THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. The Tribunal would wish to have your motion in writing in accordance with the rule of the Tribunal. von Papen, which I believe is next.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am beginning with my presentation of evidence on behalf of my client, von Papen, by calling the defendant von Papen as a witness.
FRANZ VON PAPEN, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat the oath after me:
pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: emphasizing especially the period of time in which you entered politics. those points which to me seem essential for the High Tribunal to form judgment of my personality and how they influenced my life and my political attitude and opinion. nine hundred years. I grow up in a conservative home on conservative principles whichunite a personmost closely with his home soil and with his people. Since my family for a thousand years has been a support and a bulwark of the church, I of course grew up inthis tradition as well.
I was the second son and I was to enter a military career. At the ago of eighteen I became a lieutenant ina cavalry regiment and I went -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you gave us the date of your birth.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us you joined a cavalry regiment at the age of eighteen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There may be a misunderstanding. At the age of eighteen he entered it. Not in1918, but at the age of eighteen.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I said so. Saar industrialist, Geheimrat von Koch. The relatives of this family brought me in contact with many French and Belgian families and through that I gathered an intimate knowledge of the spiritual and cultural factors of neighboring countries. All of these factors made a very lively and vital impressionon me, and beginning with this period of time -- that is since 1905 -- I have been convinced of how wrong a certain political attitude can be, namely, that France and Germany had been considering themselves mortal enemies.
I felt howmuch these two peoples had to offer each other on a mutual basis, and especially if their peaceful development was not hampered. academy, and in 1913, after I had had training for five years, I was taken into the General Staff, At the end of 1913, at the command of His Imperial Majesty, The Kaiser, I was appointed Military Attache at Washington and Mexico. In this capacity, in the summer of 1914, I accompanies the U.S.A. Expeditionary Corps, which was dispatched to Vera Cruz because of the incident at Tampico. In Mexico, I was surprised at the out break of the First World War. Until the end of 1915 I remained at my post in Washington. Our war, which was carried on with legal methods against the unilateral supplying of our enemies with war materials, led to a heated propaganda. This propaganda, which was fostered by the enemy, as far as the military attaches of Germany were concerned, tried to cast suspicion upon them at all cost and by all means, to accuse than of illegal acts and especially of having organized acts of sabotage.
At the end of 1915 I left the United States. I regret to say that I never tried to rectify and correct this false propaganda, but this propaganda followed me until the '30s and even until today and it impressed its stamp upon me. In order to cite just one example, even after 1931, the high Valley Company stated before the Mixed Claims Commission that their claim against the German Reich, in the amount of $50,000,000, was justified, and that I, the German Military Attache, had caused an explosion which had taken place in the year 1917. In other words, two years after I had left the United States.
I am just mentioning this fact, Mr. President, since this propaganda honored me with titles such as "master spy", "Chief plotter", and other pretty names; for this propaganda is the background for the judging of my personality, and something which I felt in 1932 when I entered public life.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that would be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1410 hours, 14 June 1946.)
THE MARSHAL: If it pleases the Tribunal, the report is made that the defendan* Funk and Speer are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, we stopped at the formation of public opinion. Please continue in telling us of your career. States. No effort was ever made to investigate whether this judgment was true or false. That which I was able to do actively in those years, to oppose sabotage, to fight against submarine warfare, never became known. a pamphlet published in New York, with the beautiful title "The Devil in the Top Hat". It repeats all these fairy stories without criticism, and adds new ones. letely distorted picture of my character, my opinions, and, above all, my motives in the time from 1932 to 1945. to give a true picture of my thinking and my acting. commander, and as an officer of the General Staff in the war in France. In 1917 I became Chief of the Operational Section of Army Group Falkenheim in Turkey. When Falkenheim was recalled in 1918, I became Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish Army until the armistice. me by the world--an episode which shows that I was able to do something useful for the history of Humanity. On the 8th of December 1918, after a hard struggle with the German and Turkish headquarters, I succeeded in having Falkenheim evacu* Jerusalem. This city was not shelled and not destroyed by the English army because of this decision.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I thought, the 8th of December 1918. That must have been 1917.
