Q. And who gave this announcement in the Wehrmacht report? who compiled it, who is responsible for it?
A. This Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October, which is really a supplementary order, in the main emanated from me. It deals with the refutation of a report by the English Ministry of War, a matter upon which I do not wish to dwell for it is a rather difficult and delivate point and the prosecution does not wish me to touch on it.
Q. And how about this supplementary order-
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we don't know at least I haven't seen the document of the 7th of October, 1942, and the prosecution has made no objection be any answer to any English documents as far as we know.
DR. EXNER: I wished to present this document, to submit it rather, but it was objected to.
THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?
DR. EXNER: That means, most probably, that this Wehrmacht report was not to be submitted, but perhaps the defendant can give us the contents of this report briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he means simply that no evidence has been given by the prosecution on the subject, of course there is no objection to his saying that; but when he says that the prosecution does not want him to put forward or does not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement to make.
DR. EXNER: Yes, Mr. President. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Perhaps you can tell us briefly what the contents of this Wehrmacht report is, this Wehrmacht report started on the 7th of October. I believe you will find this report in your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What the defendant has said was that the prosecution does not want him to deal with this subject:
DR. EXNER: Yes,
THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an improper remark to make. The prosecution have got no communication with the defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put forward in evidence in this case. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Did you follow him? You are not to assert that you can not touch upon this subject. Can you perhaps give us an explanation of what you really meant?
A. It is in direct connection with this Commando Order, and the last paragraph of the Wehrmacht report is really important, something which was compiled by the Fuehrer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has testified already, and which Professor Jahrreis read before the High Tribunal here. That is the sentence which reads: "In the future all terror and sabotage troops of the British, and their assistants and helpers who do not act like soldiers but rather like bandits, will be considered as such by the German troops and treated accordingly, and wherever they appear they will be ruthlessly eliminated in battle." This supplement originated, word for word, with the Fuehrer personally
Q. And now it was demanded of you -
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Exner. Wait a minute.
Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October, 1942, which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?
THE WITNESS: By that I meant that my defense had the intention of using the entire Wehrmacht report of the 7th of October, and submitting it as evidence, but my defense dispensed with that when the prosecution objected to this document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never objected to it and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it at all myself; as a member of the English government at the time when this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before, but I have no objection to it at all.
DR. EXNER: May I just make one remark, please.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: In case there should be an error, it is all the more pleasing to us and we shall submit this Wehrmacht report either this morning or this afternoon. I should like to clarify one more point regarding the question which Mr. President put to the Defendant. The Defendant said that the Wehrmacht report, in the main, originated from him. The supplement originated with the Fuehrer and the -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the witness.
DR. EXNER:: Yes. Very well. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. Please declare once more and tell us which part came from you and which part came from the Fuehrer and what the contents of the Fuehrer's supplement was.
A. The entire first part of this Wehrmacht report has nothing whatever to do with Commando troops but, rather, it concerns itself with the famous affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war at the beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to this point once more later.
THE PRESIDENT: Then you were correct in saying that in the main it emanated from you?
THE WITNESS: Yes. The first part of this Wehrmacht report, that I formulated, and it contains the refutation of a British radio report given out by the British Ministry of War. This statement which the British War Ministry made was wrong, and the reason it was wrong, that I gathered together and established on the basis of records which we had, photographs which we had, and affidavits which we had. As far as Commandos are concerned and reprisals, this matter was then not all concerned with reprisals. This was brought into this Wehrmacht report through the supplement by the Fuehrer, which begins with the sentence: "The High Command of the Wehrmacht, therefore, considers itself forced to decree the following."
BY DR. EXNER:
Q. It was considered necessary now to have this announcement made known in an Execution Order. Did the Fuehrer demand drafts of an executional order? Did he demand that from you?
A. After the Fuehrer had written this last supplement, he turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an Executional Order, Ausfuehrungsbefehl, in conjunction with this general announcement as found in the Wehrmacht report, and simultaneously he set up the slogan that he did not want any military courts.
