"The Japanese Armed forces forsaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that no stone had been left unturned.
"The Japanese Armed Forces have already decided (three weeks ago) that war is inevitable, even if the United States, at the last minute, should make still greater concessions. Corresponding measures are under way."
And then I won't read the whole document and at the end it says:
"A state of war with Britain and America would certainly be established by Christmas. From this I got the impression: in three weeks." familiar with the plans of the perfidious attack upon the United States, did you not?
A I don't quite follow the sense. I have already said that we in Berlin had no conferences with the Japanese attache. I assorted that we had knowledge of the Pearl Harbor incident and that by radio, and I cannot quite say whether on the 6th of December the Attache at Tokyo told us about the presumption or it was drawing conclusions from sources which we could not control about a conflict which was t o arise. There is no connection with the fact that we in Berlin advised the Japanese to attack America. Attache? Admiralty Staff, that is, an official operative conference between the SKL and the Japanese Admiralty Staff. My document reads:
"No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the Southern Offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within three weeks, and simultaneously attacks on Siam, the Phillipines and Borneo will be launched.
"The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents."
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I don't know whether I understood him before, but what I took it to mean was that the German Admiralty first know of the Japanese attack after Pearl Harbor, not that he knew about it before by radio.
MR. ELWYN JONES: That is also my thought. BY MR. ELWYN JONES: Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor,
A I don't know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor or the fact that two days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conference was to be counted on. I was asked whether we know of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said: "We in Berlin had no conference between the SKL on the one hand and the Japanese Naval Staff". Is that what you are submitting to me? Commander in Chief said about that and see what you will say you know. On the interrogation of admiral Raeder on the 10th of November, 1945, he was asked:
"Q Would negotiations as to the intervention of Japan be embraced by the foreign office people alone or would they be in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy and the OKW?"
And Defendant Raeder's answer was that:
"A. No negotiations were made between the foreign office and on the part of the Japanese. There was this delegate Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the foreign office in his capacity as a delegate, but apart from that he was sufficiently an expert to determine at this time from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that carried on negotiations with military and naval attaches about the matters that the Japanese needed. This was all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval attaches." have given, witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters I want to deal with.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I don't know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief adjournment.
(A recess was taken).
MR. ELWYN JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from the interrogation of the defendant Raeder, he was then dealing with the relationship generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it was a drect negotiation with regard to the intervention against America. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter BY MR. ELWYN JONES: belonging to the German Navy at Bordeaux of a ship in command of two British Royal Marines in the Girond Estuary? war diary?
know whether it was the war diary of the Naval Command or the SKL. counsel for defendant Rader that the entry in D-658, which contained the sentence; "The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but nevertheless from the character of international law, since the soldiers Were in uniform, it has been suggested that entry was not from the SKL war diary." Now, you are familiar with the initials of the defendant Raeder, are you not? beyond aperadventure that this matter was entered in the SKL war diary?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will allow me, as my original is required for other purposes. D-658 was GB 229, and it may be convenient that our photostats of the originals be shown as D-658-A and GB-229-A. BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q That is the war diary of the SKL, is it not?
men at Bordeaux, wasn't it? afterward on the 9th of December they were informed about the fact of the shooting. it says here literally, "According to Armed Forces report, two soldiers have been shot in the meantime." This can be seen in the war diary of the SKL and I recognize and Confirm it.
Q And the comment of the SKL is, "It is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform."
Q The final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your contention that the German Navy fought a clean War at sea? that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the diary of SKL, which was taken from the Armed Forces report, that two soldiers were shot. That was the special order given by the Fuehrer which was mentioned, but as a . Naval War Command it was a novum in the history of naval warfare. Raeder had no influence in these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something like that I could give you my opinion, or whatever Raeder and I discussed -would have influencein the Navy if the Commander-in-Chief didn't have influence Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention in this matter he continued in office, after those men were deliberately murdered.
A That is a distortion. May I put my position as follows: The facts The facts are those:
That in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage, be it behind the lines, from the air or brought behind the lines in some way, was introduced.
Q These were marines in uniform. Your own report in the SKL diary says so .
A I have to comment on that order which has been given before. The preamble of that order was, since on the basis of Knowledge of orders which we captured -- I don't remember the wording any more -- but since it has become clear that these soldiers in the so-called commando raids received orders not to bother taking German prisoners, but shoot them, the following directives had to be issued. At that time I had discussions with Raeder about that case, of course, and I can only say that my personal opinion was as follows: that when I come to the means of sabotage behind thelines, thatof course I cannot be bothered with the taking of prisoners because then the element of surprise in this case -- our surprise -- would be excluded. If therefore a troop of three to five men, a so-called commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to bring about destruction, then of course they cannot burden themselves with German prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered that preamble quite credible and I expressed my opinion at that time. perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, and just say yes or no on that; I won't argue with you.