THE WITNESS: *-* 1918, my Lord, 1918. The 8th of December, 1918.
of the German troops, we received the news of the collapse of the German Army and of the abdication of the German Kaiser. This fact meant for me not only the loss of the war. The whole world had collapsed for me. The German Reich had collapsed from a thousand years development and everything that we had believed in had been plunged into an unforseeable future. I decided to draw the conclusions. the Army. I went home where I rented a modest agricultural holding. There I was on traditional soil and devoted myself to home tasks. Now farmer friends entrusted me with the administration of their community affairs. They chose me as honorary major and in 1923, they sent me to the Prussian Parliament. German National Party, but the centre Party, the Zentrum, and the decisive point of this decision was my conviction that in this party I could do more for regulating social matters than amongst the conservatives. At the same time this Party represented the principles of a Christian concept of the State. for strengthening the German Republic internally. In the Zentum Party, I represented the conservative ideas of my agricultural electors. I endeavored to make this Party, which in Prussia had formed a coalition with the Left, form a coalition with the Right also. Thus I wanted to form an equilibrium from the tension of which National Socialism was born. in various terms of the Versailles Treaty. By way of reaching a bettor understanding with the French people, I became a member of the German-French Study Committee, a committee which had been founded by the Luxembourg industrialist Meirich, which contained a large number of outstanding men of both countries. Closer relations and conferences united me with the formations of both countries. On the French side was the well known leader, Colonel Picant. I took an active part in the congresses of German-French Catholic circles which met in Paris and Berlin.
All of these efforts were directed toward the aim of a deeper knowledge and comprehension of our two countries. Saar which was, at that time, under international control. Then in 1929 the Germans accepted the Young Plan, and I asked Mr. Stresemann to undertake a thorough question without plebescite with Mr. Bruening because I was always of the opinion that a voluntary mutual solution of this question would leave less resentment and more community spirit than a decision brought about by an election struggle carried on with passion on both sides. Unfortunately, this did not come about. and conquered alike. Germany's new democratic form was not able to cope with such a burden, and under the increasing economic pressure and increasing internal tension, in the spring of 1932 the Papen Cabinet was formed. Here began the political group for which I am glad to answer before this Tribunal, and here I should like to add a request to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has said that the defense has to express themselves briefly because the defendant Reichsmarshal Goering presented the history of National Socialism fully. Please consider that I am not speaking for National Socialism here. My defense will be that of the other Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the questioning of the witness, it is necessary to go into detail on the events and the activities of the witness as Reich Chancellor of the German Reich in the year 1932. The indictment refers to the time, the 1st of June 1932, the time of the appointment of Mr. von Papen as Reich Chancellor. The indictment sees, in the official activity of the Reich Chancellor, the preparation of the way of the Hitler Government. independent of the ideas of National Socialism, a program arising from Papen's own basic ideas, to which he remained loyas in the following period also.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, it is not proper for Counsel to make a statement of that sort. He must elicit the statements from the witness by questions, and the question must be so formed so as not to formulate the answers for the witness.
We want to hear the answers from the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I only wanted to point out that this period of time before 1933 must also be discussed for better understanding
THE PRESIDENT: We have to stop you from eliciting the evidence. Ask the witness. You must not state the facts yourself. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, will you explain to the Court what the situation was in Germany when Hindenburg called you to form a cabinet on 1 June 1932?
A Before I answer this question, will you please permit me, My *---*, as one of thelast chancellors of the Reich, to make a brief statement on the government formed by me?
To what extent the Charter of the Court in our opinion applies to the different governments of the Reich will later be developed by one of the other Counsel. I assume that this is in order to get a clear, historically accurate picture of the developments and a judgment on my total personality. For this reason, I wi ll comment on this part of the accusation. according to its best knowledge and conscience under the constitution and under the emergency powers of the President, at a time of a most severe internal economic depression. justify the slightest suspicion of crime in the sense of the Charter. I believe I must make this statement, My Lord, to uphold the integrity of my ministerial colleagues and, above all, the integrity of the President, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the last great historicial figure of Germany.
Dr. Bruening, my predecessor in office, was highly esteemed by us all and had been welcomed with great expectations. During his period of office were the great economic crisis, the customs blockades by other countries, production and trade almost completely at a standstill, no currency to acquire the necessary raw materials, increasing unemployment, the youths on the streets, world depression leading to bankruptcy of the banks, government possible only through emergency decrees; that is, by one-sided legislative acts of the President. Support for the unemployed emp*ies the treasury, is unproductive, and is no solution. As a result of the great unemployment, the radical parties are increasing. The political splitting up of the German people reaches its height. In the last Reichstag election, there were 32 parties. an orderly democracy in Germany. The English democracy was our model, but the Weimar Constitution had given the German people an abundance of laws which did not correspond to its political maturity. In 1932 it had long been clear that the Weimar Constitution made the mistake of giving the government too little authority.
I recall this fact: That the forming of a government In Prussia, since 1919, the Social Democrats had ruled.
