demanded the keys which were in my personal possession. I refused. I had another talk with Fischboeck. The matter was obviously distasteful to him. He would give us this concession, that the remaining diamonds, which we later found in Arnhem, be returned to the owners, but the half which had been sent to Berlin they were willing, to give back only if they could be placed under German lock in a bank in the Eastern Netherlands.
I demanded that they be turned over without restrictions. Apparently Fischboeck could not agree, and for this reason, after the liberation of the Netherlands, these diamonds were not given back and as far as I know they have not yet been returned. Theresienstadt? these people, on the basis of a promise given to my colleague Fredericks, were to be given special treatment, but that their property would be given back is not known to me and I do not believe it. confiscated? from Amsterdam to Mauthausen as a measure of reprisal for the fact that a member of the NSB was supposedly murdered at Amsterdam by Jews. What do you know about this? Amsterdam. One difficulty referred to shipyard workers. I believe 3,000 of them were to be forcibly sent to Germany. I intervened with Seyss-Inquart and succeeded in preventing this, but there was excitement in Amsterdam. In the second place, Jews were already being arrested in Amsterdam, which was the occasion for a strike. strike in Amsterdam as far as I recall, because they wanted to make the Jews responsible for the strike. I said that I did not believe it, that this was an excuse.
because the population at Amsterdam was opposed to their deportation. There were demonstrations in the streets, during which several members of the NSB were killed. These Jews were therefore not deported in reprisal for the murder of the members of the NSB; quite the contrary. The men of the NSB were killed at the time when they were going to arrest the Jews, before there was any idea of reprisal. Jews were being arrested, and this led to upheaval in Amsterdam and to this strike. Exactly what happened I do not know from my own experience. not submit to being removed to Germany? Germany, on the 6th of May instructions were sent to the competent Netherlands authorities announcing that workers who were called in these ago groups could no longer receive any food cards. That was a decree of the 6th of May 1943, signed by an official of the Reich Commissariat by the name of H*fge. was in effect, the instruction was not carried out by the Netherlands authorities. What the German authorities said, in effect, was, "Whoever does not work for Germany gets nothing to eat." Germany up to 1942 were all volunteers. Is that correct?
A No, they could not all be volunteers. The unemployed in the Netherlands received compensation, and shortly after the occupation instruction were issued that people who were suited for work in Germany and refused to volunteer for this work could no longer receive unemployment compensation. Thus, they were under economic pressure. Seyss-Inquart. Could you inform us on this?
by Seyss-Inquart at the beginning of June 1940 as General Commissar for Security. No order which was then known indicated that Rauter had any kind of special position. The decree of the German Reich Chancellor of the 18th of may 1940 indicated to us Dutch that the Reich Commissar was the only responsible man in the Netherlands for the occupying power in the civilian sphere. realized that Rauter received direct orders from Himmler or from the Reichs Sicherheits Haupt Amt, the Reich Main Security Office. The population of the Netherlands could not know this. frontier and its repercussion on life in Holland.
A Yes. I will try to describe this matter in a few words. At the outbreak of war, there was a clearing agreement between the Netherlands and Germany. We Netherlands officials, at the beginning of the occupation, were able to exercise special control for deliveries of goods and such to Germany, because there was not only border control by customs officials, but we could also control payment. the matter. This was the occasion for friction. He attempted to remove this clearing, and on the first of April 1941 the foreign currency border was removed, and thus all goods could be bought in the Netherlands for Reichsmarks, and under the protection of the German authorities they could be taken to Germany.
I will give an example. According to an investigation which I ordered at that time, there were a few hundred buyers of jewelry and old and silver in the Netherlands. These articles are easy to carry with one. If there had been control of payment, it would not have been possible that in 1942 alone 80 to 100 million gulden of such goods was taken away to Germany. The important point was that by lifting this control of currency, one could operate more freely. Furthermore, there was a possibility of buying Dutch securities on the Amsterdam stock exchange.
economy together. The easiest way to do this was to lift the currency control between the occupied territories and Germany, and thus Netherlands interests were damaged more severely than those of other occupied territories where their currency control was retained. out this exploitation. The lifing of the currency control made the German policy in this connection much easier. This was clearly shown by an order of Hermann Goering of 1942, in which the control of the Netherlands-German border was abolished and the man responsible for the Four Year Plan could write that there could be no control at the border when price regulations or rational regulations were broken. That was what Hermann Goering added.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that this should be shortened, this discussion of the question of the abolition of the frontier policy for money.