Q. Did you make this draft?
A. I had many, many doubts, and when I thought over the Hague warfare rules these doubts could not be overcome. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor myself compiled any such draft, but my staff, on their own initiative, asked for drafts and asked for opinions from various officers, and in that manner document PS-1263 came into being, a document which I shall deal with later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?
DR. EXNER: 1263-PS, Page 104 of Volume II of my document book; 1263-RF, "R", Richard, "F", Frank, but we shall deal with that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204.
DR. EXNER: Page 104, Volume II.
BY DR. EXNER:
A My wish was an entirely different one. My intention was to avoid the issuance of an order or decree altogether. I expected really that on the announcement in the Wehrmacht report, an announcement which certainly was not kept secret, but which was broadcast very freely over the air to the entire world,that the British Minister of War, either directly or via Geneva, would approach us again, as had been done previously on several occasions, mad I hoped that in this way the entire matter would be transferres to the sphere of influence of the Foreign Office. However, this did not occur. The British War Ministry remained silent.
In the meantime, ten days had passed and nothing had happened. Then, on the 17th of October, General Schumundt, the Chief Adjutant to the Fuehrer, came to me and said, "The Fuehrer is demanding an executional order." And I gave him the following answer, word for word; "Please give him my best records, but I certainly will not give out an order like that."
Schmundt laughed and said, "Well, of course, I can't tell him that,"And my r reply was, "Very well, than, tell the Fuehrer that I do not know how a decree like that could be justified under international law."
And with that, he left. I hoped that I would be asked to come to the Fuehrer so that at long last after many months I should be able to speak to him personal
Q And this coincided with the Vinizza crisis?
A Yes. And also I wanted the opportunity of telling him about my misgiving and doubts -- either that or be thrown out of his presence. Either eventuality would have helped me. But neither of these things actually did happen. the Fuehrer was going to set up these decress himself. these two orders of the Fuehrer -- the order to the troops, and the reason for this order, directed to the commanders. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Are you referring to two documents which are before us?
A These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-Ps.The papers submitted to the High Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the Fuehrer; the originals handed over at Flensburg myself. The documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the originals, or a mimeographed version by my staff.
BY DR, EXNER:
Q Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned that your staff worked on something and you referred to PS-1263, which has been submitted to the High Tribunal page 104 of Volume 2. On the basis of this document, at page 106. you made two remarks. The first item is on page 206, where it says,"no" In the French translation this "no" is lacking, and I am asking you to make that correction, please. On the same page, a little further down, in your own handwriting it says, "that doesn't go either," an - there is your initial "J" standing for Jodl. Please explain what you are referring to here. 104 -- under the first figure -- of themselves asked for proposals, and they asked for proposals from the Amt Ausland Abwehr (Counter Intelligence), for under its jurisdiction the International Law group was centered; and point 2, the Wehrmachts Recht Abeilung (the Wehrmacht Legal Department), which is significant, for after all it was a legal problem that we were concerned with. Absehr (Counter Intelligence) made. And the Ausland Division the foreign division of this office, made this proposal. Under paragraph A the proposal was made by this division: "members of terroristic and sabotage troops who are found without uniform, that is civilian clothing, or found in for an uniforms, and are apprehended, are to be treated as bandits, or if they are apprehended outside combat operations, they are to be interrogated briefly by an officer and then afterward they are to be court-martialed." It was quite impossible, for if you find a soldier in civilian clothing, that is, without his uniform, then no one could be know just with whom they were concerned, it might be a spy; it could be a prisoner of war who had escaped; it could be a hostile aviator who had saved his life by jumping from his plane and now wanted to conceal himself in civilian cloth all of this had to be determined by an experienced interrogating officer and not through a court-martial consisting of a lieutenant and two non-commissioned officers or soldiers. In paragraph B -
Q And for that reason you said no?