They divided with the "Zentrum" in filling political offices in Prussia.
The have to be done in order to make it possible for the Reich government to govern and to make it more independent of the parties brought Hindenburg to the decision to appoint a cabinet independent of the parties, directed by experts. The members of this cabinet of mine were all experts in their fields. Von Neurath was an old diplomat. The Minister of the Interior, Geil, was an old administrative official. The Agricultural Minister was general director of great agricultural societies. The Finance Minister was Ministerial Director in his ministry. The Railroad Director, Elz, had been president of the board of directors of a railroad, and so forth. of the parties? did not forgive him for failing to succeed in winning the rightest parties for the re-election of Hindenburg as President in 1932. In 1925 the rightest parties had elected Hindenburg for the first time. At that time Hindenburg had been elected against thepassionate opposition of the Left and the Center. Now, in 1932, he was to be elected precisely by these leftist parties who had opposed him and against the Right. didtte was an unknown soldier of the Stahlhelm. Of course, this pained the Field Marshal greatly, and I point out that in the presidential election in 1932 Hitler received ever 11,000,000 votes, which was more than 30 per cent of the total vote for president.
Why the President chose me as Chancellor, I do not know. I can say that I myself did not lift a finger to bring this about.
formation of a cabinet was the beginning of an intrigue and a conspiracy.
On the 26th of May, 1932, I was at my estate in the Saar. Mr. von Schleicher, the Defense Minister, called me up there and asked me to come to Berlin. On the evening of the 27th, I arrived in Berlin. On the 28th I went to see Mr. von Schleicher. Mr. von Schleicher said to me: "There is a cabinet crisis; we are looking for a chancellor." He discussed various personalities with me, and finally he said: "The President would like to have you." I was greatly astonished, and I said "Why?" I then asked for time to think it over. went to see Mr. von Schleicher again. I said to him: "I have decided not to accept." Mr. von Schleicher said: "That won't do you any good. The President wants you under all circumstances." I answered Mr. von Schleicher: "The President probably has a wrong conception of the political strength which I would bring to him for this Government; he probably thinks that the Zentrum would support me politically. There can be no question of that." and I asked him about that. He told me: "Mr. von Papen, do not accept the office; the Party would immediately oppose you." I said: "Thank you, that is what I thought." Hindenburg stood up and said: "I did not call you because I wanted the support of any party through you; I called you because I want a cabinet of independent men." Then he reminded me of the duty which I would have toward the Fatherland. When I continued to contradict him, he said: "you cannot leave me in the lurch when I need you." I said: "No, under these circumstances I will not leave you in the lurch; I will accept."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks this might be dealt with in slightly less detail. The facts could be stated with less detail.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We will act accordingly.
document I, page 1. I submit document 1 as Exhibit No. 1. By DR. KUBUSCHOK: in some way. Is that true?
A In no way. I have already said that I had a very high opinion of Dr. Bruening personally, and that from the day when Mr. von Schleicher called me in -- that is, three days before my appointment -- I never had the slightest idea of being appointed as Bruening's successor. by you?
A No, that is completely false; it is a completely false statement of the prosecution. The History of the NSDAP, by Pfolz, in which that is stated and that is document 3463-PS -- is a purely private work and was probably financed by Goebbels and his Ministry. was to be created by a fait accompli without any negotiations with any party or the head of any party. beforehand?
A This statement of the prosecution is also untrue. I did not previously discuss the dissolution of the Reichstag with Hitler. The Reichstag was dissolved on the 4th of June. I saw Hitler for the first time in my life five or six days later. The dissolution of the Reichstag, as such, was a matter of course, because the now government wished to have the judgment of the electors on the new course and on the government's program.
Q What were the political aims of your cabinet? Please give this briefly. economic crisis and the one and a half million unemployed young people, the six to seven million completely unemployed, and the twelve to thirteen million, altogether, only partly employed.
were inadequate; they were a burden on finances and had no result. The aim of my government, therefore, was to employ private economy to solve this problem. We wanted to bring the who production machinery into working order again, and with the use of 2.2 billion marks we wanted to put this process into operation. In the current year we wanted to employ one and three-quarter million workers.
Such a program could not have been reconciled with the parties. The political aim, together with the reorganization of the economy, was to have the strongest of the opposition parties, the NSDAP, drawn upon for practical cooperation. been shown, through National Socialist Governments in Thuringia, in Brunswick, and in Oldenburg, that this attempt could be made without the danger of revolutionary movements. I could, therefore, hope, through a national and social program, to find approval of the Reichstag.
