you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not resign? about his picture of a war with Russia. circumventing this conflict for the following reasons: First, because of the personal attitude which he, Hitler, had received on the visit of Molotov, a visit which had taken place in the meantime. I mean between the directing and the carrying through.
Point two: The fact that supposedly the economic negotiations had not only been carried out falteringly, but, as Hitler said, in the form of blackmail. and mobilization on the Russian side had taken on such a scope, and he, Hitler, did not want to wait for an attack from the other side because of the dangers involved, for Brandenburg or its capital and Silesian industry, and then of course, Raeder had to agree that these arguments could not be refuted, for he was not in a position to prove the opposite. Russia and Germany was a defensive war so far as Germany was concerned, are you? both sides had reached such a point that the time for the discharging of the thunder was not too far distant and that from the political point of view, if he sees that he can not prevent a conflict, he would like to have the advantage of giving the first blow. Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not? L-79, which is in the British document book 10, page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence in chief this morning.
I take it that you have read those minutes, witness?
A May I look at them now, please? I have never known the minutes up until this point, and if I should be asked about them I would have to read them in toto.
Q You need not trouble to do that, witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder's discussion with you about this conference. Didn't Raeder tell you that Hitler ha d said on 23 May 1939, for instance, "There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war."
Then further,page 76 of the report:
"The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England is our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle."
Then the next paragraph but one:
"The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler's represented Hitler's considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
A First of all, I would like to correct a mistake. I thought that you had given me a record on Poland. I saw it in a different version, and I thought it was a different record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, I should like to state again that Raeder, of course, did not agree with this record as put down by Schmundt.
Q Just one moment, witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler's considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?
If you keep your headphones on--Iknow it it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk.
speeches pursued a certain purpose. In the preparations for war he saw a means for political pressure, and at that time he was using the phrase "war of nerves", which was used not only in Germany but was broadcase over the air, even beyond the boundaries of Europe. Through this he tried to use a means of preventing war, as well as of war pressure, and this document, per se, contains contradictions which permit us to gather that he himself could not have meant this document to be taken seriously -- that it could not be a warlike conflict, and I can prove this by saying that he said that the General Staff might not concern themselves with this question, and toward the and it says that all the parts of the Wehrmacht must work together for the purposes of state. He says that a war with Poland may not bring about a war with England, and our policy haste see to it. Then in the next paragraph he says, "But if a war actually does arise, I shall strike sharp blows for a decision."
In the next paragraph it says, "But I need ten to fifteen years to prepare," and in the concluding paragraph it says that the building program of the navy will not be changed. of his speech and had believed in the seriousness of the speech, that there should be an armed conflict with Poland in a short time, then he would not have argued to the fact, first of all, that we have time until 1943, and there will be no changes for the navy in this connection. Then he would have said to Raeder, "Please, in allhaste, prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take." was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That was the operation against Poland. our forces at sea could not even be reached through wireless. The policy had been forced to the breaking point, and we thought that we could use a war of nerves. At the last minute, everything was held back, and we believed that without doubt, it was only a means of pressure, and we did not believe that it would be an outbreak of war. Only when the cannons spoke were we convinced that from then on the war was not to be prevented.
I personally believe -convenient.
I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is found in Admiral Assmann's headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939:
"Raeder stresses importance of obtaining Norwegian bases, Trojndheim, and that occupation of Belgium coast provides no advantage for U-boat warfare." the point of viewof requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at that time; is that not so?
A May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me. that I am reading it correctly.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
A In this sentence, I can not find any belligerent intentions. It says specifically that he is interested in the winning of Norwegian bases.
Q That is all I am putting to you at the moment. Do you know that on 3 October the defendant Raeder was sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to the north, and upon the basis that it would be desirable for German power to acquire?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I am referring to document C-122, My Lord. Document C-122 is in document book 10 at page 91. BY MR. ELWYN JONES: second sentence:
"It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position."
Then there follow these questions:
"What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
"What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly already decisive advantages as supply positions? (F.O.U-boats alre* considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.)
"What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, e.g. "Skagen?" invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that? see any aggressive purposes in there. This morning I said that to the best of my knowledge, Admiral Karls already in September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed concern and stated plans in case of an Allied landing in Norway.
Q. The source of information which the defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give was the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the defendant Raeder and he were very close, were they not?
A. There was no connection at all. December of 1939 Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life, and never again after that.
Q. After December Quisling's agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor with the defendant Raeder, was he not?