M. DUBOST: I have no more questions on this point, Mr. President. BY M. DUBOST: occupation?
A The total sun which was paid at the end of the occupation was 8 1/2 billion gulden.
Q How were these payments demanded?
A This 8 1/2 billion gulden consisted of credits which the Wehrmacht demanded for the direct occupation costs in the Netherlands; furthermore, for the cost of the machinery of the Reich Commissariat, and third, payments which were imposed on the Netherlands under the expression which was used at first, "outside occupation costs", that is, costs which the Wehrmacht had in Germany in the interest of the occupation forces in the Netherlands. Netherlands was Dutch payments in Germany. They were in gold, which was demanded at the Netherlands Bank, and payments from the property which the Reich Netherlands Bank had in the Reichsbank.
Q But were these payments the result of one of these conditions? tion occupation costs. the means of production, such as stocks, machinery, ships, and so forth. of occupation,it could not be figured out. But, after the German capitulation, the Netherlands Government applied to the Repatriation Committee in Paris, and reported the sum of 25,000,000,000 gilders as damages for occupation. This would include 8,500,000,000 occupational costs which I mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't this all contained in the Dutch report?
M. DUBOST: Oh no, Mr. President, certainly not. BY M. DUBOST:
Q How did Seyss-Inquart's attitude change during the occupation? of view after the fall of 1944 and in the first four-and one-half years. After the fall of 1944 he was much more interested in the Netherlands' interest than previously. which you administered during the German occupation, you werehead of the Foreign Trade in Holland, and as such you were present at International negotiations and in particular, you negotiated with the representatives of Germany about economic questions concerning Holland. You therefore know Schacht?
A Yes, I believe I first met Mr. Schacht in 1933 at the World Economic Conference in London. to restrict the re-armament of Germany which was ruining her credit?
when I was in Berlin. Mr. Schacht spoke on the basis of Trade Treaty negotia-
tions. In this talk, the international financial situation came up because there were various currency evaluations at that time, the French franc, the Swiss franc, and the Dutch gulden and the situation of German currency was discussed. Schact, when I voiced my criticism, siad, "How would you do it?" Germany which was being discussed at that time, should take up more international loans, and if so, whether Germany would be ready to take the consequences if theinterests and amortizations meant that the importation of raw materials would be reduced, and if so, that this would have an unfortunate effect on the employment and on the re-armament. Would Germany be willing to accept such consequences? If so, in my private opinion in 1936, it should be international loans. If not, then such a discussion would have little point.
Then Schacht gave me his opinion. That Germany needed re-armament, in order to be equal to the other great powers in international politics. Only on such a basis could one negotiate. And Schacht said to me in his own ironical way, "I want a big and strong Germany and to achieve that, I would even ally myself with the devil." First, he wanted to clear up the currency question, and then he wanted to clear up the colonial question. On the colonial question, he said to me that in his opinion, it was possible for Germany to take on the colonies again, and to adopt the attitude not to arm these colonies, or not to set up any naval bases there. If such a policy was to be taken up, he believed that German economic and foreign policy could be changed. Then Schacht told me that he did not approve of the anti-Semitic tendency in Germany. He gave me examples of his attitudes toward anti-Semitism. He rejected it. I may add one example here that he gave me, an example of a certain Kades, who was Prime Minister of Brunswick.
Q That is of no interest whatever. Schacht told you he had defended the Jews.
Now, about this staff, the General Staff. Wasn't it the General Staff who gave the order to have these raids carried on in Rotterdam?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, If I understood the question correctly, the witness was asked about the changes against the High Command.
