cent of its millions of members to the Wehrmacht. It may be possible that 70 per cent of the SA members fulfilled their military duty. I wanted to ask you whether these 70 per cent were taken from the SA as a whole or whether they were, rather, drafted in the general draft, to which the able-bodied male population was subject? As a German citizen subject to military duty, a man was drafted, like anyone else. Whether or not he had been in the SA previously played no role whatsoever. Medical Stuerme, and use them for action within or without a division of the Wehrmacht?
A I personally know of no case wherein any SA. formation appeared in the wa outside of Germany. the SA?
A No. From time to time, and officer came from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which continued the tradition of the SA. occasion of the inspection of SA member's, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present They want to show the close connection between the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?
companied the Chief of Staff Lutze when he inspected an SA unit, and that on that occasion he was accompanied by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Roehm Putsch we had no more cases of conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war, all this equipment was placed at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember that especially clearly. this inspection of SA members, be an official activity of the Field Marshal? connection withthe SA, do you know whether it was always the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a war of aggression? Do you know whether the SA, especially in regard to youth, created war spirit and expanded it and maintained it? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observation?
A I do not know about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, endeavored to create the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one prepared for wars of aggression.
Q But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?
DR. BOEHM: I have no more questions.
DR. HORN: Dr. Horn for the defendant von Ribbentrop. BY DR. HORN: of the 26th of August, 1939, is it true that on the 25th of August the lifting of this order to advance was done at the urging of Ribbentrop, because, according to the information available to the Foreign Office, England had ratified the treaty concluded with Poland on the 6th of April, 1939, and Ribbentrop said that the advance of German troops would mean war with England.
A I do not know quite as much as you have asked, but I do know some-
thing about it. On the 25th we were quite surprised to receive the order that the attack the 26th would not take place, and I called up Major Schmundt -- Field Marshal Keitel was not there -- and asked him what was the matter. He told me that theReich Foreign Minister had reported to the Fuehrer that England had concluded a treaty with Poland, and for that reason he would expect English intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason, the Fuehrer withdrew the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time. of the Fuehrer with the commanders of the Wehrmacht took place, to which, later, the defendant von Ribbentrop was called. point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made by diplomatic means to iron out the differences with Yugoslavia, and how did Hitler react to the suggestion? before I had said the same thing to theFuehrer, that we should clear up the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark and he did not do as well as I did. The Fuehrer said, "What is your view of it. The Yugoslavs lie. They say they have no warlike intentions, and when we have marched into Greece they will attack us from therear." I recall that statement very exactly. war, was completely eliminated from eastern questions, and that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, without success in his suggestions to the Fuehrer? peatedly complained in private talks that so much of the work had been taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter, but also the opinion of the whole Foreign Off* and also of the Foreign Minister. Wehrmacht was against Hitler's intention to denounce theGeneva Convention.
Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed Hitler's intention, and that after the original rejection of the objections of theWehrmacht, Ribbentrop succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?
A In this form, I cannot confirm it fully. I know only one thing for certain. The Foreign Office informed me in writing of an unfavorable attitude toward the suggestion or thought of the Fuehrer.
That was proof to me that of course the Reich Foreign Minister had this point of view. I reported this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign office together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy and Luftwaffe, in a short report and submitted it to the Fuehrer. To what extent the Reich Foreign minister spoke to the Fuehrer personally about the matter, I cannot say with certainty. prisoners as reprisal against the fettering of German prisoners, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to discontinue this measure?
A That is true. The Foreign Office repeatedly spoke to the Fuehrer and urged the Fuehrer to recall the order concerning the fettering of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order recalled. terror fliers. In this connection you stated that you wanted to prevent a decision. The Prosecution submitted two documents on this question, one the recors of an ostensible talk between Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler, the ether a statement by Ambassador Hitter who has already been mentioned. I would like to know whether you know anything about Ribbentrop's attitude on the treatment of terror fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop was in favor of treatment according to the Geneva Convention, and whether he considered deviating from this convention possible only under military necessity and only under express indication that deviating from the Geneva Convention would first have to be reported to the protective powers?
