On the next page, page 29, I would like to refer to the last ten lines or so, the statement of State Secretary Plank regarding the Aeltestenrat, that is, regarding the Committee of Elders of the Reichstag.
"In the conversations referred to, the National Socialists are to assume the lead and to attempt to realize the concentration of all groups from the National Socialists to the Center into a majority front which failed to materialize at the end of 1932. The leadership in these negotiations in which the Schleicher Cabinet is in no way involved, rests with Hitler. If, on the 31st of January, it comes to the summoning of the Reichstag and then to a conflict between Government and Reichstag, or also, on the other hand, if this conflict is superseded by other events or brought about by other events, the proclamation of the often-discussed state of emergency must increasingly be reckoned with. The Government would then dissolve the Reichstag and set the date for thenew elections in the early fall."
THEPRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal doesn't think it necessary to read all this detail. It is evident fromthe headlines of these entries that there were political negotiations which led to the assumption of power by the National Socialist Party. Isn't that allthat you want to say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. I should like to prove, however, Mr. President, that the formation of the government on the 30th of January was a forced situation and arose out of a difficult situation resulting from the political parliamentary incidents of the day. Therefore, it is important to explain what took place and whatattempts were made and failed, and what other possibilities existed.
THE PRESIDENT: What I mean is this. It appears, does it not, from the headlines of these entries, really? You can read the headlines without reading the details. For example, on page30, the entry on 21 January, and those other entries, give the substance of the matter.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Very well. I quite agree, Mr. President, but if you permit me to refer to page 31 in this connection, dealing with the historical events leading to the overthrow of the cabinet of Schleicher on the 28th, I should like to read just part of thetext given there,just a brief extract. This was the decisive conversation between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President.
"The following is officially communicated regarding the decisive interview between the Reich Chancellor and the Reich President:
"Reich Chancellor von Schleicher submitted today his report regarding the situation to the Reich President, and declared that the present Reich Cabinet, in keeping with its character as a presidential government -that is, the minority government--with the consent of the President, would only be in a position to represent its program and its point of view if the Reich President placed the dissolution order at its disposal. Reich President von Hindenburg declared that in view of the situation prevailing at the time, he could not accept this proposition. Reich Chancellor von Schleicher hereupon handed in the collective resignation of the Reich Cabinet, which the Reich President accepted, whilst entrusting the Cabinet with the duty of the provisional carrying on of official business." the parliamentary majority were not present, I should like to refer you to a brief extract on page 32:
"National Socialist sources again state categorically that for the National Socialist only a Hitler Government can be considered. Any other attempts towards a solution must be fought against with the utmost vigor. This, of course, applies particularly to a Papen Cabinet, but a Schacht Cabinet is also out of the question."
I should now like to refer to the next document, document 8. In this document we find the collective possibilities which were at hand for the formation of a new cabinet. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: political situation? A After efforts had failed to split the National Socialist Party and to bring about a majority in the Reichstag, Reich Chancellor Schleicher asked the Reich President to give him dictatorial powers, and that meant, of course, a violation of the Constitution. That is, he wanted the very thing which I had proposed on the 1st of December, 1932, to the Reich President. He considered this the only way out of a perilous situation. At that time the Reich President had acquiesced in this proposal, but General von Schleicher had prevented the carrying out of my proposal.
von Ribbentrop, at which, besides yourself, Goering, Meissner, and Oskar von Hindenburg participated. Did this discussion come about at your initiative, or who was responsible for this discussion? himself. At Hitler's suggestion, von Ribbentrop placed his home at our disposal. The Reich President wished to find out what opinion Hitler had about this solution of the political crisis and what proposals he intended to make. Therefore, the conversation of the 22nd pivoted completely and exclusively on the demands of the National Socialists. However, we did not discuss the formation of a government as it originated on the 30th. you to start negotiations about the formation of a new government. What possibilities for the formation of a government resulted from the political situation? What possibilities did you see? given up since the 20th of January, and had been considered quite impossible. Hitler wasnot willing to take over the leadership of such a government or to participate in such a government in any way. a declaration of a state of emergency and a postponement of the Reichstag, which was against the Constitution, hadbeen rejected by the President on the 23rd of the month. He had rejected these things, as we know, because von Schleicher had told him, in December, that a violation of the Constitution would mean civil war and a civil war would mean chaos, "because", he said, "with the army and with the police I am in no position to keep law and order in the country in a case of civil war." with the support of the president, this was the only possibility which was left, and every faction was ready to participate. These people were willing to support me, even in 1932.
