A. At the beginning of the second paragraph the Tribunal will find the sentence that the moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world. I shall now explain: The primary cause was a report from General conLeeb, the Supremem Commander of the Army Troop North, stationed before Leningrad. He reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to press against his positions south and west. He pointed out that it would be absolutely impossible for him to keep those millions of the Leningrad population supplied with food if they were in any way to fall into his hands, because they supply situation at that time and the supplies for that Army group, were in a catastrophic condition. That, as I said, was the primary cause. But then shortly before Kiev had been abandoned by the Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when there was one tremendous detonation after another. The major part of the inner town burned down. 50,000 people were without homes. German soldiers were being used to fight the flames, which brought us considerable losses, because during that fire, further tremendous amounts of detonating material went up. The local commander of Kiev was first of all under the impression that this was sabotage by the population, and, too, we found a detonating chart, and this chart contained about 50 or 60 objectives in Kiev which had been prepared to be blown up for some considerable time and which, as the investigation by engineers proved at once, was in fact correct. At least 40 more objectives were prepared to be blown up and the detonations were to be set off from outside by means of short waves. This original detonation chart came into my hands and that proved -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think we need go into the details of Kiev. This deals with Leningrad. He might briefly state in substance what he says happened at Kiev, but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to claim that the same thing that happened in Kiev was feared for Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: We understand that, but if he said that he had plans of the blowing up of Leningrad it would be a different matter and he could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go into the details about Kiev.
BY DR. EXNER:
some things contained in the Document AJ 15, which is on Page 149 of the second volume of my document book, and which is a report regarding the detonation in Kiev. But let us not go into it in any more detail. I just want to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal. that what had happened in Karkov and Odessa would happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive factor. He had given this order in writing, which was given orally to the armed forces commanders, and his conviction was strengthened by the fact that the Russian radio had already informed that Leningrad had been encircled and would be defended to the last man. troops against such catastrophes as had occurred when entire staffs had been blown up in Karkov and Kiev. The Fuehrer issued that order, which, in turn, by his express request, was laid down by me in writing. That is the reason why the order began with the words, "The Fuehrer has again decided." It means "once more", "for the second time." there should be gaps in the east.
A We did not want those masses of population. We had our experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary in the summer to use the entire relief grain in Bavaria, which could, supply 10,000 people, to save the population from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible, because first of all the railways had been destroyed. The rails had not yet been adjusted to our gauge. Supplies were very difficult to get up, and it was, in fact, impossible to assist in any way these millions of people. There would, in fact, have been a real catastrophe. Therefore, there came the thought to press them out of towns eastward into the Russian areas, a thought which was, incidentally, contrary to the theory which is being mentioned here, that we wanted to exterminate the Jews.
Q I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor, has accused you that, in the Document U.K. 56, which is R.F. 1438, contained in my document book, the second volume, on Page 153, you had ordered the deportation of Jews, and that you, as chief of the military staff, had given a political order here.
Will you please explain how this order came about?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You said -- at least, I took it down -- page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155; I beg your pardon, Mr. President. It is on Page 155 of the second volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Please, defendant, will you reply? of Jews from Denmark was mentioned during a conference at which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Fuehrer, and the Fuehrer approved and ordered it. I was informed thereof either through General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel. military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The address and heading of this teleprint message shows that it was addressed to two departments, the foreign office and the commander of the German troops in Denmark. They are the departments which, shall we say, received it, in the main. It was only as a matter of information that the Reichsfuehrer SS received the letter; that is to say that in accordance with our office custom, he would not have to do anything upon it. This did not mean an order to him; it meant merely information to him, because he knew the Fuehrer's decision already.
But I did not by any means order the deportation of the Jews. I wrote that the deportation of Jews is being carried out by the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q That is Point 2?
A Point 2. Had this been in order, then it would have had to be addressed to the Reichsfuehrer SS, and it would have had to be worded like this:
"Reichsfuehrer SS will deport Jews from Denmark."
But this is exactly the other way around. This figure 2 is informing General von Hannecken in Denmark that he will have nothing to do with this affair, but that it is being handled by the Reichsfuehrer SS. General von Hannecken would know that, because there was a military regime. He had executive powers for Denmark, and if something like that had been done without his knowledge, then he might have objected to it at once and not tolerated it.