A That was the reason I put "no" next to that paragraph. In paragraph it was suggested that if sabotage groups were apprehended wearing uniforms, that was to be reported to the Wehrmacht operational staff and the staff was then to decide what was to be done, and in that way the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab -- the operational staff -- was to have the function of a military Tribunal, which it could never actually be.
As far as I am concerned, on the basis of my wide experience, I have pondered these problems more than some of my subordinates and I have to lay claim to that wider experience. ings about the Fuehrer decreem which you have just said, Now, tell us what objections, what doubts, you actually did have?
A First of all, I had a series of legal doubts. Then this decree was ambiguous and not clear enough for execution in practice. In this case -- especially in this case -- I considered military Tribunals or courts-martial as absolutely necessary. I know full well that courts, either consciously or not, may on occasion be under coercion and may judge not only according to the right, but there is the possibility of a miscarriage of justice.
Q. Therefore, you wanted to instal a legal or tribunal procedure.
What did you mean when you said that the report was ambiguous end unclear?
A. The thought was this; Soldiers who, by their actions, put themselves beyond the law of war can not claim to be treated according to the law of war. This is a basic principle, as shown in international law, for instance, when we would deal with the concept of a spy or Franc Tireur. certain methods of warfare used by the British commando troops, but the order of the Fuehrer went further than that, and it said that all comman do troops had to be eliminated. This was the point which cause me grave trouble.
Q. What legal doubts did you have?
A. I had this doubt -- that on the basis of this order, soldiers would be mowed down.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you can speak a little bit more fast.
A. I was concerned that not only hostile solders would be mowed down, and, to use the Fuehrer's expression, soldiers who actually had acted like bandits, but that decent soldiers as well would be mowed down. that in the very last supplement in document 503-PS, it was ordered that soldiers were to be shot after they had been captured and interrogated. The thing that was toally mysterious to me was the general question or situation in law, whether a solder who had previously acted like a bandit, upon being captured and brought into the legal situation of prisoners of war, whether he would actually enter this legal sphere, or whether, because of his prior actions, he had already placed himself beyond the pale of the law and of justice.
Q. By that you mean the Geneva Conventions.
A. Yes, I mean the Geneva Conventions.
Q. Hostile fighters who had acted in an unsoldierly manner were not to be treated as soldiers, was that, per se, something that you could under-stand?
A. Yes, I could quite understand that, and I was not the only one who understood it. The Fuehrer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders that were with the Canadian landings brgiade at Dieppe and these orders were before ,e in the original. In these orders it was set down that wherever possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. After some time, through the Commander in Chief, Most-
Q. You can speak faster.
A. --I received witnesses' testimony and court records. All of this was documented by photographs, and whose things showed to me, anyway, unambiguously and unequivocally, that numerous people who belonged to the organization Todt --fathers of families, unarmed old people, but people who carried an arm band with a swastika that was part of their insignia -that these people had been shackled so that there was a loop around their necks and the end of the rope was fastened around their thigs in such a way that they had strangled themselves. incidents, which to me seemed to be facts, I kept from the Fuehrer. I concealed these matters from the German people, and therefore I concealed those matters from the Propaganda Ministry as well.
Then through the radio we had the English report, which said: "It is emphatically denied that any soldiers had Icon shackled." island of Sercq. Again we received reports, which had been sworn to, that soldiers had been shackled, and they had been German prisoners. That was the decisive factor with the Fuehrer. I studied this report very, very carefully as well. In this report it was shown through pictures how people could be shackled so that they will kill themselves through this method of shackling, and it was set down in exactly what period of time death would result.
Q. Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his order, decree 498, actually were based on facts. Hitler was referring to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been killed, and-
THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphasing the evidence in a way that is inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That is not what the witness said. BY DR. EXNER: decree is based were known to you, whether they had been reported to you.