A. I do not believe that Hagelin visited Raeder but once or twice. I believe that he called on Raeder for the first time when he accompanied -
Q. Well, Raeder was in very close touch with Quisling's secretary, was he not?
A. No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement.
Q. A man, Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the Supreme Commander of the Navy in Berlin -
A. I did not quite catch the name.
Q. Giese, g-i-e-s-e-. Part of his duties were to receive all visitors of the Supreme Commander. He was an assistant of the Supreme Commander's Adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. No doubt you recollect the man.
Q. Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian we are dealing with?
Q. A German subject, an employee of the Supreme Command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the Supreme Commander's visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up the list of collars for the Supreme Commander. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D. 722, G.B. 479.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Not yet, My Lord.
THE WITNESS: I just received now from this gentleman -- the man you are talking of was in one of the ante-rooms of the Adjutant's office, and who was to be admitted into the inner office was not up to this man, that was up to and I asked them first what their reason for calling was.
Mr. Hagelin was not admitted before Quisling, not before December '39. BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q. I am not suggesting that but I am suggesting that after December '39 there was a very close link between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From page 3, My Lord, of the English translation:
"I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway. An appointment with the Supreme Commander was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman whose name I cannot recall at present, through a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Bureau; as a rule they were received immediately. I also received instructions accordingly that in the event of a Mr. Hagelin announcing himself personally, I should always take him to the Supreme Commander at once. I the learned after a short time that he was a Norwegian agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I cannot recall either any more, also conversed with me and trusted me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretence of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling to was announced at the Supreme Commander's through Hagelin and was received immediately. Another part in all these negotiations was played by Lieutenant Commander Schreiber of the naval reserve, who was later Naval Attache in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well. He worked with the Quisling party and its gents in Oslo."
A. That might be true up to a certain degree but the fact is that at that time after the visit of Quisling I told Hagelin that if he had naval reports in the future I was asking him to give them to me.
Q. Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?
A. Before December. Later he did not receive him any more.
Q. He in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on the 14th of December '39, did he not?
A. He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any discussion with Raeder alone.
Q. You spoke this morning as to conference between Quisling and Raeder on the 12th of December '39 and suggested that politics were not dicussed at that conference.
A. By the word 'politic' I mean something which applies to National Socialistic tendencies on the German side and National Socialistic tendencies on the other side. The matters discussed were only Naval political matters.
Q. I am not going into a discussion of the question of politics with you I will consider the familian German definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the document C. 64 you will see that political problems were discussed on the 12th of December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is on page 31 of the document book 10-A; in which Raeder writes:
"Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that: 'As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great, especially through Storthing -,President Hambro, Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha, all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway; in which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 onwards the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution prolonged its term by a year.'" Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not?
You have said that the defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with Norway. it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?
A. In reply to your first question I would like to say in the record the refers to the matter that in these incidents one can never know as to the people involved, how far they were furthering their own politics and how far German interests and politics were protected. From this document just submitted to me, in my opinion I wanted to say as to Raeder and Quisling that no party business, party affairs, were discussed to any agreement on these matters, and this was not politics with him but rather, he discussed facts with him.
Quisling of course in a preamble mentioned certain things and he also called attention to the fact what he actually agreed with was not party matters but what should be above these matters.
Q. The defendant Raeder was preferring the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor quisling. That is so, is it not?
A. I would say that Raeder never saw the reports from theGerman Ambassador at Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.
Q. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan's intention to attack the United States?
A. To my knowledge I can speak only about Raeder and myself. I have opinion only at that moment as to the attack on Pearly Harbor which took place.
Q. You received a communication from your German Naval Attache at Tokio before the attack on Pearly Harbor indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, did you not?
A. Pearl Harbor, no.
Q. United States Forces. Just look at the Document D. 872, which will be exhibit G.B.480. You will see that those are extracts from the War Diary of the German Naval Attache in Tokio. The first entry is dated the 3d of December 1941.
"The Naval Attache extended an invitation to several office and the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be deemed to have broken down completely and that, quite obviously, speedy military action to the South by the Japanese armed forces is to be counted on."
Then on the 6th of December 1941:
"Conversation with Commander Shiba, The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following signal: 'Naval Attache 1251 Top Secret. Last week America proposed a non-aggression pact between the United States, Britain, Russia and Japan.
In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high compensatory demands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down.
"The Japanese Armed forces forsaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that no stone had been left unturned.
"The Japanese Armed Forces have already decided (three weeks ago) that war is inevitable, even if the United States, at the last minute, should make still greater concessions. Corresponding measures are under way."
