Q Excuse me, did you mean 1944 or 1945?
A 1945. And from the spring of 1945 on when Kaltenbrunner was frequently in the Reichchancellory, I met him there. Before this time he was at the Fuehrer's headquarters from time to time and talked to me there, especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence Service, but he was not present at the situation conferences with the Fuehrer.
Q Did he witness military situation reports? over on the 1st of May 1944 -- before he took over the intelligence service I observed from time to time very good reports from the Southeastern area, and through these reports my attention was called to his experience in intelligence service. When he had taken over the intelligence service against my opposition at first -- but after I had talked to him he was even supported by me -- but I had the impression that the man knew his business. Of course, I constantly received reports from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had from Canaris,; not only the daily reports but from time to time he sent, I might say, a political survey, on the basis of the individual agent's reports. abroad, attracted my attention especially because they displayed an openness and soberness and seriousness of our whole military situation which had not been noticeable in Canaris' reports. situation conference had been ended, every day, was surrounded by his confidants and by his political men. Was Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidential agents? of the Fuehrer. What I saw was purely official attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: I have no more questions.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Counsel for Grand Admiral Doenitz. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: the spring of 1945 he called on the Navy to fight on. Did you yourself as a responsible military adviser, did you advise the Fuehrer at that time to capitulate?
A I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was com-
pletely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. That would have had no value.
Q Not even after the failure of the Ardennes offensive in 1945?
A Not even after the failure of the Ardennes offensive. The Fuehrer realized the situation as a whole as well as we did and probably much sooner than we did. We did not need to say anything to him in this connection.
Q What reasons were against it?
A In the winter of 1945 there were many reasons against it; aside from the fact that the question of capitulation or giving up resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander, the reasons against it were, primarily, that we had no doubt that there could only be unconditional surrender, for the other countries left us no doubt on that score; and if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely removed by the fact that we captured the English "Eclipse" -- the gentlemen of the English delegation will know what that is. It was exact instructions on what the occupation corps was to do in Germany after capitulation. they were, and with front capture by the enemy facing them. The same thing happened to occur in the winter of 1941 at Viasma. Millions of villagers suddenly left the camp in the winter in the open field. That would have taken an enormous harvest. Above all, approximately 3 1/2 million still on the eastern front would have fallen absolutely into the hands of the eastern enemy. It was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by taking them into the western area. That could be done only if the two fronts had moved closer together. stages of the war. than I can say today -- than I want to say today.
DR. NELTE: Dr. Nelte, Counsel for Keitel. BY DR. NELTE:
Q Colonel General, since when have you known Field Marshall Keitel?
section of the Army.
you always worked with him? Ministry but at the front. I believe that was in '34 and '35 when he disappeared from my view too; but otherwise, all the time.
Q. Was this work with him only official, or was your relationship also personal?
A. In the course of years, as a result of our common suffering, this relationship became very personal.
Q. The prosecution has characterized Field Marshal Keitel as one of the most powerful men of the Wehrmacht. It charges him that in this position he influenced Hitler. Other circles represented here called Keitel weak, and accused him of not being in a position to exert his influence. but there are questions which have answered in different ways, and only a person like you can answer them, a person who worked with the field marshal over a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly the official relationship between Keitel and Hitler.
A. The official relationship between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel was, on a somewhat different lever, exactly the same as between the Fuehrer and mo. It was a purely official one, and particularly in the first period, it was characterized just as in the case of all other higher officers by constant clashes between the revolutionary and a Prussian officer bound by tradition.
Q. It was the case, then, that clashes, as a result of differing opinions, were the order of the day?
A. They were the order of the day, and in effect led to extremely unpleasant scenes, such scenes that one had to be ashamed as a higher officer in the presence of young adjutants to listen to anything like that. The entry in my diary proved that on the 19th of April, for example, 1940, Field Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That was a fact.
Q. May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No. Dr. Nelte, if you want him to confirm the evidence which the defendant Keitel has given, why don't you ask him whether he confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning was necessary because -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) The question you put to him was, what was his relation with the Fuehrer.