A I have not said that in any way. I only said, here is a fact of which we were only informed by the Armed Forces report, and that Raeder and the High Command, had not been heard on that point. That is what I pointed out. indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want to submit D-873, new document, which will be GB 481, the log book of U-boat U-71, under the dateline 21st of June, 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:
"Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Penderson drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted, under a tarpaulin and only appeared when the U-Boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed twentyeight days before. I turned down their request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave then the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crow were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue."
Is that your conception of a clean war at s ea? inview of the weather he described, that in view of the prevailing weather, rescue could not be carried out, that he provided them with food and water and gave then the course to the coast. I could not say why that should be inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the course, then you might make that accusation.
Q He could have taken them aboard, youknow. These were three men -
A He, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the men in charge of the U-Boat. I should have to look at the weather, because it says here, "Medium swell"-it must have been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well that he was leaving them to die.
A No, not at all. Then he did not have to give them any food and did not have to give, them the course to the coast. know he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting that he could have taken them aboard and might have done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.
A No; I do not know the state of the U-Boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you haven't seen conditions on a U-Boat; otherwise you wouldn't judge it like that. The crew of a U-Boat which has been under water for weeks uses every bit of space to the last and is exposed to dangers day and night. One cannot say this would be a necessity.
Besides, the commanderhimself said there was no chance in view of the prevailing weather.
(This concluded Mr. Elwyn Jones' cross-examination of the witness.) BY DR. SIEMERS: Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. October, 1939, an entry under the 10th of October, with the assertion that from this it could be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have bases along the Norwegian coast. I should like to read to you the full entry, and I should like you to speak to the entire document:
"The Fuehrer agrees that the true battleship should not be put to use. Russia has offered bases near Murmansk. Question of siege of England. Fuehrer and High Command Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, also the danger of entry of U.S.A., in the war which would continue the duration of the war. The more 'brutal' that war is conducted, the sooner the end, the shorter the war. Capacity for large production program, submarine program. Fuehrer rejects suggestion to have submarines built by Russia -- from Russia -- for political reasons. High Command Navy states no advantages by conquest of Norwegian coast. Fuehrer will consider question." clarification of the Norwegian problem? treated and therefore only one strategic -
MR. ELWYN JONES: The translation came through ,"no occupation of Norwegian coast," andthe translation of the document of Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases. I am not saying this in a critical sense -
THE PRESIDENT: Did you give that an exhibit number?
MR. ELWYN JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann's headline diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it. But I want to know the exhibit number.
MR. ELWYN JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given this evening, my Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB 482, would it not?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Yes, my Lord; that is it; GB 482.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg your pardon if it does not agree; but I have that material from which I read. I received that by the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation, and get that settled.
MR. ELWYN JONES: Yes, your Lordship. BY DR. SIEMERS: October -- that is, of the same conference -- am I right in saying that there were many strategic questions, so one could not say of any one of these strategic questions that question had been treated completely and finally?
A No. I believe that complexity of questions had nothing to do with the long discussion between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. It touches the question of the occupation of Norway, and then discusses a few points which Raeder probably had taken down in his notebook. Independently of that question, whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, that question has been discussed by coincidence on the same day, the possibilities of acquisition of bases outside of German territory. Russia. possibilities for the continuance of submarine warfare Raeder and Hitler was in quotation marks. Were these words which were used by Hitler?
Can one assume that?
MR. ELWYN JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been checked, and the original reading of "Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases" appears to be a perfectly correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
THE WITNESS: I understood, doctor. Shall I speak about that? BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Yes. Do you want to say something about that point?
A Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed out that Raeder allegedly mentioned the necessity of acquisition of bases for submarines to Hitler, and in that connection, that he once spoke about support from Russia, and on another occasion about the possibility of bases from Norway. But that does not reveal any intention of attack.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr.President, I asked Dr. Kranzbuehler also to check the translation. The German text says, which I should like to point out right now, "Weist hin auf den wert", "points out the importance, or the value." That is something different from the English translation. But may I come back to this later? BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it again. It is D 722. The first line reads:
"I was born in Stettin on the 24th November, 1900, as the son of the foreman bricklayer, Ernst Giese."
Then it says, "I sat in the ante-room of the Supreme Commander as assistant to the adjutant," Then it says, in the same paragraph "I received the Register from the Adjutant at midday after the callers had departed, to lock it up in the joint armour-plated safe."
Then it says on the second page "I did not have much contact with the Supreme Commander personally - this consisted rather in my submitting to, or fetching from, him top secret correspondence." messenger?