Q What were the instructions that the Reich president gave you?
A The instructions given me by von Hindenburg read as follows:
"Proposal for the formation of a government under the leadership of Hitler, with Hitler at the head, and with the utmost restriction of the influence of the National Socialists and of this government within the framework and background of the Constitution." president to ask any one person to form a government which was not to be headed by this person himself. In the normal course of events, Hindenburg, of course, would have had to entrust Hitler himself with the formation of a government. However, he instructed me to form this now government, for he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler in his cabinet as far as possible.
Q And with whom did you negotiate? with the formation of this government; that is. Rightist groups. By that I mean the leaders of the NSDAP, the German National People's Party, the "Steel Helmet Party" ("Stahlhelm"), and the German People's Party. president the formation of the new cabinet? was present. That was a coalitation government with all of these groups involved participating.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks that the defendant is going into far too much detail about this, because he has given his account of why the president sent for him and why he had anything to do wi* it. And that is the only matter that concerns him. After he has given that explanation, it should not be necessary to go into any further detail about it at all.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, the prosecution is accusing the defendant the very act of forming the Reich government was in itself a crime. He is trying to defend himself along the lines that he tried to bring about certain safeguarding measures and to minimize Hitler's influence.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but that is what I said. He has given that explanation. He does not need to add all sorts of details to support that explanation.
asked him becaused he wished to minimize the influence of Hitler. Now he is going on with all sorts of details.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, he is trying to set forth now in what way he tried to minimize, limit and restrict Hitler's influence. This is a very important point, and he is trying to point out now just what safeguards he did take, that is, in the selection of the personalities involved in the new government, just so that Hitler's influence could not dominate. point in replying to the prosecution's assertion.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can do it as shortly as possible, and is not to do it in too great detail. That is all the Tribunal wants.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I shall be very bried, My Lord.
THE WITNESS: The measures for safeguarding the cabinet and the government which were brought into play at the request of the Reich president were the following: First of all, there was to be a very small number of National Socialist ministers in this now cabinet, only three out of eleven, including Hitler. Secondly, the decisive economic departments of this cabinet were to be placed in the hands of non-National Socialists, Thirdly, experts were to be put into the ministry posts as far as possible. Fourthly, there was to be a joint report of Reich Chancellor Hitler and Vice Chancellor von Papen to Hindenburg, so that the personal influence of Hitler measure of the NSDAP *---* internal counter-balance against the political ramifications of the National Socialist party.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : the selection of the men to himself ? foreign minister and the Reichswehr minister. These two decisive posts were to be given to von Neurath, in whom the president had every confidence. Also, the Reich defense ministry was to be given to General von Blomberg, who also was in the confidence of the Reich president. Apart from that, in this cabinet there was the Reich minister of the interior, Frick, whose activity as minister of interior in the state of Thuringia had been quite important, and Minister-without-portfolio, and later Prussian minister of the interior, Goering. These were the men in the cabinet. Book 3, Documents Nos. 87 and 93. In these documents you will find an affidavit by the former minister, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg, and you will also find an interrogatory of Kurt Freiherr von Lers* ner.
THE PRESIDENT : What page in Book 3 did you say ?
DR. KUBUSCHOK : Pages 194-5. That is, Hugenberg's statement will be found on pages 210-212. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK : of January took over the program of the NSDAP as its own program. please comment on this, witness. What was the basis for the police of the government which was established on the 30th of January ? The program which we decided to follow was not the program of the Nazi party, but rather it was the program of coalition. And this may be seen very clearly and obviously from the statements which this government gave to the German people on the 1st of February.
In order to fix this date and this matter in history, I should like to quote two excerpts from that appeal to the German people It says :
" The national government will consider as its utmost and first task to restore the spiritual unity of our people.This government will take Christianity as the basis of its general moral structure. The family will be the determining unit in the state, and this government will protect the family.