You could not have put it any wider than that, and you certainly covered that with the defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel answered it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness appeared here who wants to contradict Field Marshal Keitel. If what he ways is true -
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) That is the very reason why I asked you whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the defendant Keitel said, and if you did, why didn't you ask him whether he did confirm the evidence of Keitel. BY DR. NELTE:
Q. Colonel general, you have heard that we can simplify the questioning on this matter. I submit to you, what the witness Gisevius said here in this room about Field Marshal Keitel was in contradiction essentially to what Field Marshal Keitel and the other witnesses questioned about Keitel said. I point out that Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given information from the OKW. If you want to consider this, pleas answer the question now: To your knowledge of things, is what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath such as has been confirmed by others, with the exception of Gisevius, or is it true what Gisevius said?
A. Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in this connection is a general form of speech. Apart from Hitler, there was no powerful man; there was no influential man next to him, and this could not be one.
Q. The witness Gisevius mentioned an exhibit to prove that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler. Since you had a part in this document which is before you, I should like to have this one document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is Document 790-PS. This document does not consist of a set of minutes, but a file notice, as you see. It is the white book which was prepared on the ostensible violations of neutrality of Belgium and Holland. And in this connection, the witness Gisevius said:
"I believe that I should mention two more examples which are of special significance, to my mind. In the first place, all means were used to induce Field Marshal Keitel to warn Hitler against invading Holland and Belgium, and to tell him -- that is, Hitler -- that the information submitted by Keitel about the ostensible violations of neutrality of the Dutch and Belgians was false. The counter-intelligence -- that is, Canaris -- was to prepare these reports which incriminated the Dutch and the Belgians. Admiral Canaris refused to sign these reports. He repeatedly told Keitel that this report that had been prepared by the OKW was false".
"That was the one example when Keitel did not turn over to Hitler what he was supposed to". that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were accused of covering false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report, in Part A, the OKW refused to cover this white book. Is that true?
A. (No response)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you answer it?
THE WITNESS: I understand the question, and I should like to assert this as an effect here briefly and tell how the event really was. report, Field Marshal Keitel then submitted to him the draft of the white "*-*" of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked this book over and listened to the essential remarks which Canaris made at the wish of the Foreign Office that intelligence needed some improvement, that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely necessary, and that, as it says here, a last really "eclatante" violation of neutrality was lacking. the table and said, "I forbid that. How could I take over the responsibility for a political decision?
"In this white book, there are, word for word, the reports which you yourself (Canaris) made to me."
Thereupon, Canaris said, "I am of exactly the same opinion. In my opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are completely sufficient to show the breaches of neutrality which took place in Holland and Belgium". And he advised Field Marshal Keitel against signing it.
That is what took place. The field marshal took the book with him, and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that the imaginary reports of this Gisevius turns everything upside down. All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these people who now asserted that we had signed them falsely.
Q. Did Admiral Canaris play a role in this case? Gisevius said it was not possible that Admiral Canaris could submit an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative. It is reported that Canaris gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel, who did not submit them. I ask you, is that ture?
marshal Keitel, but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything of which one could say, the Fuehrer has to know that. I have already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he could give it to the Fuehrer directly. He had only to go into the office and give it to the Chief Adjutant of the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don't know, why don't you say so. If you don't know whether he gave it to the Fuehrer or not, say so. could not come to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that question.
Q If he wanted to, he had access at any time?
THE PRESIDENT: Now will you tell me what page in the shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: It is the minutes of the meeting as far as Keitel is concerned. It is on Page 8376 to 8385 of the German minutes, the session of 26 April, 1946. BY DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Keitel, which have been submitted to the Court. These are the affidavits Keitel No. 9, High Commander of the Wehrmacht and General Staff; and the affidavit Keitel No. 13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to 1945, and the military competencies. You remember that you signed these affidavits?
Q Can you confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
Q I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the question of rearmament of General Thomas, who was also given as a source of information here, I should like to ask you a few questions. You know that the prosecution submitted an extensive book here, PS 2353 regarding rearmament, from the pen of General Thomas. Since General Thomas was also given by the witness Gisevius here as a source of information, I must question you about Thomas.
In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353, he said that on the 1st of February, 1943, he was released from the OKW. Do you know anything about that? Do you know whether that is true or not? the high commanders of the Wehrmacht. He was at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
Q Did he not have a special assignment?
Q I want to ascertain only that; after the 1st of February, 1943, General Thomas was given assignments by the OKW, especially taking down this work which has been submitted here; is that true? armament I might say.
