Q. Now we will speak of your own department, Agriculture and Economy.
Did the Reich Commissar interfere in the administration of your ministry? In particular, did he release or transfer officials from the Food Service?
A. The Reich Commissar personally did not interfere. His officials attempted to do so several times, but we refused to let them interfere.
Q. A so-called State Political Secretariat of the NSB existed. Did it have any influence on the Administration?
A. According to the order of the Reich Commissar, this State Political Secretariat had no influence on the Netherlands Administration. However, I should like to add that through the appointment of the NSB General Secretaries later, such influence took place in various departments, though not in my department.
Q. Did the Reich Commissar have the head of the Food Service, Laues -who was know as being hostile to the Germans -- retained in the interest of the food supply for the population?
A. I believe that the Netherlands officials, who had been left behind by the Government, in general had the same attitude as Mr. Laues. However, Mr. Laues was left in his office.
Q. Although it was demanded that he should be removed?
A. This was reported to me by Mr. von der Wense at that time.
Q. When the trade economy was reorganized, was this done by order of the Reich Commissar or by the General Secretary?
A. The reorganization of the trade economy was carried out on the basis of an order signed by me, although there was originally a draft, which was to be signed by the Reich Commissar. I refused this, because I was of the opinion that this was a Dutch affair, and if the order was signed by me the danger of German influence could be avoided.
Q. The Reich Commissar organized agriculture in the so-called Landstand. Did this Landstand receive any executive powers?
A The Landstand had received no executive powers. I should like to add that, in a personal talk, I advised the Reich Commissar not to form the Landstand. Regulation, put into force to a great extent, or at all, in the Netherlands? only to a slight extent in the Netherlands, but more for the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany. capable of military service, especially from Rotterdam and the Hague -- who carried out this drive?
A What drive do you mean? in 1944. particularly in your department? of this at the time. dam were to be blown up. Do you know the attitude of the Reich Commissar on this subject? issar, Voelkers, in Rotterdam, that he objected to these measures, in speaking to the Wehrmacht.
Dr. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I must remark that Voelkers' affidavit has not yet arrived, and that is why I am putting this question to this witness. BY DR. STEINBAUER: reduced by about 100,000 hectares the area which was to be flooded. his office, the area which was to be flooded was reduced, though I do not know the exact extent. That was particularly in 1933.
Q. You mean 1943. You made a mistake. You said 1933; you meant 1943. Is it possible that this figure of 100,000 hectares is correct?
A. I recall that it might be about half of what the Wehrmacht had intended to flood at that time.
Q. Is it true that the Reich Commissar, in view of the blockade, changed agriculture over to the production of food ?
A. When in 1940 the Netherlands were occupied by the German invasion, the authorities who concerned themselves with agriculture were of the opinion that a reorganization of agriculture was necessary. The Reich Commissar and his office did not oppose us in this work.
Q. Is it, in particular, true that the high numbers of cattle in the Netherlands were retained ?
A. The livestock in the Netherlands in the period of occupation, to my knowledge, was reduced by about 30 per cent. These measures of reorganization of agriculture made it possible to retain this 70 per cent of the livestock throughout the war. Hogs had been reduced to a much greater extent and it was necessary to slaughter almost all the fowl.
Q. The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in detail here. I have one question to put to you, When did you speak to the defendant SeyssInquart for the first time in regard to lifting the embargo?
A. In answering this question, I must go back a little. When the railroad strike was proclaimed, Mr. Laues and I on the 22nd of September, 1944, were visited by von der Wense, who, on behalf of the Reich Commissar told us that he expected that Mr. Laues and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men, in order, in the interests of the food supply for the county, to put an end to the railroad strike, If we did not do so, counter-measures would immediately be taken, in order to place the Netherlands population in the west of the country before a famine, immediately.
We refused to issue such a statement. We told von der Wense that he should report to the Reich Commissar that reprisals against the population in connection with the railroad strike would place responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissar. That was the decisive talk. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being. Thereupon, protests were issued to the various agencies of the Reich Commissar.
And on the 16th of October, 1944, the first talk took place in which it was reported that there was the intention to lift this embargo.
Q. Is it true that unfortunately just in this year the frost came earlier than in other years?
A. Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in Holland the question of frost is always an uncertain question. The Dutch pointed out -- I did this myself in a press report -- that we always have to expect an early frost.