I object to this question for the following reasons: of the court promulgated on the 8th of June, prohibited the questioning of witness or cross-examination of witness...... If I am not allowed to question witnesses, then the Prosecution must not be allowed to question them since the rules must be the same for Prosecution and Defense.
M. DUBOST: I therefore will forego my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't hear what you said.
M. DUBOST: I said, Mr. President, that I will forego my question about the General Staff, and I have two more questions about Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost. BY M. DUBOST: the large Dutch cities?
Q Who gave these orders for the round-ups to be carried out? Who gave these orders?
A These raids were carried out by the German Wehrmacht. From whom the orders came I don't know. It is only known that in Rotterdam, this raid -- I believe it was on 11 November 1944 -- was carried out by the divisional commander in Rotterdam, who held a speech in the town hall on the subject, and, of course, this raid.
Q But, didn't Seyss-Inquart have children from the children's hospital taken away for work in Germany? children's hospital and sent them to work in the service of Germany? did all of this take place on Seyss-Inquart's orders?
A I know that the SS in the Netherlands recalled soldiers. As far as I know from the newspapers, bulletins and handbills, it was always done by the SS as such.
Q Who pledged himself not to use chemical products made in Holland for war?
Was it Seyss-Inquart who had pledged himself not to do so? made in Holland and to have themreserved only for Dutch agricultural purposes? made that the nitrogen fertilizer in the Netherlands would only produce artificial fertilizer. This was done already in the middle of August, 1944, when instructions came that the nitrogen fertilizer industry was to change its production over to explosives. These instructions had been issued by an office of the Reichs Commissar. It was signed by a certain Mr. Brocke. attempted to speak to Seyss-Inquart personally on this matter and to intervene. I was given the answer by his adjutant that he had already made his decision and that I could establish contact with Viebich, the representative of Speer in the Netherlands. I discussed the matter with Viebich and told him that the Netherlands industry and the Netherlands labor could not work on explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, can't this question be answered a little more shortly? The question is, did Seyss-Inquart promise that chemicals should be used, I suppose on the land in Holland and not for purposes in the Reich? isn't that the question? BY M. DUBOST:
Q You have heard what Mr. President has said. Will you kindly try to answer more briefly? duced. Then the demand was made to produce explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, we don't want it all again. Can't you get the question answered?
M. DUBOST: I didn't understand the answer of the witness, Mr. President. It didn't come through.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn.
(A recess was taken) M. DUBOST:
With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall ask two or three questions.
BY M. DUBOST: newspaper at the Hague was destroyed by the commissioners of the Reich?
Q Can you tell us?
A Yes. The newspaper at the Hague was destroyed because the workers of the paper refused to publish an article which spoke against the railroad strike, an article which had been compiled by the Reich Press Section. That was the reason for refusing to publish it.
Q It was destroyed by means of dynamite, was it not; the buildings and machinery were blown up, were they not?
A The equipment was blown up; yes, with dynamite.
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel, for defendant Seyss-Inquart):
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal, I shoul like to call my last witness to the witness stand, Ernst Schwebel. follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name,please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath)
THE PRESIDENT: Y ou may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER: in the Netherlands?
Q When did you come to the Netherlands? or plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissar in the province of South Holland, including the cities of the Hague and Rotterdam? have constant contact with the Dutch administrative authorities in this province and with the local authorities? office -- left from the Royal regime, that is? of the local government, or did he change them?
A No, he made but few changes -- very few. Shall I discuss these changes?
Q Yes, but briefly. Perhaps you can just cite the reasons for the changes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the changes have already been stated by other witness, have they not, and have not been cross-examined to. Is that right? Did not Seyss-Inquart state the changes, and they were not cross-examined to?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall turn to another question. BY DR. STEINBAUER: emergency was declared?
Q And the security powers were turned over to the Wehrmacht? regulation declaring this state, but for military reasons.
Q On the basis of military developments?
of the Reich Fuehrer SS Himmler began to place time bombs in the public buildings of your province, just in case of an evacuation of this territory?
