DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the High Tribunal, I should like to submit the document which was granted to me, Exhibit Raeder 111. I submit it because of its connection with this conflict of questions. It is to be found in my document book VI, page 485. This is an affidavit given by Rear Admiral Hans Buetow, dated the 21st of March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What Page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 485 in Document Book VI, Raeder Exhibit Number 111. It reads as follows:
"During the period of June 20, 1941 to October 20, 1941, namely, the period to which Document USSR 113 (UK 45) refers, I was stationed in Finland as naval commander. I was subordinate to Admiral Carls, the commander-in-chief of Group North. I guarantee that the document in question, USSR 113 (UK 45), or its contents, a letter of September 29, 1941, addressed by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, have never come to my knowledge, which undoubtedly would have been the case if Admiral Carls had passed on the letter to the officer subordinate to him. Also, as far as I know, this letter was not brought to the attention of anyone else under my command.
"I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler in November 1945, on the occasion of a conversation I had with Dr Siemers, the defense counsel for Grand Admiral Raeder.
"I have also never been spoken to about this order by other officers, especially not by other naval commanders.
"It results from this that other commanders likewise had in no way knowledge of this order." who took down this affidavit. BY DR. SIEMERS: That is the alleged war of aggression which supposedly Raeder planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
A No, never. We never had any such discussions with Japan before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against a war with America, America who would be combined with England and have superiority. High Command, warn Hitler? before in the strategical framework of the position which Raeder took during the entire course of the war, Raeder considered the chief enemy on the sea rather than by land. If, in addition to that, the largest sea power in the world would have allied herself to England, then the war would have expanded beyond all proportions for us. Vice Admiral Wiethoeft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States. a war economy, the tremendous planning of shipyards which Wiethoeft expressed a few months before the war, that many tons per month could be launched, these figures spoke a very expressi* language to us. At the same time, they were a tremendous warning to us. At no time did we underestimate the productive capacity and potential of the United States. sions to the contrary, that Raeder, on the 18th of March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should move toward Singapore, attack Singapore. rect proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in giving blows against important strategic nucleus points of England. That he tried to ease our situation is conceivable and is a matter of course, but at no time did he propose that Japan should attack America, but rather against England.
military agencies on the other hand, were there any discussions about these strategic questions at this time? the war Japan carried on no military discussions with us. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
A No. We heard about this for the first time through the radio. Navy, and especially in your capacity as a ommanding admiral at Trojndheim, did you have any knowledge about the treatment of prisoners of war at the hand of the Navy? Do you have any information as to that?
A I should like to reply vice versa. I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were eithin the sphere if influence of the Navy, were treated other than chivalrously and correctly. boat that attacked the Tirpitz, after his internment he returned to England and on the occasion of his decoration with the Victoria Cross he gave a press interview. On this occasion he lauded the chivalrous and correct treatment which he had received at the hands of the commander of the Tirpitz. of the Norwegian resistance movement, who in civilian clothing were in our power, were treated chivalrously and correctly as well. I had to investigate these always proved.
Q When did you do this at the order of the British Military Government?
Q Not Military Government. The British Navy? by the competent British Admiral, there were no objections? ed the cases to me. I had to investigate them and had to present the results of my investigation.
Q And the results ?
Q The result was presented to the competent British officer?
this Court and is well known to the High Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like to touch this case in passing. I should like to have you tell me: Did the Supreme Command know, that is, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939, that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat?
A No. The commander-in-chief of the U-boats reported -- he reported this on the 3rd -- that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since if I remember correctly, they were a distance of 70 sea miles from the scene of the incident.
Q When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the Athenia? did return.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was the 27th of September. BY DR. SIEMERS: von Weizsaecker to the effect that it was not a German U-boat, and the date involved was the 3rd, 4th, or 5th of September? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder undertake to do? and State Secretary von Weizsaecker acted in the best of faith, as we did. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler, therefore, decreed that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office stricken out or denied, and he decreed that the participants, that is those who knew, should remain silent and give their oath, and this period of silence was to be kept untilthe end of the war.
