Q. It is doubtless a mistake.
A. I beg your pardon?
Q. I will pass on. Were the professors of the University of Amsterdam not threatened with the death penalty if they handed in their resignations, and did you not threaten them yourself?
A. I have neither expressed such a threat, nor do I know of any threat of that kind. I consider it quite impossible that anybody could have expressed such a threat.
THE PRESIDENT: We shall adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1000 hours, 14 June, 1946) DR. FRIEDRICH WIMMER -Resumed BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. I still have a few questions to put to this witness. libraries which have been looted and taken to Germany, I would like to read to you a few lines taken from a document which I have submitted day before, yesterday to the Tribunal. This document is F-803, RF-1525, on page 34 of the French text. This is a report from the Minister of Education and Art, of the Netherlands. We find the following:
"The Collection, as well as the libraries of the International Institute for Social History at Amsterdam, have been closed down. The Library, which has about 150,000 volumes, has been taken to Germany as well as a very important collection of papers. The Library Rosenthaliana which belongs to the University of Amsterdam has been stacked in 153 crates and has also been taken to Germany.
"Famous collections concerning Natural History of the College of St. Ignace at Mont Aucon (Valkenburg), and the Museum of Natural History at Maestrich has also been taken to Germany as well as the Library which belonged to it.
"In 1940, all the Masonry Lodges were also taken away to Germany. Amongst them was the well known ..."
THE PRESIDENT: Monsieur Debenest, haven't you put enough for the purpose of your question now? We have got the document, and you have already put about one-half dozen libraries which you are suggesting to him were taken to Germany, and you want to know what he has to say, I suppose. It is not necessary to go into the whole detail.
BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. What do you think about this story ? Are these facts correct ?
A. The question which you have put to me was answered in part yesterday. As far as it concerns the property of Free Masons, it was said yesterday, and I confirmed it, that it is known to me that the property of the organizations, but not of the individuals, was confiscated.
THE PRESIDENT: That's not an answer to the question. The question is, was it true that these libraries were moved to Germany ?
WITNESS: I know nothing of the removal of these libraries. BY M. DEBENEST:
Q. But you did, nevertheless, pretend that the Rosenthaliana Library had remained in the Netherlands, did you not ?
A. The Rosenthaliana, I said that.
Q. Well, maybe it was the Rosenthaliana, but you say that in the report it was specified that it was packed in crates and taken to Germany.
A. Do you mean the Rosenthaliana ?
Q. Yes, the Rosenthaliana.
A. I know that instructions were given by the Reich Commissar that this Library was to remain in Amsterdam. If it was removed, nevertheless, it was an illegal action of which I have no knowledge.
Q. But still it was you who had the task of controlling the education and the training in arts ?
A. Yes, but not of the arts.
Q. No, but as far as the Livraries and Universities were concerned ?
A. Yes.
Q. It is rather curious that you should not have been kept informed of this.
A. That the Libraries were removed ? I don't know.
Q. Well, alright. According to the statements which you made last evening you seemed to pretend that the Reich Commissar did all he could in favor of the Dutch Nation, isn't that so ?
A. Yes.
Q. At any rate, everything he could he did to avoid the worst, is that so ?
A. Yes.
Q. But on the other hand, you knew that numerous people in that country had been arrested, interned, deported; others were shot; you also know that severe coercion was forced upon that nation in every sphere, under threat of extreme penalties and reprisals; you also knew that that country was looted, Who were then, the people who ordered the execution of these crimes ?
A. I said that the Reich Commissar did for the country what he could, and prevented as much as he could. In a 5-year period of occupation, measures had to be taken which were difficult for the country to bear. I did not deny the fact, and it is undeniable. mention the action which you call crimes. The question is too general for me to answer it yes or no, or at all briefly.
Q. Who ordered the crimes ?
A. I beg your pardon ?
Q. Who ordered the crimes ?
A. Which crimes ?
Q. Why, the arrests of the Dutch people, of course.
A. I beg your pardon ?
Q. The arrests of the Dutch people.
A. The arrests were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Chief, he was the Chief of the Police.
Q Who ordered the internments?
A Which internments? Do you mean internments in the concentration camps?
A They were ordered by the Higher SS and Police Chief. That was his department.
