of the Reich Fuehrer SS Himmler began to place time bombs in the public buildings of your province, just in case of an evacuation of this territory?
AAs far as these special commandos of Himmler's were concerned, I know nothing about them. I know only one case in which an Oberleutnant appeared, but I believe that that was prior to the time you mentioned. He wanted to take such steps. I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissar and the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, and I learned, that no one of the gentlemen there knew anything about anything of this nature. Then, on the request of the Reich Commissar, this Oberleutnant was told to cease his activity and to take up the bombs which he had already planted and put them away again and to leave immediately. I know of no other cases like that.
so-called drive for those who were fit for military service, to take them into the Reich?
A Yes; the Wehrmacht was carrying through this drive at the time. They had a delegate of Minister Skubi's, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for Total Warfare. This man had been in the Gau, and special afencies had been set up in the provinces. The director of this agency in the Gau carried these matters through incorrectly; he carried them through rather harshly. immediately got in touch with the commanding general and had this officer replaced immediately. in your province? in connection with the Wehrmacht. What I know is not from my own experience in administration, but, rather, it is knowledge I received through my connection with these agencies. From those sources I know that the resistance movement approached 50,000, perhaps; that is an estimate. These were people who were to be apprehended. By that I do not mean that they were people who were acting constantly or who were organized in any way. 200,000, Dutch children? Seyss-Inquart to end the war prematurely. Will you tell us briefly how connections were carried out with the representative of the General Staff Officer of Eisenhower?
A In the beginning of April, in the year 1945, Mr. von de Flicht approached me. He was the leader of the so-called IKO. That was an allied church council for the support of food problems.
Q Witness, please speak slowly, and a little more clearly. I cannot understand you even in the German language, which you are speaking.
A I was approached by Mr. von der Flicht, who was the director of an inter-church group, which wanted to supply the population with foodstuffs. I knew him because of that.
He told me that he was acting on behalf of the Dutch Government in London.
He put the question to me whether the Reich Commissar would be ready to negotiate with him--that is, von der Flicht. Three questions were mentioned which he wanted to discuss: First, a more extensive food supply for the Netherlands people through the Allies; secondly, the stopping of floodings; and third, the stopping of the combatting of the resistance movement. declared himself ready. Then, two days after that, we dealt with Mr. von der Flicht and another representative.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness the yellow light means that you are going too fast, you see. So, when you see the yellow light, go a little more slowly.
T HE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You were telling us what Seyss -Inquart did.
A(Continuing) Yes. Seyss-Inquart declared himself ready to negotiate about these questions immediately. A discussion then took place between us and Mr. von der Flicht and another representative of the Dutch Government in London. That was Junker. That is, this discussion took place among the four of us. that any combatting of the resistance movement was to be stopped, and the resistance group, on itspart, was to dispense with sabotage. ous supplyfor the population would be taken care of, and to stop the floodings. However, there were to be more detailed negotiations. Dutch people transported to London. Then, after there had been negotiations pro and con, we received an inquiry from London as to whether the Reich Commissar was ready to work with the Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower, and deal with him about these questions. The immediate answer was "yes". at Ammersford, and there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the Chief of the General Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery.
at Ammersford, and there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the Chief of the General Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery.
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need any more detail about it, do you?
A (Continuing) On that occasion we determined and agreed that another discussion was to take place two days following. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness, we are not really concerned with the details. We are concerned with the results of this conversation, and how it worked out to the interests of the Dutch population.
A Yes. This discussion took place on the 30th of April, between the Reich Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff of General Eisenhower, who was General Beedle-Smith. In this discussion the Reich Commissar agreed completely to the wishes of General Beedle-Smith. A very generous supply for the Dutch population-
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): If he said he agreed with the demands of General Beedle-Smith, surely that is all you want, isn't it? BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q What you have told us is quite sufficient. I should like to ask you this. Through these negotiations the was was ended two months prematurely, was it not?
A You cannot say that exactly. The situation was as follows. For the Dutch population, of course, on that day, the war ended in practice, because the welfare work could take place through the air, over highways, over canals, and rivers and lakes, to Rotterdam. This supply and health work was very generous, and, in order for these transports to take place, there had to be an armistice. armistice, and the population, at that time, immediately had the benefits of it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions of this witness.
THE WITNESS: May I just make a few remarks, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: If counsel has finished examining you, we do not want any more remarks.