And then I won't read the whole document and at the end it says:
"A state of war with Britain and America would certainly be established by Christmas. From this I got the impression: in three weeks." familiar with the plans of the perfidious attack upon the United States, did you not?
A I don't quite follow the sense. I have already said that we in Berlin had no conferences with the Japanese attache. I assorted that we had knowledge of the Pearl Harbor incident and that by radio, and I cannot quite say whether on the 6th of December the Attache at Tokyo told us about the presumption or it was drawing conclusions from sources which we could not control about a conflict which was t o arise. There is no connection with the fact that we in Berlin advised the Japanese to attack America. Attache? Admiralty Staff, that is, an official operative conference between the SKL and the Japanese Admiralty Staff. My document reads:
"No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the Southern Offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within three weeks, and simultaneously attacks on Siam, the Phillipines and Borneo will be launched.
"The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents."
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I don't know whether I understood him before, but what I took it to mean was that the German Admiralty first know of the Japanese attack after Pearl Harbor, not that he knew about it before by radio.
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is also my thought. BY MR. ELWYN JONES: Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor,
A I don't know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor or the fact that two days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conference was to be counted on. I was asked whether we know of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said: "We in Berlin had no conference between the SKL on the one hand and the Japanese Naval Staff". Is that what you are submitting to me? Commander in Chief said about that and see what you will say you know. On the interrogation of admiral Raeder on the 10th of November, 1945, he was asked:
"Q Would negotiations as to the intervention of Japan be embraced by the foreign office people alone or would they be in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy and the OKW?"
And Defendant Raeder's answer was that:
"A. No negotiations were made between the foreign office and on the part of the Japanese. There was this delegate Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the foreign office in his capacity as a delegate, but apart from that he was sufficiently an expert to determine at this time from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that carried on negotiations with military and naval attaches about the matters that the Japanese needed. This was all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval attaches." have given, witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters I want to deal with.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I don't know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief adjournment.
(A recess was taken).
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from the interrogation of the defendant Raeder, he was then dealing with the relationship generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it was a drect negotiation with regard to the intervention against America. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter BY MR. ELWYN JONES: belonging to the German Navy at Bordeaux of a ship in command of two British Royal Marines in the Girond Estuary? war diary?
know whether it was the war diary of the Naval Command or the SKL. counsel for defendant Rader that the entry in D-658, which contained the sentence; "The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but nevertheless from the character of international law, since the soldiers Were in uniform, it has been suggested that entry was not from the SKL war diary." Now, you are familiar with the initials of the defendant Raeder, are you not? beyond aperadventure that this matter was entered in the SKL war diary?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will allow me, as my original is required for other purposes. D-658 was GB 229, and it may be convenient that our photostats of the originals be shown as D-658-A and GB-229-A. BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q That is the war diary of the SKL, is it not?
men at Bordeaux, wasn't it? afterward on the 9th of December they were informed about the fact of the shooting. it says here literally, "According to Armed Forces report, two soldiers have been shot in the meantime." This can be seen in the war diary of the SKL and I recognize and Confirm it.
Q And the comment of the SKL is, "It is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform."
Q The final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your contention that the German Navy fought a clean War at sea? that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the diary of SKL, which was taken from the Armed Forces report, that two soldiers were shot. That was the special order given by the Fuehrer which was mentioned, but as a . Naval War Command it was a novum in the history of naval warfare. Raeder had no influence in these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something like that I could give you my opinion, or whatever Raeder and I discussed -would have influencein the Navy if the Commander-in-Chief didn't have influence Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention in this matter he continued in office, after those men were deliberately murdered.
A That is a distortion. May I put my position as follows: The facts The facts are those:
That in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage, be it behind the lines, from the air or brought behind the lines in some way, was introduced.
Q These were marines in uniform. Your own report in the SKL diary says so .
A I have to comment on that order which has been given before. The preamble of that order was, since on the basis of Knowledge of orders which we captured -- I don't remember the wording any more -- but since it has become clear that these soldiers in the so-called commando raids received orders not to bother taking German prisoners, but shoot them, the following directives had to be issued. At that time I had discussions with Raeder about that case, of course, and I can only say that my personal opinion was as follows: that when I come to the means of sabotage behind thelines, thatof course I cannot be bothered with the taking of prisoners because then the element of surprise in this case -- our surprise -- would be excluded. If therefore a troop of three to five men, a so-called commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to bring about destruction, then of course they cannot burden themselves with German prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered that preamble quite credible and I expressed my opinion at that time. perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, and just say yes or no on that; I won't argue with you.