Q. When the invasion was threatened an a large part of the population was drawn upon to build fortifications, did the Reich Commissar agree to your suggestion that large part of agricultural workers should be allowed to go home early?
A. I know of two cases. In the first place, it was a question of workers from the big cities who were sent to the northeastern provinces in order to dig potatoes, and the promies was made that these workers would not be used for fortification work. This promise was kept. At the same time, a large number of agricultural workers who were already being used for fortification work was released for digging potatoes.
Q. I was not hole to ask the witness Fischboeck about questions relating to finance. Do you know that Mr. Tripp, who resigned on the question of the foreign currency blockade in agreement with Funk, was left in the bank for international payment?
A. I recall of this matter that Mr. Tripp intended to resign as a member of the administrative council of the international bank. When this became known, the Germans were apparently somewhat surprised, and Mr. Tripp was asked not to hand in his resignation. I know that he did not hand it in. What reasons there were for this, I do not know from my own experience.
Q. I have two last questions, which are extremely important. An order at the Reich offices under the title "scorched earth" exists. It was issued in March, 1945, for the Netherlands. Docks, dykes, etc. were to be destroyed important matter? Did you speak with him about this question?
A. This question was discussed for the first time in a talk which I held on the 14th of December, 1944, with the defendant. In this talk, he told me that in view of military developments, he feared that their request to destroy the West of the country would be received by the Wehrmacht. He spoke to me about it; he discussed to what extent it would be possible to keep the western part of the Netherlands outside of war events.
On the 8th of January, 1945, this conversation was continued. On the basis of this conversation, I attempted to establish contact with London on this question. I did not succeed in obtaining an answer. These reports had to be made by secret radio stations. I did not learn whether it was possible to get the reports through. that the "scorched earth" order had arrived, and that he had talked with Speer. Speer had told him that the Reich Commissar did not need to carry out this order in the civilian sphere. But Speer could not speak for the Whermacht.
The Reich Commissar had also talked with General Bloskowitz. Bloskowitz had told him, orders are orders, but if a way could be found to avoid this order, he would be ready to do so. Then the Reich Commissar asked me what possibilities I saw. On the 4th of April, 1945, I reported, first in a report to London by telegram. This report reached London. Further conversations followed.
Q. The last question: Did the Reich Commissar, in contrast to the central agencies, establish contact with the agents of the resistance movements to end the war?
A. A few days after the talk on the 2nd of April, 1945, I had a talk with the deputy of the Reich Commissar, Schwebel. He asked me to what extent the Reich Commissar could have contacted the agents and whether the men designated were the proper men. I confirmed this.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defense counsel want to ask questions?
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Sauter, counsel for the defendant Funk, I should like to ask the witness a few questions. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Dr. Hirschfeld, you said that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Tripp, was in the administrative council of the bank for international payments and remained there after he had resigned his office as bank president in Holland. You said so. I should like to know, do you know that the Reich Minister of Economy, Funk, urged the bank in Basel that Dr. Tripp should remain in the International Bank in Basel although Dr. Tripp was no longer authorized to represent Dutch interests?
THE PRESIDENT: How are we concerned with this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: In questioning the defendant Seyss-Inquart by the French prosecution, the fact was brought out that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Tripp, was forced to resign, or resigned, and the defendant Seyss-Inquart was reproached with this. As the defense counsel for the defendant Funk, I should like to prove the the defendant Funk took the part of Dr. Tripp as president of the Netherlands State Bank and saw to it that Dr. Tripp was retained in the International Bank at Basel.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks it is so remote and so trivial that really it is quite a waste of time for the Tribunal to listen to this sort of thing.
DR. SAUTER: Then I will ask another question. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, do you know that at the time when Dr. Funk was president of the Reichsbank, the Reichsbank shares in the possession of Dutch capitalists were taken ever and that Dutch circles realized that this was done in a fair way by Dr. Funk?
A. As for taking over shares in the Reichsbank, I know nothing at all.
Q. Do you know anything, Dr. Hirschfeld, about how Dr. Funk felt on the question of the treatment of the clearing debts?
A. After the outbreak of the war between Holland and Germany I never spoke to Funk.
He did not express any opinion at all to me during the war.