I informed the military commander in Denmark quite openly over the telephone, without any consideration for the necessary secrecy. which made it possible for most Jews to escape from Denmark into Sweden, then it is presumably due to that telephone call that this was possible. deportation of Jews. I merely informed the military commander in question that he had nothing to do with this. Apart from that,as I heard afterwards, when I made inquiries, these Jews were taken to Theresienstadt. They were looked after and cared for by the Red Cross; and the Danish ambassador even declared himself satisfied with their treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to one point which I consider to be an insufficient translation into English and French. Under Point 1 on Page 136 of the second volume of my document book, it does not mention the word "volunteers" in the translation. It says, "The Reichsfuehrer SS has permiss to recruit from the former members of the Danish forces volunteers." And the word "volunteers" is not in the English translation. In the French, it merely says "homes", "men." BY DR. EXNER: occupied territories. That, If I understand you correctly, was outside your jurisdiction. Why did you sign this order?
AActually, that matter did not concern me at all. But I signed it because on that day, Field Marshal Keitel was absent. about the extermination of Jews? And I remind you in that connection that you are under oath.
A I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very often the improbable can be true and the probable untrue.
I can only say, being fully conscious of my responsibility that never, and with no hint, word, or document, did I ever hear of the extermination of the Jews. On one single occasion I became distrustful, and that was when Himmler was taling about the revolt in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight, but Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the shelters which had been built there, the emplacements, and he said: "It is not only the Jews though; there are Nationalists. They entrenched themselves there and there is bitter resistance." And with that he settled my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
THE WITNESS: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I heard through a personal report from Himmler in the presence of our soldiers and the Fuehrer and during which he never talked about anything but an uprising and bitter fighting. As far as the action of the police is concerned, the so-called action groups, Einsatzgroppen--a conception, incidentally, which I only heard of in this court room -- as I said, as far as these police units are concerned, there has never been any other explanation through the Fuehrer than that they were supposed to be necessary to combat uprisings, rebellions, partisan fights, and stop them before they could grow, something which it was said the Armed Forces could not do and which was supposed to be a task for the police. That, it was said, was the reason why the police would have to enter Army operational areas. I have neverhad any private information regarding the extermination of the Jews, and as I am sitting here, I can swear that I heard all these things for the first time after the end of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think it is necessary to point out to you that you can't speak about there having been no explanation to the Fuehrer; you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself. The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had been no explanation to the Fuehrer.
THE INTERPRETER: From the Fuehrer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Fuehrer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord
THE WITNESS: I said that the Fuehrer had never given us any other reasons for the use of police forces than by saying that there was the necessity for police measures to be introduced.
THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation. Thank you. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Did you know anything about concentration camps, how many? Please be brief. at Dachau and Oranienburg. Oranienburg I knew of in 1837 because officers from a certain department visited it and they gave me enthusiastic reports about it. The name "Buchenwald" I heard for the first time in the spring of 1945. I thought it was a new troop training site when the word was used and I made inquiries. As far as the inmates were concerned, there was never any other story than that German professional criminals and certain political sworn enemies were there, who, like Schuschnigg or Niemoeller, were held under sort of honorary detention there. Never has there been a single word about tortures of important persons who were there or prisoners of war, of crematoriums, gas masks, of tortures not unlike the time of the inquisition, of medical experiments; and I can only say that even if I had heard it, I wouldn't have believed it until I had seen it with my own eyes. General of the Police, Pancke, which he read. According to that, during a conference on the 30th of December, '44, you are supposed, to have been present together with Hitler, and , during that conference terror and counter terror in Denmark is supposed to have been discussed as well as reprisal measures. What do you have to say about that?
A I think it was on the 30th of December, 1943. In some points that statement is correct and in others it is incorrect. During that conference, at least so long as I was present, the word "murder" was never mentioned at all. The Fuehrer explained that the terror which was now beginning, sabotage and attacks in Norway, that this terror was to be met with exactly the same weapons. That is to say, if a Danish firm working for Germany is blown up, which of course did happen, then a firm will, also be blown up which is working for the Danes only, and if certain individual bases of ours are attacked by a terrorist group, which, of course, also happened, then these terrorists will be sought and they, too, will be surrounded, and they, to , will be killed during battle; that he did not wish to have court martials, which would only create martyrs.
