THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphasing the evidence in a way that is inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That is not what the witness said. BY DR. EXNER: decree is based were known to you, whether they had been reported to you.
A I believe that the High Tribunal has document PS-498. The first thing that is mentioned by the fuehrer in that document is that is is saying generally, for quite some time cur opponents in their conduct of war have used methods which are beyond the international Geneva Agreements, and I had to see that the reports which we had regrettably been receiving since the summer of 1941 were true.
I do not wish to refer to these cases in detail. There was a rather fantastic incident of a British U-boat. There was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war were not to have any water before they were interrogated.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in respect of, namely, the shackling, and you are now referring to other thing which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which happened long before.
THE WITNESS: Then I shall not deal with this matter any longer, but I feel that I have to prove that in general the reasons given by the Fuehrer for this order not only sprang from a diseased imagination, but that he had actual proof and real proof and we did as well, for there is a decisive difference whether I, in my own mind, saw certain justifications for this order and had to concede this or whether I considered this entire order an open scandal, and that is a point that is very important for my own behavior, but I shall try to be very brief. People who had been punished repeatedly as criminals were active as commandos, and to prove this, testimony of prisoners is available, and that prisoners had been shackled, and we had captured reports -THE PRESIDENT:
You have told us that already. We have heard that more than once--that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled and that you had the Canadian orders before you. BY DR. EXNER: any captured order, according to which it was decreed to kill German prisoners of war. This was one of the reasons contained in the Fuehrer decree, the killing of prisoners, but I should like to explain that the English Ministry of War had advised us--I can not recall exactly whether it was via Geneva or via th radio--that it might very well be that cases would arise in which prisoners of war would have to be killed--no, rather, in which prisonersof war would have to be shackled, for otherwise one would be forced to kill them instead. Then, if in conclusion, the Fuehrer says that, we have found orders that prisoners as a basic principle are to be killed through commandos, then, in my opinion, he was referring to the English close combat regulations, in which shcklings were prescribed which had to bring about death.
order? ing this decree distributed. of these orders, although I don't know which of them. That is not correct, is it? secret.
Q We'll deal with that right away. Could you hove refused to transmit this order? I would have been arrested immediately, and in this case I must say it would have been justified. But I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its entirety or in part, was actually against the law, and I still don't know that today. I am convinced that if one were to call together a council of international law experts here, probably each one of them would have a different opinion on the subject.
Could you have node counter-proposals? was a time of conflict with the Fuehrer, it wasn't even possible for no to speak with the Fuehrer personally. To broach the subject during the general situation report was quite impossible. Therefore, in carrying out this order, I intended to follow a very generous practice, and I was certain that the commanders in chief, as well, would do the same.
Q And what do you mean by a generous practice? Could this order have been interpreted in different ways?
A Yes. The order really put down two methods. In order to avoid the treating of really decent soldiers as criminals, this was done: If a commando operation at night was not mowed down, but captured -- as was the rule in almost all cases -- it was almost certain proof that they did not consider those fighters as bandits, and the commanders in chief had to investigate that matter and check it.
If it was a purely reconnaissance operation, then the entire action did not fall under the concept of the commando order and did not have to be reported as a commando action. However, is it was an actual sabotage and destruction group which was operating then it had to be checked as to how it was equipped; whether they were wearing civilian clothing underneath their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armhole guns so that when they started to surrender, by lifting their arms the pistols would automatically go off; or whether during the fighting, they used treacherous methods. The commanders in chief could act in accordance with the outcome of this investigation. possible -- and I must say this took place in the bulk of cases -that the shooting of brave soldiers was avoided. followed by the troops? When it was reported to me that a troop like that had been captured -- and according to the Fuehrer Decree they shouldn't have been cap tured -- then I did not object at all, and I did not ask any questions. I did not report to the Fuehrer commando enterprises or operations if they did not have any great success in sabotage. of Percara which Field Marshal Kesselring pictured to the court, I dissuaded some people from rather drastic treatment, and succeeded in persuading the Fuehrer that it was actually only a reconnaissance unit. operations?