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you put that question more shortly; what does he know about it? just like the Wehrmacht, was against deviation from the Geneva Convention, and that he spoke to Hitler to this effect? learned that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain terror acts as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of view of the Foreign Office.
interested, after what I had concluded from his oral instructions. However, this suggestion of the Reich Foreign Minister was never put into effect, or at least I never heard anything about it. of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in 1943? Do you know anything about that? believe it was an English Captain -- established contact with us. This captain said that he came from English headquarters in the Southeastern Area. I was present when the Reich Foreign minister reported to the Fuehrer about this matter. I know he suggested that this contact should be tried to see whether it resulted in anything. That was done, the Fuehrer agreed, but I heard nothing more about the matter so apparently nothing come of it. especially after the Polish campaign and after Dunkirk, in 1943? campaign. At that time the Fuehrer spoke quite openly and frankly with everyone. I heard that the Reich Foreign Minister and the Fuehrer agreed that peace could be concluded with England at any time only if part of our old colonies were given back to us. that Hungarian Jews, to the extent that they wished, should be permitted to emigrate?
A I recall that too. At the Berghof, shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our troops, at about the beginning of May, 1944, there was a conference hold, or a talk, where a decision was to be reached. The Fuehrer wanted to hear views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the Fuehrer: "Can't we send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral country?" The Fuehrer answered: "How can you imagine that? Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically impossible."
that this expulsion took place at the order of Himmler. which asserts that this expulsion took place at the order of the Reich Foreign Minister. Is that statement true? occasion of my teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a word that Jews were to be deported from Denmark, and I never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in that. von Ribbentrop on the Jewish question? any talk of the Reich Foreign Minister at which I was present and in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you; I have no further questions. BY DR. KRAUS (counsel for defendant Schacht): yesterday that in the year 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
on the 1st April, 19387 I am interested in this date because on that day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many divisions ware ready on the 1st April, 1938? as regards personnel and material.
Q Can you tell me how they were made up?
A I can't say with certainty. one cavalry division, one mountain division and the rest were probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equiped, and they existed only as skeleton formations. from 27 divisions by the outbreak of the war, the 1st September, 1939. because the preparations in the armament industry were now having their effect, and equipment was being amply delivered for the divisions. Also, fromfrom this time on the trained age groups were coming to the army in noticeable numbers. Therefore we were in a position, in the late fall of 1938, with approximately 55 divisions, including research divisions, even though they may have been, in pant, only weakly equipped. In 1939, as I said before, according to my recollection, there between 73 and 75 divisions. after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by 200 percent in one year and five or six months, whereas, to set up 27 divisions, over three years were needed. or these 75, rather, also had considerable gaps in their equipment. The slight number which I mentioned from the spring, or the 1st of April, 1938 -and from that time on armament went much faster -- arises from the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. KAUFMANN (counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner):
during Kaltenbrunner's time, was better organized than afterwards. Please tall me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in the OKW?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr.Kaufmann, you have asked a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner's positions given to us more than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner testified only that his Intelligence Service was connected with the Military Intelligence Service quite generally. This witness can tell us what the significance was, or what influence on the whole policy this connection of the Military Intelligence Service had with the ether Intelligence Service.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't understand you to ask him anything about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Dr. Kauffmann, Counsel for Kaltenbrunner. May I state the question?
BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
Q Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner's time the whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time, that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have within the intelligence service?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The Tribunal does not think that you ought to ask general questions of this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, you can ask it. BY DR. KAUFFMANN: the situation which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner, what was his activity over anumberof years.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I said during the daily military conferences what did Kaltenbrunner do, what did he say, did he report, what did his reports consist of? That is, in my opinion, a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: At what time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief of theReich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if you know of any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention. BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
Q Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell me? moved to the Reichchancellory in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did not take part it all in a discussion of the situation. I cannot recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Fuehrer's quarters.
Q Excuse me, did you mean 1944 or 1945?
A 1945. And from the spring of 1945 on when Kaltenbrunner was frequently in the Reichchancellory, I met him there. Before this time he was at the Fuehrer's headquarters from time to time and talked to me there, especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence Service, but he was not present at the situation conferences with the Fuehrer.