Do any other counsel wish to ask questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross examination? BY MR. DEBENEST:
Q Witness, you spoke a short while ago of the negotiation's which you undertook with delegates of the government London. Are you aware of the fact that these delegates, before undertaking the negotiations with the Reich commissar in April, 1945, laid down as a condition that no more people would be shot by any German person having civil or military authority unless that person was first judged by a proper court? Commissar whether the SS would conform to the conditions of an accord which would put an end to the hostilities?
A Yes. That actually took place. After that time, nothing was undertaken against the resistance movement; no steps were undertaken. Nothing was undertaken there against the resistance movement from that period of time.
Q Very good. Is it correct to say that the Reich commissar replied, in his capacity of Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS, that he was in a position to impose upon the SS, and to assure himself that they would observe the conditions of this accord, and that he could answer for it?
Q (Interposing) No, no, wait a minute, please. I am asking you whether the Reich Commissar made that reply to the negotiators; that is, the delegates of the London government? capacity he was to see to it that the SS would comply with this agreement.
Q I thank you. The last question is this: Did you know a Kiehl?
He was a functionary of the Reich government -- K-I-E-H-L?
A Kiehl?
A K-I-E-H-L? Meer.
A Mr. Kiehl, to my knowledge, did not give out any directions. Mr. Kiehl was an expert on water works, and he was a very good expert. But orders for the flooding could be given only by the highest military authority, and that was General Blaskowitz.
DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff and the OK): Mr. President, I object to the questioning of this witness. The prosecution is using this testimony again to charge and accuse the OKW. In the objection I mentioned previously, I said that if I may not question the witnesses to exonerate, then the other side should not be permitted the corresponding right, either. I ask that the last statement be stricken from the record.
M. DEBENEST: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say, M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I merely wanted to say that if I asked this question, it is following the information that was given to me, where there was no question of the army, but of the instructions that were given by a civil servant of the Reich commissar. Therefore, I do not understand the interjection of the counsel, and I did not know by any means whether the witness was going to tell me whicher the Army was responsible when I was talking of the Reich commissar.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You may ask the question. BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. Will you proceed?
A. Mr. Kiehl was the hydrostatic engineer for the Reich commissar. But at the same time, he was a hydostatic engineer under the Wehrmacht commanderin-chief. He belonged to both of these agencies, but as an expert only. However, he was a very fine expert. But he could not give any instructions or orders.
Q. Please answer directly yes or no. Yes or no, did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Weeringer Meer?
A. Mr. Kiehl? No. He could not have done that.
Q. I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking whether he transmitted this order.
A. I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far Mr. Keihl was involved in this order.
Q. You do not know, therefore? That is sufficient.
What was the interest at that time in flooding the Weeringer Meer? Did not people think that the war was over?
A. No. When the Weeringer Meer was flooded, the war had not been concluded, and these agreements had not been concluded, either. When the Weeringer Meer region was flooded -- and I found this out from military men -there was the danger that an aerial landing at the terrain of the Weeringer Meer would take place, and there would be a union so that Friesland and North Holland would be connected, and it would be in enemy hands. That was the reason why military authorities considered this flooding necessary, and that is what I was told.
Q. But wasn't the war considered as being lost for Germany in Holland?
A. No. At that time, it was not considered lost. At any rate, we had an army which was defending us; and it still had its orders to defend, and had to carry out that order to defend. There was the danger that this landing would take place.
M. DEBENEST: That suffices. I have finished, Mr. President. BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q. I would not have to put another question to you if the French prosecutor had not broached a certain subject. What did General Bedell Smith tell you about the flooding of the Weeringer Sea?
A. General Bedell Smith said at this negotiation, towards the end of the negotiation, anything that has been undertaken in the line of flooding can be justified on the military basis and on the basis of military necessity. But no more floodings are to be undertaken from now on.