With no word, however, did he speak of innocent Danes being murdered as compensation. That is all I can say, namely, that in my presence and in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel only that was said and nothing else. Again, it is most doubtful, from the point of view of international law, whether a fighting force might not be entitled to meet the fighting methods of their opponents by adopting the same methods when they fight against them, particularly during these rebellions and Franc-Tireur fights. That seems to be most doubtful.
Q You just said "in your presence". Wereyou not there during the entire conference? Can you remember? absent. I was there for a short time, probably fifteen minutes.
Q We now come to the bandit fights. Bandits have been mentioned a great deal in this court toom. Tell us briefly, whowere these bandits? which was used during this world War, but there are five gruides which must exist in that connection. Firstly, they must be a fighting group which is forming behind their own front; secondly, they must only be partly or not at all wearing uniforms; thirdly, they are not members, initially, of the Armed Forces even if they receive their orders from there; fourthly, they must be in a position, or, generally speaking, are in a position to hide among the population -
THE PRESIDENT: We don't require a lecture about this matter. BY DR. EXNER: now want to hear about the fight against bandits. First of all, I shall read what we have here about bandits, and that is Document L 180, USA. 276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book on Page 121. That is a report from an action group against bandits, and it is Enclosure No. 9;
something which is to be found on Page 122 appears to me to be relevant and of importance.
First of all, I refer to point 5, Roman numeral I, point 5, I quote: "In the larger cities, especially those with industrial facilities, so-called Istribitjelni-Battalions (ie destruction battalion) were formed by the Soviets before theentry of the German troops." It then states, after Roman numeral III: "The tasks and fighting methods of the various Partisan groups has become known partly from the experiences in combatting them and partly from the captured combat directives of the Partisans themselves. The statement of a captured Partisan of a battalion s tationed at Leningrad is significant: ' A Partisan must destroy everything that he can reach.'" And then in one of the "Combat Directives for Partisan Groups," transmitted to the Commander of the Army Area North (Rear), it is stated that "unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his accomplices in territories occupied by the enemy.
All measures of the enemy are to be prevented." camouflage themselves cleverly, that they are to be disguised as farmers and to work in the field as soon as German military personnel are approaching. bandits had been carried out and that chaotic conditions -- by which he meant it wasn't directed from above -- existed, and you obviously must be informed about that, is that trye?
A. No, it is not. This expert on bandit fighting apparently has a very poor memory. I draw your attention to the document, F-665, in document Book 2, on page 126. This shows the first page of fighting instructions against bandits. It is called Pamphlet for Bandit Fighting. will find that it says in its second sentence -
Q. On page 126 -
A. -- that the pamphlet No. so and so, in brackets, directives for conducting the battle against guerillas in the East, is issued by the OKW, Command Staff, and that it is dated the 11th of November, 1942, which by this order is cancelled. This proves that at least since the 11th of November, 1942, the troops had in their possession instructions issued by the Army Command Staff as to just how the battle against gorillas was to be conducted.
Q. I want to draw your attention in this connection to my document, AJ-1, on page 133. It is an affidavit from a certain Wettberg, which I won't read. He reported to me that he himself was engaged in the fights against bandits and he is confirming that there was perfectly well-regulated fighting against bandits after 1942. But then this new pamphlet appeared in 1944, done by you without Hitler's permission?
A. Yes.
Q. What was the cause of that? It was quite unusual, wasn't it?
A. I want to state that this pamphlet was not submitted by me to Field Marshal Keitel, nor to the Fuehrer, because this pamphlet is in contradiction of all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later on that it deals, beginning at that date, with all so-called guerillas in France and in Yugoslavia. Russian guerillas territories were dealt with elsewhere. And it deals with these guerillas as regular fighting troops, and, following that, as prisoners of war. previous shooting of the English RAF officers at Sagan that beginning with that time the Fuehrer no longer was concerned with the humane, legal aspects of warfare, and because since the 1st of May, 1944, I myself felt responsible for questions of international law, because the department of Canaris had been dissolved on the 1st of May. The foreign department, together with the international law department, had come under my orders on the 1st of May, and I was resolved not to tolerate any such violations of international law on our part or allow it, and beginning with that dry up to the end of the war I did so. clothes, were declared by me to be regular troops or regular prisoners of war, long before Eisenhower had demanded that terrorists in France be placed in that category, because that didn't happen until the 7th of July, 1944.