Q. Did you not learn from any other source what point of view Funk had on the action to be taken in regard to the clearing debts?
A. I know from various reports and from publications during that time that the Germans represented these clearing debts as actual debts. We, however never believed this; and if one saw the development when this central clearing was organized during the war as an expert on national economics, could realize that these debts could not represent any actual value. In the course of the war they rose to more than 42,000,000,000 marks. The president of the Dutch bank, who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart, in his annual reports compared the Reichsmark to the pound sterling. We in Holland laughed at it.
Q. Dr. Hirschfeld, you just spoke of a president of the Dutch State Bank appointed by Seyss-Inquart. I believe that was Mr. Rost von Tonningen?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that the defendant Funk, who was the President of the German Reichsbank at that time, endeavored to prevent the appointment of this Rost von Tonningen and wanted Dr. Tripp to remain in office as president of the Dutch State Bank?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question again, isn't it? That is practically the same question as we have already said we did not want to hear about, about Furk's support for Dr. Tripp?
Dr. SAUTER: If I may say so, Mr. President, the first time I wanted to ask whether Funk tried to have Dr. Tripp retained on the administrative council of the International Bank in Basel although he was actually no longer competent to represent Dutch interests. You said that that question was immaterial. The present question refers to whether Dr. Funk endeavored to have the Dutchman, Dr. Tripp, retained as president of the Dutch bank. That is the last question which I have to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I should like to explain this a little. To understand this matter it is necessary -
THE PRESIDENT: Try to be very short about it then.
THE WITNESS: It is necessary to know that, at the suggestion of the Reich Commissar and Dr. Fischboeck, -- although it was known that we in the Netherlands considered Rost von Tonningen a traitor -- he was promoted. When Tripp was forced to resign, Wohltat, the German Commissar, told me that this matter was discussed in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: I think what you were asked was whether Funk tried to get Tripp appointed to the presidency of the Dutch Bank when this other man was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. Do you know?
THE WITNESS: I only know from Wohltat that Funk attempted to do so and that Goering made the decision in another way at the suggestion of the Reich Commissar and Dr. Fischboeck. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Anyway, you confirm that Funk attempted to have the Dutchman, Dr. Tripp, retained as president of the Dutch State Bank?
A. I presume that on the basis of a report from Wohltat.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross examination? BY M. DUBOST:
Q. Of what nature were the orders which the Dutch government left you when the government left for England?
A. There were written instructions by the Dutch government for all Netherlands officials of the administration. These instructions were based on the Hague rules for land warfare.
Q. But these orders therefor did not imperil the German Army?
A. No.
Q. Will you then please explain, if you are capable of doing so, why Holland had an exceptional regime, since immediately after the invasion Holland had a Gauleiter, which was the case for Holland alone in all the western countries?
A. We had the appointment of a Reich Commissar who was chief of the civilian administration in the Netherlands. We considered this appointment to that the German government had political intentions in the Netherlands and not purely the intensions of an occupying power.
Q. In your opinion, it was, therefore, because the German government had the intention of modifying the national Dutch institutions in spite of common law; and on the morning after the invasion Seyss-Inquart was appointed?
A. We were convinced -- and this was confirmed by experience -- that all possible Notional Socialist arrangements would be introduced in the Netherlands, and that attempt was made in fact.
Q. This attempt was made?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it exact that during the occupation a great number of the members of the Dutch National Socialist party were at the head of the police and executed German orders for arresting Jews as well as hostages or members of the resistance movement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the Dutch police itself, when it became mixed up with these arrests, did it do so because it was forced to do so?
A. The conditions were such that old Netherlands policemen, if they ever took part in such matters, they did so because they were forced to; but there were policemen who had been appointed by the German authorities. They were, in general, members of the NSB, and they, in part, volunteered for such malodorous tasks.
Q. Is it exact that the wives and children of the Dutch police were taken as hostages, wives and children of those members of the German police who refused to carry out German orders?
A. I know that in various cases the families were taken as hostages when police officials regused to carry out orders. It is further known that this did not happen only in the case of the police, but also in other cases.
Q. It has been alleged here that the diamonds taken at Arnheim had all been found in Holland. That was stated by the witness Wimmer.