Q. Was any undertaken after that?
A. No, none was undertaken thereafter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this way I have concluded my examination of witnesses. Now I should like to refer to those documents which are contained in my document book which I have submitted to the High Tribunal. I was notified that the document book No. 3 has been submitted and put at the disposal of the high Tribunal. number 91, concerning the apostolic letter of the Catholic bishops, concerning the plebescite in Austria. In this apostolic letter, the attitude of the Gauleiter Buerckel is referred. We can gather from it that the persecution of the churches cannot be charged to Seyss-Inquart, but rather the responsibility is to be placed on Buerckel. judicial notice of this document without my reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Herewith I should like to conclude my presentation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, have you offered all the documents that you want to offer in your books? Have you offered them as evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you offered all the documents that you want to offer as evidence and given then exhibit numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. Yes, Mr. President. Only a few affidavits are lacking, affidavits which were admitted by the High Tribunal: Voelkers', Belle's and Rauter's. I am hopeful that we shall have these affidavits within a very short period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Steinbauer, you see you must offer each of these documents as evidence; you must say so. Merely putting them in the book doesn't offer them as evidence and, therefore, you must offer these things to us as evidence, if you wish to do so, giving them a number. You can offer them all together, saying you offer -
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to offer your documents Nos. 1 to -- I don't know what the last number is. 105 seems to be the last one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. I ask that the numbers in my document book be included up to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, are the numbers given in the books the exhibit numbers which you wish to give to the documents?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. They are in consecutive numerical order and they are found in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish, then, to offer Nos. 1 to -- whatever the last number is, as evidence. Is that right?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You offered some in the course of your presentation of the witnesses.
DR. STEINBAUER: Some of them I submitted and quoted according to the numbers given in my document book, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You now wish, then, to offer the remainder?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the remainder as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the numbers which they bear in your document book
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are offering all the originals under those numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Insofar as they are in my possession and I can say that the extracts and excerpts coincide with the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You have certified that they are true copies of the originals in accordance with the Tribunal's rules?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes indeed, Mr. President.
DR. FRITZ: Dr. Fritz, on behalf of the defendant Fritsche.
Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal that the defendant Fritsche be absent Monday and Tuesday of next week. He inquires this time for the preparation of his defense.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Dr. Flaechsner, on behalf of defendant Speer.
Mr. President, I wanted to put the same request on behalf of my client as he will be the next to be up on the witness dock, and I ask that he have permission to be absent Monday and Tuesday.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, on behalf of the General Staff and the OKW.
Mr. President, I shall need but a very brief period of time, but I must make an especially important motion, a motion which concerns procedure, and I should like to give the reasons for my motion. given on the 8-6-46, Point 2 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if your motion is an important motion, it should be in writing. If it is not in writing, it must be put in writing. You know perfectly well that is the rule of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it is very important to me that this motion of mine appears in the record. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: It will appear in the record if you make the motion in writing. You have been here for many months and you know perfectly well what the rule of the Tribunal is, that motions be made in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed, but since we are concerned with a motion which applies to procedure and which applies to an orally given resolution, I believe I am justified in putting my motion in this manner.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. The Tribunal would wish to have your motion in writing in accordance with the rule of the Tribunal. von Papen, which I believe is next.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I am beginning with my presentation of evidence on behalf of my client, von Papen, by calling the defendant von Papen as a witness.
FRANZ VON PAPEN, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name, please?
Q Will you repeat the oath after me:
pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: emphasizing especially the period of time in which you entered politics. those points which to me seem essential for the High Tribunal to form judgment of my personality and how they influenced my life and my political attitude and opinion. nine hundred years. I grow up in a conservative home on conservative principles whichunite a personmost closely with his home soil and with his people. Since my family for a thousand years has been a support and a bulwark of the church, I of course grew up inthis tradition as well.
I was the second son and I was to enter a military career. At the ago of eighteen I became a lieutenant ina cavalry regiment and I went -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think you gave us the date of your birth.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us you joined a cavalry regiment at the age of eighteen.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: There may be a misunderstanding. At the age of eighteen he entered it. Not in1918, but at the age of eighteen.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I said so. Saar industrialist, Geheimrat von Koch. The relatives of this family brought me in contact with many French and Belgian families and through that I gathered an intimate knowledge of the spiritual and cultural factors of neighboring countries. All of these factors made a very lively and vital impressionon me, and beginning with this period of time -- that is since 1905 -- I have been convinced of how wrong a certain political attitude can be, namely, that France and Germany had been considering themselves mortal enemies.