Q. I has been stated by the Prosecution that the fight against guerillas had been only camouflage to destroy Slave and Jews, is that true?
A. The bandit fight was an unbelievable reality. Only to quote a figure, I want to point out to you that in June, 1943, 1560 acts of railway sabotage took place. There were 2,600 in September. That is 90 per day. There was a book by Polomarenko, about which an American paper said that 500,000 Germans had been killed through these gorillas. If you cross off a zero from that figure, it is still quite an achievement for a peaceful Soviet population. But then it si supposed to state in that book that the population was becoming increasingly hostile and that murder and terror were increasing, and that the peaceful Quisling mayors -- burgomeisters -- were being killed. At any rate, it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in the East -
DR. EXNER: In this connection I want to draw the Tribunal's attention to an entry in Jodl's diary, 1807. The date is the 25th of May and it can be found on page 119 of the second volume. There, under the 25th of May, it says that, "General Raider draws the attention of the Fuehrer" -
THE PRESIDENT: The Defendant stated, I think, that in this directive of his on the 6th of May, 1944, there was an order that guerillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to the passage? BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Please, will you state that, Defendant?
A. This appears under figure 163, on page 131, of the Document Book. And if I may read it to you, I quote:
"All bandits captured in enemy uniform or civilian clothing or who surrender during combat are to be treated, on principle, as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons encountered in the immediate fighting area and are to be considered as guerilla accomplices, even when no acts of combat can be proved against them. Bandits in German uniform or in the uniform of an allied armed force are to be shot after careful interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how they are dressed, on principle are to be well treated. The guerillas must learn of this."
THE PRESIDENT: Well, since it is one o'clock, perhaps you might break off now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 1490 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at *00 hours, 4 June 1946.)
Q I have one further question concerning the guerilla regulations. The Prosecution charges that you, through Number 161 of the Guerilla regulations, which concerns itself with the document we submitted and used last, F-665, page 130 of volume 2, were responsible for the Instruction of whole villages and even of the populations of the villages, in France. Will you please comment on this?
A. I believe the opposite is true, through Number 116, I decreased collective measures and collective punishments that the Fuehrer had decreed, so that everything would apply under Article 50 or the Hague Landwarfare Rules. In this article collective punishment is prohibited unless the entire population is equally guild. In these terror measures, therefore, with this Number 161, I did not order the burning down of villages or the destruction of populations, but, on the other hand, I said that such collective measures may only be used in very exceptional cases and then only with the approval ed a division commander. for he was the one who had a Tribunal at his disposal and he could carry through a juridical invest gation.
this regulation, in this document. I discussed the good treatment of the population and to leave them the necessities of life, and I do believe, in any event, of that this document actually is a model example to bring this sort of war into the limits of International Law. I did take this, I was of the conviction that at the period of time the French Maquis movement and revolt had begun to turn into a regular war.
that I caused through 161. I can say only that the behaviour of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its comman or. Only months afterward did I have I am grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement the beginning was nothing else than a Franctireur warfare, whose heroism I do not dispute.
of volume 11 of my document book. sals for the treatment of hostile low flying fliers who had made emergency landings. Can you tell us, first of all, what was the reason for this and what was your position of attitude toward these proposals?
A I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was the reports on the hunting of people by several hostile aircraft. The Fuehrer demanded countermeasures, and in this way the report-notice came into being, 731-PS. RF 1407. It is not a draft for an order and it is not an order. It is only a note. This note contains proposals given by the Luftwaffe in this manner. There was no talk about lynching. The fact that I concerned myself with this problem at all was based on the reason which I have previously mentioned, the problem of responsibility which, since 1 May, I believed I had as far as problems of International Law were concerned. The comment which I made in this matter has already been read. I objected to a figure which I considered inadmissable according to International Law, and this was later crossed out and replaced. soldier landing with a parachute was shot at. This objection I entered, document 735, PS. The concept of lynching -
DR. EXNER: I should like to state where this passage is, for the assistance of the Tribunal. This remark is found on page 144 of my document book, and in this handwritten addition, various proposals are made, and then Jodl adds number 3, and this is his addition. BY DR. EXNER:
A. My notation was: Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Point 3-B; namely, is the shooting of aviators who have been shot down and are parachuting to earth to be considered a terrorist act?