Q For the Government's statement, I refer to document 1, Exhibit 1, pages 2 and 3. government. Will you please explain briefly how you regarded the problem and how you attempted to solve it? and labor as great asit was in Germany, as a result of industrialization and alienation of the soil. The reason is known; I need not speak of it. However, one of the reasons, which is generally overlooked, was the German inflation, which had destroyed all liquid property in Germany. This inflation had affected the middle class and the workers, who formed to backbone of the nation. It had robbed them of savings and their property, and workers, tradesmen, the middle class, had become the proletariat.
new social order had arisen in our great neighboring countries, the order of classless society and the totalitarian state. The democratic powers of the world resisted the export of this system. They took protective measures in the economic field, but these protective measures, the "New Deal", and "Ottawa", weakened the German position all the more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kuboschok, I think the defendant must realize that this is all very familiar ground to the Tribunal, and it is not necessary to restate it in detail.
THE WITNESS: I only wanted to explain to the Tribunal that this social problem was the basis for the whole matter which developed historically .
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of the social problem is the question of the development of the NSDAP, and the witness is going to comment later from this point of view. BY Dr. KUBUSCHOK: government you did not contact Hitler. When did you see Hitler for the first time and what agreements did you reach? time on the 9th or 10th of June. This talk was an order to ascertain under what conditions Hitler would be willing to tolerate my government My program by the National Socialists was to be expected. Hitler's demand for such treatment of the government program was the removal of the prohibition of uniforms for the SS; that is, making his party politically equal to other parties. against the SS since the Bruening government had been an obvious injustice. The SA had been prohibited, but the formations of the socialists and the Communists, the "Rotfront" and the "Reichsbanner had not been prohibited. himself to tolerate my government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to correct a mistake made by the witness. He spoke of the "SS", and meant "SA". There was no SS at that time. President concerning the removal of the prohibition against the SA. The President points out that he decreed the lifting of this prohibition under the condition that there would be no acts of violence in the future. He says furthermore that he was determine with all constitutional means at his disposal to act against all violations of any kind if this expectation was not fulfilled. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: your efforts in the course of the Lousanne Conference in June, 1932, which had such a great influence on the development of the NSDAP? this conference, because the result was closely connected with the enormous increase of the NSDAP immediately thereafter. This conference had been prepared Long beforehand, as is known. It was to abolish reparations.
But I went to Lousanne with many other aims and hopes. The abolition of reparations was, so to speak, a "cause jugee". But what was necessary was to help Germany's moral discomfort, if Europe was to find an orderly test. This moral dissatisfaction had many reasons. Germany had become a "second rate nation". It had been robbed of sovereignty as a defensive power, the Rhineland, the Corridor, the Saar, and others.
I have already described the conomic conditions. This economic and political development of conditions helped the radical elements, and the extremists increased in every direction. parations question have to be solved, which was negative, but positive moral aid had to come. My program was the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich. In the first place, the famous paragraph 231 of the Versailles Treaty was to be abolished.
That was the paragraph which stated Germany's sole responsibility for the war. Historical events of all countries had long established that we were not the only ones responsible. In the second place, confidential relations with France had to be established.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that this really is very important for them.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I explain quite generally that the events in 1932, internal and foreign political events, formed the key for the growth of the NSDAP, which led to the 30th of January, 1933. We discussed various questions here; we discussed the events of 1932. We will be able to come back to it. I believe then we will first go on here. Therefore, I ask to permit the discussion at this time in somewhat greater detail.
THE WITNESS: I will make it as brief as possible, Mr. president.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better go on, as you suggest, from 1933. Is that not what you were suggesting, that you should go on to 1933, and then possibly cone back to 1932, if it is necessary?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not what I suggested. I said that the discussion of conditions in 1932 would find the key for the growth of the NSDAP and the formation of the Hitler government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but the defendant has been discussing the conditions of 1932 for a long time now. Surely we can get on to something which has something to do with the National Socialist party now.
THE WITNESS: I will come to that immediately, Mr. President. I only wanted to say that I took up these subjects at Lousanne and tried to achieve understanding for the internal situation in Germany. I talked to the French prime minister and negotiated with him with respect to striking out that famous paragraph. I negotiated a pact with him, but nothing came of all this.
For reasons which I do not want to go into now, the final result of the conference of Lousanne was negative. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q What was your point of view in the armament question? a role in the year 1993, I had already determined at that time in Lousanne with MacDonald, the prime minister, and M. Herriot. Later; in an interview, I did discuss this point of view with Herriot. I quoted this point of view again so as to have it well defined. That is in Document 55. In this document I said that it was not a question of German rearmament, but only a question of equal rights and equal treatment for Germany.