Q What was his relationship to Field Marshal Keitel? war or at the very beginning of the war, I know it only as a good relationship.
Q Do you know the reports to General Thomas concerning rearmament? rearmament. I can recall reports about the war potential of our enemies.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer, because it is ten minutes past five and if you are not going to conclude tonight we had better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need some time yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946, 1000 hours.)
follows: BY DR. NELTE: said that he constantly made reports on the war potential of enemy powers, to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Where these important reports always submitted to Hitler ? regularly submitted to the Fuehrer and often occasioned a violent dispute, because the Fuehrer considered their presentation of the enemy potential greatly exaggerated. presentations of General Thomas were justified? careful study of enemy armament achievements the statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole completely accurate. been an enemy of the Command and of Hitler. In the course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
A I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was that he objected to this exaggerated optimism of the Fuehrer. But perhaps in hi basic attitude he to took a pessimistic rather than an optimistic turn. economy office? Minister Speer, but Mr. Speer wanted to work with him and requested from the Fuehrer that he should be dismissed from the armament office which Mr. Speer had taken over.
And that was done on the order of the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, how is the evidence about General Thomas relevant to the case of the Defendant in the witness-box or General Keitel? The evidence of Gisevius was relevant to the case of the Defendant Schacht. It seems to me -- and, I think, to the Tribunal -- that this is entirely irrelevant to the case of the Defendant you represent or the case of General Jodl. What does it matter to us whether General Thomas was acting in order to try to overthrow Hitler or not?
DR. NELTE: The questions which concerns the Defendant Keitel is whether Field Marshal Keitel submitted and presented the reports handed in by Thomas. The witness Gisevius said here, referring to Thomas as a source of information, that these reports of Thomas were kept from Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: We went into that yesterday and now the Defendant Jodl has said that the reports of Thomas were submitted to the Fuehrer. But what I was pointing out to you was that the question whether Thomas was making his reports honestly or not is a matter which is entirely irrelevant.
DR. NELTE: Not as to the credibility of the source of information, Gisevius, in my opinion; but I will put this question aside. However, in this connection I must ask one more question with regard to the other source of information, Canaris.
Q Canaris was frequently a guest in the Fuehrer's headquarters and a guest of yours. What was the relationship of Field Marshal Keitel to his oldest office chief? day to the last was an especially friendly and good one. Unfortunately he had too much confidence in him.
of July? Keitel did not believe the charges against Canaris and that after the arrest of Canaris he supported his family with money.
Q What was the relationship of Canaris to Heydrich?
A I mentioned that once before. Canaris always tried to Maintain an especially good relationship with Hitler and Heydrich so that they would not distrust him. Keitel to Hitler's plan in October, 1939, the plan to attack in the West? impressed by the attitude of the Commander in Chief of the Army and the General Staff of the Army and also raised a warning voice against this attack in the West. I know, although I did not experience it personally but somebody told me about it later, I know that during this time he had the controversy with the Fuehrer whi led to a request for his resignation. This is what Schmundt told no; I did not witness it myself. Field Marshal Keitel did not te me about it personally. those are the so-called directive and special field instructions 21 -- under Roman numeral I-B is the famous paragraph according to which, in the operational area of the Army, the Reichsfuehrer is instructed to prepare a political administration with a special * on behalf of the Fuehrer, resulting from the battle of two oppos* political systems. I am sure you are acquainted with the document
Q I will not hand it to you, and to make the matter br* I will only ask, please tell the Court what Field Marshal Keitel felt about this order, how he acted in regard to it? eignty of the Army and its operational area with Himmler led to days of bitter discussion with the Fuehrer.
The same argument had already taken place when Terboven was appointed in Norway. One need only read my entries in my Diary, PS 1780, to understand why the Fuehrer insisted on this point of view under all circumstances and why he forced the police, under Himmler, into the operational area. It was against all our rules. It was against all previous agreements with the police and with Himmler, but in the last analysis, the Fuehrer put this measure through in spite of resistance. Keitel gave the order to kill General Weygand, the Chief of the General Staff of the French Army. This statement is based, essentially, on testimony of the witness, General Lahousen. I have a few brief questions to you on this matter. Was yield Marshal Keitel competent to order the killing of a general?
A No. Any death sentence had to be confirmed by the Fuehrer. No one is competent to order murder.