Q Did you give your oath of silence? did Admiral Raeder. Both of us were in the High Command, and with Admiral Fricke were the only ones who had knowledge of that, and we would have had to pledge each other.
Q According to Hitler's decree, you were obligated to get an oath from the others who knew about this?
A Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, as far as the members of the crew knew that this mistake had actually taken place. Mr. von Weizsaecker and telling him it actually was a German U-boat, and not telling the American naval authorities, "I'm sorry; it was a German U-boat after all."
discrepancy which would bring about public disfavor in America was to be avoided, and stirring up this case once more would have aroused public opinion tremendously. I believe the Lusitania case during the First World War would be a case in point. To bring up this case again after a few weeks, and to arouse public opinion, and, in a way, to force entry into the war, would have been of very little value. decree? again, but regrettably, as you know, this case was again stirred up. On the 23rd of October 1939, in the Voelkischer Beobachter, a very unpleasant and disagreeable article appeared under the heading, "Churchill Sinks the Athenia". Do you remember that article?
A Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder's knowledge and without the knowledge and aid of the Navy. I do not know who the author of the article was. It did come from the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and we in the High Command of the Navy were flabbergasted, less because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tone that was used since deliberately or unintentionally -- for we did not know -there was a distortion. had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. Of course, we had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry, and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the Voelkischer Beobachter. We were especially upset, first of all, since it was basically against policy that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in such a sharp and intense manner. In addition to that, the facts were completely distorted, and besides -- this may be important also -- in this case we were attacking the opponent of Raeder and there was no reason for making derogatory remarks about this opponent before the German public.
Q Now, my final question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder before this article appeared?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President.
Perhaps I was not interpreted correctly. I meant to say that it was my final question to the complex of the Athenia problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put. BY DR. SIEMERS: General von Fritsch after he had been freed following a court proceeding, and the Prosecution accuses Raeder of not using his influence in reestablishing Fritsch in office and in dignity. Is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me the file of the legal proceeding against Fritsch in the first month of the year 1939. He gave me the file to keep in my safe. At that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had influenced him and what his impression was, and he also told me that he had offered to have Fritsch reestablished completely, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous office and position. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he would never assume his former office again, that he would never consider returning because of the incidents that had taken place, and he requested Raeder not to put forth anymore effort in his behalf along those lines. it would be too much to say that they were very good friends.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions ? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for the defendant Doenitz). treatment given prisoners who had made an attack on the Tirpitz. Do you mean by that, the attack of November 1939?
Q Was it a two-man U-boat?
A Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I don't know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commandant of the one which was successful attacked the Tirpitz.
I believe he was the one who was taken prisoner.
Q And this commandant was treated according to the Geneva convention?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Thank youvery much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine? BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q Witness, I want to ask you first about the Athenia episode. I take it you agree that the article in the Voelkischer Beobachter was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
Q I will repeat my question. With regard to theAthenia -- do you hear me now? do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable publication? dishonorable. to ask you, I'm afraid -- it might be more convenient for the work we have to do.
You say that the defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
Q What action did he take to manifest his displeasure? newspaper article. The interests of the state could be interpreted along those lines, that in any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided. throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
A That I do not believe. I believe that in these cases he acted like a good patriot would act.
you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not resign? about his picture of a war with Russia. circumventing this conflict for the following reasons: First, because of the personal attitude which he, Hitler, had received on the visit of Molotov, a visit which had taken place in the meantime. I mean between the directing and the carrying through.
Point two: The fact that supposedly the economic negotiations had not only been carried out falteringly, but, as Hitler said, in the form of blackmail. and mobilization on the Russian side had taken on such a scope, and he, Hitler, did not want to wait for an attack from the other side because of the dangers involved, for Brandenburg or its capital and Silesian industry, and then of course, Raeder had to agree that these arguments could not be refuted, for he was not in a position to prove the opposite. Russia and Germany was a defensive war so far as Germany was concerned, are you? both sides had reached such a point that the time for the discharging of the thunder was not too far distant and that from the political point of view, if he sees that he can not prevent a conflict, he would like to have the advantage of giving the first blow. Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not? L-79, which is in the British document book 10, page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence in chief this morning.
I take it that you have read those minutes, witness?