I need not quote this document. It is in the hands of the Court , Document 55.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I submit Document 55 as an exhibit, and further refer to Document 1, which has already been submitted, on Page 9, and Document 6, which I submitted as Exhibit 3, and refer to page 22.
THE WITNESS: At the conclusion of the Lousanne conference, I told MacDonald and Herriot, "You must give me a firm political success, for my government is the last government in Germany. Later there will be only rightists and leftists, or extremists". But they did not believe me, and I returned from Lousanne with only a half-success.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess Was taken) come up to your expectations.
Why did you, just the same, sign this contract?
A First of all, I had to sign it. Otherwise, there would have been a continuation and Germany would have become an economic vacum. Then we were directly confronted with the Reichstag election and I had to try to salvage the best possible from the situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, I should like to submit Document No. 7, to become Papen Exhibit No. 4. This document is a statement by von Papen, dated the 12th of July, 1932, the speech made at Lousanne, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall read a short extract in which Papen says: "But just aslittle as we are unable to erase by a onesided act four signatures given since 1918 by former governments, just aslittle was this possible with the solemn obligations --"
THE PRESIDENT: What is this document? No. 7 you say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document No. 7, yes; Page 23 in Document Book I. Exhibit No. 4, My Lord.
"-- just aslittle was this possible with the solemn obligations which were undertaken at that time by the government's parties in the name of the German people. The present government simply had to liquidate a situation which had been created by all former governments since signing the Versailles Treaty. This question of whether this situation can be liquidated if Germany denies the validity of her signature and with it places herself outside the conception *f cultural and other standards, I must answer it with a definite "no". attitude, especially since the propaganda given out by the NSDAP, this attitude taken by the defendant at that time is especially noteworthy. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: demonstrations. This was a general decree, as you have already sai, on the 16-6, relating to the prohibition of the wearing of uniforms, Since that prohibition had been lifted, what were the reasons for the proclamation against demonstrations being proclaimed?
against the wearing of uniforms, that did not take place. Meetings became more and more radical astime went on and now I decided to suggest to the Reich President a decree prohibiting demonstrations. In order to distinguish this decree from the decree which had prohibited the wearing of uniforms, this decree dealing with demonstrations treated all parties equally. Therefore, it did not prohibit only the SA but all fighting formations of the other parties.
Q Now * shallturn to the 20th of July, '32. The prosecution dealt with this statement and it calls your behaviour a "coup d'etat", and the witness Severing has given testimony in that regard. What was the reason for your action on the 20th of July, 1932? orderly circumstances, the re-establishment of order. I had received reports about collaboration of the police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and Communists. The position of the Reich government at Berlin has to be considered specifically in this case and I do not know whether the High Tribunal is cognizant of the legal position. The Reich government at Berlin was not an extra territorial domain or region such as obtains in the United States in Washington, D. C.; but it was in the police power of the Prussian State. My own surveillance, that is the guarding of the Reichschancellor, that was a task which belonged to the Prussian police. Then, if there in the Prussian police ministry agreements with the Communists were effected, that was something which concerned the security of the Reich government. In this instance we were concerned with an act against the Prussian government, but it was not a political incident or a procedure against Socialism as such. Neither was it a Nazification of the Republican police, as the witness Severing testified here. Officials, with the exception of a few higher place officials, remained completely unchanged. As I seized up the situation there, I made it known in a radio speech on the evening of the 20th; I told the German people about my sizing up of the situation. The High Tribunal will find this speech in Document 1, Page 4. However, I shall forego the reading of this speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should further like to point to Document 2, which I wish to submit to the High Tribunal as exhibit No. 5. I should like to point out Page 15, specifically, in which case the defendant, von Papen, gives his opinion about the necessity of this measure.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: highest German tribunal and was any decision made?
A Yes. The Prussian cabinet started proceedings before the Reich Tribunal at Leipzig and a judgment was passed. This sentence confirmed the action of the Reich's president. It is therefore impossible for the prosecution to call this matter a "Putsch" and characterize it as such.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to call your attention to Document 8, which I wish to submit as exhibit No, 6. This is an extract--I beg your pardon.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, is it necessary for you to give the document exhibit numbers different from the document numbers? you see, it becomes a littl bit confusing each one of these documents has got, at the head of the document. 1,2,3 and so forth, and they follow each other -
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to acquiesce in the suggestion of the High Tribunal and retain the same number. Therefore, Document 5 shall become Exhibit No. 5.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be much less confusing I think, if you could.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, My Lord.