during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from the defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when we asked for it. There is no cross examination about it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then may I ask you what were the reasons why Raeder remained? promises concerning the integrity of the navy.
THE PRESIDENT: The power is on again now; so you can go at your ordinary speed.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, sir. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q The power is on again; we can go a little faster now. navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and to put party people in that ministry. we did not see a strengthening in that possibility, but a weakening of our force. Then there was a vacuum during that period, the period following, with reference to successes, because of illness and losses. reasons of responsibility and patriotism.
Q Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?
A Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. Once I w* ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
Q When was that? his point of view, and asked me to persuade Raeder to stay. Furthermore, he confidence in the navy, and enjoyed the confidence of the navy. All of the senior officers of the navy asked me orally and in writing to try to influence Raeder in that direction, that he should not leave his office before the time. Since 1928 he had led the navy through all its political crises. beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
plans?
A No; about political plans, not in that sense, but that which considers politics. But he had tried once more to bridge the political discrepancies with Raeder. He told me one could not weigh every one of his words.
Everyone that left him was always in the right. He came with protocols and witnesses; but his main interest was to incite his listeners to higher efficiency, but not to commit himself to individual words. technical questions of the navy.
Q You just said "not to weigh each individual word". Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down correctly; that is, by stenographers? Hitler protested against being tied down word for word, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He freed himself from his text; he thought out loud, and he wanted to carry his listeners away. But he did not want to be tied down to individual words.
I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We knew at all times what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted. come about later that in the letter part of the war his speeches were taken down by stenographers?
A I told you already that so many misunderstandings occurred. And Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they introduced the written record. The minutes kept, up to then, were personalimpressions, based on the initiative of the individual who wrote them.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is he speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of? BY DR. SIEMER:
by the stenographers?
A Since 1942, I believe. It may also be 1941.
Q Since 1942?
A It may also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
Q And your conversation with Hitler was in January, 1939?
Q Admiral, how did the stenographic minutes look later? Did you see them? compare them with the prepared text. Even there, there were contradictions. I have shown to you the directive No. 21, concerning the "Case Barbarossa".
DR. Siemers: Mr. President, that is document 446-PS, US 31, Document Book of the British Prosecution 10-a, Page 247. BY DR. Siemers: leadership or the command of the navy -- had contributed to the draft of that directive; is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. The navy had nothing to do with that draft.
Q Did Raeder before that time have any knowledge of Hitler's plans of an aggression against Russia, before he received that directive? middle of October, 1940. Russia? If so, what was Raeder's attitude concerning these conferences? too serious to be treated superficially. Raeder opposed most energitically a war against Russia, for, I should like to say in fact, moral reasons, because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact or treaty with Russia could not be broken unless the other side gave cause for it.
That, asfar asRaeder knew, had not been the case in October. That economic treaty -- that is what we called it at that time -- to our knowledge was at the expense of the navy, about 90 per cent of it.
We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery, heavy guns for battleships, fire direction, installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, optical instruments for use on submarines. And Raeder was also of the upinion that the furore of operations should not be carried into the Baltic Sea.
The Baltic Sea was our back yard, I should like to say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea.
A He had deprived the Baltic coast in part of batteries and per-
sonnel already in order to have protection for the Norwegian and the French coast. He disposed of very small oil reserves; the synthetic production of oil was not yet completed and the Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder had opposed seriously any plans of war against Russia. opposed the war against Russia concerning the date, and we have to look at the War Diary if we have information as to the date, is thatcorrect?
A No, that is not correct. After that Directive 21, called Barbarossa, was received, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the scheme against Russia; and he had also put down his thoughts in a memorandu. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: After Poland had been crushed, after France had been occupied, and after, for political reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question, he had expressed clearly that now the time had arrived where the further conduct of the war would not be decided on the Continent but on the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him this: To concentrate all forces at his disposal in the direction of one target and to try to bit the strategic centers of gravity of the Empire, especially supply lines of the British Empire, so that England would, under any circumstances, get ready for peace negotiations if possible. He suggested, as has been noticed before, that politics be used to conclude peace with Norway, peace with France, and closer cooperation with the Russian Navy, such as the basis of the economic treaty, the repurchase of submarine equipment and submarines. He has said in one word that the possibility to make the decision was no more on our side because we did not dispose of the necessary sea power and that, in view of the long duration of the war, danger of participation of the United States should also be considered that, therefore, the war would not be decided on the European continent and could certainly not be won in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office. you have expressed it, for moral reasons, reason of international law.