A I have not said that in any way. I only said, here is a fact of which we were only informed by the Armed Forces report, and that Raeder and the High Command, had not been heard on that point. That is what I pointed out. indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want to submit D-873, new document, which will be GB 481, the log book of U-boat U-71, under the dateline 21st of June, 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:
"Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Penderson drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted, under a tarpaulin and only appeared when the U-Boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed twentyeight days before. I turned down their request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave then the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crow were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue."
Is that your conception of a clean war at s ea? inview of the weather he described, that in view of the prevailing weather, rescue could not be carried out, that he provided them with food and water and gave then the course to the coast. I could not say why that should be inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the course, then you might make that accusation.
Q He could have taken them aboard, youknow. These were three men -
A He, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the men in charge of the U-Boat. I should have to look at the weather, because it says here, "Medium swell"-it must have been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well that he was leaving them to die.
A No, not at all. Then he did not have to give them any food and did not have to give, them the course to the coast. know he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting that he could have taken them aboard and might have done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.
A No; I do not know the state of the U-Boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you haven't seen conditions on a U-Boat; otherwise you wouldn't judge it like that. The crew of a U-Boat which has been under water for weeks uses every bit of space to the last and is exposed to dangers day and night. One cannot say this would be a necessity.
Besides, the commanderhimself said there was no chance in view of the prevailing weather.
(This concluded Mr. Elwyn Jones' cross-examination of the witness.) BY DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. October, 1939, an entry under the 10th of October, with the assertion that from this it could be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have bases along the Norwegian coast. I should like to read to you the full entry, and I should like you to speak to the entire document:
"The Fuehrer agrees that the true battleship should not be put to use. Russia has offered bases near Murmansk. Question of siege of England. Fuehrer and High Command Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, also the danger of entry of U.S.A., in the war which would continue the duration of the war. The more 'brutal' that war is conducted, the sooner the end, the shorter the war. Capacity for large production program, submarine program. Fuehrer rejects suggestion to have submarines built by Russia -- from Russia -- for political reasons. High Command Navy states no advantages by conquest of Norwegian coast. Fuehrer will consider question." clarification of the Norwegian problem? treated and therefore only one strategic -
MR. ELWYN JONES: The translation came through ,"no occupation of Norwegian coast," andthe translation of the document of Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases. I am not saying this in a critical sense -
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give that an exhibit number?
MR. ELWYN JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann's headline diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it. But I want to know the exhibit number.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given this evening, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB 482, would it not?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Yes, my Lord; that is it; GB 482.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg your pardon if it does not agree; but I have that material from which I read. I received that by the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation, and get that settled.
MR. ELWYN JONES: Yes, your Lordship. BY DR. SIEMERS: October -- that is, of the same conference -- am I right in saying that there were many strategic questions, so one could not say of any one of these strategic questions that question had been treated completely and finally?
A No. I believe that complexity of questions had nothing to do with the long discussion between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. It touches the question of the occupation of Norway, and then discusses a few points which Raeder probably had taken down in his notebook. Independently of that question, whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, that question has been discussed by coincidence on the same day, the possibilities of acquisition of bases outside of German territory. Russia. possibilities for the continuance of submarine warfare Raeder and Hitler was in quotation marks. Were these words which were used by Hitler?
Can one assume that?
MR. ELWYN JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been checked, and the original reading of "Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases" appears to be a perfectly correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
THE WITNESS: I understood, doctor. Shall I speak about that? BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Yes. Do you want to say something about that point?
A Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed out that Raeder allegedly mentioned the necessity of acquisition of bases for submarines to Hitler, and in that connection, that he once spoke about support from Russia, and on another occasion about the possibility of bases from Norway. But that does not reveal any intention of attack.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr.President, I asked Dr. Kranzbuehler also to check the translation. The German text says, which I should like to point out right now, "Weist hin auf den wert", "points out the importance, or the value." That is something different from the English translation. But may I come back to this later? BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it again. It is D 722. The first line reads:
"I was born in Stettin on the 24th November, 1900, as the son of the foreman bricklayer, Ernst Giese."
Then it says, "I sat in the ante-room of the Supreme Commander as assistant to the adjutant," Then it says, in the same paragraph "I received the Register from the Adjutant at midday after the callers had departed, to lock it up in the joint armour-plated safe."
Then it says on the second page "I did not have much contact with the Supreme Commander personally - this consisted rather in my submitting to, or fetching from, him top secret correspondence." messenger?