Q Who chose the hostages?
Q Who appointed Rauter, who was the Commissar for Public Security? Commissar, but his main function was that of the Higher SS and Police Chief. In this function, he was appointed by the Reichsfuehrer SS. Reich Commissar in his job of helping with the police and for the security. did not have any direct right to issue instructions to the Higher SS and Police Chief. The Reich Fuehrer SS had this right. The appointment as General Commissar for Security was a formality. It was done because the Reich Fuehrer SS wanted the Higher SS and Police Chief to have this title. Originally he was not to be appointed General Commissar.
Q You therefore consider that Seyss-Inquart had no authority over Rauter?
Q Very well. In that case I am going to read a document to you, and you will tell me what you think of it, whether Seyss-Inquart had no authority, and you can also make any explanations you choose.
M. DEBENEST: That is document 3430-PS, which has already been submitted as USA 708. This is an excerpt from one of Seyss-Inquart's speeches. It was made in Holland, and it is to be found on page 124 and page 125 of the German text. It will most probably also be found in the Trial Brief of Seyss-Inquart. I am afraid I do not have the exact page, but I think it is page 57 or page 58. BY MR. DEBENEST:
Q Seyss-Inquart in that speech of the 29th January 1943 said:
"I will give the orders, and they must be carried aout by everybody. In the present situation, the refusal to carry out such an order cannot be called anything except sabotage. It is equally certain that we must, more than ever, eliminate and do away with every resistance directed against the struggle for life."
And further on, we find the following:
"Our husbands, our sons, our fathers are fighting and meeting deaths in the East, with bravery and fortitude, without weakening, and they are making the greatest sacrifice. It is unthinkable that we should tolerate conspiracies which seek to render insecure the rear of the front in the East. The person who dares to do that must perish." to make such a speech and say that he would issue the orders?
A I did not say that Seyss-Inquart had no authority over the police. I said only that the orders were given by the Higher SS and Police Chief. The relationship with the police was as follows: in any case, but it was only his wish and not a binding order. In such cases, when it was an important case, the police first consulted the Reich Fuehrer SS, and only if this office approved could a wish of the Reich Commissar be carried out by the police. he do so-- id he issue orders in cases such as are mentioned in his speech? He himself mentioned this, you know.
Q I merely note that you do not agree with Seyss-Inquart's speech. I will now speak to you of another document, and you will tell us how you explain that Seyss-Inquart could only give requests, as you term it, and not orders.
M. DEBENEST: This is F-860, which I submitted yesterday. This document is a letter of Seyss-Inquart which was sent to Dr. Lammers. BY M. DEBENEST: in order to adapt it to the German Police organization, and in the same document he states the opinion that the police must be the strongest expression of the interior administration of a country.
That is what Seyss-Inquart says in that document. How can you then co-ordinate your answer with what Seyss-Inquart writes? Reich Commissar but originated from the police themselves.
The Reich Commissar in this re-organization--and I myself, too--attempted to see to it that the Dutch Police at least would be separated from the administration, which was the case essentially in Germany, and what the German Police in the Netherlands also wanted. this document. Very well. How do you explain what Seyss-Inquart wrote further on in the same document:
"I would not like to appoint as president of the Tribunal the Supreme Leaders SS here of the Police for this appointment suggest to the Dutch a limitation of the authority of the Reich Commissar because the Reich Commissar was appointed as the guardian of the interests of the Reich by order of the Fuehrer, but I have myself given to the supreme Chief SS Fuehrer of the Police all plenary ppowers which a magistrate needs."
A Would you please read the first two sentences again?
THE PRESIDENT: M. Debenest, the document is before us, don't you think?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: It is not so well to argue with the witness about it.
M. DEBENEST: Well, I will not insist upon it. BY M. DEBENEST: submitted to you, the interrogatory of Schoengart? How do you explain that Schoengart, on the very morning after the attempt on Rauter, went to Seyss-Inquart and that Seyss-Inquart gave him the order, as he himself states in the document, to take increased measures of reprisal and to execute 200 prisoners, and this with the aim of intimidating the population?
A Yesterday, I believe, I exhausted this subject. I said everything I knew about it.