A Yes. In order to save officers, we put civilians in a large number of positions, people who we thought were worthy of our confidence. That job of administering a strong box or carrying the key was the job really of a second adjutant, who later had to be shelved. amount of practice in keeping books.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out in the document, exactly as the admiral said. You are wasting the time of the Tribunal in spying it here.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe What Mr. Elwyn Jones presented is also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. But the witness has been confronted with certain points, and I believed that I had the right in the re-examination also to point out certain paragraphs in the document. I can be very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the paragraphs.
THE WITNESS: I can be very brief. looked into the minutes of the conference, which was no verbatim shorthand record but only a personal note for the memory of the adjutant, he, without having taken part in the conference, could never have gotten the correct information. He had no decision in hand as to who should be admitted to see the commander-in-chief, but only the adjutant; that is to say, myself. He could not even knew who could be admitted. It is an incorrect assumption when he says that Hagelin saw Raeder without seeing me first. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to Hitler?
A Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the ante-room and took care of the telephone calls.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggested that he was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was questioned at talks between Raeder and the Fuehrer or Raeder and Hagelin.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit, we read, which I would like to point out,on page 3, he says "According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement."
THE WITNESS: How could he know that? I only know that I as chief of staff was not present at these conferences, and Giese had no other possible source of information than to draw upon his imagination. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q I come now to Document D 872. That is the war diary of the Naval Attache in Japan, with which you were confronted. But according to it, you should have known that Japan, on the 7th of December, would attack America. The telegram which is mentioned here is of the 6th of December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office?
A You mean when could I have received it personally?
Q Yes; or Raeder? to decide, and he was the one who decided whether for operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, or not.
Q Admiral, you remember that document?
Q Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?
A No. I tried to explain that, that Pearl Harbor had no connection with that telegram by Admiral Daenecker. It is not identical with it. And Daenecker depended on sources of information, and his assumption was based on this information which I formulated in that telegram, without having any definite evidence.
Such telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes those assumptions were correct; sometimes they were incorrect. negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying that that was only a message about eventualities?
A Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that there were no military negotiationsbetween general staffs. But the naval attache is charged with transmitting all information, after examination, to us. submitted, but was an interrogation of Raeder of the 10th of November, 1945. May I ask you to look at page 5, at the bottom of that page of the document which I have handed to you, and the passage which is presente d on page 6?
THE PRESIDENT: That ought to have a number, ought it not?
MR. ELWYN:JONES: That will be GB 483, My Lord. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q On that document, page 5, on the bottom it says Document C 75; that is mentioned?
A I have an English copy -- do you mean the English one?
Q Yes, the English copy because it doesn't exist in German.
A You mean the last paragraph?
Q I believe the last line or the line before the last. The English translation is hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page.
DR. SIEMERS: In the case of this interrogation, mr. President, we deal with document C 75. I believe the witness will find it right away, Mention has been made of that document recently and, according to the wish of the Tribunal which has been stated recently, I submit C 75; that is Directive 24, about the cooperation with Japan, and the full text is Document Raeder No. 128. The Tribunal will recall that -
THE PRESIDENT: I think it has already been put in. C 75 hasn't it already been put in?
DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C 75.
THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been offered in evidence?
DR SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document C 75 as U.S. -
THE PRESIDENT: It has already been put in. It doesn't want a new number, isn't that correct?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I remind you that it needs a new number because only the first part was submitted, the first paragraph.
MR. ELWYN JONES: U.S.A. 151.
THE PRESIDENT: ell, we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr. Siemers, to par of documents which have already been put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the old number; that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, but if the Prosecution in their document only puts in the first two paragraphs -
THE PRESIDENT: I know that perfectly well, and you are entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I thin -- I may be wrong -- that up to the present we haven't given new numbers to documents once that they have been put in although fresh parts of the document are put in.
MR. ELWYN JONES: My. Lord, the position with regard to C 75 is that the whole of the original has been put in as U.S.A. 151 but only an extract from the original was included in the English document which was put before the court.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. All I was concerned with was the number of the thing It has got the number U.S.A. 151 and I thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I have been asked recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose. Under these circumstances, now that is hear that it has been submitted entirely, I can withdraw that, I should be grateful if the Tribunal would also receive the complete translation of the document in English and not only the first two paragraphs. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Admiral, have you found it in the meantime?
A Yes. It is on page 7 and I was looking at 5.
Q Well, I apologize to you. It is right, therefore, that the interrogation refers to Document C 75. Document C 75; Admiral, is directive No 24 concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: Concerning collaboration with Japan, it is necessary to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war: and besides that, the document also mentions that which I have mentioned recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan. Now Raeder, on the 10th of November, 45, has stated his position on that and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It says there, on page -- I thought it was at the top of page 6 Maybe it is page 7.
