formation of a cabinet was the beginning of an intrigue and a conspiracy.
On the 26th of May, 1932, I was at my estate in the Saar. Mr. von Schleicher, the Defense Minister, called me up there and asked me to come to Berlin. On the evening of the 27th, I arrived in Berlin. On the 28th I went to see Mr. von Schleicher. Mr. von Schleicher said to me: "There is a cabinet crisis; we are looking for a chancellor." He discussed various personalities with me, and finally he said: "The President would like to have you." I was greatly astonished, and I said "Why?" I then asked for time to think it over. went to see Mr. von Schleicher again. I said to him: "I have decided not to accept." Mr. von Schleicher said: "That won't do you any good. The President wants you under all circumstances." I answered Mr. von Schleicher: "The President probably has a wrong conception of the political strength which I would bring to him for this Government; he probably thinks that the Zentrum would support me politically. There can be no question of that." and I asked him about that. He told me: "Mr. von Papen, do not accept the office; the Party would immediately oppose you." I said: "Thank you, that is what I thought." Hindenburg stood up and said: "I did not call you because I wanted the support of any party through you; I called you because I want a cabinet of independent men." Then he reminded me of the duty which I would have toward the Fatherland. When I continued to contradict him, he said: "you cannot leave me in the lurch when I need you." I said: "No, under these circumstances I will not leave you in the lurch; I will accept."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, the Tribunal thinks this might be dealt with in slightly less detail. The facts could be stated with less detail.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: We will act accordingly.
document I, page 1. I submit document 1 as Exhibit No. 1. By DR. KUBUSCHOK: in some way. Is that true?
A In no way. I have already said that I had a very high opinion of Dr. Bruening personally, and that from the day when Mr. von Schleicher called me in -- that is, three days before my appointment -- I never had the slightest idea of being appointed as Bruening's successor. by you?
A No, that is completely false; it is a completely false statement of the prosecution. The History of the NSDAP, by Pfolz, in which that is stated and that is document 3463-PS -- is a purely private work and was probably financed by Goebbels and his Ministry. was to be created by a fait accompli without any negotiations with any party or the head of any party. beforehand?
A This statement of the prosecution is also untrue. I did not previously discuss the dissolution of the Reichstag with Hitler. The Reichstag was dissolved on the 4th of June. I saw Hitler for the first time in my life five or six days later. The dissolution of the Reichstag, as such, was a matter of course, because the now government wished to have the judgment of the electors on the new course and on the government's program.
Q What were the political aims of your cabinet? Please give this briefly. economic crisis and the one and a half million unemployed young people, the six to seven million completely unemployed, and the twelve to thirteen million, altogether, only partly employed.
were inadequate; they were a burden on finances and had no result. The aim of my government, therefore, was to employ private economy to solve this problem. We wanted to bring the who production machinery into working order again, and with the use of 2.2 billion marks we wanted to put this process into operation. In the current year we wanted to employ one and three-quarter million workers.
Such a program could not have been reconciled with the parties. The political aim, together with the reorganization of the economy, was to have the strongest of the opposition parties, the NSDAP, drawn upon for practical cooperation. been shown, through National Socialist Governments in Thuringia, in Brunswick, and in Oldenburg, that this attempt could be made without the danger of revolutionary movements. I could, therefore, hope, through a national and social program, to find approval of the Reichstag.
Q For the Government's statement, I refer to document 1, Exhibit 1, pages 2 and 3. government. Will you please explain briefly how you regarded the problem and how you attempted to solve it? and labor as great asit was in Germany, as a result of industrialization and alienation of the soil. The reason is known; I need not speak of it. However, one of the reasons, which is generally overlooked, was the German inflation, which had destroyed all liquid property in Germany. This inflation had affected the middle class and the workers, who formed to backbone of the nation. It had robbed them of savings and their property, and workers, tradesmen, the middle class, had become the proletariat.
new social order had arisen in our great neighboring countries, the order of classless society and the totalitarian state. The democratic powers of the world resisted the export of this system. They took protective measures in the economic field, but these protective measures, the "New Deal", and "Ottawa", weakened the German position all the more.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kuboschok, I think the defendant must realize that this is all very familiar ground to the Tribunal, and it is not necessary to restate it in detail.