I felt howmuch these two peoples had to offer each other on a mutual basis, and especially if their peaceful development was not hampered. academy, and in 1913, after I had had training for five years, I was taken into the General Staff, At the end of 1913, at the command of His Imperial Majesty, The Kaiser, I was appointed Military Attache at Washington and Mexico. In this capacity, in the summer of 1914, I accompanies the U.S.A. Expeditionary Corps, which was dispatched to Vera Cruz because of the incident at Tampico. In Mexico, I was surprised at the out break of the First World War. Until the end of 1915 I remained at my post in Washington. Our war, which was carried on with legal methods against the unilateral supplying of our enemies with war materials, led to a heated propaganda. This propaganda, which was fostered by the enemy, as far as the military attaches of Germany were concerned, tried to cast suspicion upon them at all cost and by all means, to accuse than of illegal acts and especially of having organized acts of sabotage.
At the end of 1915 I left the United States. I regret to say that I never tried to rectify and correct this false propaganda, but this propaganda followed me until the '30s and even until today and it impressed its stamp upon me. In order to cite just one example, even after 1931, the high Valley Company stated before the Mixed Claims Commission that their claim against the German Reich, in the amount of $50,000,000, was justified, and that I, the German Military Attache, had caused an explosion which had taken place in the year 1917. In other words, two years after I had left the United States.
I am just mentioning this fact, Mr. President, since this propaganda honored me with titles such as "master spy", "Chief plotter", and other pretty names; for this propaganda is the background for the judging of my personality, and something which I felt in 1932 when I entered public life.
THE PRESIDENT: I think that would be a convenient time to break off.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1410 hours, 14 June 1946.)
THE MARSHAL: If it pleases the Tribunal, the report is made that the defendan* Funk and Speer are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kubuschok. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q Witness, we stopped at the formation of public opinion. Please continue in telling us of your career. States. No effort was ever made to investigate whether this judgment was true or false. That which I was able to do actively in those years, to oppose sabotage, to fight against submarine warfare, never became known. a pamphlet published in New York, with the beautiful title "The Devil in the Top Hat". It repeats all these fairy stories without criticism, and adds new ones. letely distorted picture of my character, my opinions, and, above all, my motives in the time from 1932 to 1945. to give a true picture of my thinking and my acting. commander, and as an officer of the General Staff in the war in France. In 1917 I became Chief of the Operational Section of Army Group Falkenheim in Turkey. When Falkenheim was recalled in 1918, I became Chief of the General Staff of the Fourth Turkish Army until the armistice. me by the world--an episode which shows that I was able to do something useful for the history of Humanity. On the 8th of December 1918, after a hard struggle with the German and Turkish headquarters, I succeeded in having Falkenheim evacu* Jerusalem. This city was not shelled and not destroyed by the English army because of this decision.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I thought, the 8th of December 1918. That must have been 1917.
THE WITNESS: *-* 1918, my Lord, 1918. The 8th of December, 1918.
of the German troops, we received the news of the collapse of the German Army and of the abdication of the German Kaiser. This fact meant for me not only the loss of the war. The whole world had collapsed for me. The German Reich had collapsed from a thousand years development and everything that we had believed in had been plunged into an unforseeable future. I decided to draw the conclusions. the Army. I went home where I rented a modest agricultural holding. There I was on traditional soil and devoted myself to home tasks. Now farmer friends entrusted me with the administration of their community affairs. They chose me as honorary major and in 1923, they sent me to the Prussian Parliament. German National Party, but the centre Party, the Zentrum, and the decisive point of this decision was my conviction that in this party I could do more for regulating social matters than amongst the conservatives. At the same time this Party represented the principles of a Christian concept of the State. for strengthening the German Republic internally. In the Zentum Party, I represented the conservative ideas of my agricultural electors. I endeavored to make this Party, which in Prussia had formed a coalition with the Left, form a coalition with the Right also. Thus I wanted to form an equilibrium from the tension of which National Socialism was born. in various terms of the Versailles Treaty. By way of reaching a bettor understanding with the French people, I became a member of the German-French Study Committee, a committee which had been founded by the Luxembourg industrialist Meirich, which contained a large number of outstanding men of both countries. Closer relations and conferences united me with the formations of both countries. On the French side was the well known leader, Colonel Picant. I took an active part in the congresses of German-French Catholic circles which met in Paris and Berlin.