Q. Will you please continue.
A. And I should like to say that the concept of lynching was added by an article by Goebbels, published in the Voelkischer Beobachter. that nothing at all could be done with measures of this kind, for one could never apprehend a guilty low-flying aviator, for he would either escape or he would be dashed to the ground and die. This would only lead to a general murder of aviators. Field Marshal Keitel on this point -- to bring about the failure of this entire action. the 21st of May and Document 735-P3, 16 days had elapsed wherein nothing had been done. If, when on the 6th of June I received a rather length report, I noted on it, "This is not efficient; we have to start all over again. How can we determine that we will not act like this against enemy aviators? Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?" then, My Lord Justices, this is absolute proof that I had not other intention except to stall until the matter had solved itself. And I was successful in doing that in this case. No military office issued an order. We did not even go so far as to have a draft of an order. The only thing we had was the scraps of paper. It has been proved and will be proved further that many months afterwards the Fuehrer made the gravest accusations against us and against the Luftwaffe for our action in regard to the order at the time involved.
Q. Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief of the OKW, in a letter, designated you and Warlimont to collaborate with the Eastern ministry of Rosenberg. That is Document PS-865, USA-143. How did that work out in practice?
A. Not at all. As far as the ministry of Rosenberg was concerned, apart from one conference in the year 1943, I had no connection with Rosenberg's ministry at all.
The only collaboration which went on constantly was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it compiled and which were distributed over Russia had been discussed first with the Eastern Ministry.
Q. Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?
A. That was purely a matter of form, since Minister Dr. Lammers wrote generaly to each higher Reich office, asking that a deputy be designated. Then Field marshal Keitel designated a deputy.
Q. We shall now turn to something new. We have been shown the rather remarkable document C-2, USA-90, which is not contained in my document bock, but I believe in all probability the Court will recall that this is a compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance in international law are cited. In the second column there are examples; in the third and fourth, examples.
MR. ROBERTS: It is page 163 in the big document book.
Q. (Continuing): This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side a certain incident, and on the other side is set down the attitude of international law, Voelkerrecht. That is, the judgement of international law and the propaganda explanation or other reasons in regard to this incident are set forth.
This is really a truly remarkable document. What are the atecedents of it? Twelve infringements of internationa law by our side are set down, and, I believe, 13 infractions of international law by the enemy.
A. I do not believe that this document is so remarkable after all. It come about at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich conference, since I did not know for certain in my division whether we would have an armed conflict or not, and since at that time the stipulations of internation law were not clear to us. I wanted, through a wealth of examples, to have the Voelkerrecht Gruppe, the International Law Staff, tell me what the attitude at that time would be against infractions of international law.
Every office in my division then wracked his brain for examples, and we tried to cover every branch of international law through a specific example.
cerned ourselves with the concept of international law. There can be no doubt whatsoever that I carry responsibility only for the fact that I searched out these examples. But if one were to object to the answers to the problems or examples, as far as the background of war is concerned, I can only say that this doesn't even originate with me; this emanated from the office of Canaris. to international law, specifically concerning air warfare. In any event, it is on a much higher level than that which was carried out in practice.
Q. Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions of international law?
A. Not at all, but as someone who knew the history of war, I knew that never in this world has there been a war which did not produce infractions of international law. Propaganda ministry, which is the paragraph at the end, I should like to point out that the judgements as far as international law were concerned were to be taken into consideration. Admiral Buerckner, who answered of his own initiative, pointed out that propaganda could be used only after the points of international law had been cleared. first the Foreign Office and the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have to be listened to.
DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Buerckner as a witness to answer these questions, but it seems to be a more or less insignificant matter, and I shall therefore forego the calling of this witness. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Now, I should like to put a rather general question in this connection. In general, what was your attitude as to the limitations of the conduct of war by international law?
A. I considered international law as the absolute prerequisite for the decent and moral carrying on of the war, and I know international law very well, and I observed it.