A. What was stolen at Arnheim?
Q. The diamonds.
A. The matter of the diamonds is a typical example of how they wanted to deal with such property. These diamonds were in a bank safe in Arnheim. After the invasion in Normandie attempts were made by the Germans to seize these diamonds. The director of the Netherlands agency which is concerned with diamonds and later, I, was asked for the keys to the bank safe. We refused. And then on the day of the airborne landings at Arnheim, the German Wehrmacht blew up this safe. Apparently only half of the diamonds were found and they were sent to the Reichsbank in Berlin. When I protested, Fischboeck said that they had only been put in the custody of the Reichsbank in Berlin. Then I demanded that these diamonds should be given bank. Meanwhile, it was learned that half of the diamonds were still in Arnheim.
demanded the keys which were in my personal possession. I refused. I had another talk with Fischboeck. The matter was obviously distasteful to him. He would give us this concession, that the remaining diamonds, which we later found in Arnhem, be returned to the owners, but the half which had been sent to Berlin they were willing, to give back only if they could be placed under German lock in a bank in the Eastern Netherlands.
I demanded that they be turned over without restrictions. Apparently Fischboeck could not agree, and for this reason, after the liberation of the Netherlands, these diamonds were not given back and as far as I know they have not yet been returned. Theresienstadt? these people, on the basis of a promise given to my colleague Fredericks, were to be given special treatment, but that their property would be given back is not known to me and I do not believe it. confiscated? from Amsterdam to Mauthausen as a measure of reprisal for the fact that a member of the NSB was supposedly murdered at Amsterdam by Jews. What do you know about this? Amsterdam. One difficulty referred to shipyard workers. I believe 3,000 of them were to be forcibly sent to Germany. I intervened with Seyss-Inquart and succeeded in preventing this, but there was excitement in Amsterdam. In the second place, Jews were already being arrested in Amsterdam, which was the occasion for a strike. strike in Amsterdam as far as I recall, because they wanted to make the Jews responsible for the strike. I said that I did not believe it, that this was an excuse.
because the population at Amsterdam was opposed to their deportation. There were demonstrations in the streets, during which several members of the NSB were killed. These Jews were therefore not deported in reprisal for the murder of the members of the NSB; quite the contrary. The men of the NSB were killed at the time when they were going to arrest the Jews, before there was any idea of reprisal. Jews were being arrested, and this led to upheaval in Amsterdam and to this strike. Exactly what happened I do not know from my own experience. not submit to being removed to Germany? Germany, on the 6th of May instructions were sent to the competent Netherlands authorities announcing that workers who were called in these ago groups could no longer receive any food cards. That was a decree of the 6th of May 1943, signed by an official of the Reich Commissariat by the name of H*fge. was in effect, the instruction was not carried out by the Netherlands authorities. What the German authorities said, in effect, was, "Whoever does not work for Germany gets nothing to eat." Germany up to 1942 were all volunteers. Is that correct?
A No, they could not all be volunteers. The unemployed in the Netherlands received compensation, and shortly after the occupation instruction were issued that people who were suited for work in Germany and refused to volunteer for this work could no longer receive unemployment compensation. Thus, they were under economic pressure. Seyss-Inquart. Could you inform us on this?
by Seyss-Inquart at the beginning of June 1940 as General Commissar for Security. No order which was then known indicated that Rauter had any kind of special position. The decree of the German Reich Chancellor of the 18th of may 1940 indicated to us Dutch that the Reich Commissar was the only responsible man in the Netherlands for the occupying power in the civilian sphere. realized that Rauter received direct orders from Himmler or from the Reichs Sicherheits Haupt Amt, the Reich Main Security Office. The population of the Netherlands could not know this. frontier and its repercussion on life in Holland.
A Yes. I will try to describe this matter in a few words. At the outbreak of war, there was a clearing agreement between the Netherlands and Germany. We Netherlands officials, at the beginning of the occupation, were able to exercise special control for deliveries of goods and such to Germany, because there was not only border control by customs officials, but we could also control payment. the matter. This was the occasion for friction. He attempted to remove this clearing, and on the first of April 1941 the foreign currency border was removed, and thus all goods could be bought in the Netherlands for Reichsmarks, and under the protection of the German authorities they could be taken to Germany.