Q Will you kindly give me the explanation I am asking you to make? the matter to me to the effect that the Reich Fuehrer SS had demanded 500 shootings and that Schoengart, on the advice of the Reich Commissar, had succeeded in reducing the number to 200. That is what I said yesterday.
Q You maintain that he received orders from the Reich Commissar then?
Q Yes, I beg your pardon; from the Reich Fuehrer.
A I can only say Schoengart reported the matter to me in that way. I was not there when he telephoned the Reich Fuehrer SS.
Q Very well. Didn't you yourself take part in a meeting during which hostages were chosen?
AA meeting?
Q When was that, upon what occasion?
A. I recall that in the Rotterdam case the Reich Commissar had a conference with the General Commissar, and the matter was reported.
Q. Were you present at the meeting with General Christiansen?
A. I cannot say with certainty; I believe I was.
Q. Do you know what Seyss-Inquart said during that meeting, what his attitude was?
A. His attitude was that the intention of theWehrmacht to carry out 50, or, as I heard yesterday, 25 shootings, was impossible. I reported on this yesterday, that the Reich Commissar was able to persuade the Wehrmacht -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): This has all been gone over with SeyssInquart, has it not?
M. DEBENEST: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: And with this witness as well?
M. DEBENEST: Yes, Mr. President. I just wished to see whether the witness agreed with a document which I submitted to the Tribunal.
I have finished, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to reexamine, Dr. Steinbauer?
Dr. STEINBAUER: (Counsel for defendant Seyss-Inquart): I have no questions to put to the witness, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
Dr. STEINBAUER: With the approval of the Court, I shall call the witness Dr. Hirschfeld to the stand.
DR. HANS MAX HIRSCHFELD, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. Will you state your full name, please?
A. Hans Max Hirschfeld.
Q. Will you repeat this oath after me: truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down. BY Dr. STEINBAUER:
Q. Witness, when, in May of 1940, the Netherlands were occupied, were you General Secretary of the Economic and Agricultural Ministry?
A. Before I answer your question, I should like to state that I would have preferred to speak Dutch, but in order not to delay the proceedings, I will speak the foreign language which I speak best; I will speak in German.
As for your question, I can say "yes".
Q. In this same capacity, did you direct the affairs of both ministries until the end of the occupation?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it true that the Reich Commissar, in the first conference, told all general secretaries that he expected loyal fulfilment of their duties, but that no one would have to fear any disadvantage if he should resign?
A. I should like to say that the Netherlands general secretaries, who were assigned by the Netherlands Government to remain in the Netherlands, told the Reich Commissar at that time that, in the interests of the Netherlands people, they would remain in office; that is, after they had received approval to do so from the Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Army who, at that time, was the authorized representative of the Netherlands Government. In answer to a question of the Reich Commissar we said yes, under those conditions. that that had nothing to do with our decision.
Q. Did the general secretaries who resigned receive their pension? For example, Mr. Tripp, who was president of the Dutch Bank.
A. Yes.
Q. Did the General Secretary of the Interior, Fredericks, remain in office until September of 1944?
A. Yes.
Q. Now we will speak of your own department, Agriculture and Economy.
Did the Reich Commissar interfere in the administration of your ministry? In particular, did he release or transfer officials from the Food Service?
A. The Reich Commissar personally did not interfere. His officials attempted to do so several times, but we refused to let them interfere.
Q. A so-called State Political Secretariat of the NSB existed. Did it have any influence on the Administration?
A. According to the order of the Reich Commissar, this State Political Secretariat had no influence on the Netherlands Administration. However, I should like to add that through the appointment of the NSB General Secretaries later, such influence took place in various departments, though not in my department.
Q. Did the Reich Commissar have the head of the Food Service, Laues -who was know as being hostile to the Germans -- retained in the interest of the food supply for the population?
A. I believe that the Netherlands officials, who had been left behind by the Government, in general had the same attitude as Mr. Laues. However, Mr. Laues was left in his office.
Q. Although it was demanded that he should be removed?
A. This was reported to me by Mr. von der Wense at that time.
Q. When the trade economy was reorganized, was this done by order of the Reich Commissar or by the General Secretary?
A. The reorganization of the trade economy was carried out on the basis of an order signed by me, although there was originally a draft, which was to be signed by the Reich Commissar. I refused this, because I was of the opinion that this was a Dutch affair, and if the order was signed by me the danger of German influence could be avoided.