A May I look at them now, please? I have never known the minutes up until this point, and if I should be asked about them I would have to read them in toto.
Q You need not trouble to do that, witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder's discussion with you about this conference. Didn't Raeder tell you that Hitler ha d said on 23 May 1939, for instance, "There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.
We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war."
Then further,page 76 of the report:
"The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England is our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle."
Then the next paragraph but one:
"The Dutch and Belgium air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler's represented Hitler's considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
A First of all, I would like to correct a mistake. I thought that you had given me a record on Poland. I saw it in a different version, and I thought it was a different record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, I should like to state again that Raeder, of course, did not agree with this record as put down by Schmundt.
Q Just one moment, witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler's considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?
If you keep your headphones on--Iknow it it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk.
speeches pursued a certain purpose. In the preparations for war he saw a means for political pressure, and at that time he was using the phrase "war of nerves", which was used not only in Germany but was broadcase over the air, even beyond the boundaries of Europe. Through this he tried to use a means of preventing war, as well as of war pressure, and this document, per se, contains contradictions which permit us to gather that he himself could not have meant this document to be taken seriously -- that it could not be a warlike conflict, and I can prove this by saying that he said that the General Staff might not concern themselves with this question, and toward the and it says that all the parts of the Wehrmacht must work together for the purposes of state. He says that a war with Poland may not bring about a war with England, and our policy haste see to it. Then in the next paragraph he says, "But if a war actually does arise, I shall strike sharp blows for a decision."
In the next paragraph it says, "But I need ten to fifteen years to prepare," and in the concluding paragraph it says that the building program of the navy will not be changed. of his speech and had believed in the seriousness of the speech, that there should be an armed conflict with Poland in a short time, then he would not have argued to the fact, first of all, that we have time until 1943, and there will be no changes for the navy in this connection. Then he would have said to Raeder, "Please, in allhaste, prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take." was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That was the operation against Poland. our forces at sea could not even be reached through wireless. The policy had been forced to the breaking point, and we thought that we could use a war of nerves. At the last minute, everything was held back, and we believed that without doubt, it was only a means of pressure, and we did not believe that it would be an outbreak of war. Only when the cannons spoke were we convinced that from then on the war was not to be prevented.
I personally believe -convenient.
I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is found in Admiral Assmann's headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939:
"Raeder stresses importance of obtaining Norwegian bases, Trojndheim, and that occupation of Belgium coast provides no advantage for U-boat warfare." the point of viewof requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at that time; is that not so?
A May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me. that I am reading it correctly.
(A document was handed to the witness.)
A In this sentence, I can not find any belligerent intentions. It says specifically that he is interested in the winning of Norwegian bases.
Q That is all I am putting to you at the moment. Do you know that on 3 October the defendant Raeder was sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to the north, and upon the basis that it would be desirable for German power to acquire?
MR. ELWYN JONES: I am referring to document C-122, My Lord. Document C-122 is in document book 10 at page 91. BY MR. ELWYN JONES: second sentence:
"It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position."
Then there follow these questions:
"What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to carry this out without fighting?
"What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"Will the harbours have to be developed completely as bases, or have they possibly already decisive advantages as supply positions? (F.O.U-boats alre* considers such harbours extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats to call at temporarily.)
"What decisive advantages would exist for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, e.g. "Skagen?" invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that? see any aggressive purposes in there. This morning I said that to the best of my knowledge, Admiral Karls already in September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed concern and stated plans in case of an Allied landing in Norway.
Q. The source of information which the defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give was the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the defendant Raeder and he were very close, were they not?
A. There was no connection at all. December of 1939 Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life, and never again after that.
Q. After December Quisling's agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor with the defendant Raeder, was he not?
A. I do not believe that Hagelin visited Raeder but once or twice. I believe that he called on Raeder for the first time when he accompanied -
Q. Well, Raeder was in very close touch with Quisling's secretary, was he not?
A. No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement.
Q. A man, Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the Supreme Commander of the Navy in Berlin -
A. I did not quite catch the name.
Q. Giese, g-i-e-s-e-. Part of his duties were to receive all visitors of the Supreme Commander. He was an assistant of the Supreme Commander's Adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. No doubt you recollect the man.