AAs far as these special commandos of Himmler's were concerned, I know nothing about them. I know only one case in which an Oberleutnant appeared, but I believe that that was prior to the time you mentioned. He wanted to take such steps. I immediately got in touch with the Reich Commissar and the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht, and I learned, that no one of the gentlemen there knew anything about anything of this nature. Then, on the request of the Reich Commissar, this Oberleutnant was told to cease his activity and to take up the bombs which he had already planted and put them away again and to leave immediately. I know of no other cases like that.
so-called drive for those who were fit for military service, to take them into the Reich?
A Yes; the Wehrmacht was carrying through this drive at the time. They had a delegate of Minister Skubi's, in his capacity as Reich Commissar for Total Warfare. This man had been in the Gau, and special afencies had been set up in the provinces. The director of this agency in the Gau carried these matters through incorrectly; he carried them through rather harshly. immediately got in touch with the commanding general and had this officer replaced immediately. in your province? in connection with the Wehrmacht. What I know is not from my own experience in administration, but, rather, it is knowledge I received through my connection with these agencies. From those sources I know that the resistance movement approached 50,000, perhaps; that is an estimate. These were people who were to be apprehended. By that I do not mean that they were people who were acting constantly or who were organized in any way. 200,000, Dutch children? Seyss-Inquart to end the war prematurely. Will you tell us briefly how connections were carried out with the representative of the General Staff Officer of Eisenhower?
A In the beginning of April, in the year 1945, Mr. von de Flicht approached me. He was the leader of the so-called IKO. That was an allied church council for the support of food problems.
Q Witness, please speak slowly, and a little more clearly. I cannot understand you even in the German language, which you are speaking.
A I was approached by Mr. von der Flicht, who was the director of an inter-church group, which wanted to supply the population with foodstuffs. I knew him because of that.
He told me that he was acting on behalf of the Dutch Government in London.
He put the question to me whether the Reich Commissar would be ready to negotiate with him--that is, von der Flicht. Three questions were mentioned which he wanted to discuss: First, a more extensive food supply for the Netherlands people through the Allies; secondly, the stopping of floodings; and third, the stopping of the combatting of the resistance movement. declared himself ready. Then, two days after that, we dealt with Mr. von der Flicht and another representative.
THE PRESIDENT: Witness the yellow light means that you are going too fast, you see. So, when you see the yellow light, go a little more slowly.
T HE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: You were telling us what Seyss -Inquart did.
A(Continuing) Yes. Seyss-Inquart declared himself ready to negotiate about these questions immediately. A discussion then took place between us and Mr. von der Flicht and another representative of the Dutch Government in London. That was Junker. That is, this discussion took place among the four of us. that any combatting of the resistance movement was to be stopped, and the resistance group, on itspart, was to dispense with sabotage. ous supplyfor the population would be taken care of, and to stop the floodings. However, there were to be more detailed negotiations. Dutch people transported to London. Then, after there had been negotiations pro and con, we received an inquiry from London as to whether the Reich Commissar was ready to work with the Commander in Chief, General Eisenhower, and deal with him about these questions. The immediate answer was "yes". at Ammersford, and there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the Chief of the General Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery.
at Ammersford, and there I briefly negotiated with General Sir Francis Gengard, who was the Chief of the General Staff of Field Marshal Montgomery.
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need any more detail about it, do you?
A (Continuing) On that occasion we determined and agreed that another discussion was to take place two days following. BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Witness, we are not really concerned with the details. We are concerned with the results of this conversation, and how it worked out to the interests of the Dutch population.
A Yes. This discussion took place on the 30th of April, between the Reich Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff of General Eisenhower, who was General Beedle-Smith. In this discussion the Reich Commissar agreed completely to the wishes of General Beedle-Smith. A very generous supply for the Dutch population-
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing): If he said he agreed with the demands of General Beedle-Smith, surely that is all you want, isn't it? BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q What you have told us is quite sufficient. I should like to ask you this. Through these negotiations the was was ended two months prematurely, was it not?