A The top of page 3. I do not speak English as well as German, but I would translate it as that which Japan needs.
Q If I remember correctly, the word is "needs". Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not concerned with strategy points?
A No; that is entirely two different things.
A Yes, purely questions of materials. Discussions of that kind we had with all navies, not only with the Japanese.
Q. Then I come to the Commando order about which you testified already. I want to put to you the following: You have been shown Document 656, which says that according to armed forces reports soldiers were executed and where mention is made of the fact that the soldiers were uniforms and that the order of the Fuehrer was something new in international law. I believe that the Naval Command in Chief in Western France reported that and that is a report by the armed force and that the men who wrote it, who put the entries in the ar Diary wrote a new thing in international law. I should like to ask you, would you consider that a criticism of the order?
A I believe that I have to answer the question in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in the ar Diary -
THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that is really a matter which we can go into, whether he thinks this is a criticism of the order. BY MR. SIEMERS:
Q It is a question concerning the facts. The Prosecution asserts again that there were soldiers in uniform concerned. The Wehrmacht communique carried information about the execution of the 9th of November and that execution, as I have proved, took place on the 11th of December. I am presenting to you now the Document UK 57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading is concerned with sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux of the 12th December, 1942, and further on we read: The participants had presented Girond with canons coming from submarines. They carried a special grey uniform. After carrying out the blastings they sank the boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain in civilian clothes.
Did those soldiers behave correctly according to international law?
DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions. -- Excuse me, one final question carried out on the order of the Fuehrer directly, was any inquiry made to you on did you receive any information?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr President, the question arose as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated correctly. I should like to identify the number. The English translation, which I have beforerme. is not identical with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is the Document GB 482.
the English translation.
"The High Command of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian coast provides no advantage for submarine warfare. In view of Norwegian base (Trojndheim) with the support of pressure from Russia, the Fuehrer will consider question."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, it would save time really if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating division. It is not worth while wasting title over
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it should have been examined again.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the translation certified to.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President.
Mr. President, I, Myself, have a question to the witness BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q Admiral, the document 873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary of U-71 and was concerned with three Norwegian in a lifeboat. The entry was on the 21st of June. I have already submitted it to the Tribunal under Doenitz No. 13, on page 23 of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding officer Flaechsenberg. According to that statement, the submarine was put to sea on the 14th of June. It was west of Norway. Can you tell no if that U-boat therefore, on the 21st of June, was putting out for operation or returning from operations?
A You mean from memory?
Q As you know, that submarine was a 500-ton boat. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three additional people on board?
A I believe not. I am not enough of an expert in order to decide or judge definitely what an additionaof personnel aboard may mean but, aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for a longer operation, can be charged with prisoners. I do not consider that possible.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness canretire.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, then, with the permission of the Court, the witness may retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, according to my statement made at the beginning of this case, I have submitted the majority of my documents already during the testimony. With the permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying statements.
I submit to the Tribunal Raeder Exhibit No. .8, an excerpt from the document book 2, page 105, an except from the book which Churchill has written in the year 1935 under the title "Great Contemporaries". I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points out that there are two possibilities that one cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether he will be the man who will restore honor and peac for the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and strong to the forefront of the European family circle.
As Raeder Exhibit No. 20, I submit a short excerpt from Adolph Hitler's "Mein Kamf", considering that the Prosecution has sail that from that book one could see that Hitler intended to wage aggressive wars. I believe I shall be able to show how much one can see from, that book. I ask to take judicial notice of the short excerpt on page 154. I read: "For such a policy there was but one ally in Europe, England."
Raeder Exhibit No. 21, a speech made by Hitler to the German Reichstag on the 26th April 1942, as evidence to show how liberties were limited in Germany and the dictatorship was strengthening itself. the Hague Convention, about the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare, I need that in connection with Raeder Exhibit No. 66, in tin expert statement by Dr. Mosler.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 289 in document book 7. It is the first page of the document book No. 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take document book No. 5. Here are documents which have already been submitted. I submitted it as Raeder Exhibit No. 100, document book 5 page 437, which is a document from the "White Book" concerning the Hooting of the French General Staff of the 9th of April 1940, top secret, President Daladier, Gamelin the Minister of the Navy, Colonial Minister, the Air Minister. It concerns the suggestion by Daladier to move into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General Gamelin and also by the Minister for International Defense on War. On page 442 there is mentioned about the march into Holland and finally of the area of Luxembourg. Sir the High Tribunal has knowledge of the details from the discussion of the documents, I should not like to read anything from these documents. I only ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice. I should only like to point out that on page 443 of that very long document, mention is made of the occupation of the Port of Narvik and of the intention to capture the mines of Delavada.