A Commando operations were really reduced. They were announced in the Wehrmacht Report; they were reduced considerably. I believe that there were no more than eight or ten cases in all.
now I am dealing with the months of July and August of the year 1944 -- increasingly large numbers were reported as to terrorists who had been killed. Those are not commando groups that are mean but rather they are those who fell during the combatting of those who revolted in France. That fact is proved if the Tribunal will turn to Document USA-551, Figure $. There you will find the evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is page 70 of Book 7.
THE WITNESS: Or page 117 of our document, Volume 2. There it is shown just what was decreed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to deal with another document no and discuss it with the witness, Document PS-532.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
Q With reference to the subject "commando order" I want to mention Document PS 532, RF 368, which is in our Document Book 2 on page 113.
This document has already once been offered. It was the occasion for an objection on my part because the document isn't signed, or rather because it has been crossed off, would you say. Will you explain to us please why this draft creer was crossed out by you? this draft order. Now after the invasion that Commando order should have been rescinded or was to have been rescinded altogether. I agreed to that proposal, which meant the rescinding of that order. Referring to the immediate area slightly farther than that from the beach-head, there were daily landings by parachutists, at that time."
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was that document rejected? You told us you objected to the document, but I am asking you what did the Tribunal do upon your objection, did they maintain it or deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, but the document was struck off. I don't think I am wrong. I had not applied at that time to have the document struck off. I merely objected to the fact that it wasn't mentioned that the document had been crossed out, and that it had been turned down with the hand written note of Jodl on the margin which you can see.
THE PRESIDENT: Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not and either it has an exhibit number or it has not, and as I understand your objection was allowed.
MR. ROBERTS: It was objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French exhibit RS 368, and after discussion it was then stricken from the record, the English short hand note reference being page 3631. My Lord, I think in fact both the prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl's writing upon it, and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to it's admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross examine him about it, and I haven't the slightest objection to my friend, Dr. Exner, putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It may, therefore, be left in as RS 368. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Will you please continue? all of this commando order should be dropped. For that reason I wrote inside the statement under Figure 4: "The enemy should not be treated as manners of the Commando", and I crossed out the entire first page. That, however, didn't help because still on that same day the Fuehrer on the basis of that appl ication from the Supreme Commander made a different decision and opinion of what he desired, and that is contained in Document 551 PS, USA 551, that is contained in the second volume on page 115, an order regarding the treatment of commando personnel. written remark of yours saying that similar action should be taken in the Italian theatre of war? This is on page 117. Please, will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for this remark?
A That can be briefly explained. There were certain territorial limits contained in that order, regarding the use of that commando order. It means that the order was illegally carried out wherever there were enemy actions behind the lines of the corps, but not in the fighting territory of the beachheads. Those were territorial limits which had not yet been established and which had not yet been ordered. I immediately included in it the Italian Theatre of War, because there was a fighting front on the land as well. If this order was used in practice in Italy then it meant that no commando action which surrounded a landing on the coast could be regarded as a commando operation because all of these landings took place before the corps operations. It was very desirable, in my opinion, therefore, to have the same conditions applied to the Italian Theatre of War.
Q I just want to read one paragraph on page 116. It is the second paragraph under No. 1. You see it says in the first paragraph it says that the enemy soldiers in uniform are to be excepted if they are in the enemy beach head, that is to say, and this is important, this means when they are in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line, as well as invasion troops up to and including General Commands.
With reference to paragraph 4 of the basic order, the word "corps command" means just "corps command". It hasn't been rightly translated into English and the French. This limiting of the order to certain territories in accordance with Jodl's remark was meant also to be applicable to the Italian Theatre. At the end with reference to -
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: The word "General Kommando", general command, has been translated into the French "Region Militaire."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: In the English it says "Corps Command" and that is correct, "Corps Command", which is the same as General Kommando.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, theTribunal would prefer that you should not draw attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mis-translation. Rather than stating it is a matter of mis-translation I call it a question of opinion as to whether it is a mis-translation or not. It isn't for you to tell us it is a mis-translation. You may draw our attention to it. But now will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551, it appears to be signed by, initialled by Warlimont. In the other variation of the translation it appears to be signed by the defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I also say that I think theCourt should get the original from the Exhibit Room? No. 551 in fact, consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil, and the senond is a draft initialed "A". That is Warlimont with Jodl's at the end, and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl's alteration to include Italy is also incomplete. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with themimeographed signature of Keitel.