A You cannot say that exactly. The situation was as follows. For the Dutch population, of course, on that day, the war ended in practice, because the welfare work could take place through the air, over highways, over canals, and rivers and lakes, to Rotterdam. This supply and health work was very generous, and, in order for these transports to take place, there had to be an armistice. armistice, and the population, at that time, immediately had the benefits of it.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions of this witness.
THE WITNESS: May I just make a few remarks, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: If counsel has finished examining you, we do not want any more remarks.
Do any other counsel wish to ask questions?
(No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross examination? BY MR. DEBENEST:
Q Witness, you spoke a short while ago of the negotiation's which you undertook with delegates of the government London. Are you aware of the fact that these delegates, before undertaking the negotiations with the Reich commissar in April, 1945, laid down as a condition that no more people would be shot by any German person having civil or military authority unless that person was first judged by a proper court? Commissar whether the SS would conform to the conditions of an accord which would put an end to the hostilities?
A Yes. That actually took place. After that time, nothing was undertaken against the resistance movement; no steps were undertaken. Nothing was undertaken there against the resistance movement from that period of time.
Q Very good. Is it correct to say that the Reich commissar replied, in his capacity of Obergruppenfuehrer of the SS, that he was in a position to impose upon the SS, and to assure himself that they would observe the conditions of this accord, and that he could answer for it?
Q (Interposing) No, no, wait a minute, please. I am asking you whether the Reich Commissar made that reply to the negotiators; that is, the delegates of the London government? capacity he was to see to it that the SS would comply with this agreement.
Q I thank you. The last question is this: Did you know a Kiehl?
He was a functionary of the Reich government -- K-I-E-H-L?
A Kiehl?
A K-I-E-H-L? Meer.
A Mr. Kiehl, to my knowledge, did not give out any directions. Mr. Kiehl was an expert on water works, and he was a very good expert. But orders for the flooding could be given only by the highest military authority, and that was General Blaskowitz.
DR. LATERNSER: (Counsel for the General Staff and the OK): Mr. President, I object to the questioning of this witness. The prosecution is using this testimony again to charge and accuse the OKW. In the objection I mentioned previously, I said that if I may not question the witnesses to exonerate, then the other side should not be permitted the corresponding right, either. I ask that the last statement be stricken from the record.
M. DEBENEST: I beg your pardon?
THE PRESIDENT: What did you say, M. Debenest?
M. DEBENEST: Mr. President, I merely wanted to say that if I asked this question, it is following the information that was given to me, where there was no question of the army, but of the instructions that were given by a civil servant of the Reich commissar. Therefore, I do not understand the interjection of the counsel, and I did not know by any means whether the witness was going to tell me whicher the Army was responsible when I was talking of the Reich commissar.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You may ask the question. BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. Will you proceed?
A. Mr. Kiehl was the hydrostatic engineer for the Reich commissar. But at the same time, he was a hydostatic engineer under the Wehrmacht commanderin-chief. He belonged to both of these agencies, but as an expert only. However, he was a very fine expert. But he could not give any instructions or orders.
Q. Please answer directly yes or no. Yes or no, did Kiehl transmit the order to flood the Weeringer Meer?
A. Mr. Kiehl? No. He could not have done that.
Q. I am not asking you whether he gave the order; I am asking whether he transmitted this order.
A. I know absolutely nothing about that. I do not know how far Mr. Keihl was involved in this order.
Q. You do not know, therefore? That is sufficient.
What was the interest at that time in flooding the Weeringer Meer? Did not people think that the war was over?
A. No. When the Weeringer Meer was flooded, the war had not been concluded, and these agreements had not been concluded, either. When the Weeringer Meer region was flooded -- and I found this out from military men -there was the danger that an aerial landing at the terrain of the Weeringer Meer would take place, and there would be a union so that Friesland and North Holland would be connected, and it would be in enemy hands. That was the reason why military authorities considered this flooding necessary, and that is what I was told.
