In this case he was considering a war-like solution of this question. There, upon Hitler had pacified him completely and had told him that he had the politic situation firmly in hand. contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, he had answered to this effect. This is the conversation as told to me by Raeder:
"I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets, First of all, when both of us are speaking alone. The second, I, Hitler, will keep to myself. and the third those are problems of the future, the end of which I cannot foresee." Then Hitler replied: "These things may be interpreted as such." And this is what Raeder told me. "It might be that both of us were dealing with a comparison I, Hitler--and a Mark is involved-I, Hitler, have already 99 pfennig. Do you believe that because of this one lacking Phennig you will call me to account?" And Raeder said "No". Then Hitler said "Now you will see. I have what I want, and I received it politically, and I do not believe that because of this last political question"--as we called it, the solving of th Polish corridor question --"that we shall be involved in a war,with England. speech was made?
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
(A recess was taken.)
BY DR. SIEMERS: one final question. which were sent to Raeder? Did you receive them? and presented to Raeder. question differently.
What was the position of Raeder concerning Navy and politics? politics. He took that point of view over as a directive and a testament from the old Reich President von Hindenburg, who, at the time he called him to head the Navy, had made it his duty.
Q I now come to Norway. What were the reasons or the causes for Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider possible occupation of Norway?
intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, from Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our counter-intelligence service; about once a week he reported to Raeder as to recent information in my presence: Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attache is Oslow, Kervettenkapitaen Schrieber and which indicated that the rumors were intensified that the Allies intended to drag Scandanavia into the war so that, if possible, the imports from Sweden to Germany could be stopped. cause we had documentary evidence from the last World War that Churchill had had similar considerations concerning the occupation of Norway.
Q Was there another source of reports of that kind? north had received similar reports and orally and in writing he reported them to Raeder. us, briefly? lians who were supposedly in Oslo. There were reports about Allied officers measuring along Norwegian bridges, viaducs and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which would indicate that one intended to use heavy equipment, tanks and guns. And last but least, there was news about silent mobilization of Swedish troops and the basis of alleged danger to the ore areas.
Q What danger arose to Germany because of that? the north would have become almost impossible and would have been very difficult in the Baltic. The are imports would have been stopped most probably. The danger from the air for north Germany and eastern territories North Sea and theBaltic would have been blocked completely, which would have led in the long run to the total loss of the war.
Q What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?
Q When was that report made?
A If I remember correctly, the fall of '39
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because owing to the power of the electrical recording being off what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have got to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather mere slowly than usual.
BY DR. SIEMERS: the first time pointed out these dangers? offhand you could not remember, on the 10th of October. At any rate you probably mean that conference. on the part of Hitler? that subject?
A No. First there were no further conferences until perhaps the end of the year concerning these subjects. Only when the reports, which I mentioned before, were received in increasing numbers, in more severe forms was that subject taken up again. spoke to Raeder?
Q What did Quisling tell Raeder? important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, on the whole, all the facts which we know already.
Q During that conference did you speak only about these military dangers? very short one.
Q One did not discuss political questions?
Q Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time? At the occasion of that visit did Raeder have any closer connection to Rosenberg?
Quisling? Had he informed him before that time about it? from Canaris and other sources? assumed, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
Q Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
Q And that happened? 1939? should be taken for such a landing in Norway. To my knowledge a final directive came out only by the middle of March. a risky one or did one think it absolutely safe to do so? commanders of combat units saw the tremendous risk in that undertaking. May I remind you of the speech of Churchill in the House of Parliment where, after he had been questioned about that fact, he said that he did not believe that the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
Q Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately?
Q 1940?
Q What was your estimation in the Naval Command as to risk of losses? loss of the fleet and that if the operations were to be carried out according to plan he would have to anticipate the less of about 30 per cent of the forces used.
Q And how much was lost? the beginning in spite of everything, in favor of that operation?
A No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to occupy that country. have recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for glory and conquest. What do you say about that?
A The desire for glory was not in Raeder's character. The plans for occupation which came from his desk bore the mark of daring, but also thorough planning, even to the most minute details. With the distance it was the German ports all the way to Narwik, it can be compared with the distance from Nurnberg to Madrid. And one does not use a Navy, just out of a desire for glory, to combat the entire British fleet. there was a compelling necessity to do so. Naval War Command? coning in continuously from the sources you have mentioned?
of the landings discernible or didn't you see the details an that?
Q Did Raeder -- excuse me; I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder put to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway? Germany had occupied Norway.
peace; and he suggested in several instances making peace with Norway.
He was in agreement in that respect with the German commander-in-chief in Norway, General Admiral Boehm. Terboven, who was steering political matters, was of a different opinion. his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Boehm and their assistants, especially Korvettenkapitaen Schreiber, on the other? conflicts which were fought out all the way up to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway out of consideration for France.
Q Admiral, you said, "out of consideration for France," Wasn't it possible to conclude the peace with France also, and what was Raeder's position in that regard?
