleicher and told him just what had been discussed at this conference. Thereupon, Mr. von Schleicher issued an official communique. Document No.9.
Q 9-A?
A Yes; 9-A deals with this communique. I should like to submit Document 9-A. In this document it says that these official reports showed that there was nothing to do with these controversies which existed between Reichschancellor von Schleicher and Mr. von Papen. political discussions about the forming of a nwa government?
A No. Between the 9th and 22nd of January. I did not participate in any political discussions about the formation of a government. political development, starting with the 10th until the 21st of January? and the 30th of January, I was the chief factor in forming the government of Hitler as it assumed power on the 30th of January. the 11th and the 30th how completely wrong this claim and assertion of the prosecution actually is. Therefore, I shall have to mention a few dates in this connection.
On the 11th of January: "Hitler is in Berlin. He did not see von Schleicher, von Hugenberg, or von Papen. But the Reichstag decided through the council of elders that we have to give a reprieve to the government of von Schleicher".
On the 13th of January: "Schleicher received Hugenberg, the chief of the rightist movement".
On the 14th: "Hindenburg received Hugenberg". leader of the "right flank" negotiated with von Schleicher about his entry into the cabinet, not about the formation of a government with Hitler. These Lippe Wahlen gave the National Socialists more strength.
Elders, decided to meet, and met on the 31st rather than on the 24th, as had been scheduled. declared in this connection, "The Reich government intends to clear the political situation as quickly as possible. But as far as questions of majority are concerned, the Reich government is really not interested in this majority problems" From that we could see that Mr. von Schleicher would not even consider the formation of a government on the basis of majority parties.
to your personal activities.
TEE PRESIDENT: If you are going into another subject, we had better adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, Monday, 17 June, 1946)
MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, report is made that the defendants Fritsche and Speer are absent.
DR. KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for defendant von Papen): I should like to ball the attention of the High Tribunal to the fact that we are concerned with certain incidents that took place in 1933. I shall have to devote some tire to these incidents. The other things I can take care of briefly, so that sometime in the course of the dry I shall conclude my examination in chief of the defendant von Papen. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: known conversation with Hitler on 4 January 1933, which took place at the home of Schroeder, you did not speak about the formation of the cabinet which came into being on 30 January. You further say that up until 22 January you did not take part in any political conversation. However, the Prosecution asserts that at that, time you influenced the Reich President to the effect that Hitler an 30 January was appointed Chancellor. Did you in that way influence Hindenburg? of something that happened Friday. Your Lordship asked me about the date of the evacuation of Jerusalem. At that time I said it was 1918. Your Lordship said 1917. Of course, Your Lordship is correct. It was 1917, and I beg your pardon. influence as you just mentioned on Reich President von Hindenburg, but even if I had, it would not have been decisive in the final decision taken by the Reich President.
It would not have affected his decision in any way. The political situation, as I shall point out and we shall see, left the Reich President only the choice between a violation of the constitution or a cabinet by Hitler. from the historical incidents which took plage on 1 January, which may be seen from Document 9, page 27 through 31, you can see the following very, very clearly: During the entire month of January up until the 22, without my cooperation daily conferences or negotiations of the Reich Government took place with the various parties and conferences and negotiations among the parties themselves. All of these conferences were concerned with the formation of a majority government in the Reichstag. All of these negotiations were fruitless and in vain. I have explained that the Reich Chancellor, von Schleicher, tried by splitting the Party -- that was the National Socialist Party -- to bring about a majority government in the Reichstag. This division of the Party did not succeed, and this attempt failed on 20 January, and this fact was obvious to the world public opinion, for on that day the Reich Chancellor stated in the Reichstag that he was not at all interested in having a formation in the Reichstag.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this connection, I should like to refer to Document 9, which is to be found in Volume 1. I shall limit myself to the reading of a very few sentences from this document. Document 9, Page 27. The heading is:
"January 11, Reich Chancellor von Schleicher receives party leader Dingeldey." bring about a division of the Party had ceased, that the attempts had not been concluded. I shall quote from the beginning:
"At the same time it only now becomes known that the Reich President received Gregor Strasser last week for a conference. Strasser apparently intends to keep in the background for a while; only in the event of an unexpectedly quick conflict between Hitler and Schleicher's Reich cabinet would Strasser be likely to play a definite part.
In the meantime, the Lippe elections took place. They gave another clear picture of the development of the National Socialists. I shall now quote from the center of the page, from the paragraph under15 January:
"The electoral victory of the NSDAP not only surprisingly refutes the assertions of the opposition regarding the decline of the National Socialist movement, but is also a proof that the stagnation of the movement is entirely overcome, and that a new upward development of the movement has now begun." negotiations with the Center Party, and I shall now refer to the last paragraph on page 28:
"Reich Chancellor von Schleicher receives Prelate Dr. Kaas, president of the Center Party, for a lengthy conference.
"In regard to the surmises concerning a reorganization of the Cabinet, the fiction is kept up in government circles that a Strasser-HugenbergStegerwald combination is possible, despite the difficulties these plans undoubtedly met with. Privy Councillor Hugenberg is said to have made it a condition that an undisturbed activity within the Cabinet of at least one year must be guaranteed."