There is no charge against the High Command for having arranged courts martial or administering their courts martial improperly
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I offer an opinion at this point? If the senior officers and commanders had heard of any breaches of discipline or of -
THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Do you know of anything in the indictment or anything in the evidence which chargesthe High Command or any member of the High Command with improper behavior at a court martial, or in connection with a court martial?
DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical attitude of the supreme commanders. BY DR. LATERNSER:
THE PRESIDENT: I cannot hear you. BY DR. LATERNSER: prisoners of war during the winter of 1941?
were sent there personally, and they reported to the Fuehrer in my presence. We are mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the battle of Viasma. The reason for this number of deaths was described by the Fuehrer's adjutants, as horrors. The Russian armies, which were encircled, had put up fanatical resistance during the last eight or ten Gays without any food whatever. They literally lived off the bark of trees and roots because they had retreated to the most impenetrable wooded country; and now they were falling into our hands in a condition in which they could hardly move.
It was impossible to transport them away. In the transportation situation in which we found ourselves because of the many difficulties, it was impossible to take them away, and there was no accommodation on the spot. The majority of them could only be saved through careful hospital treatment. reason why such a large number of these prisoners died. to the front. Similar reports came from the quartermaster general of the army
Q What do you know about the artillery bombardment of Leningrad? You remember that a witness has been examined here on that point? with the German artillery commander who was commanding the artillery outside Leningrad. He brought his target charts along, and there was the most careful system, which consisted in charting only the key scoters inLeningrad as targets, which it was necessary to fire at, so as to eliminate the resistance fire of the fortress. There were firms, in particular, who were still producing ammunition in Leningrad. could roach the center of Leningrad, was so short that one had to be most careful with the use of that ammunition. They were mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as much ammunition as we had captured. had deliberately fired on and destroyed castles in Leningrad, and you have seen the operational charts for this artillery?
A Yes; I had it in my files in my briefcase for many weeks. Only the armament industry was on it. It would have been insane to shoot at anything else.
Q What do you know about Hitler's order and the order from the OKH regarding the retreat during the winter of 1941, stating that residences and chimneys were to be destroyed? What was the reason for that order being compiled?
I refer to the order R 130. Unfortunately I have not been able to ascertain on what day the prosecution presented that order. I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed. degrees of frost, the commander reported to the Fuehrer in his headquarters from the front that in this battle they were concerned with nothing that was not fit for warm shelter. These who were not in the possession of some sort of heaping arrangement -- that is to say, a village with useful stoves could not held out, and they would not be able to fight the following day, either. In this case, it really was a fight for stoves; and if, in consequence, we were forced to retreat, the Fuehrer then ordered that those chimneys, or fireplaces, would have to be destroyed. Not only the houses, but also the fireplaces would have to be blown up, because that alone would prevent a pursuit through the Russian areas in such a critical situation. destruction is permissible which is inevitable from the military point of view, I believe that for this type of winter warfare -- and it only happened during the winter -- that order can be justified.
Q What do you know about the case of Katyn?
ved the first report through my propaganda deportment, which was informed through its propaganda company attached to an Army group. I heard that the Reich Police Criminal Department had been given the task of investigating that entire affair, and I then sent an officer from my propaganda department to the Katyn Woods at the time when these foreign exports were being shown the graves. He rendered a report to me which, in general, corresponds with the report which is contained in -- I think it was the White Book of the Foreign Office. Any doubt as to the facts as they were represented I have never heard from anyone. cution had shown in this court room and which dealt with atrocities committed in the Jugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the pictures which you still night recollect? is perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photograph But it has never been said what the photographs, as such, were showing. That did not become clear from the film. It did not become clear whether the dog that was mauling a human being was not photographed in an Army school -
THE PRESIDENT: That is more argument. BY DR. LATERNSER: be able to clarify so that -- well, I remember one photograph where a police dog is jumping on a human being or a doll -
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs and he says that they were all true, in his opinion, true pictures; and he didn't take them, he doesn't know anything about them and anything that he can say upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question. BY DR. LATERNSER: which the witness has testified it was? It is being said that Louvain wasn't defended at all.
18th of May, that in that communique the sentence is contained: Louvain was taken after a serious fight, but that -
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was captured, whether it was cleared and then occupied or whether there was a fight about the place; and the witness has stated that there was not a fight for Louvain but that -
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I don't know who should be blamed for the event. I can't see any connection with any one of the individual defendants and if nobody can be binned for it, we must cross off the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the indictment doesn't refer to ** THE PRESIDENT:
Does the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: It isn't dealt with, but in the way of evidence, a witness was called who has stated that German artil lery had deliberately destroyed the University of Louvain, and I assumed that there must have been shooting of course. I an not certain, Mr. President, but I think it is Louvain.