Q And what did he say? to push these matters. He told Hitler when the Atlantic Coast was fortified he had pointed out to him that it would be better and more correct to conclude peace with France than to make sacrifices which would still be inadequate in the way of defense. And Hitler replied that he understood that but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace with France.
Q Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
Q Were you there? Were you present? were favorable?
Q Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
Q And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
Q According to your knowledge, did the Party or the Leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
disfavor through derogatory statements to Hitler. He took reports which were removed from their context and presented them fraudulently. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
Q Why was the Party against Raeder?
A That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe that essentially because first of all there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders, commanding officers, before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder to see that during their absence their relatives would not be impeded in their freedom of religion.
during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from the defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when we asked for it. There is no cross examination about it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q Then may I ask you what were the reasons why Raeder remained? promises concerning the integrity of the navy.
THE PRESIDENT: The power is on again now; so you can go at your ordinary speed.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, sir. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q The power is on again; we can go a little faster now. navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and to put party people in that ministry. we did not see a strengthening in that possibility, but a weakening of our force. Then there was a vacuum during that period, the period following, with reference to successes, because of illness and losses. reasons of responsibility and patriotism.
Q Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in office?
A Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. Once I w* ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
Q When was that? his point of view, and asked me to persuade Raeder to stay. Furthermore, he confidence in the navy, and enjoyed the confidence of the navy. All of the senior officers of the navy asked me orally and in writing to try to influence Raeder in that direction, that he should not leave his office before the time. Since 1928 he had led the navy through all its political crises. beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
plans?
A No; about political plans, not in that sense, but that which considers politics. But he had tried once more to bridge the political discrepancies with Raeder. He told me one could not weigh every one of his words.
Everyone that left him was always in the right. He came with protocols and witnesses; but his main interest was to incite his listeners to higher efficiency, but not to commit himself to individual words. technical questions of the navy.
Q You just said "not to weigh each individual word". Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down correctly; that is, by stenographers? Hitler protested against being tied down word for word, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He freed himself from his text; he thought out loud, and he wanted to carry his listeners away. But he did not want to be tied down to individual words.
I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We knew at all times what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted. come about later that in the letter part of the war his speeches were taken down by stenographers?
A I told you already that so many misunderstandings occurred. And Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they introduced the written record. The minutes kept, up to then, were personalimpressions, based on the initiative of the individual who wrote them.
THE PRESIDENT: What time is he speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of? BY DR. SIEMER:
by the stenographers?
A Since 1942, I believe. It may also be 1941.
Q Since 1942?
A It may also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
Q And your conversation with Hitler was in January, 1939?
Q Admiral, how did the stenographic minutes look later? Did you see them? compare them with the prepared text. Even there, there were contradictions. I have shown to you the directive No. 21, concerning the "Case Barbarossa".
DR. Siemers: Mr. President, that is document 446-PS, US 31, Document Book of the British Prosecution 10-a, Page 247. BY DR. Siemers: leadership or the command of the navy -- had contributed to the draft of that directive; is that correct?
A No, that is not correct. The navy had nothing to do with that draft.
Q Did Raeder before that time have any knowledge of Hitler's plans of an aggression against Russia, before he received that directive? middle of October, 1940. Russia? If so, what was Raeder's attitude concerning these conferences? too serious to be treated superficially. Raeder opposed most energitically a war against Russia, for, I should like to say in fact, moral reasons, because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact or treaty with Russia could not be broken unless the other side gave cause for it.
That, asfar asRaeder knew, had not been the case in October. That economic treaty -- that is what we called it at that time -- to our knowledge was at the expense of the navy, about 90 per cent of it.
We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery, heavy guns for battleships, fire direction, installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, optical instruments for use on submarines. And Raeder was also of the upinion that the furore of operations should not be carried into the Baltic Sea.
The Baltic Sea was our back yard, I should like to say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea.
A He had deprived the Baltic coast in part of batteries and per-
sonnel already in order to have protection for the Norwegian and the French coast. He disposed of very small oil reserves; the synthetic production of oil was not yet completed and the Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder had opposed seriously any plans of war against Russia. opposed the war against Russia concerning the date, and we have to look at the War Diary if we have information as to the date, is thatcorrect?
A No, that is not correct. After that Directive 21, called Barbarossa, was received, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the scheme against Russia; and he had also put down his thoughts in a memorandu. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: After Poland had been crushed, after France had been occupied, and after, for political reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question, he had expressed clearly that now the time had arrived where the further conduct of the war would not be decided on the Continent but on the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him this: To concentrate all forces at his disposal in the direction of one target and to try to bit the strategic centers of gravity of the Empire, especially supply lines of the British Empire, so that England would, under any circumstances, get ready for peace negotiations if possible. He suggested, as has been noticed before, that politics be used to conclude peace with Norway, peace with France, and closer cooperation with the Russian Navy, such as the basis of the economic treaty, the repurchase of submarine equipment and submarines. He has said in one word that the possibility to make the decision was no more on our side because we did not dispose of the necessary sea power and that, in view of the long duration of the war, danger of participation of the United States should also be considered that, therefore, the war would not be decided on the European continent and could certainly not be won in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office. you have expressed it, for moral reasons, reason of international law.