" The large task of the reorganization of our economy will be met by this government with two large Four-Year Plans," I should like to add just one sentence :" This government fully realizes the sacred duty it has for the maintenance and the securing of peace, which is some thing that the world needs more than ever now," to look like the Nationalist program by the prosecution, this program contained the following points as well:
No doing away with the federal aspect of the Reich or doing away with the various States in the Reich; the maintaining of the legislative system and the integrity of the Judges; the bringing about of a reform of the constitution, and to take the necessary steps in that direction; the safeguarding of the rights of the Christian churches; and, above all, the abolishing of the caste struggle through a solving of the economic problems and difficulties. That meant the restoration of a true people's community, Volksgemeinschaft. through of your political thoughts would be established and safeguarded? had contributed to this political program, together with my political friends, and to carry these thoughts through and into active practice. At that time, the essential point to me seemed to be to create an internal counter-balance to National Socialism, and, therefore, I asked the leaders of the Rightist parties to give up the old party programs and to unite in a large common political organization with the purpose and aim of fighting for the principles which we would set up and had set up. However, the party leaders did not agree to this. Party limits were too strong. The only thing I succeeded in doing was the creation of a voting block of all these parties, and for this voting block I announced to the country in many, many speeches that program which, in actuality, was the coalition program.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Now, I should like to refer you to a speech delivered by the witness on the 11th of February, which he hold on behalf of the voting block and which may be found in Document 12, Pages 54 and 55. I should like to quote from Page 55, the center of the page, briefly: "Therefore, I consider the circumstance that the present Reich cabinet is not made up of one single party or movement but of various groups of the Nationalist movement, of free politicians and experts, not a disadvantage, but rather an advantage." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
of this voting block? You stated your views about this in various speeches.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In order to save time, I should like to submit Document No. 10 to the High Tribunal. various questions. First of all, will you deal with the social problem? found there, for the social problem was the one that dominated everything else. It was our task to make satisfied citizens out of the warring and belligerent workers who were engaged in the class struggle and to give the workers a right to live and the opportunity to have their own home. At that time I stated in this speech, which is contained in this document: "There will always be and must be differences in property. But it should not be that a small group possesses everything and the predominating mass of the people nothing at all." Again and again I emphasized the fact that if we would succeed in solving the social problem that we would, in that way, contribute immensely and make an emminent contribution to the satisfaction and to the pacification of Europe.
Q What was your program when it came to foreign political matters?
A Our platform in that regard was very simple. It started and exhausted itself in the wish to do away with the discrimination against the German people, discrimination against our sovereignty, and to do away with the discrimination in a peaceful way.
Q What was your platform on religious questions? of the German people in a Christian sense and that I considered this to be the keystone and the prerequisite of the solution of the social and all other problems which confronted us. Later on I shall return to this point.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to submit the document which I have already mentioned, Document No. 10, and I ask that the High Tribunal take judicial notice of this document. There seems to be a mistake in translation on Page 39, something which completely disturbs the sense of the document. The question of doing away with trade unions is an important one and later on will play a large role. I should like to read a brief statement on Page 39, about the middle of the page: "I recognize that the trade unions have done many things to imbue the working classes with professional honor and professional price.
Many trade unions, for instance the union of office clerks, have accomplished marvels, though a real sudden change and definite work in this respect was in opposition to the ideaof class conflict. It was the socialist parties who prevented big scale consequences of the tendency of the trade unions to converts the working classes into a class. If the trade unions realize the signs of the times and keep off politics on a big scale, then they can become a big scale pillar of the new order." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: 5th of March, 1933?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In this case, I should like to refer to Document No. 98, in which I am presenting a diagram on the development of the election results in the years in question. developments. First of all, I should like to state that this election was a really and truly free one, for it was held with the old functionaries of the Republic, and the fact that it was actually free is shown by the fact that the votes of the Communists and of the Social Democrats did not decrease in any way, I, personally, had counted on the fact that the NSDAP would be successful at the polls. In November of 1932 I had taken away 36 of their seats in the Reichstag, and I counted on the fact that they would make good this loss and regain these seats. I had also hoped that my own voting block would be very, very successful. I hoped that the people would realize the necessity of forming an internal counter-balance. However, this was not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the figures are sufficient for us. We can form our own conclusions from the figures. We can see the figures. We don't need to have them all explained and commented on to us. There are very much more important things for us to consider.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Please, Witness, describe the coming about of the Enabling Act of the 23rd of March 1933, the Ermaechtigungsgesetz.