I will give an example. According to an investigation which I ordered at that time, there were a few hundred buyers of jewelry and old and silver in the Netherlands. These articles are easy to carry with one. If there had been control of payment, it would not have been possible that in 1942 alone 80 to 100 million gulden of such goods was taken away to Germany. The important point was that by lifting this control of currency, one could operate more freely. Furthermore, there was a possibility of buying Dutch securities on the Amsterdam stock exchange.
economy together. The easiest way to do this was to lift the currency control between the occupied territories and Germany, and thus Netherlands interests were damaged more severely than those of other occupied territories where their currency control was retained. out this exploitation. The lifing of the currency control made the German policy in this connection much easier. This was clearly shown by an order of Hermann Goering of 1942, in which the control of the Netherlands-German border was abolished and the man responsible for the Four Year Plan could write that there could be no control at the border when price regulations or rational regulations were broken. That was what Hermann Goering added.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, the Tribunal thinks that this should be shortened, this discussion of the question of the abolition of the frontier policy for money.
M. DUBOST: I have no more questions on this point, Mr. President. BY M. DUBOST: occupation?
A The total sun which was paid at the end of the occupation was 8 1/2 billion gulden.
Q How were these payments demanded?
A This 8 1/2 billion gulden consisted of credits which the Wehrmacht demanded for the direct occupation costs in the Netherlands; furthermore, for the cost of the machinery of the Reich Commissariat, and third, payments which were imposed on the Netherlands under the expression which was used at first, "outside occupation costs", that is, costs which the Wehrmacht had in Germany in the interest of the occupation forces in the Netherlands. Netherlands was Dutch payments in Germany. They were in gold, which was demanded at the Netherlands Bank, and payments from the property which the Reich Netherlands Bank had in the Reichsbank.
Q But were these payments the result of one of these conditions? tion occupation costs. the means of production, such as stocks, machinery, ships, and so forth. of occupation,it could not be figured out. But, after the German capitulation, the Netherlands Government applied to the Repatriation Committee in Paris, and reported the sum of 25,000,000,000 gilders as damages for occupation. This would include 8,500,000,000 occupational costs which I mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: Isn't this all contained in the Dutch report?
M. DUBOST: Oh no, Mr. President, certainly not. BY M. DUBOST:
Q How did Seyss-Inquart's attitude change during the occupation? of view after the fall of 1944 and in the first four-and one-half years. After the fall of 1944 he was much more interested in the Netherlands' interest than previously. which you administered during the German occupation, you werehead of the Foreign Trade in Holland, and as such you were present at International negotiations and in particular, you negotiated with the representatives of Germany about economic questions concerning Holland. You therefore know Schacht?
A Yes, I believe I first met Mr. Schacht in 1933 at the World Economic Conference in London. to restrict the re-armament of Germany which was ruining her credit?
when I was in Berlin. Mr. Schacht spoke on the basis of Trade Treaty negotia-
tions. In this talk, the international financial situation came up because there were various currency evaluations at that time, the French franc, the Swiss franc, and the Dutch gulden and the situation of German currency was discussed. Schact, when I voiced my criticism, siad, "How would you do it?" Germany which was being discussed at that time, should take up more international loans, and if so, whether Germany would be ready to take the consequences if theinterests and amortizations meant that the importation of raw materials would be reduced, and if so, that this would have an unfortunate effect on the employment and on the re-armament. Would Germany be willing to accept such consequences? If so, in my private opinion in 1936, it should be international loans. If not, then such a discussion would have little point.
Then Schacht gave me his opinion. That Germany needed re-armament, in order to be equal to the other great powers in international politics. Only on such a basis could one negotiate. And Schacht said to me in his own ironical way, "I want a big and strong Germany and to achieve that, I would even ally myself with the devil." First, he wanted to clear up the currency question, and then he wanted to clear up the colonial question. On the colonial question, he said to me that in his opinion, it was possible for Germany to take on the colonies again, and to adopt the attitude not to arm these colonies, or not to set up any naval bases there. If such a policy was to be taken up, he believed that German economic and foreign policy could be changed. Then Schacht told me that he did not approve of the anti-Semitic tendency in Germany. He gave me examples of his attitudes toward anti-Semitism. He rejected it. I may add one example here that he gave me, an example of a certain Kades, who was Prime Minister of Brunswick.
Q That is of no interest whatever. Schacht told you he had defended the Jews.