So there are three documents, and the last is a mimeograph, with a mimeographed signature attached.
That appears from the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. The prosecution has been asserting that you had issued an order ordered to be kept absolutely secret and that you had ordered that it was only to be distributed down to the level of commanding officers so that it should not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands. You ordered that for the second order also, didn't you, giving reasons? Please will you tell me now why you ordered that order to be kept so very secret?
A. This secrecy order refers in fact only to the document 503.
Q. That, I want to add, is in the second volume of my document book on page 102. That is the order regarding the keeping secret, signed by Jodl. Please, will you continue now.
A. A particular secrecy for that order was quite inevitable because first of all it was only at best to commanders. Secondly, that order contained in great detail the considerable damage the armed forces, Wehrmacht forces, had suffered through those commando operations, and the damage which might under certain circumstances still be done. If that order were to fall into enemy hands, then he would form almost a temptation to continue and increase that particular type of warfare. And, thirdly, the order 498-PS could be considered as a permissable reprisal, permissive under international law; but the last sentence in the document PS-503, a Sentence from which one can easily recognize that it was added later, since the order had previously been completed, that sentence I have to say disgusted me. It was one of the reasons why I ordered that particularly great secrecy be attached to this particular order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
THE WITNESS: I refer to the last sentence of the document PS-503, which says if it should tuen out to be suitable that for reasons of interrogation one or two men should be saved or spared at the beginning, then they ought to be shot immediately after they have been interrogated.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, that is not in 503, is it?
DR. EXNER: 503.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't printed the whole of 503 in your docu-
ment book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, I haven't got 503, it is only the secrecy order of 502, but I ask particularly that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.
THE WITNESS: May I perhaps add that that sentence was altogether the source of all the trouble. The troops used that sentence not to shoot commando troops, as a rule to take them prisoners. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. You said this last sentence disgusted you. Were you quite clearly occupying the view that it was against international law?
A. One could have certain doubts about that too, but it disgusted me from the human point of view because if you do shoot a man, then I considered it indecent to first of all squeeze him out for information.
Q. I want to come to that with one more question before we adjourn. You said that you haven't always reported everything to the Fuehrer, you haven't reported all commandos. That means that you haven't reported such matters as you had about the enemy, killing, and such. What did you mean by that?
A. The violations of international law which we thought had taken place, the shackling of German prisoners I reported to him, but one thing I did not report was the shackling of some of the men belonging to the organization TODT in such a manner that they have settled themselves. That was something I did not report, and did not appear in any order or Armed Forces bulletin.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again, I don't know.
DR. EXNER: It didn't appear to be to be quite clear. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. We shall not pass ont to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. Tell me, Hitler's order regarding Leningrad and Moscow, how aid that came about? It is C.123, second volume, page 145 of my document book, volume 2, my 145. It was submitted under the number USSR 114. It is the order that capitulation was not to be accepted. Will you tell me how it came about?
A. At the beginning of the second paragraph the Tribunal will find the sentence that the moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world. I shall now explain: The primary cause was a report from General conLeeb, the Supremem Commander of the Army Troop North, stationed before Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to press against his positions south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep those millions of the Leningrad population supplied with food if they were in any way to fall into his hands, because they supply situation at that time and the supplies for that Army group, were in a catastrophic condition. That, as I said, was the primary cause. But then shortly before Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when there was one tremendous detonation after another. The major part of the inner town burned down. 50,000 people were without homes. German soldiers were being used to fight the flames, which brought us considerable losses, because during that fire, further tremendous amounts of detonating material went up. The local commander of Kiev was first of all under the impression that this was sabotage by the population, and, too, we found a detonating chart, and this chart contained about 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had been prepared to be blown up for some considerable time and which, as the investigation by engineers proved at once, was in fact correct. At least 40 more objectives were prepared to be blown up and the detonations were to be set off from outside by means of short waves. This original detonation chart came into my hands and that proved -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. He might briefly state in substance what he says happened at Kiev, but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to claim that the same thing that happened in Kiev was feared for Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that, but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad it would be a different matter and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.