A. The Enabling Act was born out of necessity, the necessity to set up a peaceful era for the carrying out of economic measures. First of all, there were negotiations with the Center Partywhich had taken place,so that we could bring about a period of truce in Parliament, a period of truce to last one year. However, these negotiations had been in vain and were unsuccessful. Therefore, it was necessary to have this law, a law which had some parallels in the past. conspirary. The Prosecution has accused me of this. Therefore, I should like to emphasize that I tried to exert a certain amount of control in that I tried to maintain the veto power of the Reichspresident. From the cabinet records of the 15th of March, you can see that the State Secretary Meissner did not consider the collaboration of the Reichspresident as imperative.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like torefer to Document No. 25, which is identical with USA Exhibit 578. I should like to point out just what view von Papen held in this cabinet discussion, and I should also like to call your attention to the view held by State Secretary Meissner, State Secretary of the minority cabinet, with President Hindenburg and their excellent collaborators. ment 23 for this reason, that in the enumeration of the emergency decrees, we can see that in the state of emergency which obtained then, there was no possibility to govern with actual Reich Party laws, and the Enabling Act was a substitute for these emergency measures which repeatedly became necessary.
I should like to make a correction. The attitude taken by State Secretary Meissner is contained in Document 91, USA Exhibit 578. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 21st of March 1933, there was a decree of amnesty which the Prosecution has referred to. Will you please comment.
A. The Prosecution is calling this law the sanction of political murder.
I should like to make the following comments. It was not issued by the Cabinet, and this was the most natural conclusion for a revolutionary period which had lasted seven weeks. There can be found in the past many, many parallels for this decree of amnesty and period of amnesty, for example, the law of the 21st of July 1922. The young German Republic, in its amnesty measures, is also concerned with murder.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer you to Document 28, page 99 of Volume 1. This contains the law of the 21st of July, 1922, which concluded the period of state unrest which obtained in the years 1920 and 1921.
I should also like to refer you to page 100 of this Document No. 28 which contains the Amnesty Act of 1932 which I have mentioned. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the 23rd of March, the law dealing with the special courts was issued. What can you say in that connection?
A. These special laws or special courts were not anything new. I, personally, as Chancellor of the Reich, on the 9th of August 1932, issued a law like that, and I was basing my act on a directive of the cabinet Bruening which was dated the 6th of October 1931. In revolutionary periods, punishable acts must be brought to speedy trial.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to point to Document 27, page 89 of Document Book No. 1, and I should like to call your attention especially to the introduction preceding paragraph 1, from which we see that these emergency measures were based on the Bruening Ordinance of 1931. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. On the first of April 1933, the Jewish boycott was carried through. This was a measure taken by the government. Did you participate in any way?
A. The assertion by Dr. Goebbels that the cabinet had acquiesced in this decree was completely wrong. On the contrary, at the suggestion of the cabinet Hitler had made a public announcement of the 10th and 12th of March, a statement which my attorney will submit York on the 25th, calls it a shite lie of the greatest magnitude.
In this case, I can only say that this assertion and accusation is completely unfounded. The public statements made by Hitler gave us, and had to rive us, the assurance that such excesses could no longer take place. In that belief, and in good faith, I sent my telegram. It would have been inconceivable if on the 25th, I should send a telegram to New York -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Dr. Kubuschok, I thought your question was: Did the defendant participate in these measures? I don't know what his answer is. He has been answering fro some minutes, but I don't know what the answer is.
The question was: Did you participate? And I don't know what he has answered.
THE WITNESS: I said the assertion by Goebbels that the Government agreed to this Jewish boycott was a lie.
THE PRESIDENT: Why not answer directly, did you or did you not participate?