Q I ask this because Lahousen's testimony presented it as if this order had been given by yield Marshal Keitel to Admiral Canaris. If we assume that such an order was issued by Hitler, this would have been a highly political act considering the importance of Weygand?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, this is all argument, and you are putting your questions in an entirely leading form. The real objection to it is that it is argumentative. BY DR. NELTE: unknown to you? with the ordering of murder, would not have spoken about it to me.
Q What did you hear about the Weygand case at all?
case. I heard only one thing, when Himmler reported to the Fuehrer in my presence: "I have given Weygand a very nice villa in Baden. He can be satisfied with it." That is the only thing I ever heard discussed in the name of Weygand. Giraud. Do you know anything of this case of Giraud which attrac* ed much attention at the time?
A I heard a little here about the Giraud case. Shortly after the successful flight of Giraud, Field Marshal Keitel told me once in a conversation that he had had Giraud guarded by Canar so that he would not, as the Fuehrer always said, go to North Africa and direct the building up of the Commando Army against us or that he might not go to his family in the occupied territory where he could be arrested. That is what he told me. Several months later he said to me again: "I have now withdrawn this assignment to Canaris because the Fuehrer has given it to Himmler. If two agencies are concerned with it there will only be different. The third time I heard about the Giraud case was when Field Marshal Keitel told me that a deputy of Giraud -- I believe it was about the end of '43 or in the spring of '44 -- a deputy of Giraud approached the counter intelligence and said: "Giraud does not agr with De Gaulle in North Africa. He acquired information that he might not be permitted to return to France." I told Field Marshal Keitel then that the matter had to be looked into immediately, be cause that was extremely favorable for as politically. That is the only thing I ever heard about the Giraud case. Nothing else. Fuehrer's train in September, 1939, at which General Lahousen was present. In this connection you said: "I have no objections to Lahousen's statement." To avoid misunderstandings, I should like you to say whether yon meant by that that all the testimony of Lahousen is credible and correct, referring to Giraud and Weygand or only the part regarding your presence in the Fuehrer's train?
A Of course, I meant only those statements of Lahousen' which be made about me.
As for the other statements which were made here, I have my own opinion, but that doesn't belong here.
Q Yesterday, in answer to a question of Dr. Stahmer, you spoke about the dispute on the occasion of the right RAF flyers who escaped. In regard to this question, which the prosecution charged against Field Marshal Keitel, I should like to know the following: Did you hear that Field Marshal Keitel objected violently to the recaptured RAF flyers being turned over to Himmler, that is, to the Gestapo? utes, I heard the Fuehrer say: "That is terrible. That is the tenth time that dozens of the captured officers have broken out. These officers are an enormous danger. You don't realize that." meaning Keitel -- "In view of the six million foreign people in prisoners and workers in Germany, they are the leaders who could organize an uprising. Due to this careless attitude of the Commanders, these flyers who have broken out are to be turned over to Himmler immediately." And then I heard Field Marshal Keitel answer: "My Fuehrer, part of them have already been brought back to the camp. They are prisoners of war. I cannot send then over And the Fuehrer said: When they can stay there. That is what I heard with my own ears at that moment, until my telephone call called me away again.
Q Afterwards did you speak again with Field Marshal Keitel about this incident?
A We drove back to Berchtesgaden together from the Berghof. Field Marshal Keitel was beside himself. On the way up he had told me that he would not report the escape of these fliers to the Fuehrer. He hoped that on the next day he would have them all back. He was furious at Himmler, who had immediately reported it to the Fuehrer. I told him that if the Fuehrer, in view of the total situation in Germany, saw such a great danger in the escape of foreign officers, then England should be so notified so that the order might be made for officers not to attempt to escape. of these recaptured fliers being shot. They had done nothing except escape from a camp. German officers had also done that dozens of times. I imagined that he wanted to remove them from the disciplinary action of the army, which in his opinion would be too lenient, and wanted to have them work in a concentration camp for Himmler for a time as punishment. That is what I imagined.
Q- In any case, in your presence, in your hearing, Hitler's orders to Himmler to sheet these officers were not issued? I was when I suddenly received thenews that that they had been shot.