A I believe that the High Tribunal has document PS-498. The first thing that is mentioned by the fuehrer in that document is that is is saying generally, for quite some time cur opponents in their conduct of war have used methods which are beyond the international Geneva Agreements, and I had to see that the reports which we had regrettably been receiving since the summer of 1941 were true.
I do not wish to refer to these cases in detail. There was a rather fantastic incident of a British U-boat. There was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war were not to have any water before they were interrogated.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in respect of, namely, the shackling, and you are now referring to other thing which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which happened long before.
THE WITNESS: Then I shall not deal with this matter any longer, but I feel that I have to prove that in general the reasons given by the Fuehrer for this order not only sprang from a diseased imagination, but that he had actual proof and real proof and we did as well, for there is a decisive difference whether I, in my own mind, saw certain justifications for this order and had to concede this or whether I considered this entire order an open scandal, and that is a point that is very important for my own behavior, but I shall try to be very brief. People who had been punished repeatedly as criminals were active as commandos, and to prove this, testimony of prisoners is available, and that prisoners had been shackled, and we had captured reports -THE PRESIDENT:
You have told us that already. We have heard that more than once--that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled and that you had the Canadian orders before you. BY DR. EXNER: any captured order, according to which it was decreed to kill German prisoners of war. This was one of the reasons contained in the Fuehrer decree, the killing of prisoners, but I should like to explain that the English Ministry of War had advised us--I can not recall exactly whether it was via Geneva or via th radio--that it might very well be that cases would arise in which prisoners of war would have to be killed--no, rather, in which prisonersof war would have to be shackled, for otherwise one would be forced to kill them instead. Then, if in conclusion, the Fuehrer says that, we have found orders that prisoners as a basic principle are to be killed through commandos, then, in my opinion, he was referring to the English close combat regulations, in which shcklings were prescribed which had to bring about death.
order? ing this decree distributed. of these orders, although I don't know which of them. That is not correct, is it? secret.
Q We'll deal with that right away. Could you hove refused to transmit this order? I would have been arrested immediately, and in this case I must say it would have been justified. But I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its entirety or in part, was actually against the law, and I still don't know that today. I am convinced that if one were to call together a council of international law experts here, probably each one of them would have a different opinion on the subject.
Could you have node counter-proposals? was a time of conflict with the Fuehrer, it wasn't even possible for no to speak with the Fuehrer personally. To broach the subject during the general situation report was quite impossible. Therefore, in carrying out this order, I intended to follow a very generous practice, and I was certain that the commanders in chief, as well, would do the same.
Q And what do you mean by a generous practice? Could this order have been interpreted in different ways?
A Yes. The order really put down two methods. In order to avoid the treating of really decent soldiers as criminals, this was done: If a commando operation at night was not mowed down, but captured -- as was the rule in almost all cases -- it was almost certain proof that they did not consider those fighters as bandits, and the commanders in chief had to investigate that matter and check it.
If it was a purely reconnaissance operation, then the entire action did not fall under the concept of the commando order and did not have to be reported as a commando action. However, is it was an actual sabotage and destruction group which was operating then it had to be checked as to how it was equipped; whether they were wearing civilian clothing underneath their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armhole guns so that when they started to surrender, by lifting their arms the pistols would automatically go off; or whether during the fighting, they used treacherous methods. The commanders in chief could act in accordance with the outcome of this investigation. possible -- and I must say this took place in the bulk of cases -that the shooting of brave soldiers was avoided. followed by the troops? When it was reported to me that a troop like that had been captured -- and according to the Fuehrer Decree they shouldn't have been cap tured -- then I did not object at all, and I did not ask any questions. I did not report to the Fuehrer commando enterprises or operations if they did not have any great success in sabotage. of Percara which Field Marshal Kesselring pictured to the court, I dissuaded some people from rather drastic treatment, and succeeded in persuading the Fuehrer that it was actually only a reconnaissance unit. operations?