THE WITNESS: I know that in the bulletin of the 18th of May, 1940, the sentence was contained that Louvain was captured after severe fighting. Even though the German Army communique did conceal some things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruth I can say that because I was the editor. BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q You have already spoken about the case of Oradur. I merely want to ask you, what did Field Marshal von Runstedt do be. cause of this event when it was reported to him?
had been started by Field Marshal von Runstedt and that there was correspondence about the case of Oradur between Field Marshal Keitel and the Armistice Commission and Field Marshal von Runstedt. martial proceedings? ment of an SS court in connection with this event.
Q You don't know the out cone of that trial?
A No, I am afraid I don't.
Q Then I come to the last question. How many conferences were there before the Ardennes offensive in December, 1944? ences.
Q Did you participate in all of them? at any time, a demand for an order, or an order that during that offensive prisoners were to be shot?
A No, but I can tell you more than that. Never, during any one of those conferences, has a single word been mentioned which went beyond the purely operative considerations. There was no talk about the conduct of the troops. -- let's assume -- had been issued by Field Marshal von Runstedt?
A Such an order is out of the question. It could never have been issued through the channels handled by soldiers. It could only have been issued through the police; that is to say, Himmler of the SS. of the Armed Forces units, surely? officer of the Army would have accepted such an order, and I know of no order of the Fuehrer which would be directed against ordinary prisoners of war in such a way.
the witness Van Essen has stated in this court room that, in accordance with the treatment of prisoners of war, he had to draw conclusions on an order from higher sources. Do you know the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had out your last question. You said that was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I shall be through in about five minutes. Will you please take into consideration that Colonel General Jodl is a member of the indicted group and that he is the officer who is most sufficiently informed and that an hour and a half for such an examination is not an excessive amount of time. BY DR. LATERNSER: of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant? quite remember who it came from. I discussed it with Field Marsh Keitel and I expressed my view that because of that one couldn't start, or shouldn't start legal proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German cap during such an action. Legal proceedings were in progress against him already. Then Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that the proceedings should be discontinued.
Q And were they discontinued? was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Commando Staff? shall we say, directed, in practice, General Staff work, all my staff, my entire staff, from which of course I was separated by certain distances, because I was in the so-called Circle No. 1 and my staff were in Circle No. 2; that is to say, outside; and this entire staff who worked within the immediate staff were directed by him, and, if necessary, he acted as my deputy of course.
the Armed Forces Commando Staff was responsible for strategic planning. Is that correct?
A No. I was responsible in the first place. Chief of the Armed Forces Commando Staff correspond to the significance of the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
A No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of an Army Commander, for instance, nor the position of the Chief of the General Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken.)
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other Defendant's Counsel want to ask any question BY DR. STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Goering): Hitler that about 80 English flying officers had escaped from a camp, Stalag 3, at Sagan? of the Berghof. I was in the next room telphoning. When a very loud discussion developed, I want to the curtain temporarily to hear what was going on. I heard that there was a question of the escape of the English fliers from the Sagon camp.
Q Was Reichsmarshal Goering present at this discussion?
A The Reichsmarshal was not present at this discussion of the situation. I know that with absolute certainty. shooting of a part of the escaped officers?. that the Reichsmarshal was indignant at this shooting, and I know that this one particularly, the former officer came to the fore, who did not approve of such dealings. One must give him his due. There occured repeated arguments between him and the Fuehrer, which I witnessed personally.
DR, STAHMER: I have no more questions.
DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA.): With the permission of the Court, I will as the witness a few questions. BY DR. BOEHM:
Q Witness, you were Chief of the Wehrmacht operational staff. The units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution asserts that you expected from the SA. that you could use it as a fighting troop in the first days of agressive war on the basis of the So-called Kommando Troops. How I should like to ask you if the term "Kommando Troops" is known to you in connection with the use of the SA. as such by the Wehrmacht.
A No, that is not known to me. The word "Kommando Troop" I heard for the fi* time in connection with the undertaking of the English Ranger Battalion. We nev* used this term.
the regular troops in the entry into Austria or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?
A I know of no case where formations of the SA. Were used in the occupation of another country, with the exception of the Free Corps Henlein, but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German refugees. In the Free Corps Henlein there were a few SA leaders, i believe, who had formerly been officers. regiment in the war?
A The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA and it was recruited primarily from the SA. but it had nothing to do whatever with the Supreme SA Command It was completely a regiment of the Wehrmacht. Reich Fuehrer Schools of the SA annually, 22,000 to 25,000 officers and non-commissioned officers were used as such in the Wehmacht? its officers and non-commissioned officers trained by anyone else than by its own personnel. as ordinary soldiers and had to advance in the ordinary way as Wehrmacht soldiers
A The SA. Was drafted into the Wehrmacht like other Germans. I know of many cases where high SA leaders were given the very lowest positions as soldiers and as non-commissioned officers. 25,000 officers and non-commissioned officers were trained by the SA, but that 25,000 officers, empowered and not empowered, were trained by the SA. for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this? greater extent of officers. The officers were trained only in the War Schools of the army, nowhere else. this--that in the course of the totalization of the war effort, 80 per cent of the Leadership Corps were made available.