Q. The Reich Commissar organized agriculture in the so-called Landstand. Did this Landstand receive any executive powers?
A The Landstand had received no executive powers. I should like to add that, in a personal talk, I advised the Reich Commissar not to form the Landstand. Regulation, put into force to a great extent, or at all, in the Netherlands? only to a slight extent in the Netherlands, but more for the deportation of Dutch workers to Germany. capable of military service, especially from Rotterdam and the Hague -- who carried out this drive?
A What drive do you mean? in 1944. particularly in your department? of this at the time. dam were to be blown up. Do you know the attitude of the Reich Commissar on this subject? issar, Voelkers, in Rotterdam, that he objected to these measures, in speaking to the Wehrmacht.
Dr. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I must remark that Voelkers' affidavit has not yet arrived, and that is why I am putting this question to this witness. BY DR. STEINBAUER: reduced by about 100,000 hectares the area which was to be flooded. his office, the area which was to be flooded was reduced, though I do not know the exact extent. That was particularly in 1933.
Q. You mean 1943. You made a mistake. You said 1933; you meant 1943. Is it possible that this figure of 100,000 hectares is correct?
A. I recall that it might be about half of what the Wehrmacht had intended to flood at that time.
Q. Is it true that the Reich Commissar, in view of the blockade, changed agriculture over to the production of food ?
A. When in 1940 the Netherlands were occupied by the German invasion, the authorities who concerned themselves with agriculture were of the opinion that a reorganization of agriculture was necessary. The Reich Commissar and his office did not oppose us in this work.
Q. Is it, in particular, true that the high numbers of cattle in the Netherlands were retained ?
A. The livestock in the Netherlands in the period of occupation, to my knowledge, was reduced by about 30 per cent. These measures of reorganization of agriculture made it possible to retain this 70 per cent of the livestock throughout the war. Hogs had been reduced to a much greater extent and it was necessary to slaughter almost all the fowl.
Q. The question of the embargo in 1944 was discussed in detail here. I have one question to put to you, When did you speak to the defendant SeyssInquart for the first time in regard to lifting the embargo?
A. In answering this question, I must go back a little. When the railroad strike was proclaimed, Mr. Laues and I on the 22nd of September, 1944, were visited by von der Wense, who, on behalf of the Reich Commissar told us that he expected that Mr. Laues and I would issue an appeal to the railroad men, in order, in the interests of the food supply for the county, to put an end to the railroad strike, If we did not do so, counter-measures would immediately be taken, in order to place the Netherlands population in the west of the country before a famine, immediately.
We refused to issue such a statement. We told von der Wense that he should report to the Reich Commissar that reprisals against the population in connection with the railroad strike would place responsibility for the famine on the Reich Commissar. That was the decisive talk. Nevertheless, the embargo came into being. Thereupon, protests were issued to the various agencies of the Reich Commissar.
And on the 16th of October, 1944, the first talk took place in which it was reported that there was the intention to lift this embargo.
Q. Is it true that unfortunately just in this year the frost came earlier than in other years?
A. Perhaps it came a little earlier than in other years; but in Holland the question of frost is always an uncertain question. The Dutch pointed out -- I did this myself in a press report -- that we always have to expect an early frost.
Q. When the invasion was threatened an a large part of the population was drawn upon to build fortifications, did the Reich Commissar agree to your suggestion that large part of agricultural workers should be allowed to go home early?
A. I know of two cases. In the first place, it was a question of workers from the big cities who were sent to the northeastern provinces in order to dig potatoes, and the promies was made that these workers would not be used for fortification work. This promise was kept. At the same time, a large number of agricultural workers who were already being used for fortification work was released for digging potatoes.
Q. I was not hole to ask the witness Fischboeck about questions relating to finance. Do you know that Mr. Tripp, who resigned on the question of the foreign currency blockade in agreement with Funk, was left in the bank for international payment?
A. I recall of this matter that Mr. Tripp intended to resign as a member of the administrative council of the international bank. When this became known, the Germans were apparently somewhat surprised, and Mr. Tripp was asked not to hand in his resignation. I know that he did not hand it in. What reasons there were for this, I do not know from my own experience.