Q Now I should like to ask a few brief concluding questions. The Tribunal asked the defendant Keitel on the witness stand whether he had submitted written applications asking for his resignation. You were presents. What can you tell the Court about Keitel's efforts to resign from his position? 1940, probably, because of the Western campaign. Schmundt told me about it, but I did not see it myself. ember, when there was an enormous controversy between the Fuehrer and Field Marshal Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, we do not want the details. I mean, if he can tell us when Keitel attempted to resign -
THE WITNESS: This second case was in the fall of 1941; after the controversy Field Marshal Keitel wrote his request for his resignation. When I entered the room, his pistol lay before him on his desk, and I personally took it away from him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, I have told you that the Tribunal does not want the details, and now we are being told about the details of the resignation, about the way in which it was made.
DR. NELTE: Can it be of no importance to the Court to know how serious the defendant Keitel was? As it is, he wanted to use his pistol.
THE PRESIDENT: He is going into details about some desk on which the document wasput, or something of that sort. He made his efforts to resign in writing. That is of importance. BY DR. NELTE: in his resignation in writing? in your testimony, how did it happen that Keitel always remained? any circumstances. I believe that various attempts were made in this direct from other sources, too, but the Fuehrer did not let him go. were engaged in a war for existence, in which an officer in thelast analysis, could not stay at home and knit stockings. It was the sense of duty that exerted itself and caused us to bear all the hardships. for the sake of loyalty and that duty can only go to the point where it does not injure human dignity. Have you ever thought of that?
THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is not a question for Counsel to put. That is an argument, is it not? It is argument, not evidence. It is not the sort of question to put.
DR. NELTE: I have finished.
BY DR. THOMA (Counsel for defendant Rosenberg):
gave you and General Zeitzler a draft of a proclamation to the peoples of Eastern Europe?
A That is true. It was after the situation discussion. Rosenberg was present in the headquarters. Ho asked me and Zeitzler to step into the next room for a moment. He said he wanted to report to the Fuehrer a proclamation to the Eastern peoples, and that he would like to read it to us first. I recall that.
Q Do you still recall the contents? these Eastern states. It was an outspoken attempt through a policy of reconciliation to avoid unrest and antagonism to the German system. doubts whether it was not already too late.
Q That was the success of this memorandum? often did, pigeonholed the matter; that is, he did not reject it, but he said, "Put that aside."
Q Did you have the impressions that Rosenberg's suggestions arose from concern about the danger caused by Koch's methods? by Himmler and Koch.
DR. THOMA: I have no more questions. BY DR. HAENSEL (Counsel for the SS): under your supervision? generally treated exactly like the divisions of the army. lection? Please mention the number of Wehrmacht divisions so that one will have a means of comparison.
The number increased to the end of the war to an estimated 35 to 37 divisions, as against a number of army divisions which varied, but which one can give approximately as about 280, 290, 300.
Q In the set up of new divisions, what was the procedure? Who decided whether sue* *w division would be a Waffen SS division or a Wehrmacht division. he said, after consulting Himmler, that so-and-so many divisions were to be set up, and so-and-so many Waffen SS divisions. He determined the number.
Q Was there a certain standard, or was that done arbitrarily? Fuehrer wanted to go as far as he could.
Q And when you say "could", what limitations do you see--in the methods, in the recruits, or where?
A The limitation was in the "act that the soldiers of those Waffen SS divisions were to be volunteers, and the time came very soon when Himmler had to report, "I do not get replacements for thedivisions", and from this time on, the condition arose that when the men came for military duty, the cream of them were taken by the SS, and these people, even if they were the sons of Catholic peasants, were drafted into the SS. I myself received bitter letters from farmers wives about this.
was the political viewpoint observed? Was a recruit first questioned politically before he was turned over to the Waffen SS, or was no consideration taker of this? promised to become a good soldier. That was the decisive thing. was given to whether the men belonged to the SA or not. Is the same thing true of membership in the General SS? Was no consideration given to whether the recruit belonged to the General SS, either in drafting, in training, or in promotion?
A Not to the sane extent as in the case of the SA. I believe that the majority of the men in the General SS came to the Waffen SS and volunteered But I know that very many did not do that and were drafted in the normal way by the Army, so that they were treated in the Army just like any other German citizen. General SS who served in the army on the one hand, and on the other hand there were many many who neither belonged to the Party nor the SS, but served in the Waffen SS. second half of the war, yes.
Q when in the second half of the war there were the greater number? campaign of 1941.
Q How strong was the Waffen SS at the end of the war? this number?
Q And do you have any figures in mind about that?