THE WITNESS: I only wanted to explain to the Tribunal that this social problem was the basis for the whole matter which developed historically .
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The question of the social problem is the question of the development of the NSDAP, and the witness is going to comment later from this point of view. BY Dr. KUBUSCHOK: government you did not contact Hitler. When did you see Hitler for the first time and what agreements did you reach? time on the 9th or 10th of June. This talk was an order to ascertain under what conditions Hitler would be willing to tolerate my government My program by the National Socialists was to be expected. Hitler's demand for such treatment of the government program was the removal of the prohibition of uniforms for the SS; that is, making his party politically equal to other parties. against the SS since the Bruening government had been an obvious injustice. The SA had been prohibited, but the formations of the socialists and the Communists, the "Rotfront" and the "Reichsbanner had not been prohibited. himself to tolerate my government.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to correct a mistake made by the witness. He spoke of the "SS", and meant "SA". There was no SS at that time. President concerning the removal of the prohibition against the SA. The President points out that he decreed the lifting of this prohibition under the condition that there would be no acts of violence in the future. He says furthermore that he was determine with all constitutional means at his disposal to act against all violations of any kind if this expectation was not fulfilled. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: your efforts in the course of the Lousanne Conference in June, 1932, which had such a great influence on the development of the NSDAP? this conference, because the result was closely connected with the enormous increase of the NSDAP immediately thereafter. This conference had been prepared Long beforehand, as is known. It was to abolish reparations.
But I went to Lousanne with many other aims and hopes. The abolition of reparations was, so to speak, a "cause jugee". But what was necessary was to help Germany's moral discomfort, if Europe was to find an orderly test. This moral dissatisfaction had many reasons. Germany had become a "second rate nation". It had been robbed of sovereignty as a defensive power, the Rhineland, the Corridor, the Saar, and others.
I have already described the conomic conditions. This economic and political development of conditions helped the radical elements, and the extremists increased in every direction. parations question have to be solved, which was negative, but positive moral aid had to come. My program was the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich. In the first place, the famous paragraph 231 of the Versailles Treaty was to be abolished.
That was the paragraph which stated Germany's sole responsibility for the war. Historical events of all countries had long established that we were not the only ones responsible. In the second place, confidential relations with France had to be established.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that this really is very important for them.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: May I explain quite generally that the events in 1932, internal and foreign political events, formed the key for the growth of the NSDAP, which led to the 30th of January, 1933. We discussed various questions here; we discussed the events of 1932. We will be able to come back to it. I believe then we will first go on here. Therefore, I ask to permit the discussion at this time in somewhat greater detail.
THE WITNESS: I will make it as brief as possible, Mr. president.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better go on, as you suggest, from 1933. Is that not what you were suggesting, that you should go on to 1933, and then possibly cone back to 1932, if it is necessary?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, that is not what I suggested. I said that the discussion of conditions in 1932 would find the key for the growth of the NSDAP and the formation of the Hitler government.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes; but the defendant has been discussing the conditions of 1932 for a long time now. Surely we can get on to something which has something to do with the National Socialist party now.
THE WITNESS: I will come to that immediately, Mr. President. I only wanted to say that I took up these subjects at Lousanne and tried to achieve understanding for the internal situation in Germany. I talked to the French prime minister and negotiated with him with respect to striking out that famous paragraph. I negotiated a pact with him, but nothing came of all this.
For reasons which I do not want to go into now, the final result of the conference of Lousanne was negative. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q What was your point of view in the armament question? a role in the year 1993, I had already determined at that time in Lousanne with MacDonald, the prime minister, and M. Herriot. Later; in an interview, I did discuss this point of view with Herriot. I quoted this point of view again so as to have it well defined. That is in Document 55. In this document I said that it was not a question of German rearmament, but only a question of equal rights and equal treatment for Germany.
I need not quote this document. It is in the hands of the Court , Document 55.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I submit Document 55 as an exhibit, and further refer to Document 1, which has already been submitted, on Page 9, and Document 6, which I submitted as Exhibit 3, and refer to page 22.