Q. Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian we are dealing with?
Q. A German subject, an employee of the Supreme Command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the Supreme Commander's visitors, to accept applications for interviews, and draw up the list of collars for the Supreme Commander. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D. 722, G.B. 479.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?
MR. ELWYN JONES: Not yet, My Lord.
THE WITNESS: I just received now from this gentleman -- the man you are talking of was in one of the ante-rooms of the Adjutant's office, and who was to be admitted into the inner office was not up to this man, that was up to and I asked them first what their reason for calling was.
Mr. Hagelin was not admitted before Quisling, not before December '39. BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q. I am not suggesting that but I am suggesting that after December '39 there was a very close link between Raeder and the Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From page 3, My Lord, of the English translation:
"I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway. An appointment with the Supreme Commander was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman whose name I cannot recall at present, through a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Bureau; as a rule they were received immediately. I also received instructions accordingly that in the event of a Mr. Hagelin announcing himself personally, I should always take him to the Supreme Commander at once. I the learned after a short time that he was a Norwegian agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I cannot recall either any more, also conversed with me and trusted me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretence of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling to was announced at the Supreme Commander's through Hagelin and was received immediately. Another part in all these negotiations was played by Lieutenant Commander Schreiber of the naval reserve, who was later Naval Attache in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well. He worked with the Quisling party and its gents in Oslo."
A. That might be true up to a certain degree but the fact is that at that time after the visit of Quisling I told Hagelin that if he had naval reports in the future I was asking him to give them to me.
Q. Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?
A. Before December. Later he did not receive him any more.
Q. He in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on the 14th of December '39, did he not?
A. He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any discussion with Raeder alone.
Q. You spoke this morning as to conference between Quisling and Raeder on the 12th of December '39 and suggested that politics were not dicussed at that conference.
A. By the word 'politic' I mean something which applies to National Socialistic tendencies on the German side and National Socialistic tendencies on the other side. The matters discussed were only Naval political matters.
Q. I am not going into a discussion of the question of politics with you I will consider the familian German definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the document C. 64 you will see that political problems were discussed on the 12th of December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is on page 31 of the document book 10-A; in which Raeder writes:
"Quisling creates the impression of being reliable and states that: 'As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great, especially through Storthing -,President Hambro, Jew, a friend of Hore-Belisha, all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway; in which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great - possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 onwards the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional as Parliament in defiance of the constitution prolonged its term by a year.'" Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not?
You have said that the defendant Raeder was anxious for peace with Norway. it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?
A. In reply to your first question I would like to say in the record the refers to the matter that in these incidents one can never know as to the people involved, how far they were furthering their own politics and how far German interests and politics were protected. From this document just submitted to me, in my opinion I wanted to say as to Raeder and Quisling that no party business, party affairs, were discussed to any agreement on these matters, and this was not politics with him but rather, he discussed facts with him.
Quisling of course in a preamble mentioned certain things and he also called attention to the fact what he actually agreed with was not party matters but what should be above these matters.
Q. The defendant Raeder was preferring the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor quisling. That is so, is it not?
A. I would say that Raeder never saw the reports from theGerman Ambassador at Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.
Q. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan's intention to attack the United States?
A. To my knowledge I can speak only about Raeder and myself. I have opinion only at that moment as to the attack on Pearly Harbor which took place.
Q. You received a communication from your German Naval Attache at Tokio before the attack on Pearly Harbor indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, did you not?
A. Pearl Harbor, no.
Q. United States Forces. Just look at the Document D. 872, which will be exhibit G.B.480. You will see that those are extracts from the War Diary of the German Naval Attache in Tokio. The first entry is dated the 3d of December 1941.
"The Naval Attache extended an invitation to several office and the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be deemed to have broken down completely and that, quite obviously, speedy military action to the South by the Japanese armed forces is to be counted on."
Then on the 6th of December 1941:
"Conversation with Commander Shiba, The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following signal: 'Naval Attache 1251 Top Secret. Last week America proposed a non-aggression pact between the United States, Britain, Russia and Japan.