THE WITNESS: We did not participate.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I would like to refer to Document 33, page 113, a statement by Hitler on the 10th of March, and I should like to refer to the lost two lines:
"The annoying of individuals, the obstruction of automobiles, or the disturbance of business life must absolutely be discontinued". to the last paragraph of the declaration of Hitler of the 12th of March:
"Whoever, from now on, attempts by individual action t* bring disturbances into our administrative or business life, acts willingly against the national government".
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, I didn't intend to prevent the defendant telling the Tribunal what he had done with reference to his telegram to the New York Times, but I wanted him in the first instance to answer your question. to the New York Times, let him do so. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Will you please go back to this question regarding the New York Times.
A. I can only add, my Lord, that it would have been quite inconceivable and inexplicable if, on the 25th of April, I had sent this telegram to New York with the knowledge that three or four days afterwards a new Jewish boycott would once more arise.
That would have been quite nonsensical. day Mr. von Neurath sent quite a similar wire to Cardinal O'Connel.
Q. Please give us a description of your attitude to the Jewish problem.
A. The view I hold in regard to the Jewish problem can be briefly delineated. In my life I have always held the view which is expected by the Catholic Church of its members. My attitude to the question of race, in so far as it refers to National Socialist doctrine, I laid down in a speech in Gleiwitz in the year 1934, and I made my views known to the public and to the entire world. My attorney will submit that document. basic attitude toward the Jewish problem, was the question of a certain estrangement or the overwhelming influence of the Jewish element in these spheres which influence the public opinion of the people, such as the press, literature, theater, movies, and especially the legal system. unhealthy and that it would have to be corrected in some way, but as I said, we had nothing whatever to do with the racial question.
Dr. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to refer to Document 16, page 68, in which will be found an extract from the speech made in the year 1934 at Gl*iwitz. I quote -- and von Papen is speaking here:
"There are certainly no objections against race research and eugenics which endeavour to maintain the peculiarity of a nation as pure as possible, and at the same time to awaken a taste for nationality.
This love for one's own race will never degenerate into hatred towards other nations and races.
This is decisive and this *ug*nics must never be brought into conflict with Christianity, for race and Christianity are not contradictions but only difference orders. It was Christianity which first made of the German tribes a German nation and certainly it is not necessary first to create a new Nordic Germanic religion in order to be able to give a testimony to our nationalism."
second topic that the defendant has just mentioned, that is on page 103, excerpt dealing with the 4th of July, from the diary of Mr. Dodd.
I should also like to refer to document 35, page 115. There you shall find an article from the "Voelkischer Beobachter", dated 19 August, 1932. The heading of that article is:
"The Papen Government Inscribed the Protection of Jews on its Banner."
THE PRESIDENT: That was August, 1932? Where is it?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document 35, page 115. It is the last page in the document book, my lord.
I should like to read the heading of this article found in the "Voelkischer Beobachter", dated 19 August, 1932.
"The Papen Government Inscribed the Protection of Jews on its Banner."
This report deals with the statement of Mr. Kareski from Berlin, as a representative of the Jewish People's Party. Kareski was the director of the Synagogue in Berlin. At that time he stated and I should like to quote the last paragraph of this article:
"Fortunately, he said, the constitution of the German Republic still protects the legal position of the Jews and the Papen Government has inscribed the protection of the Jews on its banner." BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: dealing with Jews and exceptions which apply. Did you do anything with reference to the fact that these exceptions, as they were originally planned, Were much more extensive and restricted as set down in the law?
A May I just mention one thing? believe you forgot to tell the High Tribunal about and to submit to them the document 33, a document itself with the German, legal system. civil servants, I agree with this law only insofar as Jewish civil servants who were appointed after the year 1918 were concerned with this law and would fall under its regulations.
from the east, especially from Poland, a country which was anti-semitic at the time, an immigration from Poland into Germany, an immigration which started after the war. be concerned with this law or fall under it for I always held the view that a German, no matter what his antecedents, a German who had done his duty to his country in the war, should not be restricted in any way in his rights.