BY DR. EXNER:
some things contained in the Document AJ 15, which is on Page 149 of the second volume of my document book, and which is a report regarding the detonation in Kiev. But let us not go into it in any more detail. I just want to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal. that what had happened in Karkov and Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive factor. He had given this order in writing, which was given orally to the armed forces commanders, and his conviction was strengthened by the fact that the Russian radio had already informed that Leningrad had been encircled and would be defended to the last man. troops against such catastrophes as had occurred when entire staffs had been blown up in Karkov and Kiev. The Fuehrer issued that order, which, in turn, by his express request, was laid down by me in writing. That is the reason why the order began with the words, "The Fuehrer has again decided." It means "once more", "for the second time." there should be gaps in the east.
A We did not want those masses of population. We had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary in the summer to use the entire relief grain in Bavaria, which could, supply 10,000 people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because first of all the railways had been destroyed. The rails had not yet been adjusted to our gauge. Supplies were very difficult to get up, and it was, in fact, impossible to assist in any way these millions of people. There would, in fact, have been a real catastrophe. Therefore, there came the thought to press them out of towns eastward into the Russian areas, a thought which was, incidentally, contrary to the theory which is being mentioned here, that we wanted to exterminate the Jews.
Q I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor, has accused you that, in the Document U.K. 56, which is R.F. 1438, contained in my document book, the second volume, on Page 153, you had ordered the deportation of Jews, and that you, as chief of the military staff, had given a political order here.
Will you please explain how this order came about?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said -- at least, I took it down -- page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155; I beg your pardon, Mr. President. It is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Please, defendant, will you reply? of Jews from Denmark was mentioned during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer approved and ordered it. I was informed thereof either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel. military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The address and heading of this teleprint message shows that it was addressed to two departments, the foreign office and the commander of the German troops in Denmark. They are the departments which, shall we say, received it, in the main. It was only as a matter of information that the Reichsfuehrer SS received the letter; that is to say that in accordance with our office custom, he would not have to do anything upon it. This did not mean an order to him; it meant merely information to him, because he knew the Fuehrer's decision already.
But I did not by any means order the deportation of the Jews. I wrote that the deportation of Jews is being carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q That is Point 2?
A Point 2. Had this been in order, then it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS, and it would have had to be worded like this:
"Reichsfuehrer SS will deport Jews from Denmark."
But this is exactly the other way around. This figure 2 is informing General von Hannecken in Denmark that he will have nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsfuehrer SS. General von Hannecken would know that, because there was a military regime. He had executive powers for Denmark, and if something like that had been done without his knowledge, then he might have objected to it at once and not tolerated it.
I informed the military commander in Denmark quite openly over the telephone, without any consideration for the necessary secrecy. which made it possible for most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden, then it is presumably due to that telephone call that this was possible. deportation of Jews. I merely informed the military commander in question that he had nothing to do with this. Apart from that,as I heard afterwards, when I made inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt. They were looked after and cared for by the Red Cross; and the Danish ambassador even declared himself satisfied with their treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to one point which I consider to be an insufficient translation into English and French. Under Point 1 on Page 136 of the second volume of my document book, it does not mention the word "volunteers" in the translation. It says, "The Reichsfuehrer SS has permiss to recruit from the former members of the Danish forces volunteers." And the word "volunteers" is not in the English translation. In the French, it merely says "homes", "men." BY DR. EXNER: occupied territories. That, If I understand you correctly, was outside your jurisdiction. Why did you sign this order?
AActually, that matter did not concern me at all. But I signed it because on that day, Field Marshal Keitel was absent. about the extermination of Jews? And I remind you in that connection that you are under oath.