Now, about this staff, the General Staff. Wasn't it the General Staff who gave the order to have these raids carried on in Rotterdam?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, If I understood the question correctly, the witness was asked about the changes against the High Command.
I object to this question for the following reasons: of the court promulgated on the 8th of June, prohibited the questioning of witness or cross-examination of witness...... If I am not allowed to question witnesses, then the Prosecution must not be allowed to question them since the rules must be the same for Prosecution and Defense.
M. DUBOST: I therefore will forego my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't hear what you said.
M. DUBOST: I said, Mr. President, that I will forego my question about the General Staff, and I have two more questions about Seyss-Inquart.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, M. Dubost. BY M. DUBOST: the large Dutch cities?
Q Who gave these orders for the round-ups to be carried out? Who gave these orders?
A These raids were carried out by the German Wehrmacht. From whom the orders came I don't know. It is only known that in Rotterdam, this raid -- I believe it was on 11 November 1944 -- was carried out by the divisional commander in Rotterdam, who held a speech in the town hall on the subject, and, of course, this raid.
Q But, didn't Seyss-Inquart have children from the children's hospital taken away for work in Germany? children's hospital and sent them to work in the service of Germany? did all of this take place on Seyss-Inquart's orders?
A I know that the SS in the Netherlands recalled soldiers. As far as I know from the newspapers, bulletins and handbills, it was always done by the SS as such.
Q Who pledged himself not to use chemical products made in Holland for war?
Was it Seyss-Inquart who had pledged himself not to do so? made in Holland and to have themreserved only for Dutch agricultural purposes? made that the nitrogen fertilizer in the Netherlands would only produce artificial fertilizer. This was done already in the middle of August, 1944, when instructions came that the nitrogen fertilizer industry was to change its production over to explosives. These instructions had been issued by an office of the Reichs Commissar. It was signed by a certain Mr. Brocke. attempted to speak to Seyss-Inquart personally on this matter and to intervene. I was given the answer by his adjutant that he had already made his decision and that I could establish contact with Viebich, the representative of Speer in the Netherlands. I discussed the matter with Viebich and told him that the Netherlands industry and the Netherlands labor could not work on explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, can't this question be answered a little more shortly? The question is, did Seyss-Inquart promise that chemicals should be used, I suppose on the land in Holland and not for purposes in the Reich? isn't that the question? BY M. DUBOST:
Q You have heard what Mr. President has said. Will you kindly try to answer more briefly? duced. Then the demand was made to produce explosives.
THE PRESIDENT: M. Dubost, we don't want it all again. Can't you get the question answered?
M. DUBOST: I didn't understand the answer of the witness, Mr. President. It didn't come through.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn.
(A recess was taken) M. DUBOST:
With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall ask two or three questions.
BY M. DUBOST: newspaper at the Hague was destroyed by the commissioners of the Reich?
Q Can you tell us?
A Yes. The newspaper at the Hague was destroyed because the workers of the paper refused to publish an article which spoke against the railroad strike, an article which had been compiled by the Reich Press Section. That was the reason for refusing to publish it.
Q It was destroyed by means of dynamite, was it not; the buildings and machinery were blown up, were they not?
A The equipment was blown up; yes, with dynamite.
DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel, for defendant Seyss-Inquart):
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now, with the permission of the High Tribunal, I shoul like to call my last witness to the witness stand, Ernst Schwebel. follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you state your full name,please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath)
THE PRESIDENT: Y ou may sit down. BY DR. STEINBAUER: in the Netherlands?
Q When did you come to the Netherlands? or plenipotentiary of the Reich Commissar in the province of South Holland, including the cities of the Hague and Rotterdam? have constant contact with the Dutch administrative authorities in this province and with the local authorities? office -- left from the Royal regime, that is? of the local government, or did he change them?
A No, he made but few changes -- very few. Shall I discuss these changes?
Q Yes, but briefly. Perhaps you can just cite the reasons for the changes.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, the changes have already been stated by other witness, have they not, and have not been cross-examined to. Is that right? Did not Seyss-Inquart state the changes, and they were not cross-examined to?
DR. STEINBAUER: Then I shall turn to another question. BY DR. STEINBAUER: emergency was declared?
Q And the security powers were turned over to the Wehrmacht? regulation declaring this state, but for military reasons.
Q On the basis of military developments?