A Yes.
Q Why didn't that get into the War Diary whereasthe other reasons that you have mentioned could be found in the War Diary, at least they are hinted at?
A That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval WarCommand or combat commanders, never criticized the political leadership. Therefore, he did not, excepting to me, speak about the conversations which he had with Hitler except when it was necessary for the military conduct of the war. Directive 21 that you have in front of you? Do you remember that?
Q At any rate, certainly after the directive?
Q Raeder acted on the basis of that, didn't he? precautionary strategic measure? can be seen from Points 4 and 5.
Q In what way? from commanding generals, and after that Raeder reported to Hitler, after he had received the directive. in accord with your opinion?
A Yes, of course, evidently. The word "precautionary measures" is even underlined.
Q Precautionary measures for what? Was it neutrality or -should point to that sentence where it says just what are theprecautionary measures.
A "In case Russia should change her attitude, she is - - -"
THE PRESIDENT: He doesn't need to read the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. BY DR. SIEMERS: in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?
A Yes. At that time, after that report, he came back and said: "I believe that I gout that out of his head." At first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences on that; to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.
Q May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I willhave shown to you, on the 18th of March, 1941, a report was made by Raeder to Hitler in which he asked to occupy the whole of Greece. What were the thoughts that caused the high command, that is Raeder and you, to make that suggestion? the War Diary, that Greece should be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been in possession of the document for three months, which was concerned with the occupation of Greece.
Q Excuse me. Was that Directive No. 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is 1541 PS; GB-13; in the Document Book of the British prosecution 10A, page 270, Directive 20, Enterprise Marita.
BY DR, SIEMERS: again in the month of march; that is to say on the 18th of March? strategic reasons?
A Yes, indeed. A menace to the occupation from the sea or from the air and the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or a menace from the air against the oil fields, had to remain excluded under all circumstances. May I remind you of the Saloniki enterprise in the First World War? That was a similar situation. quest and glory. Is that correct? don't see what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship there. Raeder, for the strategic reasons which I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction. We occupied Greece? circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff, We knew that Greek merchantmen put out for England and, therefore, we thought we were obliged to consider the Greek merchantmen which went into the combat zones to England as enemy ships. And in the beginning of 1940 or maybe the middle of 1940 we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece; that is to say, to establish a Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 22 May 1946.) BY DR. SIEMERS: like to submit to you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document No. UK 45, equal to USSR 113. This Document concerns itself with the memorandum of the S.K.L. of the 29th of September, 1941, addressed to Group North under General Admiral Karle. Under "11" it is stated:
"At the outcome of the conversation between Admiral Fricks and Hitler, it is reported that the Fuehrer has decided to rape the City of St. Petersburg fro the ground." and also that the S.K.L.transmitted this document, I should like to ask you, admiral, did you know of this memorandum in the year 1941?
I beg your pardon. Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment.I'm sorry to say, I had no photostat copy of this document. I tried to secure this copy. I have just received the copy and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point.
A This is the original which I have before me? it was reproduced for our own use exactly like the original.
Did you know this piece of writing in the year 1941?
A I did not. I am seeing this document for the first time at this Moment; I did not know it in 1941. was sent off, even though you, yourself, had not Seen it?
A That must have been a wonder if it actually did take place. This piece of writing and the pieces of writing which were submitted to admiral Raider all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either "The Commander-inChief has knowledge of this," or it was initialled by me personally; or this piece of writing contained the notation "this decree or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief", and again my initials were contained they on, if that was the case.