A I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know of that.
cent of its millions of members to the Wehrmacht. It may be possible that 70 per cent of the SA members fulfilled their military duty. I wanted to ask you whether these 70 per cent were taken from the SA as a whole or whether they were, rather, drafted in the general draft, to which the able-bodied male population was subject? As a German citizen subject to military duty, a man was drafted, like anyone else. Whether or not he had been in the SA previously played no role whatsoever. Medical Stuerme, and use them for action within or without a division of the Wehrmacht?
A I personally know of no case wherein any SA. formation appeared in the wa outside of Germany. the SA?
A No. From time to time, and officer came from the Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and well-being of the Feldherrnhalle regiment, which had come primarily from the SA, and later, about a Panzer formation which continued the tradition of the SA. occasion of the inspection of SA member's, Field Marshal Brauchitsch was present They want to show the close connection between the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you explain this photograph?
companied the Chief of Staff Lutze when he inspected an SA unit, and that on that occasion he was accompanied by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Roehm Putsch we had no more cases of conflict with the SA. At the outbreak of war, all this equipment was placed at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember that especially clearly. this inspection of SA members, be an official activity of the Field Marshal? connection withthe SA, do you know whether it was always the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare Germany, and especially the youth, for a war of aggression? Do you know whether the SA, especially in regard to youth, created war spirit and expanded it and maintained it? Do you know anything in this connection from personal observation?
A I do not know about that. That the SA, as a branch of the Party, endeavored to create the patriotic spirit within its ranks, to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for wars of aggression, no one prepared for wars of aggression.
Q But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You are of the opinion that it is not true?
DR. BOEHM: I have no more questions.
DR. HORN: Dr. Horn for the defendant von Ribbentrop. BY DR. HORN: of the 26th of August, 1939, is it true that on the 25th of August the lifting of this order to advance was done at the urging of Ribbentrop, because, according to the information available to the Foreign Office, England had ratified the treaty concluded with Poland on the 6th of April, 1939, and Ribbentrop said that the advance of German troops would mean war with England.
A I do not know quite as much as you have asked, but I do know some-
thing about it. On the 25th we were quite surprised to receive the order that the attack the 26th would not take place, and I called up Major Schmundt -- Field Marshal Keitel was not there -- and asked him what was the matter. He told me that theReich Foreign Minister had reported to the Fuehrer that England had concluded a treaty with Poland, and for that reason he would expect English intervention in the war with Poland. For this reason, the Fuehrer withdrew the order for attack. That is what I learned at that time. of the Fuehrer with the commanders of the Wehrmacht took place, to which, later, the defendant von Ribbentrop was called. point of view that before military action was taken, an attempt should be made by diplomatic means to iron out the differences with Yugoslavia, and how did Hitler react to the suggestion? before I had said the same thing to theFuehrer, that we should clear up the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark and he did not do as well as I did. The Fuehrer said, "What is your view of it. The Yugoslavs lie. They say they have no warlike intentions, and when we have marched into Greece they will attack us from therear." I recall that statement very exactly. war, was completely eliminated from eastern questions, and that Ribbentrop complained personally and through his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, without success in his suggestions to the Fuehrer? peatedly complained in private talks that so much of the work had been taken away from the Foreign Office, and I must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter, but also the opinion of the whole Foreign Off* and also of the Foreign Minister. Wehrmacht was against Hitler's intention to denounce theGeneva Convention.
Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically opposed Hitler's intention, and that after the original rejection of the objections of theWehrmacht, Ribbentrop succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?
A In this form, I cannot confirm it fully. I know only one thing for certain. The Foreign Office informed me in writing of an unfavorable attitude toward the suggestion or thought of the Fuehrer.
That was proof to me that of course the Reich Foreign Minister had this point of view. I reported this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign office together with the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy and Luftwaffe, in a short report and submitted it to the Fuehrer. To what extent the Reich Foreign minister spoke to the Fuehrer personally about the matter, I cannot say with certainty. prisoners as reprisal against the fettering of German prisoners, and in agreement with the OKW induced Hitler to discontinue this measure?