Q. But wasn't the war considered as being lost for Germany in Holland?
A. No. At that time, it was not considered lost. At any rate, we had an army which was defending us; and it still had its orders to defend, and had to carry out that order to defend. There was the danger that this landing would take place.
M. DEBENEST: That suffices. I have finished, Mr. President. BY DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart):
Q. I would not have to put another question to you if the French prosecutor had not broached a certain subject. What did General Bedell Smith tell you about the flooding of the Weeringer Sea?
A. General Bedell Smith said at this negotiation, towards the end of the negotiation, anything that has been undertaken in the line of flooding can be justified on the military basis and on the basis of military necessity. But no more floodings are to be undertaken from now on.
Q. Was any undertaken after that?
A. No, none was undertaken thereafter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I have no further questions of this witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, in this way I have concluded my examination of witnesses. Now I should like to refer to those documents which are contained in my document book which I have submitted to the High Tribunal. I was notified that the document book No. 3 has been submitted and put at the disposal of the high Tribunal. number 91, concerning the apostolic letter of the Catholic bishops, concerning the plebescite in Austria. In this apostolic letter, the attitude of the Gauleiter Buerckel is referred. We can gather from it that the persecution of the churches cannot be charged to Seyss-Inquart, but rather the responsibility is to be placed on Buerckel. judicial notice of this document without my reading it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. STEINBAUER: Herewith I should like to conclude my presentation of evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, have you offered all the documents that you want to offer in your books? Have you offered them as evidence?
DR. STEINBAUER: I did not understand the question.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you offered all the documents that you want to offer as evidence and given then exhibit numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes. Yes, Mr. President. Only a few affidavits are lacking, affidavits which were admitted by the High Tribunal: Voelkers', Belle's and Rauter's. I am hopeful that we shall have these affidavits within a very short period of time.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Steinbauer, you see you must offer each of these documents as evidence; you must say so. Merely putting them in the book doesn't offer them as evidence and, therefore, you must offer these things to us as evidence, if you wish to do so, giving them a number. You can offer them all together, saying you offer -
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to offer your documents Nos. 1 to -- I don't know what the last number is. 105 seems to be the last one.
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. I ask that the numbers in my document book be included up to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, are the numbers given in the books the exhibit numbers which you wish to give to the documents?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President. They are in consecutive numerical order and they are found in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You wish, then, to offer Nos. 1 to -- whatever the last number is, as evidence. Is that right?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You offered some in the course of your presentation of the witnesses.
DR. STEINBAUER: Some of them I submitted and quoted according to the numbers given in my document book, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: You now wish, then, to offer the remainder?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, the remainder as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Under the numbers which they bear in your document book
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are offering all the originals under those numbers?
DR. STEINBAUER: Insofar as they are in my possession and I can say that the extracts and excerpts coincide with the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: You have certified that they are true copies of the originals in accordance with the Tribunal's rules?
DR. STEINBAUER: Yes indeed, Mr. President.
DR. FRITZ: Dr. Fritz, on behalf of the defendant Fritsche.
Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal that the defendant Fritsche be absent Monday and Tuesday of next week. He inquires this time for the preparation of his defense.
DR. FLAECHSNER: Dr. Flaechsner, on behalf of defendant Speer.
Mr. President, I wanted to put the same request on behalf of my client as he will be the next to be up on the witness dock, and I ask that he have permission to be absent Monday and Tuesday.
DR. LATERNSER: Dr. Laternser, on behalf of the General Staff and the OKW.
Mr. President, I shall need but a very brief period of time, but I must make an especially important motion, a motion which concerns procedure, and I should like to give the reasons for my motion. given on the 8-6-46, Point 2 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, if your motion is an important motion, it should be in writing. If it is not in writing, it must be put in writing. You know perfectly well that is the rule of the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it is very important to me that this motion of mine appears in the record. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: It will appear in the record if you make the motion in writing. You have been here for many months and you know perfectly well what the rule of the Tribunal is, that motions be made in writing.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, indeed, but since we are concerned with a motion which applies to procedure and which applies to an orally given resolution, I believe I am justified in putting my motion in this manner.