This copy which you have just submitted to me now, I never saw it before; I do not know it; and I consider it completely impossible that Grand Admiral Raeder had ever seen this piece of writing because on the 29th of September, 1941, I was in Berlin. Navy? gentlemen of the S.K.L. reported on the intentions of the army and on that occasion the future of Leningrad was dealt with -- not Petersburg, Leningrad. The Raeder mentioned his wish that an operation would be taken into consideration that at all costs Leningrad should fall undamged into our hands, if possible, so as to enable us to build up shipyards and docks there for his Navy; and he also wanted that the army would be informed of his wish and that his wish was urgent; because of the imminent threat of an attack by air, that part of the dock capacity should be transferred to the east. far as possible, according to Raeder's wish. And he emphasized specifically that therefore, this city was to remain undamaged as far as possible; otherwise, he would have no space for his workers. And that is all I can tell you about the case of Leningrad. who said it was not possible to spare the docks? as far as I know, came about very quickly.
Q did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document? cuss this with anyone at 11.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the High Tribunal, I should like to submit the document which was granted to me, Exhibit Raeder 111. I submit it because of its connection with this conflict of questions. It is to be found in my document book VI, page 485. This is an affidavit given by Rear Admiral Hans Buetow, dated the 21st of March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What Page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 485 in Document Book VI, Raeder Exhibit Number 111. It reads as follows:
"During the period of June 20, 1941 to October 20, 1941, namely, the period to which Document USSR 113 (UK 45) refers, I was stationed in Finland as naval commander. I was subordinate to Admiral Carls, the commander-in-chief of Group North. I guarantee that the document in question, USSR 113 (UK 45), or its contents, a letter of September 29, 1941, addressed by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, have never come to my knowledge, which undoubtedly would have been the case if Admiral Carls had passed on the letter to the officer subordinate to him. Also, as far as I know, this letter was not brought to the attention of anyone else under my command.
"I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler in November 1945, on the occasion of a conversation I had with Dr Siemers, the defense counsel for Grand Admiral Raeder.
"I have also never been spoken to about this order by other officers, especially not by other naval commanders.
"It results from this that other commanders likewise had in no way knowledge of this order." who took down this affidavit. BY DR. SIEMERS: That is the alleged war of aggression which supposedly Raeder planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
A No, never. We never had any such discussions with Japan before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against a war with America, America who would be combined with England and have superiority. High Command, warn Hitler? before in the strategical framework of the position which Raeder took during the entire course of the war, Raeder considered the chief enemy on the sea rather than by land. If, in addition to that, the largest sea power in the world would have allied herself to England, then the war would have expanded beyond all proportions for us. Vice Admiral Wiethoeft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States. a war economy, the tremendous planning of shipyards which Wiethoeft expressed a few months before the war, that many tons per month could be launched, these figures spoke a very expressi* language to us. At the same time, they were a tremendous warning to us. At no time did we underestimate the productive capacity and potential of the United States. sions to the contrary, that Raeder, on the 18th of March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should move toward Singapore, attack Singapore. rect proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in giving blows against important strategic nucleus points of England. That he tried to ease our situation is conceivable and is a matter of course, but at no time did he propose that Japan should attack America, but rather against England.
military agencies on the other hand, were there any discussions about these strategic questions at this time? the war Japan carried on no military discussions with us. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
A No. We heard about this for the first time through the radio. Navy, and especially in your capacity as a ommanding admiral at Trojndheim, did you have any knowledge about the treatment of prisoners of war at the hand of the Navy? Do you have any information as to that?
A I should like to reply vice versa. I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were eithin the sphere if influence of the Navy, were treated other than chivalrously and correctly. boat that attacked the Tirpitz, after his internment he returned to England and on the occasion of his decoration with the Victoria Cross he gave a press interview. On this occasion he lauded the chivalrous and correct treatment which he had received at the hands of the commander of the Tirpitz. of the Norwegian resistance movement, who in civilian clothing were in our power, were treated chivalrously and correctly as well. I had to investigate these always proved.
Q When did you do this at the order of the British Military Government?
Q Not Military Government. The British Navy? by the competent British Admiral, there were no objections? ed the cases to me. I had to investigate them and had to present the results of my investigation.
Q And the results ?