The Hague Land Warfare Regulations and the Geneval Convention were always found on my desk. towards mob justice, and my attitude toward the intention to leave the Geneva Convention, which all commanders in chief and all branches of the Wehrmacht and of the Foreign Office rejected very, very abruptly, I have proven that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international law.
themselves will probably be mentioned by my defense counsel. I should like to point out rather generally and cite the behaviour of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter which I worked out and dealt with myself. I should like to point out the matter of guerilla regulations. Volume I. These are special directives for conduct and personal relationships at the occupation of Norway and Denmark, a directive which was issued in connection with the occupation of these countries. There are some very charateristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I would like to read, If you will please turn to page 98, point I "The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of insuring the neutrality of these countries. At the same time the objective must be to execute the same peacefully Then on page 99, at the top it says:
"Directive for conduct in personal relations with the Norwegian population.
"Every member of the army must be aware that he is not entering enemy country, but the troops are entering Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of its inhabitants.
"Therefore, the following is to be observed:
"I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic people.
"Therefore: avoid anything that might wound national honor."
Point 2 is rather characteristic as well. Then I shall turn to point 4. It is found on the top of page 100.
"The home of the Norwegian is holy according to the Old-Germanic conception. Hospitality is willingly practiced."
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is enough to show the nature of the document, isn't it?
DR. EXNER: Then I should like to point to the remainder of the document which I shall not read, and ask that the High Tribunal take official notice of this document.
THE PRESIDENT: That last document doesn't appear to have been signed by the defendant, does it?
DR. EXNER: It isn't signed by the defendant. BY DR. EXNER:
Q And what is the connection this document has with you, defendant? section of the Wehrmacht Operational Staff, and the staff of von Falkenhorst were a unit and I participated in the drawing up of this document and I submitted it t the Fuehrer and the Fuehrer approved of it, and there is an entry to that effect in my diary.
Q Then AJ-16, which I should like to submit herewith. These are special regulations for the administration of the occupied countries of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. This is page 161, volume 11 of my document book. I shall quote only from page 162 in order to save time. I shall read perhaps the last sentence.
"The International Law is to be strictly observed in every case" them take judicial notice of it. document book 11, page 164. Those are directions. No. 6 is the conduct of war, dated 21 November, 1939. It concerns itself with the tasks of the air force. Perhaps I can read just one paragraph:
"Localities, especially large open cities and industries are not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, either in the Dutchm nor Belgium or Luxembourg areas." Signed Keitel.
Did you also draft that? been discussed here also? that immediately I ordered an investigation of the case Malmedy. the basis of International Law as that applied to my orders. I do not wish to detain the court with the insight I gathered from these regulations. I should like to conclude with that and say that through the fact that there were no regulations in air warfare, this rather deplorable situation arose and confusion in the conception arose, that is, between rebellion and legal war, between Franctireur and informant, between spies and informant, between demolition crews and saboteurs, and many times with the help of air craft a rebellion could be changed or would be changed into a legal war, and a legal war could be reduced to the state of rebellion, and that is the significance in International Law of parachutists and supplies by way of air.
AJ 10. This document has not been submitted to the Court since the Prosecutor declared yesterday he would agree to the use of this affidavit. I believe it originates with Colonel General Dr. Lehmann. If the High Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissable I perhaps can refer to it, be would like to submit it, although it has not been translated as yet, since we only received permission yesterday, or yesterday the granting took place in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: we said yesterday we had no objection to the affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of Lehmann, My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then in order to save time, I shall just cite passages or refer to it and ask that the High Tribunal take judicial notice and read the testimony of Dr. Lehmann. It seemed to be significant to me, and in any event he was the highest jurist in the German Wehrmacht General Staff.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number 1 gave it, Your Honor: BY DR. EXNER: occasion to carry on with Jodl and he gave us Jodl's attitude toward legal questions, and now, Colonel General, in connection with the legal war crimes, there is one last question which comes to out attention. Frequent orders in the war diary entries arecharged against you. Did you have occasion or opportunity before you were captured to destroy this material? every piece of paper, but I had given instructions to my staff not to destroy a single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal, but the complete files, and also all, the especially vital and important ones and originals from the Fuehrer, beginning back with 1940, I submitted them to the American officer when I was being captured.