A Commando operations were really reduced. They were announced in the Wehrmacht Report; they were reduced considerably. I believe that there were no more than eight or ten cases in all.
now I am dealing with the months of July and August of the year 1944 -- increasingly large numbers were reported as to terrorists who had been killed. Those are not commando groups that are mean but rather they are those who fell during the combatting of those who revolted in France. That fact is proved if the Tribunal will turn to Document USA-551, Figure $. There you will find the evidence.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is page 70 of Book 7.
THE WITNESS: Or page 117 of our document, Volume 2. There it is shown just what was decreed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to deal with another document no and discuss it with the witness, Document PS-532.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.
(A recess was taken.)
Q With reference to the subject "commando order" I want to mention Document PS 532, RF 368, which is in our Document Book 2 on page 113.
This document has already once been offered. It was the occasion for an objection on my part because the document isn't signed, or rather because it has been crossed off, would you say. Will you explain to us please why this draft creer was crossed out by you? this draft order. Now after the invasion that Commando order should have been rescinded or was to have been rescinded altogether. I agreed to that proposal, which meant the rescinding of that order. Referring to the immediate area slightly farther than that from the beach-head, there were daily landings by parachutists, at that time."
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was that document rejected? You told us you objected to the document, but I am asking you what did the Tribunal do upon your objection, did they maintain it or deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, but the document was struck off. I don't think I am wrong. I had not applied at that time to have the document struck off. I merely objected to the fact that it wasn't mentioned that the document had been crossed out, and that it had been turned down with the hand written note of Jodl on the margin which you can see.
THE PRESIDENT: Either the document was offered in evidence or it was not and either it has an exhibit number or it has not, and as I understand your objection was allowed.
MR. ROBERTS: It was objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been given the French exhibit RS 368, and after discussion it was then stricken from the record, the English short hand note reference being page 3631. My Lord, I think in fact both the prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl's writing upon it, and, therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to it's admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or Defense. My Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to cross examine him about it, and I haven't the slightest objection to my friend, Dr. Exner, putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It may, therefore, be left in as RS 368. BY DR. EXNER:
Q Will you please continue? all of this commando order should be dropped. For that reason I wrote inside the statement under Figure 4: "The enemy should not be treated as manners of the Commando", and I crossed out the entire first page. That, however, didn't help because still on that same day the Fuehrer on the basis of that appl ication from the Supreme Commander made a different decision and opinion of what he desired, and that is contained in Document 551 PS, USA 551, that is contained in the second volume on page 115, an order regarding the treatment of commando personnel. written remark of yours saying that similar action should be taken in the Italian theatre of war? This is on page 117. Please, will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for this remark?
A That can be briefly explained. There were certain territorial limits contained in that order, regarding the use of that commando order. It means that the order was illegally carried out wherever there were enemy actions behind the lines of the corps, but not in the fighting territory of the beachheads. Those were territorial limits which had not yet been established and which had not yet been ordered. I immediately included in it the Italian Theatre of War, because there was a fighting front on the land as well. If this order was used in practice in Italy then it meant that no commando action which surrounded a landing on the coast could be regarded as a commando operation because all of these landings took place before the corps operations. It was very desirable, in my opinion, therefore, to have the same conditions applied to the Italian Theatre of War.
Q I just want to read one paragraph on page 116. It is the second paragraph under No. 1. You see it says in the first paragraph it says that the enemy soldiers in uniform are to be excepted if they are in the enemy beach head, that is to say, and this is important, this means when they are in the area of the divisions fighting in the front line, as well as invasion troops up to and including General Commands.