A Yes.
Q Why didn't that get into the War Diary whereasthe other reasons that you have mentioned could be found in the War Diary, at least they are hinted at?
A That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval WarCommand or combat commanders, never criticized the political leadership. Therefore, he did not, excepting to me, speak about the conversations which he had with Hitler except when it was necessary for the military conduct of the war. Directive 21 that you have in front of you? Do you remember that?
Q At any rate, certainly after the directive?
Q Raeder acted on the basis of that, didn't he? precautionary strategic measure? can be seen from Points 4 and 5.
Q In what way? from commanding generals, and after that Raeder reported to Hitler, after he had received the directive. in accord with your opinion?
A Yes, of course, evidently. The word "precautionary measures" is even underlined.
Q Precautionary measures for what? Was it neutrality or -should point to that sentence where it says just what are theprecautionary measures.
A "In case Russia should change her attitude, she is - - -"
THE PRESIDENT: He doesn't need to read the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. BY DR. SIEMERS: in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?
A Yes. At that time, after that report, he came back and said: "I believe that I gout that out of his head." At first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences on that; to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.
Q May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I willhave shown to you, on the 18th of March, 1941, a report was made by Raeder to Hitler in which he asked to occupy the whole of Greece. What were the thoughts that caused the high command, that is Raeder and you, to make that suggestion? the War Diary, that Greece should be occupied even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been in possession of the document for three months, which was concerned with the occupation of Greece.
Q Excuse me. Was that Directive No. 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is 1541 PS; GB-13; in the Document Book of the British prosecution 10A, page 270, Directive 20, Enterprise Marita.
BY DR, SIEMERS: again in the month of march; that is to say on the 18th of March? strategic reasons?
A Yes, indeed. A menace to the occupation from the sea or from the air and the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or a menace from the air against the oil fields, had to remain excluded under all circumstances. May I remind you of the Saloniki enterprise in the First World War? That was a similar situation. quest and glory. Is that correct? don't see what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship there. Raeder, for the strategic reasons which I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction. We occupied Greece? circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff, We knew that Greek merchantmen put out for England and, therefore, we thought we were obliged to consider the Greek merchantmen which went into the combat zones to England as enemy ships. And in the beginning of 1940 or maybe the middle of 1940 we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece; that is to say, to establish a Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn at this time.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)
(The hearing reconvened at 1400 hours, 22 May 1946.) BY DR. SIEMERS: like to submit to you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document No. UK 45, equal to USSR 113. This Document concerns itself with the memorandum of the S.K.L. of the 29th of September, 1941, addressed to Group North under General Admiral Karle. Under "11" it is stated:
"At the outcome of the conversation between Admiral Fricks and Hitler, it is reported that the Fuehrer has decided to rape the City of St. Petersburg fro the ground." and also that the S.K.L.transmitted this document, I should like to ask you, admiral, did you know of this memorandum in the year 1941?
I beg your pardon. Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment.I'm sorry to say, I had no photostat copy of this document. I tried to secure this copy. I have just received the copy and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point.
A This is the original which I have before me? it was reproduced for our own use exactly like the original.
Did you know this piece of writing in the year 1941?
A I did not. I am seeing this document for the first time at this Moment; I did not know it in 1941. was sent off, even though you, yourself, had not Seen it?
A That must have been a wonder if it actually did take place. This piece of writing and the pieces of writing which were submitted to admiral Raider all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either "The Commander-inChief has knowledge of this," or it was initialled by me personally; or this piece of writing contained the notation "this decree or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief", and again my initials were contained they on, if that was the case.
This copy which you have just submitted to me now, I never saw it before; I do not know it; and I consider it completely impossible that Grand Admiral Raeder had ever seen this piece of writing because on the 29th of September, 1941, I was in Berlin. Navy? gentlemen of the S.K.L. reported on the intentions of the army and on that occasion the future of Leningrad was dealt with -- not Petersburg, Leningrad. The Raeder mentioned his wish that an operation would be taken into consideration that at all costs Leningrad should fall undamged into our hands, if possible, so as to enable us to build up shipyards and docks there for his Navy; and he also wanted that the army would be informed of his wish and that his wish was urgent; because of the imminent threat of an attack by air, that part of the dock capacity should be transferred to the east. far as possible, according to Raeder's wish. And he emphasized specifically that therefore, this city was to remain undamaged as far as possible; otherwise, he would have no space for his workers. And that is all I can tell you about the case of Leningrad. who said it was not possible to spare the docks? as far as I know, came about very quickly.
Q did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document? cuss this with anyone at 11.