Q I should like to refer to document 33, page 115. It is a report eminating from the Ministry of Justice, from which we conclude that at the issuing of the civil servants' regulation there were more than three thousand Jews who were attorneys -- there were 3,515 Jews and as was just mentioned and because of the mitigating circumstances described by the witness, 735 ex-service men were excluded and also some others, people who had been admitted to the bar before 1918. In all 2,158 Jewish attorneys were admitted. There remained 2,158 Jewish attorneys whereas 523 had to resign from office.
A I believe that this was a completely normal happening. National Socialists, as one of the partners in the coalition government and since they controlled more than fifty per cent of the German vote, felt they should have an part in the filling of official posts. which they had carried on for years, had warred on the so-called "B*nzentum" system and we could not predict the fact that later on they would revert to the same mistake.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to adjourn?
(A recess was taker.)
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: servants' law. This law in its points which we have discussed was to a certain degree based on the trends of thoughts of the NSDAP. What was the reason that you in these points which were now limited made certain concessions? servants' law, we were creating something basic. I did not anticipate nor could I guess that the Party would later, during later years, introduce new laws again and again and in that manner, the civil service would be totally destroyed.
Q What was your attitude towards the dissolving of the parties? about as amatter of force. Hitler had demanded four years for the the reforms which we intended. The document 26 will show that I had requested Hitler to create a new basic state law and in his speech of the 23rd of March, Hitler did in fact promise that. In that speech, he was talking about a reformed constitution composed through the channels provided for in the constitution. That reform in my opinion, would have given us in a revolutionary way a new and better founded democratic and parliamentary reform. Apart from that, I must say that during the temporary application of the one-party system, I did not see any danger. We had excellent examples for it in ether states. Take Turkey and Portugal, for instance, where this one-party system was functioning excellently. Finally, I should like to point out that in my speech at Marburg on the 17th of June 1934. I referred,to that development and criticized it, saying that one could only regard it as an intermediary state which would have to be terminated by a reconstructed constitution. Please, will you state your views regarding that question. the prosecution and they have accused me of twofold lack of truth or cheating. The prosecution have alleged with reference to the Federalist developments in Germany, that I had changed my mind from the point of view which I had represented in 1932 to another one which I had adopted in 1933; but, then, even if I had then changed my mind in that respect during that year, I still cannot see why the problem of a Federal or central government should be a crime within thisCharter.
Apart from that, I haven't changed my mind at all. The things I said in 1932 were these: I recognized the advantages of a Federal system with respect to Germany and I hoped to maintain it but I always wished even in 1932, that there would be joint aims in the bigger political line in Germany; that for a Federal country was a matter of course, namely, that it would be run on unified principles and that was the only thing I was concerned with. That, also, i s the problem of my intervention in Prussia on the 20th of July. If you know the history of Germany, then you will know that Bismarck had overcome that same difficulty by combining the office of the Reichschancellor with the office of the Prussian Prime Minister. If therefire, now, in 1933, we appointed governors in the countries, then that was merely meant to achieve it, that they were to take care of bringing about unified political command. Apart from that, the privileges of the countries remained without intervention. They had their own independent financial system and their own legislation, their own Ministry of Culture and their own parliaments.
Q With regard to this governors' law, I draw your attention to document 31, particularly page 111 of that document and I quote: "Only after the activity of the defendant von Papen in 1935, there had been a further Reich Governors' law which transferred the authority." Now, for what reasons did you on the 7th of April 1933 resign as Prime Minister of Prussia? prosecution and the letter shows the reasons for my resignation. In Prussia-and that I had already stated -- in Prussia I had already carried out the coordination of political aims in July. The Reich Governor law enabled the Reichschancellor either to be Prime Minister of Prussiahimself or to nominate a substitute. For th at reason, my task in Prussia had been completed. Apart from that, I should like to draw your attention to the following point: The elections of March 5th had brought aboutin the Prussian Parliament, too, a strong majority for National Socialists. The Prussian Parliament met and desired, of course that a National Socialist should become Prime Minister of Prussia and those are the reasons for which I resigned. Catholic church had been particularly suitable to consolidate the regime as far as the churches were concerned. We must discuss your attitude regarding this church political problem and I want you to describe the church political situation in Germany at that time?