THE WITNESS: At the conclusion of the Lousanne conference, I told MacDonald and Herriot, "You must give me a firm political success, for my government is the last government in Germany. Later there will be only rightists and leftists, or extremists". But they did not believe me, and I returned from Lousanne with only a half-success.
THE PRESIDENT: I think this would be a good time to break off.
(A recess Was taken) come up to your expectations.
Why did you, just the same, sign this contract?
A First of all, I had to sign it. Otherwise, there would have been a continuation and Germany would have become an economic vacum. Then we were directly confronted with the Reichstag election and I had to try to salvage the best possible from the situation.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with this question, I should like to submit Document No. 7, to become Papen Exhibit No. 4. This document is a statement by von Papen, dated the 12th of July, 1932, the speech made at Lousanne, and with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall read a short extract in which Papen says: "But just aslittle as we are unable to erase by a onesided act four signatures given since 1918 by former governments, just aslittle was this possible with the solemn obligations --"
THE PRESIDENT: What is this document? No. 7 you say?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Document No. 7, yes; Page 23 in Document Book I. Exhibit No. 4, My Lord.
"-- just aslittle was this possible with the solemn obligations which were undertaken at that time by the government's parties in the name of the German people. The present government simply had to liquidate a situation which had been created by all former governments since signing the Versailles Treaty. This question of whether this situation can be liquidated if Germany denies the validity of her signature and with it places herself outside the conception *f cultural and other standards, I must answer it with a definite "no". attitude, especially since the propaganda given out by the NSDAP, this attitude taken by the defendant at that time is especially noteworthy. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: demonstrations. This was a general decree, as you have already sai, on the 16-6, relating to the prohibition of the wearing of uniforms, Since that prohibition had been lifted, what were the reasons for the proclamation against demonstrations being proclaimed?
against the wearing of uniforms, that did not take place. Meetings became more and more radical astime went on and now I decided to suggest to the Reich President a decree prohibiting demonstrations. In order to distinguish this decree from the decree which had prohibited the wearing of uniforms, this decree dealing with demonstrations treated all parties equally. Therefore, it did not prohibit only the SA but all fighting formations of the other parties.
Q Now * shallturn to the 20th of July, '32. The prosecution dealt with this statement and it calls your behaviour a "coup d'etat", and the witness Severing has given testimony in that regard. What was the reason for your action on the 20th of July, 1932? orderly circumstances, the re-establishment of order. I had received reports about collaboration of the police department of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior and Communists. The position of the Reich government at Berlin has to be considered specifically in this case and I do not know whether the High Tribunal is cognizant of the legal position. The Reich government at Berlin was not an extra territorial domain or region such as obtains in the United States in Washington, D. C.; but it was in the police power of the Prussian State. My own surveillance, that is the guarding of the Reichschancellor, that was a task which belonged to the Prussian police. Then, if there in the Prussian police ministry agreements with the Communists were effected, that was something which concerned the security of the Reich government. In this instance we were concerned with an act against the Prussian government, but it was not a political incident or a procedure against Socialism as such. Neither was it a Nazification of the Republican police, as the witness Severing testified here. Officials, with the exception of a few higher place officials, remained completely unchanged. As I seized up the situation there, I made it known in a radio speech on the evening of the 20th; I told the German people about my sizing up of the situation. The High Tribunal will find this speech in Document 1, Page 4. However, I shall forego the reading of this speech.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should further like to point to Document 2, which I wish to submit to the High Tribunal as exhibit No. 5. I should like to point out Page 15, specifically, in which case the defendant, von Papen, gives his opinion about the necessity of this measure.
BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: highest German tribunal and was any decision made?
A Yes. The Prussian cabinet started proceedings before the Reich Tribunal at Leipzig and a judgment was passed. This sentence confirmed the action of the Reich's president. It is therefore impossible for the prosecution to call this matter a "Putsch" and characterize it as such.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to call your attention to Document 8, which I wish to submit as exhibit No, 6. This is an extract--I beg your pardon.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, is it necessary for you to give the document exhibit numbers different from the document numbers? you see, it becomes a littl bit confusing each one of these documents has got, at the head of the document. 1,2,3 and so forth, and they follow each other -
DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to acquiesce in the suggestion of the High Tribunal and retain the same number. Therefore, Document 5 shall become Exhibit No. 5.