A I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable can be true and the probable untrue.
I can only say, being fully conscious of my responsibility that never, and with no hint, word, or document, did I ever hear of the extermination of the Jews. On one single occasion I became distrustful, and that was when Himmler was taling about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight, but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the shelters which had been built there, the emplacements, and he said: "It is not only the Jews though; there are Nationalists. They entrenched themselves there and there is bitter resistance." And with that he settled my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
THE WITNESS: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler in the presence of our soldiers and the Fuehrer and during which he never talked about anything but an uprising and bitter fighting. As far as the action of the police is concerned, the so-called action groups, Einsatzgroppen--a conception, incidentally, which I only heard of in this court room -- as I said, as far as these police units are concerned, there has never been any other explanation through the Fuehrer than that they were supposed to be necessary to combat uprisings, rebellions, partisan fights, and stop them before they could grow, something which it was said the Armed Forces could not do and which was supposed to be a task for the police. That, it was said, was the reason why the police would have to enter Army operational areas. I have neverhad any private information regarding the extermination of the Jews, and as I am sitting here, I can swear that I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to point out to you that you can't speak about there having been no explanation to the Fuehrer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Fuehrer.
THE INTERPRETER: From the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Fuehrer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord
THE WITNESS: I said that the Fuehrer had never given us any other reasons for the use of police forces than by saying that there was the necessity for police measures to be introduced.
THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation. Thank you. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Did you know anything about concentration camps, how many? Please be brief. at Dachau and Oranienburg. Oranienburg I knew of in 1837 because officers from a certain department visited it and they gave me enthusiastic reports about it. The name "Buchenwald" I heard for the first time in the spring of 1945. I thought it was a new troop training site when the word was used and I made inquiries. As far as the inmates were concerned, there was never any other story than that German professional criminals and certain political sworn enemies were there, who, like Schuschnigg or Niemoeller, were held under sort of honorary detention there. Never has there been a single word about tortures of important persons who were there or prisoners of war, of crematoriums, gas masks, of tortures not unlike the time of the inquisition, of medical experiments; and I can only say that even if I had heard it, I wouldn't have believed it until I had seen it with my own eyes. General of the Police, Pancke, which he read. According to that, during a conference on the 30th of December, '44, you are supposed, to have been present together with Hitler, and , during that conference terror and counter terror in Denmark is supposed to have been discussed as well as reprisal measures. What do you have to say about that?
A I think it was on the 30th of December, 1943. In some points that statement is correct and in others it is incorrect. During that conference, at least so long as I was present, the word "murder" was never mentioned at all. The Fuehrer explained that the terror which was now beginning, sabotage and attacks in Norway, that this terror was to be met with exactly the same weapons. That is to say, if a Danish firm working for Germany is blown up, which of course did happen, then a firm will, also be blown up which is working for the Danes only, and if certain individual bases of ours are attacked by a terrorist group, which, of course, also happened, then these terrorists will be sought and they, too, will be surrounded, and they, to , will be killed during battle; that he did not wish to have court martials, which would only create martyrs.
With no word, however, did he speak of innocent Danes being murdered as compensation. That is all I can say, namely, that in my presence and in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel only that was said and nothing else. Again, it is most doubtful, from the point of view of international law, whether a fighting force might not be entitled to meet the fighting methods of their opponents by adopting the same methods when they fight against them, particularly during these rebellions and Franc-Tireur fights. That seems to be most doubtful.
Q You just said "in your presence". Wereyou not there during the entire conference? Can you remember? absent. I was there for a short time, probably fifteen minutes.
Q We now come to the bandit fights. Bandits have been mentioned a great deal in this court toom. Tell us briefly, whowere these bandits? which was used during this world War, but there are five gruides which must exist in that connection. Firstly, they must be a fighting group which is forming behind their own front; secondly, they must only be partly or not at all wearing uniforms; thirdly, they are not members, initially, of the Armed Forces even if they receive their orders from there; fourthly, they must be in a position, or, generally speaking, are in a position to hide among the population -
THE PRESIDENT: We don't require a lecture about this matter. BY DR. EXNER: now want to hear about the fight against bandits. First of all, I shall read what we have here about bandits, and that is Document L 180, USA. 276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book on Page 121. That is a report from an action group against bandits, and it is Enclosure No. 9;
something which is to be found on Page 122 appears to me to be relevant and of importance.