Q Did he witness military situation reports? over on the 1st of May 1944 -- before he took over the intelligence service I observed from time to time very good reports from the Southeastern area, and through these reports my attention was called to his experience in intelligence service. When he had taken over the intelligence service against my opposition at first -- but after I had talked to him he was even supported by me -- but I had the impression that the man knew his business. Of course, I constantly received reports from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had from Canaris,; not only the daily reports but from time to time he sent, I might say, a political survey, on the basis of the individual agent's reports. abroad, attracted my attention especially because they displayed an openness and soberness and seriousness of our whole military situation which had not been noticeable in Canaris' reports. situation conference had been ended, every day, was surrounded by his confidants and by his political men. Was Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidential agents? of the Fuehrer. What I saw was purely official attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no more questions.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Counsel for Grand Admiral Doenitz. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: the spring of 1945 he called on the Navy to fight on. Did you yourself as a responsible military adviser, did you advise the Fuehrer at that time to capitulate?
A I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was com-
pletely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. That would have had no value.
Q Not even after the failure of the Ardennes offensive in 1945?
A Not even after the failure of the Ardennes offensive. The Fuehrer realized the situation as a whole as well as we did and probably much sooner than we did. We did not need to say anything to him in this connection.
Q What reasons were against it?
A In the winter of 1945 there were many reasons against it; aside from the fact that the question of capitulation or giving up resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander, the reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt that there could only be unconditional surrender, for the other countries left us no doubt on that score; and if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English "Eclipse" -- the gentlemen of the English delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions on what the occupation corps was to do in Germany after capitulation. they were, and with front capture by the enemy facing them. The same thing happened to occur in the winter of 1941 at Viasma. Millions of villagers suddenly left the camp in the winter in the open field. That would have taken an enormous harvest. Above all, approximately 3 1/2 million still on the eastern front would have fallen absolutely into the hands of the eastern enemy. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by taking them into the western area. That could be done only if the two fronts had moved closer together. stages of the war. than I can say today -- than I want to say today.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Nelte, Counsel for Keitel. BY DR. NELTE:
Q Colonel General, since when have you known Field Marshall Keitel?
section of the Army.
you always worked with him? Ministry but at the front. I believe that was in '34 and '35 when he disappeared from my view too; but otherwise, all the time.
Q. Was this work with him only official, or was your relationship also personal?
A. In the course of years, as a result of our common suffering, this relationship became very personal.
Q. The prosecution has characterized Field Marshal Keitel as one of the most powerful men of the Wehrmacht. It charges him that in this position he influenced Hitler. Other circles represented here called Keitel weak, and accused him of not being in a position to exert his influence. but there are questions which have answered in different ways, and only a person like you can answer them, a person who worked with the field marshal over a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly the official relationship between Keitel and Hitler.
A. The official relationship between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel was, on a somewhat different lever, exactly the same as between the Fuehrer and mo. It was a purely official one, and particularly in the first period, it was characterized just as in the case of all other higher officers by constant clashes between the revolutionary and a Prussian officer bound by tradition.
Q. It was the case, then, that clashes, as a result of differing opinions, were the order of the day?
A. They were the order of the day, and in effect led to extremely unpleasant scenes, such scenes that one had to be ashamed as a higher officer in the presence of young adjutants to listen to anything like that. The entry in my diary proved that on the 19th of April, for example, 1940, Field Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That was a fact.
Q. May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No. Dr. Nelte, if you want him to confirm the evidence which the defendant Keitel has given, why don't you ask him whether he confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning was necessary because -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) The question you put to him was, what was his relation with the Fuehrer.
You could not have put it any wider than that, and you certainly covered that with the defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness appeared here who wants to contradict Field Marshal Keitel. If what he ways is true -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) That is the very reason why I asked you whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the defendant Keitel said, and if you did, why didn't you ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of Keitel. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Colonel general, you have heard that we can simplify the questioning on this matter. I submit to you, what the witness Gisevius said here in this room about Field Marshal Keitel was in contradiction essentially to what Field Marshal Keitel and the other witnesses questioned about Keitel said. I point out that Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information from the OKW. If you want to consider this, pleas answer the question now: To your knowledge of things, is what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath such as has been confirmed by others, with the exception of Gisevius, or is it true what Gisevius said?
A. Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this connection is a general form of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was no powerful man; there was no influential man next to him, and this could not be one.