Q The result was presented to the competent British officer?
this Court and is well known to the High Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like to touch this case in passing. I should like to have you tell me: Did the Supreme Command know, that is, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939, that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat?
A No. The commander-in-chief of the U-boats reported -- he reported this on the 3rd -- that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since if I remember correctly, they were a distance of 70 sea miles from the scene of the incident.
Q When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the Athenia? did return.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was the 27th of September. BY DR. SIEMERS: von Weizsaecker to the effect that it was not a German U-boat, and the date involved was the 3rd, 4th, or 5th of September? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder undertake to do? and State Secretary von Weizsaecker acted in the best of faith, as we did. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler, therefore, decreed that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office stricken out or denied, and he decreed that the participants, that is those who knew, should remain silent and give their oath, and this period of silence was to be kept untilthe end of the war.
Q Did you give your oath of silence? did Admiral Raeder. Both of us were in the High Command, and with Admiral Fricke were the only ones who had knowledge of that, and we would have had to pledge each other.
Q According to Hitler's decree, you were obligated to get an oath from the others who knew about this?
A Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, as far as the members of the crew knew that this mistake had actually taken place. Mr. von Weizsaecker and telling him it actually was a German U-boat, and not telling the American naval authorities, "I'm sorry; it was a German U-boat after all."
discrepancy which would bring about public disfavor in America was to be avoided, and stirring up this case once more would have aroused public opinion tremendously. I believe the Lusitania case during the First World War would be a case in point. To bring up this case again after a few weeks, and to arouse public opinion, and, in a way, to force entry into the war, would have been of very little value. decree? again, but regrettably, as you know, this case was again stirred up. On the 23rd of October 1939, in the Voelkischer Beobachter, a very unpleasant and disagreeable article appeared under the heading, "Churchill Sinks the Athenia". Do you remember that article?
A Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder's knowledge and without the knowledge and aid of the Navy. I do not know who the author of the article was. It did come from the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and we in the High Command of the Navy were flabbergasted, less because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tone that was used since deliberately or unintentionally -- for we did not know -there was a distortion. had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we did not know. Of course, we had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry, and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the Voelkischer Beobachter. We were especially upset, first of all, since it was basically against policy that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in such a sharp and intense manner. In addition to that, the facts were completely distorted, and besides -- this may be important also -- in this case we were attacking the opponent of Raeder and there was no reason for making derogatory remarks about this opponent before the German public.
Q Now, my final question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder before this article appeared?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President.
Perhaps I was not interpreted correctly. I meant to say that it was my final question to the complex of the Athenia problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put. BY DR. SIEMERS: General von Fritsch after he had been freed following a court proceeding, and the Prosecution accuses Raeder of not using his influence in reestablishing Fritsch in office and in dignity. Is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me the file of the legal proceeding against Fritsch in the first month of the year 1939. He gave me the file to keep in my safe. At that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had influenced him and what his impression was, and he also told me that he had offered to have Fritsch reestablished completely, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous office and position. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he would never assume his former office again, that he would never consider returning because of the incidents that had taken place, and he requested Raeder not to put forth anymore effort in his behalf along those lines. it would be too much to say that they were very good friends.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much, Admiral.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions ? BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER (Counsel for the defendant Doenitz). treatment given prisoners who had made an attack on the Tirpitz. Do you mean by that, the attack of November 1939?
Q Was it a two-man U-boat?
A Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I don't know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commandant of the one which was successful attacked the Tirpitz.
I believe he was the one who was taken prisoner.
Q And this commandant was treated according to the Geneva convention?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Thank youvery much.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross examine? BY MR. ELWYN JONES:
Q Witness, I want to ask you first about the Athenia episode. I take it you agree that the article in the Voelkischer Beobachter was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
Q I will repeat my question. With regard to theAthenia -- do you hear me now? do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable publication? dishonorable. to ask you, I'm afraid -- it might be more convenient for the work we have to do.
You say that the defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
Q What action did he take to manifest his displeasure? newspaper article. The interests of the state could be interpreted along those lines, that in any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided. throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
A That I do not believe. I believe that in these cases he acted like a good patriot would act.