Q. I have two last questions, which are extremely important. An order at the Reich offices under the title "scorched earth" exists. It was issued in March, 1945, for the Netherlands. Docks, dykes, etc. were to be destroyed important matter? Did you speak with him about this question?
A. This question was discussed for the first time in a talk which I held on the 14th of December, 1944, with the defendant. In this talk, he told me that in view of military developments, he feared that their request to destroy the West of the country would be received by the Wehrmacht. He spoke to me about it; he discussed to what extent it would be possible to keep the western part of the Netherlands outside of war events.
On the 8th of January, 1945, this conversation was continued. On the basis of this conversation, I attempted to establish contact with London on this question. I did not succeed in obtaining an answer. These reports had to be made by secret radio stations. I did not learn whether it was possible to get the reports through. that the "scorched earth" order had arrived, and that he had talked with Speer. Speer had told him that the Reich Commissar did not need to carry out this order in the civilian sphere. But Speer could not speak for the Whermacht.
The Reich Commissar had also talked with General Bloskowitz. Bloskowitz had told him, orders are orders, but if a way could be found to avoid this order, he would be ready to do so. Then the Reich Commissar asked me what possibilities I saw. On the 4th of April, 1945, I reported, first in a report to London by telegram. This report reached London. Further conversations followed.
Q. The last question: Did the Reich Commissar, in contrast to the central agencies, establish contact with the agents of the resistance movements to end the war?
A. A few days after the talk on the 2nd of April, 1945, I had a talk with the deputy of the Reich Commissar, Schwebel. He asked me to what extent the Reich Commissar could have contacted the agents and whether the men designated were the proper men. I confirmed this.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other of the defense counsel want to ask questions?
DR. SAUTER: Dr. Sauter, counsel for the defendant Funk, I should like to ask the witness a few questions. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Dr. Hirschfeld, you said that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Tripp, was in the administrative council of the bank for international payments and remained there after he had resigned his office as bank president in Holland. You said so. I should like to know, do you know that the Reich Minister of Economy, Funk, urged the bank in Basel that Dr. Tripp should remain in the International Bank in Basel although Dr. Tripp was no longer authorized to represent Dutch interests?
THE PRESIDENT: How are we concerned with this, Dr. Sauter?
DR. SAUTER: In questioning the defendant Seyss-Inquart by the French prosecution, the fact was brought out that the former president of the Dutch State Bank, Dr. Tripp, was forced to resign, or resigned, and the defendant Seyss-Inquart was reproached with this. As the defense counsel for the defendant Funk, I should like to prove the the defendant Funk took the part of Dr. Tripp as president of the Netherlands State Bank and saw to it that Dr. Tripp was retained in the International Bank at Basel.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks it is so remote and so trivial that really it is quite a waste of time for the Tribunal to listen to this sort of thing.
DR. SAUTER: Then I will ask another question. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Witness, do you know that at the time when Dr. Funk was president of the Reichsbank, the Reichsbank shares in the possession of Dutch capitalists were taken ever and that Dutch circles realized that this was done in a fair way by Dr. Funk?
A. As for taking over shares in the Reichsbank, I know nothing at all.
Q. Do you know anything, Dr. Hirschfeld, about how Dr. Funk felt on the question of the treatment of the clearing debts?
A. After the outbreak of the war between Holland and Germany I never spoke to Funk.
He did not express any opinion at all to me during the war.
Q. Did you not learn from any other source what point of view Funk had on the action to be taken in regard to the clearing debts?
A. I know from various reports and from publications during that time that the Germans represented these clearing debts as actual debts. We, however never believed this; and if one saw the development when this central clearing was organized during the war as an expert on national economics, could realize that these debts could not represent any actual value. In the course of the war they rose to more than 42,000,000,000 marks. The president of the Dutch bank, who was appointed by Seyss-Inquart, in his annual reports compared the Reichsmark to the pound sterling. We in Holland laughed at it.
Q. Dr. Hirschfeld, you just spoke of a president of the Dutch State Bank appointed by Seyss-Inquart. I believe that was Mr. Rost von Tonningen?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know that the defendant Funk, who was the President of the German Reichsbank at that time, endeavored to prevent the appointment of this Rost von Tonningen and wanted Dr. Tripp to remain in office as president of the Dutch State Bank?