THE PRESIDENT: That would be much less confusing I think, if you could.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, My Lord.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, indeed, my Lord. This exhibit No. 5 is an extract from the sentence of the State Tribunal, dated the 20th of October 1932. On page 19 in the beginning, the judgment is maintained and it is stated there that the decree of the Reichspresident of the 20th of July 1932 was entirely legal.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Document No. 8 will be Exhibit No. 8, won't it?
DR KUBUSCHOK: Yes. This is No. 5, your Honor. If it said 8, I misspoke. It is No. 5.
THE PRESIDENT: It is quite clear, anyhow, that the exhibit numbers will be the same as the document numbers.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, your Honor; they will be identical.
THE PRESIDENT: And you are now on Document No. 5, Exhibit No. 5.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: Braun, act when this judgment was made known? recognized this judgment, and this is shown by discussions which I personally had later on in October with the Prussian Prime Minister.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Regarding the position taken by the Prussian Government, I should like to submit Document No. 86, which is contained in Volume 3 of my document book. However, because of technical difficulties, this volume is not completely translated and cannot be submitted today. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK: press Correspondent and you stated in detail your position on the armament problem. Since this topic is of special significance for your case and your defense, I should like to have you comment on this matter. is the some which I held at the time that I became Vice Chancellor under the government of Hitler. I should like to refer to Document 1, which sets forth my interview to the United Press, and 1 should like to quote from Document No. 86 which is the radio speech which I made on the 12th of September. On that occasion I said -
Q (Interposing): Perhaps, Witness, you could just give us the few main key words, and in that way tell us the contents.
it will be found in Document 86, and upon looking at this document the Tribunal willfind that I was for disarmament and for peace. On that occasion I appealed to the major powers and told them -- and I would like to quote this sentence:
"In those days, Germany will undertake a gigantic attempt through the mobilization of her last internal reserves, in order to bring about work and social peace and satisfaction, so that the leading statesmen of the major powers now, for their part, will take the decision to bring an end to the poisoning of agreements, and that that shall be brought to an end."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: On the 31st of July of 1932, the Reichstag election took place. First of all, I should like to submit a diagram in which the election results of the various elections held in the years 1930 to 1933 are tabulated. This is Exhibit No. 98, which 1 should like to submit to the Tribunal. From the figures shown there we can see the political development of Germany and follow it. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK you drew on the eve of the election ?
A On the 30th of July I spoke to the United States and I said, "The world does not realize that Germany is confronted with a civil war. The world did not help us to vanquish our difficulties at Lausanne, and it is unbearable that 14 years after the end of the war there is no parity, no equality of rights for Germany." votes. from 6.4 million the figure rose to 13.7 million votes cast for this party; 230 members of the Reichstag as opposed to 110. no majority government could have been formed from the utmost rightist to the Social Democrats without the NSDAP. with that, the Party had a parliamentary key position. the rescinding of the decree on prohibition of wearing a uniform, and that is an explanation which is altogether too simple.
In fact, the prohibition of wearing of uniforms was a decree which had been rescinded, and that resinding had been in effect for one month, from June until July, and two weeks prior to the election I had issued the edict.
The real reason for the tremendous .growth in the Nazi votes was the entire economic condition in which Germany found herself and the fact of the general disappointment about the lack of foreign political successes at Lausanne.
Q. Now, what was the conclusion that you drew from the results of this election ?
A. The conclusion I drew was the same opinion which I had held before. On the next day I gave an interview t* the Associated Press, and through this interview I told the entire world, "the National Socialists have to share responsibility, have to be given responsibility, and when that has come about we have to bring about a reform of the constitution."