With reference to paragraph 4 of the basic order, the word "corps command" means just "corps command". It hasn't been rightly translated into English and the French. This limiting of the order to certain territories in accordance with Jodl's remark was meant also to be applicable to the Italian Theatre. At the end with reference to -
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: The word "General Kommando", general command, has been translated into the French "Region Militaire."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: In the English it says "Corps Command" and that is correct, "Corps Command", which is the same as General Kommando.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, theTribunal would prefer that you should not draw attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a mis-translation. Rather than stating it is a matter of mis-translation I call it a question of opinion as to whether it is a mis-translation or not. It isn't for you to tell us it is a mis-translation. You may draw our attention to it. But now will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551, it appears to be signed by, initialled by Warlimont. In the other variation of the translation it appears to be signed by the defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I also say that I think theCourt should get the original from the Exhibit Room? No. 551 in fact, consists of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil, and the senond is a draft initialed "A". That is Warlimont with Jodl's at the end, and the third is the final order in which the penciled note of Jodl's alteration to include Italy is also incomplete. So, there are really three documents, and the last is a mimeographed document with themimeographed signature of Keitel.
So there are three documents, and the last is a mimeograph, with a mimeographed signature attached.
That appears from the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. The prosecution has been asserting that you had issued an order ordered to be kept absolutely secret and that you had ordered that it was only to be distributed down to the level of commanding officers so that it should not under any circumstances fall into enemy hands. You ordered that for the second order also, didn't you, giving reasons? Please will you tell me now why you ordered that order to be kept so very secret?
A. This secrecy order refers in fact only to the document 503.
Q. That, I want to add, is in the second volume of my document book on page 102. That is the order regarding the keeping secret, signed by Jodl. Please, will you continue now.
A. A particular secrecy for that order was quite inevitable because first of all it was only at best to commanders. Secondly, that order contained in great detail the considerable damage the armed forces, Wehrmacht forces, had suffered through those commando operations, and the damage which might under certain circumstances still be done. If that order were to fall into enemy hands, then he would form almost a temptation to continue and increase that particular type of warfare. And, thirdly, the order 498-PS could be considered as a permissable reprisal, permissive under international law; but the last sentence in the document PS-503, a Sentence from which one can easily recognize that it was added later, since the order had previously been completed, that sentence I have to say disgusted me. It was one of the reasons why I ordered that particularly great secrecy be attached to this particular order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
THE WITNESS: I refer to the last sentence of the document PS-503, which says if it should tuen out to be suitable that for reasons of interrogation one or two men should be saved or spared at the beginning, then they ought to be shot immediately after they have been interrogated.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, that is not in 503, is it?
DR. EXNER: 503.
THE PRESIDENT: You haven't printed the whole of 503 in your docu-
ment book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, I haven't got 503, it is only the secrecy order of 502, but I ask particularly that it should be submitted to the Tribunal.
THE WITNESS: May I perhaps add that that sentence was altogether the source of all the trouble. The troops used that sentence not to shoot commando troops, as a rule to take them prisoners. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. You said this last sentence disgusted you. Were you quite clearly occupying the view that it was against international law?
A. One could have certain doubts about that too, but it disgusted me from the human point of view because if you do shoot a man, then I considered it indecent to first of all squeeze him out for information.
Q. I want to come to that with one more question before we adjourn. You said that you haven't always reported everything to the Fuehrer, you haven't reported all commandos. That means that you haven't reported such matters as you had about the enemy, killing, and such. What did you mean by that?
A. The violations of international law which we thought had taken place, the shackling of German prisoners I reported to him, but one thing I did not report was the shackling of some of the men belonging to the organization TODT in such a manner that they have settled themselves. That was something I did not report, and did not appear in any order or Armed Forces bulletin.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you should ask him again, I don't know.
DR. EXNER: It didn't appear to be to be quite clear. BY DR. EXNER:
Q. We shall not pass ont to another subject, the order regarding Leningrad and Moscow. Tell me, Hitler's order regarding Leningrad and Moscow, how aid that came about? It is C.123, second volume, page 145 of my document book, volume 2, my 145. It was submitted under the number USSR 114. It is the order that capitulation was not to be accepted. Will you tell me how it came about?