Q. The witness Gisevius mentioned an exhibit to prove that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since you had a part in this document which is before you, I should like to have this one document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. This document does not consist of a set of minutes, but a file notice, as you see. It is the white book which was prepared on the ostensible violations of neutrality of Belgium and Holland. And in this connection, the witness Gisevius said:
"I believe that I should mention two more examples which are of special significance, to my mind. In the first place, all means were used to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against invading Holland and Belgium, and to tell him -- that is, Hitler -- that the information submitted by Keitel about the ostensible violations of neutrality of the Dutch and Belgians was false. The counter-intelligence -- that is, Canaris -- was to prepare these reports which incriminated the Dutch and the Belgians. Admiral Canaris refused to sign these reports. He repeatedly told Keitel that this report that had been prepared by the OKW was false".
"That was the one example when Keitel did not turn over to Hitler what he was supposed to". that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were accused of covering false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report, in Part A, the OKW refused to cover this white book. Is that true?
A. (No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
THE WITNESS: I understand the question, and I should like to assert this as an effect here briefly and tell how the event really was. report, Field Marshal Keitel then submitted to him the draft of the white "*-*" of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked this book over and listened to the essential remarks which Canaris made at the wish of the Foreign Office that intelligence needed some improvement, that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as it says here, a last really "eclatante" violation of neutrality was lacking. the table and said, "I forbid that. How could I take over the responsibility for a political decision?
"In this white book, there are, word for word, the reports which you yourself (Canaris) made to me."
Thereupon, Canaris said, "I am of exactly the same opinion. In my opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are completely sufficient to show the breaches of neutrality which took place in Holland and Belgium". And he advised Field Marshal Keitel against signing it.
That is what took place. The field marshal took the book with him, and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the imaginary reports of this Gisevius turns everything upside down. All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people who now asserted that we had signed them falsely.
Q. Did Admiral Canaris play a role in this case? Gisevius said it was not possible that Admiral Canaris could submit an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative. It is reported that Canaris gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel, who did not submit them. I ask you, is that ture?
marshal Keitel, but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything of which one could say, the Fuehrer has to know that. I have already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could give it to the Fuehrer directly. He had only to go into the office and give it to the Chief Adjutant of the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don't know, why don't you say so. If you don't know whether he gave it to the Fuehrer or not, say so. could not come to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
Q If he wanted to, he had access at any time?
THE PRESIDENT: Now will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: It is the minutes of the meeting as far as Keitel is concerned. It is on Page 8376 to 8385 of the German minutes, the session of 26 April, 1946. BY DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, which have been submitted to the Court. These are the affidavits Keitel No. 9, High Commander of the Wehrmacht and General Staff; and the affidavit Keitel No. 13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military competencies. You remember that you signed these affidavits?
Q Can you confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
Q I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the question of rearmament of General Thomas, who was also given as a source of information here, I should like to ask you a few questions. You know that the prosecution submitted an extensive book here, PS 2353 regarding rearmament, from the pen of General Thomas. Since General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as a source of information, I must question you about Thomas.
In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353, he said that on the 1st of February, 1943, he was released from the OKW. Do you know anything about that? Do you know whether that is true or not? the high commanders of the Wehrmacht. He was at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
Q Did he not have a special assignment?
Q I want to ascertain only that; after the 1st of February, 1943, General Thomas was given assignments by the OKW, especially taking down this work which has been submitted here; is that true? armament I might say.
Q What was his relationship to Field Marshal Keitel? war or at the very beginning of the war, I know it only as a good relationship.
Q Do you know the reports to General Thomas concerning rearmament? rearmament. I can recall reports about the war potential of our enemies.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is ten minutes past five and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need some time yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946, 1000 hours.)
follows: BY DR. NELTE: said that he constantly made reports on the war potential of enemy powers, to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Where these important reports always submitted to Hitler ? regularly submitted to the Fuehrer and often occasioned a violent dispute, because the Fuehrer considered their presentation of the enemy potential greatly exaggerated. presentations of General Thomas were justified? careful study of enemy armament achievements the statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate. been an enemy of the Command and of Hitler. In the course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
A I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he objected to this exaggerated optimism of the Fuehrer. But perhaps in hi basic attitude he to took a pessimistic rather than an optimistic turn. economy office? Minister Speer, but Mr. Speer wanted to work with him and requested from the Fuehrer that he should be dismissed from the armament office which Mr. Speer had taken over.