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Because of the nature of the historical facts, I would like to refer to Exhibit No. 1 which has already been submitted, and especially to pages 4, 5, and 6. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. Witness, please tell the Tribunal briefly about your negotiations with
A. On the 12th of Adjust, I had a long discussion with Hitler. In order to clarify my position, I showed him the necessity of his participation in the government, and I declared my own readiness to resign as Chancellor in a few months if our collaboration was futile, and after von Hindenburg had found confidence in Hitler. rightist parties had supported my cabinet. The Zentrum party was the opposition. Now, after those elections, the Zentrum Party asked for Hitler as Chancellor, but Hitler himself did not want to become the head of a majority or coal*tion government. paragraph, last page. I quote :
"Kaas, the leader of the Zentrum Party, demands a final solution of this crisis by the full responsible participation of the former opposition in the Reichscabinet." However, Hitler declined. On the next day, we continued with our negotiations, and we did this in the presence of the Reichspresident.
together with his Party, but only on the condition that he himself be appointed Chancellor. And this may be seen in this document on Page 6. plete authority to Hitler and rejected his proposal. At this point, our efforts for bringing National Socialism into a responsible Government had failed. a speech which can be found in the Document Book, Exhibit No.1, Page 10. into the most intense opposition of the Government. Was your course changed in any way through that opposition? the attitude against me and my Government did not change my course at all. On 28 August, I deal with this order in detail. I spoke at Muenster about this matter.
Q This speech may be found in document No. 7, Exhibit No. 7. I beg your pardon, document 1, Page 7. And on this page, I would like to have you peruse a report on a judgment of a special court at Beuthen. Here the very first death sentence pronounced on the terror directors of the 8th was passed, and this terror directive . . . The Prosecution wishes to incriminate defendant von Papen because of this terror directive. A death sentence against 5 National Socialists was found. economy. Since this decree is a nucleus in your Government when it comes to the solution of economic problems, I should like to have you comment on this emergency decree. stated that it comprised a program dealing with 2.2 billion Reichsmarks with the aim of creating work for one and three-fourths million workers, people who were unemployed, to supply them with employment. We made this gigantic effort without incurring even a penny more of increased foreign debt, and if I may use these words to characterize the situation, it was the utilization of our utmost and our last reserves of strength.
The success already made itself noticeable in the first month in that the unemployment figures decreased during the first month by 120,000.
Q In one month? concerned with rearmament?
A Not at all. My Government did not support rearmament with one penny. 1, on pages 8 and 9. Reichstag? what did you say about this on that evening over the radio?
A The new Reichstag met according to the constitution. my Government, as I have already said, could not bring about a majority, but any other Government without Hitler was quite impossible. We could not form a Government without him. Therefore, it was my suggestion, which was justified, that this Reichstag would give my Government a reprieve, and especially since I had submitted a very decisive and a very comprehensive program to the Reichsstag.
Then, something happened. Something quite unexpected -- something quite fantastic and unheard of. The thing that happened was, so to speak, the prostitution of the German parliament. Mr. Goering, the President of the German Reichsstag, now gave to the communist delegate, Clara Zetkin, the impetus to an unheard of attack on my government. when I asked for conditions to be heard, I who was the responsible Chancellor of this Government, in order to answer, I was refused to speak, and the Reichsstag President asked for a vote of no confidence and when the vote was brought in, it brought the Communists, the Socialists and the National Socialists. The fact of this concerted motion on the part of the three parties really was meant to show what was to take place in Germany if and when these three parties were to rule in Germany together, and such symptoms, such signs, showed how imperative it was for me to try not to crowd National Socialism into the Leftist wing, but to bring them into My Government instead.
it on the table, and to leave. document which I have already referred to without having submitted it, Document 86, Page 192. of a Constitutional Regime. Please tellus briefly just whatyour opinions were that you voiced on that occasion. of the more urgent objectives and aims of my Government. The reasons for this are shown in this document on page 9. This regime was to comprise a regime of the right to vote so that this multiplicity of parties would be ended. Above all, it was to get more authority into the Government, and more of a possibility to rule than was possible under the Weimar Constitution. Regimes wanted to do away with some of the circumstances under which Article 48, Emergency Decrees, was issued. The magnitude to which this took place may be seen in Document 4, which is an extract from the wealth of emergency decrees which were issued. What was the election slogan of the Government and what was your opinion about the result?