THE PRESIDENT: That is the same question again, isn't it? That is practically the same question as we have already said we did not want to hear about, about Furk's support for Dr. Tripp?
Dr. SAUTER: If I may say so, Mr. President, the first time I wanted to ask whether Funk tried to have Dr. Tripp retained on the administrative council of the International Bank in Basel although he was actually no longer competent to represent Dutch interests. You said that that question was immaterial. The present question refers to whether Dr. Funk endeavored to have the Dutchman, Dr. Tripp, retained as president of the Dutch bank. That is the last question which I have to ask, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
THE WITNESS: Yes. I should like to explain this a little. To understand this matter it is necessary -
THE PRESIDENT: Try to be very short about it then.
THE WITNESS: It is necessary to know that, at the suggestion of the Reich Commissar and Dr. Fischboeck, -- although it was known that we in the Netherlands considered Rost von Tonningen a traitor -- he was promoted. When Tripp was forced to resign, Wohltat, the German Commissar, told me that this matter was discussed in Berlin.
THE PRESIDENT: I think what you were asked was whether Funk tried to get Tripp appointed to the presidency of the Dutch Bank when this other man was appointed by Seyss-Inquart. Do you know?
THE WITNESS: I only know from Wohltat that Funk attempted to do so and that Goering made the decision in another way at the suggestion of the Reich Commissar and Dr. Fischboeck. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Anyway, you confirm that Funk attempted to have the Dutchman, Dr. Tripp, retained as president of the Dutch State Bank?
A. I presume that on the basis of a report from Wohltat.
DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross examination? BY M. DUBOST:
Q. Of what nature were the orders which the Dutch government left you when the government left for England?
A. There were written instructions by the Dutch government for all Netherlands officials of the administration. These instructions were based on the Hague rules for land warfare.
Q. But these orders therefor did not imperil the German Army?
A. No.
Q. Will you then please explain, if you are capable of doing so, why Holland had an exceptional regime, since immediately after the invasion Holland had a Gauleiter, which was the case for Holland alone in all the western countries?
A. We had the appointment of a Reich Commissar who was chief of the civilian administration in the Netherlands. We considered this appointment to that the German government had political intentions in the Netherlands and not purely the intensions of an occupying power.
Q. In your opinion, it was, therefore, because the German government had the intention of modifying the national Dutch institutions in spite of common law; and on the morning after the invasion Seyss-Inquart was appointed?
A. We were convinced -- and this was confirmed by experience -- that all possible Notional Socialist arrangements would be introduced in the Netherlands, and that attempt was made in fact.
Q. This attempt was made?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it exact that during the occupation a great number of the members of the Dutch National Socialist party were at the head of the police and executed German orders for arresting Jews as well as hostages or members of the resistance movement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the Dutch police itself, when it became mixed up with these arrests, did it do so because it was forced to do so?
A. The conditions were such that old Netherlands policemen, if they ever took part in such matters, they did so because they were forced to; but there were policemen who had been appointed by the German authorities. They were, in general, members of the NSB, and they, in part, volunteered for such malodorous tasks.
Q. Is it exact that the wives and children of the Dutch police were taken as hostages, wives and children of those members of the German police who refused to carry out German orders?
A. I know that in various cases the families were taken as hostages when police officials regused to carry out orders. It is further known that this did not happen only in the case of the police, but also in other cases.
Q. It has been alleged here that the diamonds taken at Arnheim had all been found in Holland. That was stated by the witness Wimmer.
A. What was stolen at Arnheim?
Q. The diamonds.
A. The matter of the diamonds is a typical example of how they wanted to deal with such property. These diamonds were in a bank safe in Arnheim. After the invasion in Normandie attempts were made by the Germans to seize these diamonds. The director of the Netherlands agency which is concerned with diamonds and later, I, was asked for the keys to the bank safe. We refused. And then on the day of the airborne landings at Arnheim, the German Wehrmacht blew up this safe. Apparently only half of the diamonds were found and they were sent to the Reichsbank in Berlin. When I protested, Fischboeck said that they had only been put in the custody of the Reichsbank in Berlin. Then I demanded that these diamonds should be given bank. Meanwhile, it was learned that half of the diamonds were still in Arnheim.