All of these efforts were directed toward the aim of a deeper knowledge and comprehension of our two countries. Saar which was, at that time, under international control. Then in 1929 the Germans accepted the Young Plan, and I asked Mr. Stresemann to undertake a thorough question without plebescite with Mr. Bruening because I was always of the opinion that a voluntary mutual solution of this question would leave less resentment and more community spirit than a decision brought about by an election struggle carried on with passion on both sides. Unfortunately, this did not come about. and conquered alike. Germany's new democratic form was not able to cope with such a burden, and under the increasing economic pressure and increasing internal tension, in the spring of 1932 the Papen Cabinet was formed. Here began the political group for which I am glad to answer before this Tribunal, and here I should like to add a request to the Tribunal. The Tribunal has said that the defense has to express themselves briefly because the defendant Reichsmarshal Goering presented the history of National Socialism fully. Please consider that I am not speaking for National Socialism here. My defense will be that of the other Germany.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the questioning of the witness, it is necessary to go into detail on the events and the activities of the witness as Reich Chancellor of the German Reich in the year 1932. The indictment refers to the time, the 1st of June 1932, the time of the appointment of Mr. von Papen as Reich Chancellor. The indictment sees, in the official activity of the Reich Chancellor, the preparation of the way of the Hitler Government. independent of the ideas of National Socialism, a program arising from Papen's own basic ideas, to which he remained loyas in the following period also.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, it is not proper for Counsel to make a statement of that sort. He must elicit the statements from the witness by questions, and the question must be so formed so as not to formulate the answers for the witness.
We want to hear the answers from the witness.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Mr. President, I only wanted to point out that this period of time before 1933 must also be discussed for better understanding
THE PRESIDENT: We have to stop you from eliciting the evidence. Ask the witness. You must not state the facts yourself. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, will you explain to the Court what the situation was in Germany when Hindenburg called you to form a cabinet on 1 June 1932?
A Before I answer this question, will you please permit me, My *---*, as one of thelast chancellors of the Reich, to make a brief statement on the government formed by me?
To what extent the Charter of the Court in our opinion applies to the different governments of the Reich will later be developed by one of the other Counsel. I assume that this is in order to get a clear, historically accurate picture of the developments and a judgment on my total personality. For this reason, I wi ll comment on this part of the accusation. according to its best knowledge and conscience under the constitution and under the emergency powers of the President, at a time of a most severe internal economic depression. justify the slightest suspicion of crime in the sense of the Charter. I believe I must make this statement, My Lord, to uphold the integrity of my ministerial colleagues and, above all, the integrity of the President, Field Marshal von Hindenburg, the last great historicial figure of Germany.
Dr. Bruening, my predecessor in office, was highly esteemed by us all and had been welcomed with great expectations. During his period of office were the great economic crisis, the customs blockades by other countries, production and trade almost completely at a standstill, no currency to acquire the necessary raw materials, increasing unemployment, the youths on the streets, world depression leading to bankruptcy of the banks, government possible only through emergency decrees; that is, by one-sided legislative acts of the President. Support for the unemployed emp*ies the treasury, is unproductive, and is no solution. As a result of the great unemployment, the radical parties are increasing. The political splitting up of the German people reaches its height. In the last Reichstag election, there were 32 parties. an orderly democracy in Germany. The English democracy was our model, but the Weimar Constitution had given the German people an abundance of laws which did not correspond to its political maturity. In 1932 it had long been clear that the Weimar Constitution made the mistake of giving the government too little authority.
I recall this fact: That the forming of a government In Prussia, since 1919, the Social Democrats had ruled.
They divided with the "Zentrum" in filling political offices in Prussia.
The have to be done in order to make it possible for the Reich government to govern and to make it more independent of the parties brought Hindenburg to the decision to appoint a cabinet independent of the parties, directed by experts. The members of this cabinet of mine were all experts in their fields. Von Neurath was an old diplomat. The Minister of the Interior, Geil, was an old administrative official. The Agricultural Minister was general director of great agricultural societies. The Finance Minister was Ministerial Director in his ministry. The Railroad Director, Elz, had been president of the board of directors of a railroad, and so forth. of the parties? did not forgive him for failing to succeed in winning the rightest parties for the re-election of Hindenburg as President in 1932. In 1925 the rightest parties had elected Hindenburg for the first time. At that time Hindenburg had been elected against thepassionate opposition of the Left and the Center. Now, in 1932, he was to be elected precisely by these leftist parties who had opposed him and against the Right. didtte was an unknown soldier of the Stahlhelm. Of course, this pained the Field Marshal greatly, and I point out that in the presidential election in 1932 Hitler received ever 11,000,000 votes, which was more than 30 per cent of the total vote for president.