First of all, I refer to point 5, Roman numeral I, point 5, I quote: "In the larger cities, especially those with industrial facilities, so-called Istribitjelni-Battalions (ie destruction battalion) were formed by the Soviets before theentry of the German troops." It then states, after Roman numeral III: "The tasks and fighting methods of the various Partisan groups has become known partly from the experiences in combatting them and partly from the captured combat directives of the Partisans themselves. The statement of a captured Partisan of a battalion s tationed at Leningrad is significant: ' A Partisan must destroy everything that he can reach.'" And then in one of the "Combat Directives for Partisan Groups," transmitted to the Commander of the Army Area North (Rear), it is stated that "unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his accomplices in territories occupied by the enemy.
All measures of the enemy are to be prevented." camouflage themselves cleverly, that they are to be disguised as farmers and to work in the field as soon as German military personnel are approaching. bandits had been carried out and that chaotic conditions -- by which he meant it wasn't directed from above -- existed, and you obviously must be informed about that, is that trye?
A. No, it is not. This expert on bandit fighting apparently has a very poor memory. I draw your attention to the document, F-665, in document Book 2, on page 126. This shows the first page of fighting instructions against bandits. It is called Pamphlet for Bandit Fighting. will find that it says in its second sentence -
Q. On page 126 -
A. -- that the pamphlet No. so and so, in brackets, directives for conducting the battle against guerillas in the East, is issued by the OKW, Command Staff, and that it is dated the 11th of November, 1942, which by this order is cancelled. This proves that at least since the 11th of November, 1942, the troops had in their possession instructions issued by the Army Command Staff as to just how the battle against gorillas was to be conducted.
Q. I want to draw your attention in this connection to my document, AJ-1, on page 133. It is an affidavit from a certain Wettberg, which I won't read. He reported to me that he himself was engaged in the fights against bandits and he is confirming that there was perfectly well-regulated fighting against bandits after 1942. But then this new pamphlet appeared in 1944, done by you without Hitler's permission?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the cause of that? It was quite unusual, wasn't it?
A. I want to state that this pamphlet was not submitted by me to Field Marshal Keitel, nor to the Fuehrer, because this pamphlet is in contradiction of all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later on that it deals, beginning at that date, with all so-called guerillas in France and in Yugoslavia. Russian guerillas territories were dealt with elsewhere. And it deals with these guerillas as regular fighting troops, and, following that, as prisoners of war. previous shooting of the English RAF officers at Sagan that beginning with that time the Fuehrer no longer was concerned with the humane, legal aspects of warfare, and because since the 1st of May, 1944, I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, because the department of Canaris had been dissolved on the 1st of May. The foreign department, together with the international law department, had come under my orders on the 1st of May, and I was resolved not to tolerate any such violations of international law on our part or allow it, and beginning with that dry up to the end of the war I did so. clothes, were declared by me to be regular troops or regular prisoners of war, long before Eisenhower had demanded that terrorists in France be placed in that category, because that didn't happen until the 7th of July, 1944.
Q. I has been stated by the Prosecution that the fight against guerillas had been only camouflage to destroy Slave and Jews, is that true?
A. The bandit fight was an unbelievable reality. Only to quote a figure, I want to point out to you that in June, 1943, 1560 acts of railway sabotage took place. There were 2,600 in September. That is 90 per day. There was a book by Polomarenko, about which an American paper said that 500,000 Germans had been killed through these gorillas. If you cross off a zero from that figure, it is still quite an achievement for a peaceful Soviet population. But then it si supposed to state in that book that the population was becoming increasingly hostile and that murder and terror were increasing, and that the peaceful Quisling mayors -- burgomeisters -- were being killed. At any rate, it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in the East -