A That is true. The Foreign Office repeatedly spoke to the Fuehrer and urged the Fuehrer to recall the order concerning the fettering of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed that these many objections, which were supported by the OKW, finally succeeded in having the order recalled. terror fliers. In this connection you stated that you wanted to prevent a decision. The Prosecution submitted two documents on this question, one the recors of an ostensible talk between Ribbentrop, Goering, and Himmler, the ether a statement by Ambassador Hitter who has already been mentioned. I would like to know whether you know anything about Ribbentrop's attitude on the treatment of terror fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop was in favor of treatment according to the Geneva Convention, and whether he considered deviating from this convention possible only under military necessity and only under express indication that deviating from the Geneva Convention would first have to be reported to the protective powers?
THE PRESIDENT: Can't you put that question more shortly; what does he know about it? just like the Wehrmacht, was against deviation from the Geneva Convention, and that he spoke to Hitler to this effect? learned that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain terror acts as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point of view of the Foreign Office.
interested, after what I had concluded from his oral instructions. However, this suggestion of the Reich Foreign Minister was never put into effect, or at least I never heard anything about it. of General Alexander, backed up by the English Government, in 1943? Do you know anything about that? believe it was an English Captain -- established contact with us. This captain said that he came from English headquarters in the Southeastern Area. I was present when the Reich Foreign minister reported to the Fuehrer about this matter. I know he suggested that this contact should be tried to see whether it resulted in anything. That was done, the Fuehrer agreed, but I heard nothing more about the matter so apparently nothing come of it. especially after the Polish campaign and after Dunkirk, in 1943? campaign. At that time the Fuehrer spoke quite openly and frankly with everyone. I heard that the Reich Foreign Minister and the Fuehrer agreed that peace could be concluded with England at any time only if part of our old colonies were given back to us. that Hungarian Jews, to the extent that they wished, should be permitted to emigrate?
A I recall that too. At the Berghof, shortly after the occupation of Hungary by our troops, at about the beginning of May, 1944, there was a conference hold, or a talk, where a decision was to be reached. The Fuehrer wanted to hear views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved, or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the Fuehrer: "Can't we send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral country?" The Fuehrer answered: "How can you imagine that? Do you think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically impossible."
that this expulsion took place at the order of Himmler. which asserts that this expulsion took place at the order of the Reich Foreign Minister. Is that statement true? occasion of my teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I never heard a word that Jews were to be deported from Denmark, and I never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in that. von Ribbentrop on the Jewish question? any talk of the Reich Foreign Minister at which I was present and in which there was any mention of Jews.
DR. HORN: Thank you; I have no further questions. BY DR. KRAUS (counsel for defendant Schacht): yesterday that in the year 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
on the 1st April, 19387 I am interested in this date because on that day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how many divisions ware ready on the 1st April, 1938? as regards personnel and material.
Q Can you tell me how they were made up?
A I can't say with certainty. one cavalry division, one mountain division and the rest were probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet equiped, and they existed only as skeleton formations. from 27 divisions by the outbreak of the war, the 1st September, 1939. because the preparations in the armament industry were now having their effect, and equipment was being amply delivered for the divisions. Also, fromfrom this time on the trained age groups were coming to the army in noticeable numbers. Therefore we were in a position, in the late fall of 1938, with approximately 55 divisions, including research divisions, even though they may have been, in pant, only weakly equipped. In 1939, as I said before, according to my recollection, there between 73 and 75 divisions. after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased by 200 percent in one year and five or six months, whereas, to set up 27 divisions, over three years were needed. or these 75, rather, also had considerable gaps in their equipment. The slight number which I mentioned from the spring, or the 1st of April, 1938 -and from that time on armament went much faster -- arises from the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: I have no further questions. BY DR. KAUFMANN (counsel for defendant Kaltenbrunner):
during Kaltenbrunner's time, was better organized than afterwards. Please tall me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during your time in the OKW?
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr.Kaufmann, you have asked a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner's positions given to us more than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner testified only that his Intelligence Service was connected with the Military Intelligence Service quite generally. This witness can tell us what the significance was, or what influence on the whole policy this connection of the Military Intelligence Service had with the ether Intelligence Service.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't understand you to ask him anything about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the defendant was connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Dr. Kauffmann, Counsel for Kaltenbrunner. May I state the question?
BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
Q Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner's time the whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time, that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner have within the intelligence service?
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to ask? The Tribunal does not think that you ought to ask general questions of this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know about, you can ask it. BY DR. KAUFFMANN: the situation which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to imagine any more general question than that with reference to Kaltenbrunner, what was his activity over anumberof years.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I said during the daily military conferences what did Kaltenbrunner do, what did he say, did he report, what did his reports consist of? That is, in my opinion, a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: At what time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his appointment as Chief of theReich Security Main Office, the time from 1943 on.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular conferences, if you know of any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention. BY DR. KAUFFMANN:
Q Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please tell me? moved to the Reichchancellory in Berlin, Kaltenbrunner did not take part it all in a discussion of the situation. I cannot recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Fuehrer's quarters.