A Unfortunately, we had to vote once more. The program of my Government was identical with what it had been before. That meant it was an attempt to bring about a new state leadership or a new way of carrying on the Government so that the Government and the authoritarian government could work together with a parliamentary regime.
In this appeal for election of 4 November, I turned to Hitler, and I told him:
"It is the exclusiveness of your party, the fact that you demand everything or nothing--that was something that the Reich President could not recognize or accept, and this is the thing that brought about his decision of 13 August. The things that are at stake today are not whether this or that party leader will occupy the Chancellor's chair, whether his name be Bruening, Hitler or*von Papen, but, rather, that thin* that is at stake is the fact that we meet on common ground so that vital interests of the German people can be assured". Socialists, whom I was fighting against, would be weakened in such a way that this party would be squeezed out of the central parliamentary position. This result was not achieved. The National Socialists lost 34 seats in the Reichstaf, but that was not sufficient to crowd them out of their key position, for, again, the formation of a majority in the Reichstag from the Socialists to the extreme Right was possible only with Hitler. Without him, no majority. erning in a constitutional way, I tried once more to negotiate with the various parties and the National Socialists.
Q. Please give us a picture of these negotiations.
A. These negotiations are interesting, and the Tribunal must be made familiar with them so that they can judge the events of 30 January. parties that were in opposition to my government, and especially with the Social Democrats and with the Center Party. The Center Party hold an adverse position. It wished a majority, a coalition government with Hitler, but Mr. Hitler did not wish to govern or rule with a parliamentary majority. From document 2, page 13, we can see what the attitude of the Center Party was.
Then, after collaboration of Hitler for a coalition gov-
ernment was quite out of the question, I again turned to Hitler in order to ask him whether he was now ready to enter my government. I did this because I had a feeling of responsibility in order to achieve any sort of result at all, and, therefore, I wrote him the letter dated 13 November 1932, which is found in document D-633, which was submitted by the Prosecution as an "undignified"document". to Hitler, in this letter I said that I considered it a violation of duty if I did not turn to him, in spite of everything, once more, and that I was of the opinion that the leader of such a movement or party, whose worth to the country and the people I appreciated even though I had criticized them, should not turn down a discussion with the head of the State.
Q. Then on 8 November you again turned to the foreign press and you voiced-
A. May I interrupt? I should like to add, in regard to the judgement by the Prosecution of the letter, that in every parliamentary state, it is customary that if the leader of the government turns to the opposition to ask for its cooperation and collaboration, he extends a courteous and cordial letter to the leader of the opposition, and that he would not call him an ass. Therefore, I can not quite see why these remarks of nine are characterized as a lack of dignity on my part.
Q. On 8 November you turned to the foreign press, and you spoke about the revision of the Versailles Treaty. Will you please comment briefly on that and tell us what you said at that time?
A. I should like to mention the speech made to the representatives of the foreign press so that the High Tribunal will be fully aware of the repeated appeals I made to foreign countries, to the victorious powers, so that they could be ready to meet the Reich on moral grounds and moral atonement, for then, Gentlemen, the radical movements in Germany would have disappeared of their own accord and there would have been an ebb to all of these movements.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: This speech before the foreign press will be found in document 1, pages 11 and 12. BY DR. KUBUSCHOK:
Q. What were the consequences of your failure to come to any agreement with the party leaders?
A. The failure of my negotiations with the party leaders led to my resignation, which took place on 17 November. I was instructed to carry on the affairs of the government until a new regime could be formed.
Q. What efforts were made by the Reich President after your resignation toward forming a new government?
A. My resignation gave to the Reich President the opportunity to start afresh and to try once more to bring about a parliamentary majority and to form a government on that basis. ember, he received all the party leaders, beginning with the Rightists and through the Lestists, and on the 19th he received Hitler. The topic of conversation was: How can we create a parliamentary majority government? He instructed Hitler to form a coalition majority government. Hitler would then be Chancellor. Hindenburg; and it read as follows: That Hitler could not undertake the formation of a majority or coalition majority government.